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In recent years, and particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, 
European states have found it increasingly difficult to maintain breadth and scale in 
the military capabilities available to their armed forces. Cooperative initiatives such 
as the pooling, sharing and specialisation of roles and capabilities provide a way for 
states to retain access to military capabilities while funding them more efficiently. Yet 
while efficiencies can be considerable, such forms of cooperation also entail a 
degree of mutual dependence and a curtailment of autonomy. Mutual dependence 
can lead to the risk of entrapment by a partner into detrimental circumstances 
otherwise avoided, or even abandonment leading to an inability to act. Recent 
initiatives demonstrate, however, that European states are prepared to 
countenance mutual dependencies with each other, from industrial design and 
production through to frontline operations. How, then, do these states realise greater 
efficiencies through mutual dependence while creating sufficient confidence to 
mitigate the apparent risks of entrapment and abandonment? 
  
To provide a generalised answer to this question requires a theoretical perspective. 
Yet the specialisation and sharing of military capabilities in pursuit of greater 
efficiency does not fit comfortably with extant international relations theories, 
particularly the tradition of realism, which emphasises state sovereignty in an 
anarchic international system. Neorealism, the dominant school of realist thought, 
assumes that such conditions rule out specialisation in security matters, and push 
states towards self-help instead. Defence cooperation ought thus to be concerned 
with the effective aggregation of forces rather than mutualisation for efficiency. This 
thesis claims, however, that mutualisation of military capability in pursuit of greater 
efficiency deserves recognition as a distinct phenomenon in international relations. It 
is argued that by expanding the purview of neorealism to include more localised 
'process' or 'relationship' variables other than system structure alone, it is possible to 
construct a model that can explain variance in the occurrence and form of military 
capability mutualisation.  
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The theoretical model posits that military capability mutualisation occurs at various 
temporal and functional distances from the frontline of operations and, where 
concrete interests are highly aligned, even on the frontline itself. Hypotheses from 
the model are thus tested against several capability mutualisation initiatives under 
three contemporary bilateral frameworks: the Franco-British ‘Lancaster House’ 
Treaties of 2010, the BENELUX Declaration of 2012 and the German-Netherlands 
Declaration of 2013. It is shown that while the systemic factors at the heart of 
neorealist theory remain formidable barriers to capability mutualisation, in certain 
configurations they can in fact encourage its occurrence and help to underpin mutual 
confidence in the reliability of a partner and the minimisation of risks of entrapment 
and abandonment. The theory thus offers both a partial explanation for the 
phenomenon of capability mutualisation in contemporary Europe as well as a 
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Prologue: a future scenario 
 
A civilian airliner is believed to have been hijacked over the North Sea. Despite 
attempts at communication with the aircraft, there is no response. The intention of 
those in control of the ‘renegade’ plane is unknown. The airliner is, however, losing 
altitude and approaching Belgian airspace potentially on a flight path to Brussels. 
With a major NATO operation underway to defeat terrorist insurgents in North Africa, 
it is feared that the city or the nearby NATO headquarters may be a target. A week 
ago, the Royal Netherlands Air Force took over from the Belgian Air Component on a 
four-month rotation to defend the airspace of the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. As the plane approaches Belgian airspace, a Dutch pilot is scrambled 
and told to await orders to shoot down the aircraft. Under the terms of the Benelux 
air policing agreement, however, an order to fire will come not from the pilot’s 
superiors in the Netherlands, but from the Belgian Defence Minister. The most 
profound security responsibilities of the Belgian state now rest with a foreign national 
in a foreign fighter jet. 
 
As part of the operation in North Africa, French armed forces are involved in a 
sustained air campaign involving targets on land and sea. An advanced Franco-
British missile is proving highly effective and winning plaudits from American 
commanders, but war-stocks are running low. France and the UK have specialised 
aspects of the development and production of the missile, meaning that vital 
components are designed and built in the UK as well as France. While French 
support for the operation is strong, opinion in the UK has taken an isolationist turn 
and is sceptical; many parliamentarians now believe that constant air strikes are only 
fanning the flames of domestic terrorism. Elements of the British media are also 
pursuing an anti-French campaign over a separate trade dispute, and the 
relationship between the President and Prime Minister is strained. Despite difficult 
relations, however, production of the crucial components is stepped up in the UK and 
more missiles are supplied to French forces. 
 
At The Hague, high-level discussions have begun between Germany and the 
Netherlands. Germany has publicly supported the NATO mission from the outset but 
has not yet made any significant military contribution. In Washington, there is 
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mounting discontent with Germany’s apparent lack of commitment, and German 
diplomats are concerned that they must respond accordingly. They want to offer 
experienced military planners to direct the NATO operation at the corps level, and 
are being encouraged by the US military to do so. German capability in this field is, 
however, shared with the Netherlands in the form of the 1st German-Netherlands 
Corps HQ. The Dutch Government is, however, also supportive of the mission and is 










The tale outlined in the prologue to this thesis is a fictional one. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation it describes and the political positions of the 
states relating to it are entirely imaginary. Yet it is not a wholly unlikely scenario. 
Indeed, the military capability arrangements that underpin the narrative are not 
fictional at all. As will be seen, they are just three examples of an increasing number 
of such arrangements between European states1. Mutual reliance on others for 
specific military capabilities is, however, a controversial matter. It touches on highly 
sensitive questions of state sovereignty and military autonomy. Such arrangements 
rest on the absolute commitment of each party to the other; abandonment could lead 
to serious military, political and human consequences. As will be seen over the 
following chapters, decision-makers claim to be confident that the cases of mutual 
dependence considered by this thesis are robust and reliable. Yet reliance on 
another always implies some degree of risk that the partner will not reciprocate their 
side of the bargain, or that they will drag the other into a situation otherwise avoided. 
Such dilemmas could, however, be avoided altogether by retaining fully autonomous 
capabilities. Why is it then that European states have forgone their autonomy and 
willingly put themselves into a condition of mutual dependence for the generation 
and deployment of some of their most vital military capabilities?  
 
This central puzzle can be broken down into two further questions: Why is it that 
European states have sought out such arrangements at all, i.e., what is it that 
precipitates a search for mutually dependent capabilities? And, accepting an 
apparent need for such cooperation, what is it that gives the partners confidence in 
their mutual support for each other? Recent scholarship and policy analyses have 
touched on both dimensions of this problem, but have not gone into great depth on 
the specific question of mutual dependence for military capabilities. Important 
empirical cases remain largely un-investigated. And, although some academic 
research touches on aspects of the phenomenon, there is no theoretical explanation 
                                                     
1 See Table 1.1 below. For the purposes of this thesis and the case studies below, ‘Europe’ will refer to European NATO and/or 
EU member states. 
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dedicated to explaining the general phenomenon of mutual dependence for military 
capabilities in contemporary Europe. Indeed, the subject matter seems to pose a 
distinct challenge to the rationalist strain of international relations theory, of which 
neorealism is perhaps the most widely-practiced. A theory that regards sovereignty 
and the primacy of security as integral to the very notion of statehood appears to 
struggle with forms of military cooperation that push at the boundaries of these 
concepts. Thus, this thesis sets out to tackle both an empirical puzzle and a 
theoretical challenge. Why, albeit to thus far relatively small degrees, are European 
states mutualising their militaries? And can an established theory of international 
politics offer a plausible explanation? 
 
This introductory chapter will first consider the current literature on the two aspects of 
the puzzle outlined above: ‘Why at all?’ and ‘How possible?’ It will consider literature 
that has sought to explain and engage directly with the issues raised by mutual 
dependence for military capabilities, and it will consider that which deals with a 
similar but more general problem in international politics, i.e., the factors that give 
states sufficient confidence in each other to enter deep forms of cooperation. Finally, 
the chapter will briefly set out the theory and model that will be deployed, the 
hypotheses that will be extracted from the model, and the overall structure that the 
thesis will take.  
 
i. Military capability, efficiency and mutual dependence 
 
The affordability crisis in European military capability 
 
Regarding the first dimension of the puzzle, i.e., why European states are seeking 
out mutual dependence at all, there is a strong consensus among scholars and 
analysts that the primary motivation is to extract greater efficiency from scarce 
resources (Válašek, 2011; Faleg; Giovanni, 2012; Jones, 2011; Mölling and Brune, 
2011). That is not to say that efficiency is the exclusive motivation behind every case 
that involves mutual dependence for military capabilities. Indeed, defence 
cooperation initiatives, including those with elements of mutual dependence, can be 
used as diplomatic tools to deepen engagement with allies or to show a domestic 
audience that a government has friends and influence in the world; partial 
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explanations such as these may arise over the following case study chapters. It will 
be shown, however, that there is considerable evidence to concur with the prevailing 
view that efficiency is the primary motivation in most cases. What then explains this 
search for greater efficiency from the resources that European states commit to their 
military capabilities?  
 
This is a complex question with explanations at both the domestic and international 
level. The economic historian Alan Milward argued that states, even when at war, 
resource their defence spending according to a ‘strategic synthesis’ of domestic and 
international factors (Milward, 1979: 20; Freidburg, 1992). In times of relative peace, 
governments may face demands from their electorates to increase spending in areas 
such as healthcare, education and pensions, and defence may be relegated as a 
political priority. International factors will always play a role, however, not only in 
terms of the rise and fall of apparent external threats, but also in terms of the degree 
and nature of protection afforded by alignments and alliances with others. This last 
factor may create a permissive condition that shapes the level of defence spending 
and may encourage ‘free-riding’ (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Russet, 1970). 
Regarding European NATO states, scholars and analysts have noted two crucial 
trends, which have been observable for several decades.  
 
On the one hand, there is a long-term tendency towards above-inflation increases in 
the cost of military capabilities (Kirkpatrick, 2008, 2010; Hartley, 2015; Augustine, 
2015). It has been estimated that, 
 
‘the unit cost of [military] equipment increases from one generation to the next by a 
factor of between three and ten (with a few exceptional classes outside this trend), 
equivalent to a trend of 5-10% per year’ (Kirkpatrick, 2008: 70).  
 
By way of example, it is estimated that the UK defence budget would need to grow 
around 3% a year in real terms above the underlying rate of inflation in the economy 
to maintain capabilities at broadly the same level (Kirkpatrick, 2008: 71); such a rate 
would amount to an unprecedented level of sustained annual growth in peacetime. 
Indeed, the British Government recently committed to an annual real-terms uplift of 
0.5% in the defence budget (Elgot, 2017). The ever-increasing cost of capabilities is 
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driven primarily by the pressure on states to seek to maintain a competitive 
technological edge over their rivals (Kirkpatrick, 2004: 260-261; UK MOD, 2008: 23). 
And the challenge of keeping up with US technological innovation, particularly since 
the so-called ‘revolution in military affairs’ has further exacerbated the pressure on 
European states (Dyson, 2010; Futter, 2015). An additional inflationary challenge is 
the tendency for personnel costs to increase above underlying rates. This is 
particularly acute for those states that require highly-trained military professionals to 
perform complex tasks with advanced equipment (Alexander and Garden, 2001: 
515). 
 
On the other hand, there is also a tendency towards flat-in-real-terms defence 
budgets (Alexander and Garden, 2001: 510). In the post-Cold War period, and even 
before, European states have preferred to use the proceeds of economic growth to 
fund domestic priorities, a choice reflected in the widespread decline of defence 
spending as a share of GDP among European NATO states2 (Alexander and 
Garden, 2001: 518). This combination of flat budgets and long-term inflationary 
trends in the cost of military capability serves to significantly reduce the purchasing 
power of national defence ministries over time. The problem is a long-standing one, 
and is not confined to Europe. In the late 1970s, Norman Augustine extrapolated 
from trends in capability cost inflation and the US defence budget that, ‘In the year 
2054, the entire defence budget will buy just one tactical aircraft.’ In 2015, Augustine 
noted that his prediction was still ‘right on track’ (2015: 3). 
 
Accordingly, European states have tended to deal with such pressures by 
periodically ‘salami slicing’ numbers of personnel, aircraft, ships, tanks and so forth 
(Kirkpatrick, 2010: 57). This has allowed them to reduce costs while retaining the 
breadth of capabilities that they require to maintain their own defence obligations and 
contribute to operations alongside their allies. The problem, however, as Augustine 
has shown, is that assuming trends remain broadly the same, this cannot be a 
sustainable approach. Indeed, while such socio-economic and technological trends 
have been evident since the end of the Second World War (Alexander; Garden, 
2001: 513), in more recent years it has been suggested that an inevitable crunch 
                                                     
2 See tables in chapters four to six. 
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point is approaching for European military capabilities. In a 2001 article called ‘The 
arithmetic of defence policy’, Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden, two former 
senior British officers, argued that, 
 
‘At some point in the next several years the UK, as well as Europe as a whole, risks 
passing a critical point beyond which the maintenance of a military capability for 
anything other than the most local defence requirements will become impossible.’ 
(2001: 513) 
 
As will be seen in the following case studies, the 2008 financial crisis and its fiscal 
impact in several European states appeared to bring forward the ‘critical point’ that 
Alexander and Garden had predicted. The dire financial straits in many states called 
into question the ‘salami slicing’ approach and threatened the viability of entire 
military capabilities. Indeed, the Dutch army was forced to give up its tanks, and the 
UK took the decision to forego carrier strike and maritime patrol capabilities for a 
decade (Steinglass, 2011; UK Government, 2010b: 5, 27). As will be seen in 
following case study chapters, this threat to the viability of discrete military 
capabilities became particularly acute in several European states, and began to 
undermine their foreign policy goals, particularly that of maintaining their reputation 
with the United States for credible military deployments. The depth of the challenge 
of sustaining military capabilities, given both its long-term roots and the more 
immediate trigger of the financial crisis, led to advice and policy responses from 
think-tanks and institutions, creating an important body of ‘grey literature’ on the 
subject of deep defence cooperation (Válašek , 2011; Faleg; Giovanni, 2012; Mölling 
et al 2011, 2012). For example, in Surviving Austerity, an influential think-tank paper 
published in 2011 by the London-based Centre for European Reform, Tomáš 
Válašek argued that closer European defence cooperation would be vital to improve 
efficiency to maintain capabilities (2011). And, at the international level, the EU’s so-
called ‘Ghent Initiative’ of 2010 pledged a new focus on ‘pooling and sharing’ military 
capabilities, and NATO launched its ‘Smart Defence’ initiative in 2011 with a similar 
agenda (Council of the European Union, 2010; NATO, 2011).  
 
The most significant responses came, however, in the form of bilateral or small 
groups of states, forming what have been termed ‘islands’ or ‘clusters’ of capability 
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with little or no formal institutional relationship with NATO or the European Union 
(EU) (Válašek, 2011: 29, 39). The UK, for example, which was to make deep cuts in 
defence following the financial crisis, suggested in a Green Paper in 2008 that its 
armed forces should look to greater ‘international partnership’, including 
specialisation and sharing with others to sustain military capabilities (UK MOD, 2008: 
32). Most significantly, and as will be explored in the three case study chapters that 
make up the empirical body of research in this thesis, existing bilateral defence 
cooperation partnerships were rejuvenated and extended to new areas (see Table 
1.1 below). 
 
First, in 2010, the UK and France launched the ‘Lancaster House’ treaties, creating a 
new framework for defence and security cooperation and launching concrete 
initiatives of unprecedented depth, including elements of mutual dependence in 
areas including nuclear weapons and missiles (UK Government, 2010a). Secondly, 
in 2012, the BENELUX countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
deepened their longstanding cooperation arrangements (Belgian Government, 2012) 
3. Finally, in 2013, the Netherlands and Germany also took steps to deepen a pre-
existing relationship, focussing particularly on cooperation between their armies 
(Netherlands Government, 2013). Other similar initiatives were also launched 
between other European states in the same period, including the deepening of 
cooperation between Scandinavian states through the Nordic Defence Cooperation 
initiative (NORDEFCO), and the ‘Visegrad’ cooperation among Eastern European 
states (Nemeth, 2017). These broad bilateral agreements are made at the political 
level, but also provide an ongoing framework for concrete capability cooperation 








                                                     




Agreement Year Key capability initiatives  
 
NORDEFCO 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden  
2009 Joint combined logistics; common contracting; maritime 
counter-measures (MCM) vessels; airspace surveillance 
(NORDEFCO, 2011) 
Franco-British Lancaster House Treaties  
 
2010 Nuclear weapons testing and verification; centres of 
excellence in missile production (UK Government 2010a) 
EU Ghent Initiative  
 
2010 Maritime surveillance; air-to-air refuelling; medical field 
hospitals (EDA, 2011) 
BENELUX Declaration 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg 
2012 Common acquisition of frigates/MCM vessels; joint air space 
patrols (Belgian Government, 2012) 
NATO Smart Defence  
 
2013 Pooling maritime patrol; medical treatment; aviation training 
(NATO, 2014) 
Germany-Netherlands Declaration  
 
2013 Integration of Dutch air mobile brigade; tank company into 
German divisions (Netherlands Government, 2013) 
Visegrad Joint Statement/Long-Term Vision 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
2013/14 Training, exercises, joint procurement, joint air policing 
(Visegrad, 2014) 
Table 1.1. Post-financial crisis defence cooperation agreements 
 
Though the immediate pressure of the financial crisis raised the profile of defence 
cooperation among decision-makers and policy analysts, the idea of creating mutual 
dependencies to deliver greater efficiencies is not a new one. The challenge of 
maintaining an indigenous defence aerospace industrial capacity, for example, 
precipitated a limited element of industrial mutual dependence as early as the 1960s, 
with Anglo-French collaboration in fast jets and helicopters (Hussain, 1989: 129). 
And since the 1970s, the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain have embraced deeper 
industrial specialisation in the production of their principal fighter jets, the Tornado 
and Typhoon; and a wider grouping has pursued a similar approach to develop and 
acquire the A400M transport aircraft. Capability sharing has also been undertaken in 
the unique, longstanding NATO AWACS programme, where the aircraft and their 
support services are owned by NATO and staffed by multinational crews (NATO, 
2017a)4. The increasingly challenging environment for the sustainment of military 
capabilities in the 2000s brought, however, a new focus to the possibilities of 
defence cooperation for efficiency, and led to the development of new initiatives and 
the enhancement of existing cooperation.  
 
 
                                                     
4 The ‘NATO E3A Early Warning and Control Force’ is a fully integrated NATO-owned and multi-nationally-crewed capability. It 
operates the Boeing E3 Sentry Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS). 
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Mutual dependence for efficiency: how possible? 
 
While it can be argued that there is a broad consensus as to the initial ‘trigger’ for 
seeking mutual dependence, i.e., that of extracting greater efficiency from limited 
resources, the second element of the puzzle must now be addressed. How is it 
possible to act on that need for efficiency? The very fact that states can act on this 
need for efficiency by embracing mutual dependence, to whatever limited degree 
they do, is not a straightforward assumption. As noted, theoretical perspectives on 
international politics, particularly that of the neorealist school, would tend to expect 
states to prioritise autonomy over mutual dependence. There are, however, three 
strands of literature that have, directly or indirectly, made contributions to 
understanding the puzzle. The first is that body of ‘grey literature’ referred to above, 
i.e., that produced by organisations outside of academia, such as think tanks, 
governments, industry and so on. It is predominately this literature that has sought to 
attempt to define, categorise and understand the phenomenon of mutual 
dependence for military capabilities and its potential scope for the future. Secondly, 
there is an emerging body of academic work that deals directly with the post-financial 
crisis defence cooperation initiatives referred to above. And finally, there is a broader 
literature in the field of international relations on the question of security cooperation 
between states, intra-alliance dynamics and so forth.  
 
i. Pooling, sharing and specialisation - the ‘grey literature’  
 
Policy analysts tend to classify defence cooperation for efficiency into three broad 
types: pooling, sharing and specialisation. Generally, these terms relate to specific 
military capabilities, although when defining specialisation analysts and decision-
makers tend to talk of ‘role’ or ‘task’ specialisation, though in practice this is likely to 
mean a discrete military capability (Maulny and Liberti, 2008; Diesen, 2013: 68; 
Zandee et al, 2016). The first form of cooperation identified is that of the pooling of 
military capability. The European Air Transport Command (EATC) provides a helpful 
illustrative example (EATC, 2017). Under the EATC, member states pool both their 
aircraft and the individual tasks they want those aircraft to perform, for example, to 
take supplies to an operation in Afghanistan. In other words, tasks are allocated to 
different national air forces as if there were a single fleet of aircraft. As it avoids 
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duplication of effort, this is far more efficient than each state using its own aircraft for 
every single task required, particularly when several states are contributing to an 
operation in the same geographical area. There is little mutual dependence in this 
example, however, because the aircraft remain under national ownership and, strictly 
speaking, ‘command’. As such, they can leave the pool to serve national 
contingencies whenever required (EATC, 2017: 1).  
 
Thus, pooling may provide some efficiency gains in the use of military capabilities. It 
is, however, through specialisation and sharing that the greatest efficiencies may be 
available. This is because under these forms of cooperation, it is no longer 
necessary to fund whole capabilities or expensive aspects of them. It is also in these 
forms of cooperation that there will be considerable mutual dependence, thus 
reflecting the second dimension of the puzzle outlined above. How is it possible for 
states to have sufficient confidence in each other to create mutual dependencies 
through the specialisation and sharing of military capabilities?  
 
The potential for specialisation among European NATO armed forces has a long 
history, yet little of substance has ever materialised (Liska, 1962: 122; Heise, 2005). 
Indeed, analysts of contemporary defence cooperation are sceptical that it presents 
a realistic option for European states to achieve greater efficiency, particularly in 
relation to whole capabilities or ‘roles’ (Válašek, 2011; Henius, 2012; Giegerich, 
2012; Diesen, 2013). In one sense, capability specialisation need not imply any great 
level of mutual dependence with others, nor need it be based on any formalised 
agreement with another party. It could, for example, simply mean that a state 
concentrates on some military capabilities and divests itself of others. The Czech 
armed forces, for example, provide one case of whole capability specialisation in 
NATO by maintaining a specialism in chemical, biological and nuclear substance 
disposal (Henius, 2012: 35). Yet this does not necessarily imply that there is 
significant mutual dependence within the alliance for Czech expertise, useful as it 
may be in certain circumstances. And in other areas states may simply end up with 
‘specialisation by default’ because budgetary pressures forced them to prioritise 
certain capabilities over others. Again, however, this implies no formal arrangement 
for mutual dependence (Henius, 2012: 38; Giegerich, 2012: 72). 
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Jakob Henius has addressed the possibility of capability specialisation as a 
deliberate policy choice in the context of NATO’s ‘Smart Defence’ initiative (2012). 
Noting that there is ‘no formal NATO definition of specialisation’, Henius highlights 
several significant barriers to its use. First, he argues that the inherent 
unpredictability of the future is a key obstacle, i.e., alliances are not for eternity 
(2012: 33). How, therefore, can a state know for sure which capabilities it will need to 
keep? Second, the maintenance of a broad spectrum of military capability ensures 
‘strategic flexibility’. Narrowing its scope through specialisation will constrain this 
flexibility whereas a breadth of capabilities means a state is more likely to be able to 
offer something of use to an alliance (2012: 31). Finally, while specialisation for a 
NATO ‘Article 5’ mutual defence scenario may be more acceptable due to a strong 
degree of solidarity within NATO, states also use the same capabilities for other 
missions, including those that are out of NATO’s area, in ad hoc coalitions, or on 
their own, a point also noted both by former Norwegian Chief of Defence, Sverre 
Diesen and Válašek (Henius, 2012: 34; Válašek, 2011: 20). Thus, they view these 
obstacles as practically insurmountable, with Diesen noting that ‘this kind of 
advanced role specialisation has not so far been seriously considered anywhere’ 
(2013, 62). 
 
Others concur with these assessments, but draw on language more familiar to 
international relations theory to do so. Válašek, for example, argues that while 
specialisation would promise to make significant savings it raises an ‘entrapment and 
abandonment’ dilemma for states, which he identifies as one of the most critical 
barriers to deeper and more efficient defence cooperation in Europe. Thus, he 
concludes that ‘deeper specialisation seems out of reach for the foreseeable future’ 
(2011: 20). Tom Dyson, considering the potential for the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) also draws on the concept of entrapment and abandonment, 
as developed by neorealist scholar Glenn Snyder in his ‘alliance security dilemma’ 
(1984). For Dyson, this dilemma remains the most critical challenge for European 
states seeking to build ‘common military capabilities’ (2010: 239; 2013: 421). And, for 
Bastian Giegerich, the entrapment and abandonment challenge is ultimately one of 
state sovereignty itself, 
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‘The core difficulty, however, relates to sovereignty. If nations specialise in some 
areas but withdraw from others, the accompanying increase in mutual dependency 
will give rise to fears of abandonment and entrapment.’ (73) 
Similarly, Marcin Terlikowski argues in relation to specialisation that, ‘States are 
invariably attached to the concept of retaining as much sovereignty in the defence 
and security domain as possible.’ (2010: 3) And this view reflects a wider position in 
literature on European defence cooperation that defence is ‘the first and last bastion 
of national sovereignty’ and even ‘sacrosanct’ (Howorth, 2011: 5; Dyson, 2012: 21). 
Despite this general scepticism, however, it has been noted that there may be some 
capability areas where specialisation might be more acceptable to states, and 
therefore more likely. Giegerich argues that, ‘Specialisation could more usefully 
focus on less sensitive, non-front-line areas such as education, training and logistics 
support’ (2012, 74). Similarly, Anke Richter and Natalie Webb argue that NATO 
could use a division of labour approach, with some states opting to specialise in 
support services, which carry less risk, while others would retain frontline capabilities 
(2014: 354). Such an approach would seem, however, to come up against some of 
the fundamental politico-military issues raised by Henius; even the smallest of 
European states prefer the flexibility of a balanced force, and that means access to 
frontline capabilities. The notion that function may reduce fears of entrapment and 
abandonment is, however, an important one, and will provide a critical analytical 
component of this thesis. 
Giergerich also speculates that specialisation may be more likely where mutual 
dependence is formally agreed between states across specialised capabilities, 
leading to greater confidence of ‘assured access’ (2012: 71). To take a fictional 
example, state A would commit to provide infantry, and in return state B would 
provide heavy armour, around which both would build a joint military formation. To 
the best knowledge of the author, there is not yet an extant case wherein two states 
agree to specialise in discrete capabilities in this way and then fully rely on each 
other for them. Even with such agreements in place, whole capability specialisation 
would still be likely to infringe considerably on the flexibility of states and risk 
entrapment or abandonment by their partner. As will be seen, however, there are 
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now cases of cooperation where there is a form of specialisation in the integration of 
different kinds of forces at the division level. 
 
There is, for example, a form of capability specialisation in recent Dutch-German 
army cooperation initiatives. Dutch defence and security analyst Dick Zandee has 
described such cooperation as ‘modular integration’, whereby the Netherlands 
provides its 11th Air Mobile Brigade to the German Division Schnelle Kräfte or Rapid 
Reaction Division, thus creating a capability in aggregate that neither state can 
provide alone. These forces are, however, extractable from the larger formation, 
significantly reducing mutual dependence (Interview 21: September 2014); it will be 
seen, however, that there is an element of mutual dependence in such an approach. 
This thesis will also consider a case of specialisation within and across closely-
related capabilities, which applies to Dutch-Belgian naval arrangements for 
maintenance and support to their frigates and destroyers. Pieter-Jan Parrein has 
written in some depth on these aspects of Belgian naval cooperation, and echoes 
the views of others outlined above that the focus on mutual dependence in support 
services allows for the maintenance of a higher degree of autonomy than if whole 
capabilities were specialised (2011a: 24).  
 
Finally, the sharing of a discrete capability, or aspects of the development of a 
capability, implies a similarly high level of mutual dependence. Although sharing of 
frontline capability remains uncommon, the NATO AWACS initiative provides the 
most high-profile example (Diesen, 2013: 62; Alexander and Garden, 2001: 521). As 
with Giegerich’s suggestion that support services may be more easily specialised, 
Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden suggested that the most expensive air 
assets might be shared in the manner of the NATO AWACS, and thus functions at 
some distance from the frontline shared (2001: 524), Citing the NORDEFCO defence 
cooperation initiative between Scandinavian states, Diesen has also argued that 
capability sharing may also be more likely in this aspect of capability development as 
an example of ‘joint force generation’. He argues that states can aspire to retain a 
broad spectrum of military capabilities at the national level, but then create common 
defence industrial and support services, such as training and logistics, upon which 
they could all draw (2013: 64). Thus, any risk of entrapment and abandonment would 
be lessened because states would not necessarily have to deploy to the frontline on 
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every occasion with their partners. As will be seen, however, there are also cases of 
shared capabilities close to or ‘on the frontline’, notably in the form of the two 
examples in the prologue above, that of Dutch-Belgian cooperation over air defence, 
and that of the 1 Germany-Netherlands Corps Headquarters. 
 
Other than the factor of function in relation to specialisation and sharing, the work 
considered above does not attempt to consider other variables that would make 
mutual dependence for capabilities more likely. Válašek is something of an exception 
here, as he lists the ‘characteristics’ common to such initiatives; for him, the most 
important is ‘similarity of strategic culture’, followed by ‘trust and solidarity’, ‘forces of 
similar size and quality’, ‘a level playing field for defence’, ‘clarity of intentions’, 
‘seriousness of intent’ and ‘low corruption’ (2011: 21-27). As with the other authors 
considered above, however, he makes no attempt to put these insights into a 
coherent theoretical framework for explanation.   
 
Emerging literature on post-financial crisis European defence cooperation 
 
In addition to the grey literature identified above, academic work on those initiatives 
undertaken in the wake of the financial crisis is now beginning to emerge. Alice 
Pannier has written her PhD thesis on the Franco-British ‘Lancaster House’ treaty of 
2010, focussing on three areas: cooperation in the Libyan intervention of 2011, the 
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) and industrial cooperation on complex 
weapons (Pannier, 2016). Pannier’s focus is on the Franco-British initiatives as an 
example of ‘bilateral cooperation’ as a phenomenon, for which she draws on John 
Gerard Ruggie’s conceptualisation of bilateralism and the logic of cooperation within 
such a relationship (Ruggie, 1992). Pannier does not consider military capability 
mutualisation as a discrete phenomenon, nor is she able to from a comparative 
perspective, as neither the CJEF, nor the Libyan operation provide examples of 
formalised mutual dependence for military capabilities. She does, however, make 
some important observations and conceptualisations that are highly relevant to 
mutual dependence for military capabilities. 
 
Pannier argues that the key challenges for bilateral defence cooperation are 
incongruity, i.e., a divergence in interests between partners; that of astructuration, 
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i.e., the lack of established institutional frameworks between partners; that of 
symmetrism, i.e., the need for balance or a constant ‘win-win’ outcome; and that of 
entanglement, i.e. the constraints of other pre-existing relationships and 
arrangements (2016: 85-96). As will be seen, there is some empirical and conceptual 
cross-over with this thesis, particularly as regards the incongruity of interests and the 
need for what Pannier calls symmetrism between states in terms of capability 
requirements. Yet the theoretical underpinning of Pannier’s thesis is that of 
cooperation or bilateralism as a phenomenon suis generis. As such, the issues are 
addressed in terms of a dyadic relationship with ‘entanglement’ in the form of third 
parties as a complicating factor. By contrast, and as will be seen, this thesis will 
argue that the very possibility for cooperation as deep as that of mutual dependence 
for military capabilities requires explanation in terms of the configuration of the 
international system itself, and particularly that of intra-alliance dynamics. This thesis 
will share, however, Pannier’s emphasis on the importance of the convergence or 
divergence of a set of variables. 
 
Bence Neméth has recently completed his PhD thesis comparing Franco-British, 
Nordic and Central European defence cooperation initiatives (2017). Nemeth asks 
why these initiatives took place outside of NATO and EU structures and were based 
instead on ‘regional’ groupings. He concludes that each case-study had a variety of 
contextual factors at play, including a history of cooperation, similar perceptions 
about the disadvantages of NATO/EU cooperation and the importance of a 
supportive political milieu and strong domestic leadership. Neméth does not, 
however, focus on the puzzle raised by this thesis as to why and how European 
states have moved to restrict their autonomy in favour of mutual dependence for 
their military capabilities. Elsewhere, Tom Sauer has written on Belgian policies as a 
kind of avant-garde for European defence cooperation, focussing particularly on 
Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation. While he provides a thorough-going evaluation of 
elements of Belgian defence cooperation initiatives, his analysis lacks a theoretical 
approach, and does not consider in detail why it is that Belgium and the Netherlands 




Finally, Matthew Harries has written on the Franco-British nuclear weapons 
cooperation treaty of 2010 (Harries, 2012), which will be addressed in a following 
case study chapter. Again, Harries does not pursue a theoretical treatment of the 
issue, though some of his conclusions do echo those of analysts outlined above, 
suggesting that Franco-British nuclear weapons cooperation is likely to be most 
successful at functional distance from its frontline deployment, and is less likely the 
closer it gets to cooperation over operational deployment (2012: 22). Aside from 
these works, the empirical field remains under-studied; for example, to the author’s 
knowledge, there are no sustained investigations drawing on primary sources 
regarding the new Dutch-Belgian air defence arrangements, or on recent innovations 
in Dutch-German army cooperation. More importantly, however, no work has yet 
provided a systematic theoretical analysis of a wide variety of cases that can be 
generalised against the concept of capability mutualisation, and integrated into an 
existing theory of international politics. That is the goal of this thesis. 
 
Perspectives from international relations theory  
 
The grey literature considered above does not take a theoretical approach to 
explanation, but its emphasis on state sovereignty and dilemmas over ‘entrapment 
and abandonment’ demonstrates an implicit, and occasionally explicit, 
acknowledgement of neorealist theory. The chapter will return to a discussion and 
elaboration of neorealism and defence cooperation below. The broader proposition, 
however, that the alignment or convergence of certain factors might mitigate the 
collective action problems that beset the use of military capabilities, could be claimed 
by several theoretical perspectives, not only that of neorealism. Recent scholarship 
from various perspectives has considered aspects of similar questions in relation to 
the origins and prospects for the EU CSDP, and thus provides a useful parallel 
(Bickerton et al, 2011; Krotz and Maher, 2011). The following paragraphs briefly 
assess the contributions and perspectives that non-realist theoretical approaches 
might bring to the question of capability mutualisation.  
 
Described as the study of ‘the role of collective beliefs and ideas on which states rely 
in calculating how to realise their underlying goals’ (Legro and Moravscik, 1999: 11), 
in recent years epistemic theory or constructivism has taken on increasing 
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importance in analysis of European security. This literature emphasises the prospect 
of ‘ideational convergence’ through means such as elite socialisation and learning 
(Meyer and Strickmann, 2011: 64), and examines claims for the existence and role 
of a ‘European strategic culture’ (Meyer, 2005, 2006; Giegerich, 2006). Could such a 
shared strategic culture, across the EU or even between a smaller number of states, 
help to explain the variation in occurrence and form of capability mutualisation?  
 
These are undoubtedly important facets of empirical actuality to bear in mind for a 
full and rounded account of any concrete capability initiative, and as noted above, 
Válašek attaches high importance to alignments of strategic cultures as a pre-
requisite for defence cooperation (2011: 21). It may be that, for example, Belgium 
and the Netherlands are more likely to trust each other because they have similar 
strategic cultures. Yet if that is the case, it is not clear why mutual dependence is in 
fact quite variable across Dutch and Belgian capabilities, much of which remain 
partially or wholly autonomous for deployment. As will be seen, despite shared 
cultural outlooks, both states have their red lines as to the limits of capability 
mutualisation. A shared strategic outlook thus seems unlikely to provide sufficient 
confidence between partners to mutualise all their capabilities, and thus struggles to 
explain why they would do so in a few discrete areas. That said, it cannot be 
dismissed as a factor that might contribute to a more holistic explanation of any 
given example of mutual dependence, and will be recognised and assessed in the 
following case study chapters. 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a theoretical approach to international politics based 
on the idea that state preferences are formed through competition between domestic 
interest groups, and are then pursued and bargained at the international level with 
others (Moravscik, 1997: 518). While this approach has yet made relatively little 
contribution to the field of European defence cooperation (Krotz and Maher, 2011: 
571; Howorth, 2007: 202; Pohl, 2013), it may be that there are aspects of a concrete 
case of specialisation or sharing that relied on a strong sense of alignment of 
interests between domestic interest groups in the respective states, as indeed 
Neméth suggests (2017). Yet in terms of state policy being fundamentally 
determined by such means, as regards defence policy, preferences tend to be more 
fixed and there is an ‘absence of a clearly identifiable market of domestic interest 
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groups’ (Weiss, 2011: 191). Military capabilities, by their very nature, reflect a 
security environment that even liberals concede tends to militate against cooperation 
for ‘absolute gains’ for fear of others making ‘relative gains’ (Powell, 1991). The 
methodologically individualist foundations of liberalism also tend to rule out a strong 
role for systemic variables and international ‘conditions’ more broadly (Hyde-Price, 
2013: 403; Joseph, 2010: 53; Wight, 67: 2006). Thus, liberalism, conceived of as a 
contest of interests at the domestic or ‘unit level’, offers an angle on capability 
mutualisation, but it is hard to see how it can gain traction in terms of offering a 
generalised explanation for its form and occurrence. 
 
Finally, institutionalism, associated most prominently with Robert Keohane (1984) 
draws on economic theory to demonstrate how, through the provision of greater 
levels of information between states, institutions can reduce the ‘transaction costs’ 
associated with cooperation (Menon 2011, 96). Moritz Weiss has developed an 
explanation for the formation of the CSDP based on the claim that it was created to 
reduce transaction costs for EU member states when they required solutions to new 
security concerns that arose in the aftermath of the Cold War (Weiss, 2011). His 
argument is familiar to that relating to specialisation and sharing. i.e., cooperation 
can improve efficiency but may also lead to the risk of ‘opportunistic behaviour’ 
(Weiss, 2011: 192), which leads to fears of entrapment and abandonment and 
places a premium on the ‘credibility of the partners’ commitments’ (2011: 193). 
Alongside this problem of uncertainty, Weiss also identifies the notion of ‘asset 
specificity’ of capabilities. Where cooperation is over specific assets, efficiency gains 
will be high, but the risks of opportunism will also be high. Where asset specificity is 
more ‘general’, efficiencies will be lower, but the risk of opportunism will likewise be 
lower (2011: 193). Accordingly, Weiss’s analysis chimes with the trade-off between 
flexible forces and efficiency outlined in the grey literature. Given, however, that the 
capability mutualisation initiatives to be considered here occur outside of formal 
international security institutions it seems that ‘information’ is not necessarily the 
most decisive element of the phenomenon; or at least that a more systemic 
‘international politics’ theory may be able to get at those apparently significant issues 




Literature on mutual dependence for military capabilities – insights and oversights 
 
Academic literature on the phenomenon of mutual dependence between states via 
specialisation and sharing of military capabilities remains very slim. Most writing on 
the subject tends to come from the ‘grey literature’ of think-tank analysts and 
experts. As such, it lacks foundations in any of the schools of international relations 
theory. Nor does it attempt any systematic, social scientific explanation as to why the 
phenomenon is present and why it may vary in occurrence and form across different 
states. This literature does offer, however, some very important empirical insights, 
and it identifies the fundamental issues and challenges at the heart of mutually 
dependent military capabilities. As Henius argues, European states do not know for 
sure that they can rely on their allies forever. And they need to use their military 
capabilities across a wide range of commitments, thus they require ‘strategic 
flexibility’. Despite these challenges, however, the literature suggests that the 
function of a military capability might make it more likely for states to specialise or 
share capabilities because entrapment and abandonment risks are lessened by the 
distance from the ‘frontline’ at which the mutual dependence is created. Finally, 
Válašek lists various empirical ‘characteristics’ of these kinds of initiatives, and 
attaches particular importance to alignments of strategic culture, trust and similar 
size. As he concedes, however, these characteristics are not necessarily always 
present nor wholly consistent (2011: 21). 
 
By contrast, Pannier’s work on Franco-British defence cooperation is theoretically-
grounded and empirically rich. While not specifically aimed at the phenomenon of 
mutually dependent military capabilities, her thesis puts the alignment of interests 
and the symmetricity of cooperation arrangements at the heart of her explanation. 
Finally, as has been seen, other scholars working in established theoretical schools 
have attempted to explain the key variable or variables that might make collective 
military action among European states more likely, be it for reasons of culture, 
domestic interest groups or the effects of institutions. Doubtless, all these 
approaches have some insight into the kinds of initiatives outlined above, but they 
also lack what the author of this thesis regards as the essential ingredient of a causal 
explanation of any phenomenon in international politics, and that is the independent 
effects exerted at the system level, particularly those of structure and alignments in 
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the form of alliances. A system theory assumes that whether two or more states can 
cooperate in depth is related to their place in the system as much as to their own 
internal attributes. Or, to put it another way, while Belgium and the Netherlands are 
content to mutualise aspects of their military capabilities, would the Netherlands seek 
out mutual dependence with Russia for maintenance support services to its ships? 
Would the UK and China jointly develop an anti-ship missile? Both seem extremely 
unlikely. The pre-eminent theory of international politics in systemic terms is that of 
neorealism, and thus, it is to this theory that the thesis will turn for its explanation. 
 




It has been argued that the central puzzle of this thesis is captured in the following 
question: 
 
Why have European states forgone their autonomy and willingly put themselves into 
a condition of mutual dependence for the generation and deployment of some of 
their most vital military capabilities? 
 
This question can be broken down into two further sub-questions: 
 
Why is it that European states have sought out such arrangements at all, i.e., what is 
it that precipitates the search for mutually dependent capabilities?  
 
What is it that gives the partners confidence in their mutual support for each other? 
 
These research questions relate to the geographical region of Europe, specifically to 
NATO member states, and to a broadly contemporaneous historical period. One 
approach, then, would be to take the three case studies identified above and 
investigate them through a contemporary history approach, attempting to make 
empirical generalisations based on a comparison of narrative explanations for each 
case. A different, and arguably more fruitful approach, and the one this thesis will 
follow, is to develop and deploy a theory to attempt to explain these cases as 
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examples of a wider phenomenon that can be explained in general terms. Theory 
offers several advantages over historical narrative. First, it can provide a structured 
means by which to sift and select the myriad empirical data that may justifiably relate 
in some way to the research question, a process Max Weber described as ‘the 
thoughtful ordering of empirical actuality’ (Jackson, 2011: 22). This ordering comes 
at a cost, however, in that a parsimonious theory may ignore or downplay other 
explanations; it is thus necessary to take due care in applying the theory to empirical 
actuality and making claims for causation.  
 
Secondly, theory offers the possibility, if not to predict specific outcomes, then at 
least to justify general expectations of why a given phenomenon occurred and how it 
is likely to develop or even disappear, i.e., to make claims about the effects of 
continuity and change in the conditions envisaged by the theory. Finally, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, much of the empirical description of mutual 
dependence in the literature considered above is itself loaded with highly conceptual 
language, for example, that of ‘sovereignty’, ‘autonomy’, ‘mutual dependence’ and 
‘interests’. As Kenneth Waltz noted, fact and theory are interdependent, and this 
issue appears quite striking in the case of mutual dependence for military capabilities 
(Waltz, 1979: 12). Thus, even for a historical narrative, dealing with and making 
sense of highly conceptual language would seem an unavoidable task. 
 
Thus, there are two dimensions to the attempt to answer this question. One is to 
explain, at least in part, the origins of recent international agreements that create 
mutual dependence in military capabilities between states. The other is to provide 
the theoretical means to do so, which may also be generally relevant to cases not 
considered in the thesis, i.e., to other potential case studies in contemporary Europe, 
and to other regions and historical periods where similar phenomena may occur. An 
advantage of basing this theory on the neorealist school is that, as will be seen, 
neorealism is a system theory. As such, it explains the pressures or forces that 
shape a wide range of state behaviours and outcomes in international politics. It can 
provide a framework for a cluster of questions around the emergence of the 
phenomenon in contemporary Europe. The question as to why European states 
have sought out mutual dependence at all, i.e., why they seek efficiency in the 
generation and deployment of their military capabilities, can be explained in part as a 
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response to systemic factors. Likewise, the very possibility of mutual dependence 
between states, i.e., the reason as to why European states have sufficient 
confidence in their partners to forego the flexibility and security of autonomy, is also 
shaped by the systemic context for action.  
 
That said, a theory can only attempt to explain according to the logic of its own 
content. In the complexity of empirical reality, the different case studies are 
idiosyncratic; a ‘full’ causal explanation for these research questions would need to 
embrace a potentially infinite amount of data and an ungainly number of variables. 
The potential significance of variables outside the purview of the theory must, 
however, still be assessed. Thus, as will be explained in more detail in chapter three, 
while the theory will be tested as an explanation for the cases under consideration, it 
will be accepted that in causal terms, other factors play important roles. For example, 
while unit-level variables such as personalities and idiosyncratic domestic political 
cultures are not included in neorealist theory, their causal consequences may be 
considered as part of an analytical narrative. For this reason, the degree to which 
such variables might undermine or compliment the theory will be considered on an 
ad hoc basis through structured analytical narratives. 
 
The theoretical approach outlined above calls for the following procedure, which 
draws on Waltz’s conception of theory building and testing, as set out in his Theory 
of International Politics (Waltz, 1979: 13). First, it is necessary to carefully define the 
phenomenon at issue and develop a theoretical explanation for that phenomenon. 
Second, it is necessary to extract from the theory a model of behaviour and/or 
outcomes. Third, a set of hypotheses are derived from the model and tested against 
empirical actuality in various ways. These procedures are developed in more detail 
over the following two chapters, but will now be summarised below. 
 
A new definition and model of military capability mutualisation 
 
Accordingly, the thesis will seek to develop a new definition of one aspect of mutual 
dependence between states for specific military capabilities. As set out above, 
mutual dependence can, in principle, take place across completely separate 
capabilities. As noted above, Giegerich has raised the possibility of formal reciprocal 
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arrangements for this kind of ‘role specialisation’, i.e., for states to rely on each other 
for discrete capabilities performing discrete roles. It has been seen, however, that no 
such specialisation initiatives currently exist, perhaps due to the risks of entrapment 
and abandonment and restrictions on flexibility outlined above. For this reason, this 
thesis will disregard mutual dependence in terms of wholly separate ‘roles’ or ‘tasks’, 
and will focus instead on mutual dependence solely in relation to the concept of 
military capability. This has the advantage that in doing so it is possible to draw on 
an important and helpful conceptual understanding of the term as used by military 
practitioners; an approach apparently overlooked in academic literature on European 
defence cooperation.  
 
NATO states view military capability not only in terms of its ‘frontline’ use or ‘role’ in 
operations in terms of what personnel and their equipment can do, but also through 
the entire process of ‘lines of development’ from design, production, training, 
personnel and support through to actual deployment (UK MOD, 2014: 8). In 
conceptualising capability in this way, it is thus possible to consider mutual 
dependence between states at different points within a single capability development 
process. And indeed, this is how such cooperation is conceptualised by at least one 
of the European armed forces studied for this thesis (Interview 14, June 2014). In 
this way, it is possible for military capability to be understood as ‘mutualised’ 
between states, in one or several aspects of its development and deployment, and in 
principle, across all of them.  
 
Furthermore, this definition makes it possible for this thesis to introduce a novel 
conceptualisation, which is that of the ‘distance’ at which mutual dependence may 
take place from the frontline deployment of a capability. This distance can be 
measured in terms of temporality and functionality. Temporality acknowledges that 
mutual dependence in the design and production of capability may occur many 
years, even decades, before that capability is deployed on the frontline. 
Consequently, even where there is joint development and production of a fighter jet, 
for example, there need be no significant mutual dependence on the frontline, and 
considerable autonomy may be maintained. Depending on the aspect of the 
capability, this temporality may be closer or further from the frontline, i.e., 
mutualisation of the initial research and design of a fighter jet may be decades away 
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from the frontline, but the manufacture and supply of a missile may be much closer 
to the frontline of an operation. Functional distance refers to situations wherein the 
function of the capability itself, or an aspect within the development of a capability, 
for example maintenance of an aircraft or ship, means that states can keep their 
mutual dependence at a spatial distance from the ‘frontline’, and thus avoid 
embroilment and risk in the most sensitive aspects of an operation.  
 
Finally, and as will be seen, there may also be occasions when it is possible to 
conceive of mutualisation of capability on the frontline, and thus where temporal and 
functional distance may be low or even zero. In such cases, it is hypothesised, the 
concrete interests of states must necessarily be highly aligned. While function has 
been raised in the existing literature, the notion of there being a temporal dimension 
to capability mutualisation, and even the possibility for its occurrence at zero 
distance from the frontline have not been considered in these terms. Thus, the notion 
of distance of mutualisation from the frontline provides a hypothetical model for 
explaining why it is that states have sufficient confidence in each other to enter into 
mutual dependence for aspects of the generation and deployment of their military 
capabilities.   
 
Neorealist theoretical foundations 
 
The model above sets out how the variables of temporal and functional distance 
from the frontline can explain why states have sufficient confidence in each other to 
mutualise aspects of their capabilities. But what explanation lies behind this apparent 
possibility for mutualisation at various points in the development and deployment of 
military capability? As will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, the 
model is derived from a novel theoretical approach based on neorealist principles. It 
assumes the fundamental tenets of Kenneth Waltz’s original iteration of neorealism, 
wherein system structure exerts independent effects on states according to the 
distribution of power within a system and their position within it; and it assumes an 
anarchic international environment that tends towards balances of power and pushes 
states towards a logic of self-help for survival (Waltz, 1979). The theory developed in 
this thesis also borrows, however, important insights, both from Waltz and his fellow 
neorealist Glenn Snyder, into the logic of behaviour of states within a bipolar or 
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highly asymmetric alliance such as NATO. These insights relate respectively to 
explanations of mutualisation at temporal, functional and zero distance from the 
frontline.  
 
First, temporal distance relates to the durability of a bipolar or asymmetric alliance 
and the effect such an alliance may have in suppressing fears of balancing and 
‘relative gains’ among its members. It is posited that it is this phenomenon that 
explains the very possibility of efficiency through mutual dependence because it 
creates a temporal period of confidence in which the anarchy problematique is 
reduced, though not entirely eliminated. Secondly, due to the very high asymmetry of 
capability within an alliance such as NATO, where one ally dominates all others, 
there is low interdependence and high flexibility of policy between allies. It is thus 
posited that this condition, along with the expectation of alliance durability, explains 
the possibility of mutualisation at functional distance from the frontline, i.e., while 
allies are not aligned across all their interests they are confident in the durability of 
the alliance and thus have an opportunity to create mutual dependencies in lower-
risk functional aspects of military capability. Both these effects relate essentially to 
structural or alliance-wide effects. For the third form of mutualisation, however, that 
at zero distance from the frontline, it is necessary to also consider more ‘local’ 
relationships among allies.  
 
To explore the relationship between an alignment of interests and zero-frontline 
distance mutualisation, the thesis will draw on Snyder’s notion of ‘process’ or 
‘relationship’ variables that intervene between structure and unit-level causes. These 
are: alignment, interests, capability and interdependence (Snyder, 1996: 172). It will 
be argued that these variables, together with those structural factors outlined above, 
form particular structural-relational configurations that shape the possibilities for 
capability mutualisation. This approach allows the thesis to propose a novel way to 
conceptualise state interests as emanating not only from the unit level, but also as a 
function of the location of a state within a particular systemic configuration. Thus, 
subordinate states within an asymmetric alliance can be assumed to hold certain 
‘strategic ends’, to which all their concrete interests can be classified as instrumental. 
The pursuit of these strategic ends thus lead to a certain ‘logic of behaviour’ among 
subordinate states, for example, a predominant tendency to use their military 
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capabilities to mitigate entrapment by the dominant state. It will be seen that the 
alignment of concrete interests is very difficult, even unlikely, but there are a few 
areas where interests and the capabilities that serve those interests are more likely 
to be fixed, and thus where frontline mutualisation may be possible. From the model 
above, and its theoretical explanation, three hypotheses can thus be extracted for 
testing against empirical actuality. 
 
Testing the model: three hypotheses  
 
First, alliance durability is assumed to be the sine qua non of military capability 
mutualisation. The confidence that a mutualisation partner will not become a 
competitor in the long-term dissolves the relative gains dilemma and dilutes the 
preference for self-help in the generation and deployment of military capabilities. 
Thus, a local alliance structural-relational configuration based on alliance durability 
together with the alignment of a capability requirement may allow for capability 
mutualisation at temporal remove from the frontline. At such distance from the 
frontline, the high likelihood of divergent concrete interests is not a concern and 
flexibility of policy is not at risk. Thus, mutualisation at temporal distance from the 
frontline may underpin the specialisation and sharing of, for example, design and 
production in defence industrial programmes, as well as elements of capability 
supporting infrastructure. This can be summarised in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Aspects of capability mutualisation may be found at high temporal distance from 
the frontline, with or without a high alignment of concrete interests. 
 
Secondly, however, low interdependence and high policy flexibility means that while 
subordinate states may pursue similar strategic ends, in practice concrete interests 
will often diverge because states have the flexibility to interpret them differently. This 
is obviously true of idiosyncratic interests, such as, for example, the UK’s 
requirement to defend the Falkland Islands, but also of the flexibility by which a 
subordinate state seeks to mitigate entrapment by the dominant state. Because 
subordinate states have such flexibility in dealing with the dominant state, they are 
unlikely to be sufficiently well-aligned to mutualise their military capabilities for 
frontline deployment. And, where subordinate states’ concrete interests are highly 
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likely to be well-aligned, for example in NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence clause, the 
military capabilities dedicated to this concrete interest are usually highly transferable 
and thus cannot be easily earmarked for any given concrete interest. It is the case, 
however, that some concrete interests, such as the policing of territorial airspace and 
waters may require the earmarking of capabilities to fixed duties. In such cases, 
interests and capability requirements may be so closely aligned as to be temporally 
and functionally identical, and it may then be possible to mutualise such military 
capabilities at zero temporal/functional distance from the frontline. Thus, 
 
H2: Capability mutualisation may be found at zero temporal-spatial distance from the 
frontline where there is a very high certainty of support for concrete interests. 
 
Finally, while low interdependence and the transferability of capabilities across 
interests militates against widespread frontline mutualisation, it does provide an 
opportunity for mutualisation at a different point in the generation and deployment of 
military capabilities. Because low interdependence entails high flexibility of policy, 
subordinate states may be able to make reliable commitments to support each other 
at a functional remove from the frontline, for example, in maintenance and support 
roles where the political risks of entrapment and abandonment are lower. This 
reflects the effects of alliance durability, in that an ally’s embroilment in the interests 
of the dominant state or other subordinate states is not regarded as sufficiently 
dangerous to risk the future of the alliance. Therefore,  
 
H3: Capability mutualisation may be found at functional distance from the frontline, 
with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
The hypotheses set out above are intended to test the theoretical explanation as to 
why and how it is that European states are able to mutualise aspects of their military 
capabilities according to a ‘logic of mutualisation’. This is the primary aim of the 
thesis and can be described as explanation of an ‘outcome’ in international politics. 
However, and as will be explained in more detail in chapter three, it is also 
necessary to go into some depth to consider the claim that an asymmetric alliance 
leads to a specific ‘logic of behaviour’ and to the pursuit of certain ‘strategic ends’. 
Thus, before the hypotheses are tested, it will be necessary to explore whether, 
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indeed, European states do conform to such a logic of behaviour. Finally, it has been 
noted that a system theory of international politics also has a further utility in that it 
can provide a framework for a broader explanatory narrative. Thus, the more general 
question of why European states have turned to mutualisation in recent years has a 
systemic dimension, and this will be explained in part as a result of a ‘logic of crisis’. 
In this way, the thesis will be able to take on the dual challenge of testing a theory 
and providing a narrative explanation for a series of historical events.  
 
Relevance of the subject and contribution to the field 
 
It has been argued throughout this introduction that mutual dependence for military 
capabilities, and more specifically the mutualisation of military capabilities, is a 
controversial matter, from both an empirical and theoretical perspective. Yet it 
remains to a great degree under-theorised and under-explored by academic 
scholars. This is at odds with its growing importance across Europe as a policy 
measure to tackle the crisis in the sustainment of military capabilities by getting 
greater efficiency from scarce resources. High hopes have been attached to the 
potential of initiatives that entail mutual dependence. There will no doubt continue to 
be highly-informed and innovative work from various specialist think-tanks, and new 
empirical analyses of recent initiatives will emerge over coming months and years. 
Social science, however, also has a role to play in attempting to provide a 
generalised theoretical explanation for the phenomenon. Theory offers a means not 
only to explain but potentially also to guide policy-makers to new possibilities, and to 
offer justified reasons as to the likely limitations of the deepest forms of defence 
cooperation. 
 
The theoretical approach to capability mutualisation set out in this thesis will 
therefore attempt to provide generalisations within a new analytical framework that 
may also be applied to old, contemporary and not yet existent forms of the 
phenomenon in Europe. The thesis thus makes claims to innovation in three 
important ways. First, by articulating a novel definition of military capability 
mutualisation as a discrete phenomenon in international politics with the notion of 
‘frontline distance’ at its core. While, as has been seen, not all component aspects of 
this definition are new, the way in which it has been assembled into a coherent and 
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defined phenomenon appears, at least to the author, to be novel. Secondly, the 
thesis integrates the phenomenon into a mainstream theory of international politics, 
building on established though perhaps overlooked insights into structural effects on 
intra-alliance behaviour and outcomes, and providing a configurational explanation 
that emphasises the primary role of the international system, while still accepting the 
crucial role of ‘unit-level’ factors in any specific, concrete outcome. In doing so, it 
finds novel ways to resolve the apparent contradiction in neorealism between 
international cooperation for efficiency and state sovereignty, and it builds a new way 
to conceptualise state interests and their role in constraining and enabling capability 
mutualisation. Finally, in researching and considering in depth under-investigated 
empirical cases of capability mutualisation, the thesis provides new and informative 
empirical analyses of the most cutting-edge of European defence cooperation 
initiatives.  
 
Thesis structure  
 
The thesis will be set out over a further six chapters, covering theory, methodology, 
three empirical case studies and a conclusion. The following theory chapter will 
provide a more sustained critique on previous neorealist theoretical treatments of 
European defence cooperation. And it will develop and set out in more detail the 
theoretical approach built on the work of Waltz and Snyder and the definition of 
military capability mutualisation and the way it is informed by alignments of concrete 
interests and capability requirements. A subsequent chapter on methodology will set 
out the approach to testing the theory set out above, and will tackle some difficulties 
and limitations in applying neorealism to empirical actuality. Chapters four to six will 
consider three empirical case studies, each dealing with examples of capability 
mutualisation initiatives between European NATO states and launched between the 
mid 2000s and mid 2010s, focussing particularly though not exclusively, on those 
that occurred in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. These case studies will draw 
on contemporary documents and reports and thirty interviews conducted specifically 
for this thesis with high-level decision-makers, either directly involved in or with deep 
insight and relevant expertise vis-à-vis the initiatives. Multiple initiatives will be 
considered, but all will be framed by three overarching ‘local alliance’ configurations: 
Franco-British, Dutch-Belgian and Dutch-German.  
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Each case study chapter will have three sections. Each section will take the form of 
analytical narratives guided by the theoretical approach set out above. Only the 
outcomes under investigation, i.e. concrete cases of capability mutualisation, will be 
tested against the hypotheses set out above, and these will be dealt with in the final 
section of each chapter. The first two chapter sections will, however also be framed 
by the theory and will seek to demonstrate the systemic effects on the states under 
consideration and the way this effects the generation and deployment of their military 
capabilities. Thus, the first section of each chapter will attempt to demonstrate the 
high degree to which European states pursue a systemic logic of behaviour that 
would be expected in an asymmetric alliance, and the way in which this shapes their 
military capability requirements. The second chapter section will examine a ‘logic of 
crisis’ in the way in which each state faced parallel military capability ‘means-ends’ 
dilemmas, and the way in which this informed their decisions to seek cooperation 
through mutualisation. Finally, the third section of each chapter will test the concrete 
capability initiatives against the hypotheses set out above and assess the extent to 
which they conform to the ‘logic of mutualisation’ set out in the theoretical model. In 
this way, the case study chapters will attempt to provide answers to the research 
questions set out above. This will thus provide both a test of the general plausibility 
of the theory but will also help explain the more general question as to why, albeit 
from an essentially systemic perspective, European states are increasingly turning to 
capability mutualisation.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
NEOREALISM AND THE MUTUALISATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITY 
 
The following chapter will deal with the theoretical heart of this thesis. It will begin by 
setting out the theory of neorealism, particularly those aspects of particular 
pertinence and apparent conflict with the phenomenon of military capability 
mutualisation. It will go on to consider how the purview of neorealism might be 
expanded in order to encompass variables other than structure, but which remain 
focussed on the system level. Finally, it will set out a novel theoretical approach to 
the challenge of explaining military capability mutualisation, and explain how three 
key hypotheses can be extracted from the theory and tested against cases in 
contemporary Europe. 
 
i. Neorealism  
 
Self-help, structure and specialisation 
 
Neorealism, or ‘structural realism’5, is an approach to international relations 
developed by Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics (1979). While 
Waltz claimed his theory amounted to a ‘Copernican revolution’ in the explanation of 
international affairs, it was also founded on a long lineage of realpolitik and ‘balance 
of power’ thought (1979: 69; Gilpin, 1986). Like his realist predecessors, Waltz 
viewed the international system as one characterised by the condition or ‘ordering 
principle’ of anarchy (1979: 114). Waltz’s conception of anarchy echoes Thomas 
Hobbes’s ‘state of nature’, wherein the absence of a single authority leads to ‘warre 
of every one against his neighbour’ (Hobbes, 1996: 214). While Hobbes was 
sceptical that such a condition ever existed between humans, he argued that it was 
‘in all times’ a sound description of the state of international relations, or that 
between ‘Kings and Persons of Soveraigne authority’ (Hobbes, 1996: 90). In 
anarchy, states have no higher authority to call on for their security and must rely 
                                                     
5 Due to its emphasis on the causal impact of the variable structure of the international system, neorealism in its Waltzian form 
is perhaps best described as ‘structural realism’. This thesis will, however, follow the convention and use the term neorealism 
(Waltz uses both terms, apparently interchangeably, e.g., (1997: 914) and (2000: 5)); neorealism also better defines an 
approach that broadens the theory beyond structure, as will be attempted in this thesis. 
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instead on ‘self-help’ (Waltz, 1979: 111). This reliance on self-help puts fundamental 
limits on international cooperation; states can never be sure of the future intentions 
of others, and may risk handing rivals a ‘relative gain’ at their own expense (1979: 
195).  
 
Self-help under anarchy also explains why states are vulnerable to what John Herz 
described as the ‘security dilemma’. Uncertainty over future intentions leads to tit-for-
tat responses and the risk of downward spirals of fear, mistrust and potentially war 
(Herz, 1950: 180). Yet the inherent tendency towards balance also leads to a kind of 
order in the system, i.e., ‘the balance of power’, which offers greater stability than a 
Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ between individuals. Unlike the human state of nature, 
states are not essentially equal, some have greater power than others, and this may 
lead to more stability in relationships. States can also balance rival power either by 
drawing on their own internal capabilities or by aggregating them with others through 
alliance. Even within balancing alliances, however, the condition of anarchy remains 
pervasive and uncertainty about the future actions of allied states cannot be 
dispelled. Thus, Waltz’s neorealism is an heir to the ‘tragic’ tradition of political 
realism that views a world without a single authority as inevitably prone to the risk of 
conflict, regardless of leadership, ideological difference or moral concerns (Lowes-
Dickinson, 1916; Herz, 1950; Butterfield, 1951). 
 
Neorealism follows the realist tradition in prioritising the importance of material 
power, or what Waltz terms ‘capability’, in international politics. It is, however, his 
conception of capability, and the form it takes in a system, that provides Waltz with 
his Copernican turn. In a departure from earlier realist perspectives, and based on a 
highly parsimonious theory, capability is taken as the sole attribute of states under 
the purview of neorealism, and ‘survival’ is assumed to be their only end goal (Waltz, 
1991: 36). All other ‘unit-level’ factors such as culture, domestic politics, ideology and 
individual personalities are excluded6. For Waltz, the significance of capability is not 
that of states in isolation or in bilateral or multilateral relationships, but rather its 
arrangement or distribution across the entire system. It is this variable distribution of 
                                                     
6 Waltz writes of ‘units’ rather than states when describing his theory. This reflects Waltz’s contention that the theory is not 
meant to be a close reproduction of empirical actuality, but only an abstracted element of reality. This thesis will attempt to use 
the term ‘state’ in relation to empirical actuality and ‘unit’ when making more theoretical points. 
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power that gives the system its structure or polarity, and which in turn ‘shapes and 
shoves’ state behaviour and outcomes in international politics (Waltz, 1986: 336). By 
comparing behaviour and outcomes within different or similar systems, Waltz argued 
it was possible to argue that some systems are more stable than others, and that 
some forms of behaviour are more likely than others (1979).  
 
Thus, the Waltzian revolution in international political theory is the explanation of 
outcomes and state behaviour through the effects of the distribution of power in the 
international system, not as a consequence of their internal attributes. For Waltz, to 
explain international politics by reference to state attributes alone was to pursue a 
misplaced ‘reductionism’, an error he had laid at the door of previous realist scholars 
in his first book, Man the State and War (1959). While the high parsimony of the 
theory considerably restricts how much it can say in general terms about 
international politics, Waltz claimed that it would cast light on ‘a small number of big 
and important things’ (Waltz, 1986: 329). 
 
Waltz was careful, however, not to replace reductionism to the state level with 
structural determinism at the system level. He argued that actual empirical outcomes 
in international politics must always be explained as the result of interactions 
between unit level and structural causes, and accepted that domestic causes can 
and do matter in the explanation of specific historical outcomes (1996). More 
fundamentally, it is this interaction that is responsible for certain tendencies in 
outcomes and state behaviour. Like the concept of a market in economics, system 
structure emerges from the interaction of otherwise autonomous units and then in 
turn exerts independent effects upon them as a social structure, whereby it 
‘constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others’ 
(1991: 74). In this sense, ‘neorealism is a far richer sociological theory of 
international politics than its critics and defenders usually realise’ (Goddard and 
Nexon, 2005: 10). The behaviour of units in an anarchic system, exemplified in their 
tendency to ‘self-help’, is explained as a process of socialisation through competition 
and emulation of the success of others, which leads over time to functional 
similarities (1979: 97). The challenge of neorealist explanation is to distinguish 
between systemic and unit-level causes of outcomes in international politics and 
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isolate the role of a structure that does not determine but ‘mediates the outcomes 
that states produce’ (Waltz, 1991: 36).  
 
There are two further aspects of Waltz’s theory that are of importance to this thesis 
and the phenomenon of military capability mutualisation. First, it is important to be 
clear about the Waltzian conception of sovereignty, sometimes defined as 
autonomy7. For Waltz, it is intrinsic to a unit that it is autonomous in the fundamental 
sense that the raison d’etre is to survive as an independent entity. But sovereignty is 
not equivalent to an absence of constraint on their actions. Even the largest states 
are constantly constrained by the actions of others and the dynamics of the system 
itself. Thus, for Waltz, 
 
‘To say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that 
they are free of others’ influence, that they are able to get what they want.’ (1979: 
96) 
 
On the contrary, sovereignty and dependence ‘are not contradictory conditions’. To 
be ‘sovereign’ simply means that a state can,  
 
‘decide for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including 
whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by 
making commitments to them’ (1979:96). 
 
Waltz thus presents a minimalist conception of sovereignty as a capacity for strategic 
decision-making. This does not equate to the absence of constraints or potential 
dependencies, but rather reflects the ability of a state to freely decide to enter into 
restraining commitments. This thesis will define sovereignty, or what we might call 
‘sovereignty-autonomy’, as a form of strategic autonomy. This allows for a distinction 
between sovereignty-autonomy and specific incidences wherein a state may have a 
preference for more or less autonomy. It will be seen that, contrary to the claims of 
some scholars, neorealism does not imply that states seek to ‘maximise autonomy’ 
(Baumann, 2001); as Waltz explains above, there is no such assumption in 
                                                     
7 Waltz himself was not consistent throughout his writings on this point. He used the word sovereignty in Theory of International 
Politics (1979: 96) and subsequently switched to autonomy (1991: 37 fn. 37). 
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neorealist thought. In fact, in concrete areas of vital security policy states may do 
precisely the opposite and create dependencies. 
 
Secondly, however, while states may ‘limit their freedom’ by making commitments to 
one another, those commitments are necessarily temporally and materially limited. 
Due to the uncertainty of the future actions of other states under anarchy, and the 
resulting need for self-help and the avoidance of ‘relative gains’ by others, Waltz 
explicitly rules out the possibility that greater economic efficiency can be gained 
through the specialisation of functions in the provision of a state’s security. 
Specialisation can only occur within units where the organising principle is one of 
hierarchy rather than anarchy (Waltz, 1979). Thus, ‘The domestic imperative is 
“specialize!”… the international imperative is “take care of yourself!”’(Waltz, 1979: 
107). States will fear that even if cooperation may hold out the possibility of efficiency 
gains for them, it may leave another state in a relatively better position; thus, the 
logic of the system deters states from cooperation for efficiency through 
specialisation. Where autonomy may be compromised by making commitments to 
others, it is for security, not for efficiency. 
 
Critics of neorealism - extending its purview 
 
From the foregoing explication of neorealism’s theoretical components, it has been 
shown that Waltz’s theory presents a parsimonious model for the analysis of 
international politics. It is an approach that offers explanations for recurrent patterns 
in similar structural conditions and for divergent patterns in different structural 
conditions. It can make macro claims regarding the tendency of behaviour and 
outcomes in certain systems, such as stability and the likelihood of war (Waltz, 
1979). It also provides a framework for analysis when examining particular empirical 
outcomes to assess the extent to which cause can be attributed to system or unit 
levels. It is not, however, without controversy. There are four major criticisms of 
Waltz’s theory: its apparently ahistorical approach; an indeterminancy when applied 
to empirical cases; insensitivity to important non-structural systemic changes; and, 
finally, the ambiguity of its philosophical or meta-theoretical assumptions.  
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The first criticism is that neorealism is a crudely ‘ahistorical’ approach, and that 
despite Waltz’s arguments to the contrary, it does lean towards a kind of structural 
determinism (Ashley, 1986). Waltz argued that the theory captured some 
fundamentals of international politics but did not deny that the theory would only 
have relevance ‘as long as the conditions it contemplates endure in their essentials’ 
(1986: 340). He also argued that critics misunderstood the purpose of the theory 
when applied to actual historical events (Waltz, 1996: 56). The theory is so 
abstracted, incomplete and simplified that it cannot possibly be a representation of 
historical reality. It therefore makes little sense to criticise its ahistorical nature; the 
analytical core of neorealism as a theory is abstract units and systems, not real 
states and their interactions. As will be considered in more detail in the next chapter, 
when using neorealism, theory and historical actuality must be considered distinct.  
 
Secondly, a related criticism is that neorealism suffers from an essential 
indeterminancy when deployed against empirical actuality, and cannot make 
consistent predictions (Ruggie, 1986). Waltz never claimed, however, that the theory 
could by itself predict or completely explain any particular historical outcomes in 
international politics. Indeed, he argued that this criticism confuses theory with 
analysis; indeterminacy is simply a feature of the theory (1986: 343). Unit-level 
factors will always be important in an explanation and thus, ‘Much is included in an 
analysis; little is included in a theory’ (1996: 56). The third, and perhaps more 
constructive criticism of Waltz’s theory, is that it is too parsimonious and thus limited 
in its insights into international politics. Fellow neorealist scholar Glenn Snyder 
argued that while ‘it is unfair and naive to criticize neorealism for not explaining 
everything’, its parsimony does tend to heavily restrict its application to a wider 
variety of empirical outcomes and phenomena (1996: 167). Snyder sought to 
respond to the charge that neorealism is ‘insensitive to change’ because changes in 
structure are infrequent. Changes ‘within the system’, in terms of shifting alliances, 
wars and so forth, are more frequent, but structure may have little or nothing to say 
about them. 
 
In an important development for neorealism, and one that is essential for the 
theoretical approach to be set out in this thesis, Snyder responded to Waltz’s high 
parsimony by attempting an elaboration of neorealist theory, which, while retaining 
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its core theoretical assumptions would expand its purview to further areas of 
analysis. This would be made possible by considering the ‘process’ by which 
structural effects and some unit-level attributes are transferred to state interactions 
and outcomes. At the heart of this process, Snyder claimed, is the role of variables 
that make up the ‘relationships’ or ‘situational contexts’ for interactions between 
states. These relationships ‘exist prior to behavioral interaction, and as the 
background context of continuing interaction’ (1996: 171). It is through relationships 
that ‘structural effects and unit attributes make themselves felt on behavior’ (1996: 
172). Snyder classifies these ‘relational’ or ‘process’ variables that make up 
relationships or ‘situational contexts’ as alignments, interests, interdependence and 
capabilities. He argues that these concepts are ‘familiar’ to neorealism but are yet to 
find their ‘logical niche’ within the theory (1996: 172). Indeed, while they are not 
analytical terms within the purview of Waltzian neorealism, they play an important 
role in Waltz’s explication of his empirical analyses in Theory of International Politics. 
And arguably, they are logical extensions of existing Waltzian concepts. Alignment 
and interdependence deal with relationships within the system, while Snyder’s focus 
on capability in terms of function adds a different dimension to a key Waltzian 
variable. Finally, interests are conceived of as ‘ends’, and, at least in this thesis, will 
be defined as ultimately related to the end of ‘survival’8. As Jack Donelley notes, 
Snyder’s variables are ‘no less systemic than the distribution of capabilities’ (2009: 
47).  
 
First, alignment, often but not always in the form of a formal alliance between states, 
is considered by Snyder as the ‘preeminent’ variable. This is because alignments are 
‘akin to structure’ in that like structure they reflect the arrangement of states in 
relation to each other within the system. They are ‘affected by structure but are not 
constitutive of structure’ (1996: 175), but still exert their own ‘independent effects’. 
Snyder defines alignments as ‘expectations of future support’; they determine ‘the 
focus and significance of other relationship variables’ (1996: 173). To illustrate the 
concept, Snyder identifies a particularly important independent effect of alignments, 
which is that they, 
 
                                                     
8 As will be explained below, the theory to be set out here departs from Snyder’s theory in relation to the definition of interests. 
 46
‘often modify sharply the consequences of system structure. For instance, the 
concern about ‘relative gain’, which is, in general, a consequence of anarchy, is far 
less among allies than it is between opponents.’ (1996: 175) 
 
Thus, a diminution in concern over relative gains can be an effect of alignment. The 
dynamics of any particular alignment remains, however, shaped by the polarity of the 
system. It may be that, for example, while the concern over relative gain is mitigated 
by alignment under all polarity types, it is particularly strongly mitigated within the 
stable and heavily capability-asymmetric relationship of a bipolar alliance, an 
important claim that the thesis will return to below. Likewise, the level of 
interdependence between states can be attributed to capability symmetry or 
asymmetry among allies. Thus, for example, Snyder argues that the ‘process’ by 
which a multi-polar system structure made the First World War even more likely was 
the high equality between allies and thus high levels of interdependence inside the 
opposing alliances, leaving them at the mercy of each other’s own particular 
interests, and ultimately dragging them into to a system-wide war (1996: 185).  
 
Secondly, Snyder claims that the extent to which interests between states are in 
harmony or in conflict also constitutes a relationship, conceived of as a situational 
context. Shared interests, for example, may help explain the longevity of an alliance 
even when a structural cause is hard to locate. Indeed, as will be seen, both Snyder 
and Waltz point to enduring interests as an explanation for the continuation of NATO 
following the collapse of the bipolar Cold War system. Snyder concedes that defining 
state interests is ‘notoriously difficult’ (1996: 176). And, under Waltzian neorealism, 
the assumption must be that interests are located at the unit level. However, Snyder 
argues that some state interests are shaped by both structure and existing 
relationships. Alignments, for example, often lead to the interests of one state 
becoming entwined with another. Thus, there is a strong logic for arguing that the 
distribution of interests, and whether they are aligned or not, can legitimately be 
considered, at least in part, at the system level. Snyder’s definition of the types of 
interests is, however, complex (1996: 175). He divides interests into ‘instrumental’, 
‘strategic’ and ‘intrinsic’, and then into ‘general’ (i.e., systemic) and ‘particular’ 
(Snyder, 1996: 175-180). In particular, he takes on ‘value’ interests, which creates 
problems for the parsimonious deployment of the theory. Accordingly, this thesis will 
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take a simpler approach to interests than that undertaken by Snyder; this approach 
will be set out below in more detail. 
 
Thirdly, Snyder also takes a novel approach to the role of capabilities in neorealist 
theory. Under Waltz’s theory, the distribution of capabilities throughout a system 
determines the number of great powers and therefore its structure. While retaining 
this conception in relation to structure, Snyder argues that the function of different 
military capabilities, i.e., what they can do in relation to another state’s capabilities, 
can also be considered as constituting a relationship between states (1996: 180). 
Borrowing the term ‘asset specificity’ from economics, Snyder argues that, 
 
‘Different types of military forces will have different kinds of utility against different 
opponents, or different values in an alliance, just as the specific assets of firms will 
affect the kind of relationship they develop with other firms.’ (1996: 181) 
 
This notion of the variable ‘value’ of different capabilities within an alliance is clearly 
of potential importance to the study of states seeking to cooperate with each other 
over a given military capability. If states wish to cooperate over the generation of 
new equipment, for example, it is an obvious requirement that they both have a 
requirement for such equipment and can afford to develop the capability. The 
significance of this conception of capability will be considered in the final section of 
this chapter. 
 
Snyder’s conceptualisation of relationship variables is systemic rather than unit-level 
because it concerns their configuration across the system. These relationships go, 
however, further than Waltz’s parsimonious insistence that only the distribution of 
capabilities in terms of power should be included; attributes otherwise considered to 
be ‘unit-level’ can be brought up to the system level where they constitute a 
relationship. For Snyder, however, ‘preferences, perceptions and politics’ still remain 
at the unit-level; by leaving these internal factors that influence how states come to 
decisions in particular instances at the unit level, some degree of parsimony and 
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distinction between levels may be retained. An adaptation of Snyder’s schema is set 
















Table 2.1. Snyder’s table of system, structure and relationship variables (Snyder, 1996:174). 
 
Finally, it is important to note that as with Waltz’s conception of structure, Snyder 
attributes causal powers or ‘independent effects’ to relationships or process 
variables. This is a significant ontological issue that raises the fourth and final 
criticism of neorealism. A fundamental critique of the theory, and one that is equally 
applicable to Snyder’s concept of relationships, is that the ontological status of 
Waltz’s ‘shaping and shoving’ structural forces is highly ambiguous (Wight, 2006: 
98). As Colin Wight argues, ‘there are interesting questions as to how something 
which does not really exist can ‘shape and shove’ anything’ (2006, 97).  
 
In large part due to this ontological ambiguity Waltz has variously been claimed for a 
wide and incompatible range of philosophical schools and methodological 
approaches including positivism, a Weberian ‘ideal type’ approach, constructivism 
and critical realism11. Several scholars, including Wight, have argued that Waltz is 
‘instrumentalist’ in his use of theory and therefore not ontologically realist. Even this 
claim, however, is difficult to establish against the text of Theory of International 
Politics. Waltz did indeed claim that his theory was ‘instrumental’ (1991), but it is not 
clear that this amounts to a total rejection of an ontologically ‘real’ approach. Indeed, 
without the assertion that systems and structures have independent effects or real 
‘emergent properties’, it is difficult to see how Waltz’s theory can claim philosophical 
coherence when applied to empirical actuality. These issues, and their 
methodological implications will be addressed in greater detail in the following 
                                                     
9 Adapted from Snyder’s figure. 
10 Snyder argues that certain forms of technology such as nuclear weapons act as structural modifiers (1996: 168); this thesis 
does not deploy the concept of structural modifier, though it could be argued that the increasing cost of military capability meets 
the criteria. 
11 These critiques will be considered in the following chapter. 
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chapter. For now, it will suffice to assume that neorealism is based on a very narrow 
and analytical ontological realism, and that the claim that social relations produce 
emergent properties that then influence such relations independently of individual 
actors is critical to the proper deployment of neorealism. The implications of these 
philosophical issues for methodology will be examined in in the next chapter. 
 
The previous paragraphs have set out the theory of neorealism and described how it 
can be augmented by the addition of Snyder’s process variables based on a 
conception of relationships as situational contexts. It is now necessary to turn to the 
field of European defence cooperation and existing literature that has attempted to 
explain it through neorealist analysis. In explicating the strengths and flaws of 
contemporary theoretical analyses, the following section will demonstrate why a new 
theoretical perspective is necessary and how it can help to explain occurrences of 
the mutualisation of military capabilities. 
 
ii. Neorealism and defence cooperation 
 
Defence cooperation – the aggregation and mutualisation of capabilities 
 
As noted by Snyder, military capability can be defined in two different ways by 
neorealists. First, in the Waltzian sense of determining the structure of a system via 
the distribution of capability as a ‘power resource’12 among states, and secondly as 
constituting a relationship between partners regarding the particular function of 
capability (1996: 180). And indeed, in empirical actuality defence ministries generally 
consider military capability in this way in terms of ‘what it can do’ or as a ‘function’, 
and not simply in terms of ‘platform’ or ‘equipment’. Defence ministry definitions of 
capability also go further than function alone and into the ‘value chain’ or process of 
its development. The British Ministry of Defence, for example, defines military 
capability as,  
 
‘the combination of equipment, trained personnel and support that gives the armed 
forces the capacity to achieve the tasks they are given.’ (UK MOD, 2014: 8) 
                                                     




In the UK the process of generation and development is known as ‘defence lines of 
development’ or DLODs (UK MOD, 2014: 8)13, which encompass ‘training, 
equipment, personnel, information, doctrine and concepts, organisation, 
infrastructure and logistics’. To the best knowledge of the author, the importance of 
this conception of capability, in terms of generation as well as deployment, has been 
rather overlooked in academic discussions of defence cooperation. To consider 
capability in this way is thus to consider not merely cooperation over capability at 
frontline deployment, but right back through the capability chain, from conception 
and development of function, right through support, and on to frontline use. 
 
It will be argued that there are two principal rationales for defence cooperation, one 
relating to the aggregation of military capabilities and the other to their mutualisation 
between states. Regarding the first rationale, neorealist theory assumes that the role 
of an alliance is to aggregate military capability to balance or overmatch rival power. 
Seen through this lens, defence cooperation can be explained as interactions 
between states with the aim of making aggregated forces function effectively. This 
might be achieved through the definition and agreement of a joint politico-military 
strategy, through joint command and control arrangements and, in some cases, 
through the interoperability of capabilities14. European defence cooperation, whether 
through NATO, the EU or bilaterally, features these elements.  
 
By contrast, capability mutualisation goes beyond the aggregation of autonomous 
forces and into the realm of cooperation for efficiency. Sharing or specialisation in 
elements of military capabilities can deliver significant efficiencies in their generation 
and operation, as states no longer need to fund all elements of the capability alone. 
In mutualising elements of their capabilities, however, partner states must accept 
that there will be a diminution of their autonomous control over capabilities. Among 
European states, mutualisation may or may not be associated with the EU and 
NATO; indeed, such cooperation tends to be arranged on a bilateral or small group 
                                                     
13 Other defence ministries use different classifications. The US and other European states use a similar approach with 
DOTMILPF, which stands for doctrine, organisation, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities. The differences 
between different national approaches are not important for the purposes of this thesis. 
14 Although it should be noted that interoperability of capabilities assumes a certain degree of interdependence because it 
entails some sharing of knowledge over the use of a capability.  
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basis. Such a definition does not necessarily entail the complete mutualisation of an 
entire military capability from its earliest stages of generation through to frontline 
deployment, although this is not, in principle, impossible. More often, however, 
mutual dependence between states for a given capability will be found at a point or 
points through generation to deployment along the capability value chain or DLODs. 
This includes areas such as the specialisation of elements of research and 
development, industrial production or the sharing of assets such as a training facility. 
Though examples are scarce, as will be seen, mutualisation can also occur on the 
frontline, when the capability is in immediate deployment, such as under a bilateral 
agreement for the mutualisation of capabilities to defend territorial airspace. 
 
The difference between these two rationales for defence cooperation lies in both the 
level of autonomy sacrificed by such arrangements and their aims. In line with 
neorealist assumptions about the ephemeral, non-structural nature of alliances and 
‘self-help’ behaviour, aggregated forces may be separated quickly, with their 
equipment and supporting industrial bases remaining completely autonomous after 
separation. Mutualised capabilities, on the other hand, entail a restriction on 
autonomy. Thus, whereas aggregation is undertaken in direct support of a state’s 
security policy, mutualisation is concerned rather with improving the economic 
efficiency of military capabilities and is only indirectly related to security. In empirical 
actuality, mutualisation and aggregation are more closely related. The former may 
improve the effectiveness of the latter and may lead to closer cooperation on more 
strategic levels of politico-military cooperation, which will enable more successful 
aggregation of capabilities. But, for the purposes of the theoretical approach in this 
thesis, the two rationales will be dealt with as analytically distinct. 
 
While the aggregation of capabilities is relatively unproblematic, and indeed is 
specifically accounted for in neorealist balance of power theory, the mutualisation of 
capabilities presents a theoretical challenge. As explored above, Waltz argued that 
while the domestic imperative is to specialise, the international imperative is towards 
self-help (Waltz, 1979: 107). Mutualisation of capabilities involving specialisation and 
sharing in pursuit of efficiency thus appears to break a fundamental rule of Waltz’s 
neorealism, which is that, ‘In a self-help system, considerations of security 
subordinate economic gain to political interest.’ (Waltz, 1979: 107). From a neorealist 
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perspective, the problem with the mutualisation of military capabilities is that while 
alliances are assumed to be fundamentally ephemeral, specialisation or sharing will 
bind states together over a potentially long period of time, quite possibly beyond the 
foreseeable existence of an alliance. Furthermore, even if interests based on 
common defence are well-aligned, more idiosyncratic interests are likely to diverge.  
 
Thus, to embark on capability mutualisation could risk a situation with a high risk of 
either entrapment or abandonment by one or the other partner. There would, for 
example, be a potentially huge efficiency gain if the UK and France specialised for 
the provision of a mutualised aircraft carrier strike capability, wherein the UK might 
provide the aircraft and France the carriers. Yet this would create serious problems 
for any deployment where the UK and France did not have more-or-less perfectly 
aligned interests and a reasonable expectation that those interests would remain 
aligned throughout the deployment of the aircraft carriers. Some of these issues 
have been addressed in contemporary neorealist scholarship on European defence 
cooperation, but it will be seen that there are some serious shortcomings in recent 
applications of the theory. Before setting out a novel neorealist approach to 
capability mutualisation, this section will therefore now consider some contemporary 
attempts at neorealist explanation of European defence cooperation. 
 
Neorealist perspectives on European defence cooperation 
 
At the heart of this thesis is the question as to what provides sufficient confidence 
between states to allow them to mutualise their military capabilities. As noted in the 
introduction, this question has not been dealt with directly by scholars in any great 
depth. There are, however, two strands of contemporary academic literature that 
deal indirectly with this question in relation to European states and the factors that 
apparently shape their propensity to deploy their armed forces in various contexts. 
These relate firstly to the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(EU CSDP) and its prospects for the future, and secondly, as to why it is that 
European states have generally, though not wholly consistently, provided support to 
the US for its ‘out of area’ missions such as that in Afghanistan. 
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The challenge for Europeans in deploying aggregated forces, whether in support of 
the US or without the US on CSDP missions is not necessarily directly linked with 
issues of capability mutualisation, and few scholars even mention the issue. Yet the 
two matters are related. In both their support for US-led and CSDP missions, 
European states see potential advantages, and in the case of CSDP, even a 
necessity, in deploying their forces in aggregate. And if they could very reliably do 
so, there would be opportunities for greater efficiency through the mutualisation of 
their capabilities. If, however, there is uncertainty as to whether two or more 
European states will deploy their forces together in any given scenario, mutual 
dependence will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. To explain European state 
behaviour in these circumstances, scholars writing from a neorealist and 
neoclassical realist perspective have considered the logic of behaviour within certain 
kinds of alliance and have drawn on Glenn Snyder’s notion of an ‘alliance security 
dilemma’. This section will turn first to the issue of aggregation in support for the 
CSDP and secondly to the reliability of European state support for the US. 
 
The Franco-British St Malo Declaration of 1998 and the subsequent emergence of 
the CSDP brought new theoretical attention to European defence cooperation 
(Howorth, 2007: 37; Krotz and Maher, 2011; Bickerton et al, 2011; Meyer and 
Strickmann, 2011). Scholars have debated how best to explain a security project that 
breaks with the past in seeking to enable Europeans to launch autonomous action 
without the United States. The motivation for seeking this apparent autonomy from 
the US is complex and has been contested by scholars. Was the CSDP created as a 
European challenge, intentional or otherwise, to US power in the wake of the 
collapse of Cold War bipolarity? Or was it created, on the contrary, as a means of 
bolstering the American security guarantee by building up European capabilities and 
delivering a more effective institutional framework for transatlantic ‘burden sharing’ 
(Howorth, 2007: 33-60)? 
 
Scholars who answered the former question affirmatively were quick to draw on 
neorealist theory to justify their explanation of CSDP. If military alliances form as 
aggregations of power to balance rival power, then the CSDP might be interpreted 
prima facie as an attempt to aggregate military power for use autonomously to 
balance American power. It is perhaps understandable that some scholars 
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interpreted the CSDP as an indication of balancing behaviour, however ‘soft’ in form. 
And yet where such an approach has been taken, the application of neorealism has 
been somewhat inappropriate and rather unconvincing (Posen 2006; Art, 2004). As 
several scholars have argued persuasively, the empirical evidence of European state 
behaviour simply does not support the claim (Brooks and Wolhforth, 2005; Howorth 
and Menon, 2009).  
 
If the aim, then, of this aggregation of military power is not to balance rival power, 
can neorealism explain the CSDP? To use the theory differently in an attempt to do 
so, some scholars turned away from a Waltzian balancing argument and towards 
Glenn Snyder’s neorealist approach to alliance politics. Drawing on Waltz’s Theory 
of International Politics, Snyder set out what he called the ‘alliance security dilemma’, 
positing that states within an alliance fear both entrapment and abandonment by 
their allies (Snyder, 1984). In a multipolar alliance, the dilemma is acute because 
alliances are fleeting and ephemeral, and so states fear abandonment. To mitigate 
that fear they must move closer to an ally by making further commitments. This, 
however, increases the risk of entrapment into the divergent interests of their ally, 
hence the dilemma. As will be explored in more detail below, Snyder argues that the 
dilemma is most acute in a multipolar system where states are highly equal in terms 
of capabilities, and less so in a bipolar system because the fear of abandonment is 
far less due to a more stable alignment of allies. 
 
Galia Press-Barnathan has argued that the CSDP is better explained as resulting 
from this kind of intra-alliance behaviour shaped by the shift from bipolarity to 
unipolarity following the end of the Cold War (Press-Barnathan, 2006). She draws on 
Snyder’s dilemma to argue that the CSDP can be viewed as the result of European 
states attempting to concert their individual strategies, which are shaped by the 
alliance security dilemma. She argues that the shift to a unipolar system structure 
has increased the intensity of the alliance security dilemma for European states. This 
is because the risk of abandonment is greater in the absence of a bipolar structural 
constraint on the US, while entrapment is also more likely given the fewer restraints 
on its behaviour. Thus, unipolarity becomes more like multipolarity in that the alliance 
security dilemma is once again high. European defence cooperation thus represents 
an attempt at a transatlantic ‘division of labour’ aimed at influencing the US through 
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improved burden-sharing while also hedging against abandonment. Similarly, others 
have argued that the CSDP is explained not by balancing but by ‘bandwagoning’ or 
‘reformed bandwagoning’ behaviour by European states (Dyson, 2013a; Cladi and 
Locatelli, 2012). Snyder’s theory thus presents a plausible alternative explanation for 
the CSDP as an aggregation of European military capability in support of concerted 
state strategies aimed at mitigating the alliance security dilemma, and not aimed at 
balancing the US.  
 
Scholars have, however, recognised that there are inherent limitations on the 
concerting of European state strategies to pursue an effective ‘division of labour’ with 
the US. In order to explain these limitations, both Press-Barnathan and Dyson have 
drawn on Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ approach (Press-Banathan, 2006: 276; 
Dyson, 2013: 389). They argue that divergence in threat perceptions among NATO 
and EU states explains why it is so difficult to pursue collective strategies 
consistently. As such, the inability to reliably field multinational forces in support of 
any ‘EU’ objective, hampers the ambition to concert national strategies to more 
effectively mitigate the risks of entrapment and abandonment by the US. Both Dyson 
and Press-Barnathan contend that it is primarily such divergence in threat perception 
that thwarts deeper defence cooperation. Press-Barnathan concedes this significant 
limitation means that,  
 
‘The degree of successful implementation of these strategies will depend on the 
ability of these states to overcome collective-action problems among themselves.’ 
(2006: 285) 
 
This fundamental collective action problem undermines attempts at greater efficiency 
through mutualisation of capabilities at the frontline of operations, which in turn 
provides an efficiency challenge to the notion of successful autonomous European 
action. Hence the dilemma for European states over mutualisation of capabilities: if 
aggregation of military power is necessary to influence the US and more effectively 
avoid entrapment and provide a hedge against abandonment, it will require efforts to 
make European defence more efficient through rationalisation. This, however, 
means more capability specialisation and sharing of assets leading to the 
mutualisation of particular capabilities. And yet mutually dependent military 
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capabilities for frontline use must assume a very strong alignment of intent among 
the partners.  
 
The second strand of literature relates to European NATO state support for US-led 
missions such as Afghanistan from 2001 and Iraq from 2003 (Von Hlatky, 2013; 
Davidson, 2011). This literature starts from the puzzle as to why small states within a 
heavily asymmetric alliance would bother to spend precious resources, life and limb 
and political capital on supporting the dominant state, particularly when such 
resources can never make a critical difference to the success of the mission. 
Economic theory on burden-sharing within alliances suggests that free-riding is the 
more rational approach, and yet European states have contributed significantly to 
US-led operations (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). The answer, like that provided 
above by Press-Barnathan, is that by contributing to US-led missions, European 
states are seeking to extend their political influence; in Snyder’s terms, they are 
seeking to mitigate the risks of entrapment by the dominant state. Again, however, 
due to divergent policies, European states rarely act in exactly the same way vis-à-
vis the dominant state, and so reliable aggregation of their forces, and therefore their 
mutualisation, remains difficult if not impossible. 
 
While Press-Barnathan and Dyson argue that the balance of threat explains 
divergences in support among European states for the CSDP, Stephanie von Hlatky 
notes that in relation to European state support for the US, the explanation has 
significant drawbacks (2013: 27). The alignment or non-alignment of threat 
perception is not the sole, nor necessarily the most important variable to consider 
when states decide to deploy their armed forces. Indeed, following the logic of the 
alliance security dilemma in a unipolar alliance, whereby a desire for influence over 
the dominant state strongly shapes the behaviour of subordinate states, decisions to 
support the US over a given operation may not in fact reflect a threat perception 
within a subordinate state. Such decisions may instead be taken to support the US to 
attempt to gain influence over a particular operation and therefore mitigate 
entrapment risks. Von Hlatky and others have argued convincingly, for example, that 
European military deployments to Afghanistan following the 911 terror attacks 
against the US were not undertaken solely or even primarily to respond to the 
perceived threat of Al Qaeda to European states, but rather to demonstrate loyalty to 
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the US and therefore bolster other aspects of the alliance and maintain influence 
(Eilstrupp-Sangiovanni, 2014: 93; Davidson, 2011: 106-116; Shapiro and Witney, 
2009: 37). Others have noted the importance of such a strategy to the UK (Wallace 
and Phillips 2009; Gray, 2008). Thus, subordinate states ‘will consider making a 
military contribution even if they do not share the American perception of threat’ (Von 
Hlatky, 2013: 139). 
 
Thus, while threat perception remains an important factor, a range of other ‘unit-
level’ variables must be considered in any explanation as to why European states 
diverge in their support, either for CSDP or US-led missions. The system-level 
dynamics of an asymmetric alliance are crucial for understanding how the smaller 
states come to understand their own threat perception, but it is not in itself a 
sufficient explanatory framework. This leads von Hlatky to depart from neorealism 
and take a ‘neoclassical realist’ approach, drawing on both systemic and unit-level 
variables in a synthesis of explanation for particular historical cases. Others also 
pursue this approach; in a similar theme on European state support for US-led 
missions, Jason Davidson also adopts neoclassical realism (2011), as does Dyson 
for his work on European defence cooperation (2010; 2013b) This turn to 
neoclassical realism appears to take neorealism to a dead-end; even with the 
perspective of Snyder’s alliance security dilemma, there do not seem to be any 
reliable variables at the systemic level that will explain when and why allies might 
have sufficient confidence to enter into military cooperation, either over a CSDP or 
US-led mission. This also represents a methodological problem in that neoclassical 
realism is ill-equipped to explain the variation in occurrence of a systemic 
phenomenon, which is the aim of this thesis. As Taliaferro et al argue,  
 
‘Neoclassical realism seeks to explain variation in the foreign policies of the same 
state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints. It makes 
no pretence about explaining patterns of systemic or recurring outcomes’ (2009: 21). 
 
By extension, if no such reliable systemic variables exist to explain variation in the 
collective deployment of European forces in these contexts, it might be concluded 
that no such variables exist for explaining when and why allies would feel sufficiently 
confident to embark on military capability mutualisation.  
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The final challenge to a neorealist theory of capability mutualisation relates to 
neorealism’s apparent prohibition on specialisation over security matters as 
discussed above. It might be argued that the variation in European state support for 
the CSDP and US-led missions simply reflects the fact that they are sovereign-
autonomous units in a condition of anarchy. While they may seek to create a 
collective alliance strategy because that best deals with the alliance security 
dilemma with the US, they cannot do so effectively because their inherent preference 
for autonomy prevents them from doing so to any great degree. Jolyon Howorth and 
Anand Menon reach a similar conclusion when arguing against the view that 
common EU defence and security policies can be explained as ‘soft balancing’ 
against the US. They argue that balancing cannot occur through the CSDP because 
it is ‘not merely a limited undertaking, but a structurally limited undertaking.’ (2009: 
741) They argue that because European states wish to retain their sovereignty in this 
sensitive field, concerted strategies are highly restricted, and that ‘a logic of 
international politics applies within the EU in much the same way as it does in its 
relations with the outside world’ (2009: 741). Yet while this may indeed be the case 
within EU institutional structures, as has been outlined in the first chapter, European 
states have in some discrete areas opted for to mutualise aspects of their military 
capabilities. 
 
Thus, there are three major problems within existing literature on defence 
cooperation from a neorealist perspective. The first is that the neorealist analyses 
considered above have focussed on explaining variation in the aggregation of 
deployed armed forces. Thus, while it may be an appropriate framework by which to 
consider, by extension, an explanation for the occurrence and variation in capability 
mutualisation on the frontline, it does not capture those aspects of capability at 
greater temporal and functional remove from the frontline, such as defence industrial 
cooperation or maintenance support arrangements. And neither does the current 
literature make any attempt to explain these forms of mutualisation. Secondly, it has 
been seen that within existing neorealist literature there is apparently no system-
level variable that can explain the variation in support among European states either 
for US-led missions or for each other. Finally, for some scholars, the logic of 
international politics itself appears to provide a logical obstruction to the possibility of 
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capability mutualisation. These issues will now be dealt with in the final section 
below, which will attempt to produce a neorealist theory that can explain variation in 
the occurrence and form of cases of capability mutualisation across European 
states. 
 
iii. A neorealist theory of military capability mutualisation  
 
The previous section has shown that existing neorealist explanations of defence 
cooperation have significant shortcomings, particularly in terms of explaining very 
close cooperation such as the mutualisation of military capabilities. The final section 
of this chapter will therefore set out an innovative theoretical approach which, while 
preserving assumptions and concepts familiar to neorealism, will attempt to provide 
a more convincing explanation. To do this, it will be necessary to develop a model of 
the system-level effects that shape the occurrences and particular forms of capability 
mutualisation. This will be done by conceiving of two configurations of system-level  
variables that shape behaviour within a heavily asymmetric bipolar or unipolar 
alliance. The first configuration, which is concerned with the dynamics of 
relationships between dominant and subordinate states under a bipolar or unipolar 
alliance, will be called the asymmetric alliance configuration. The second, which 
describes the dynamics of bilateral or small group relationships of subordinate states 
within such an alliance, will be called the local alliance configuration. Taken together, 
these configurations encapsulate the systemic pressures and tendencies that 
provide the situational context for capability mutualisation, and thus help to explain 
its occurrence and variable form. 
 
The following section will draw on the work of Waltz and Snyder to identify two 
crucial effects that can be ascribed to the asymmetric alliance configuration that will 
be detailed below. First, the structural effects of bipolarity or unipolarity, taken 
together with the very high capability asymmetry between the dominant and 
subordinate states, means that the military capability of subordinate states is of 
relatively little consequence at the systemic level. In such a situation, where one 
state holds greatly predominant power compared to its allies, the effect is to reduce 
politico-military interdependence, which in turn leads to significant policy flexibility. 
Secondly, a bipolar or unipolar structure, taken together with an alignment of vital 
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interests between the dominant and subordinate states leads to alliance durability, 
and thus to high expectations of long-term mutual support. It will be seen that these 
two effects are of critical importance to the form and likelihood of capability 
mutualisation.  
 
First, as there is low pressure for allies to support each other across their divergent 
interests, low interdependence is likely to hinder capability mutualisation at the 
operational or ‘frontline’ level because such cooperation would lead to a high risk of 
entrapment or abandonment. However, because low interdependence leads to high 
policy flexibility, there is considerable scope for flexibility in the way in which states 
can deploy military capabilities to support their allies; thus, there may be 
mutualisation in those capabilities, or aspects of capabilities, that function at distance 
from the frontline. Second, expectations of alliance durability provide for sufficient 
confidence to allow for aspects of mutualisation to develop at a temporal distance 
from the frontline (e.g., defence industrial collaboration). Finally, alliance durability 
may provide the confidence that where concrete interests tend to be rigid in their 
alignment, states may protect them with mutualised capabilities.  
 
It is this intra-alliance interplay between low interdependence and high durability that 
marks out the asymmetric alliance configuration, and which, it will be argued, can 
explain much about the way in which subordinate states generate, use and 
cooperate over their military capabilities. The following paragraphs will now set out in 
more detail the claim that the asymmetric alliance configuration provides these 
conditions of low interdependence and alliance durability. The final paragraphs of 
this section will then describe how these theoretical insights can be used to underpin 
a model that can explain variation in occurrence and forms of military capability 
mutualisation in contemporary Europe. 
 
Interdependence within alliances  
 
In Theory of International Politics, Waltz made two important theoretical claims 
regarding the effects of system structure on state behaviour and outcomes within 
alliances. Snyder subsequently built on these claims in his own work by developing 
the idea of ‘the alliance security dilemma’ and subsequently that of relationship 
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variables. The first claim relates to the impact of system structure on politico-military 
interdependence within alliances; the second relates to the impact of structure on the 
durability of alliances and thus on relative gains concerns and the security dilemma. 
For Waltz, these two systemic effects can be attributed to a bipolar system structure. 
Following Snyder, however, they can also be explicated by considering relationship 
variables in conjunction with structure. Hence, this thesis develops the concept of 
‘structural-relational configurations’ that provide a ‘shaping and shoving’ situational 
context for unit action. 
 
First, regarding interdependence within alliances, Waltz argued that in an alliance 
under a multipolar structure, politico-military interdependence is high, and under a 
bipolar structure it is low (Waltz, 1979: 169). This is because in a multipolar structure 
a balance of power is brought about by the formation of capability-aggregating 
alliances, a phenomenon that Waltz terms ‘external balancing’ by states. Because 
balancing alliances can be made up of different potential groupings of great powers, 
however, there is a high risk of the defection of allies from one alliance to another. 
This ‘flexibility of alignment’ thus encourages ‘rigidity of strategy’ because states are 
under pressure to honour their allies’ interests as well as their own. Thus, politico-
military interdependence is high because one state’s otherwise idiosyncratic 
interests can quickly become a critical policy matter to all allies and may risk 
triggering a conflict. In Waltz’s words, allies cannot afford ‘to advertise their disunity 
by failing to back a venture even while deploring its risks’ (Waltz, 1988: 621) 
 
Snyder took these observations on the rigidity and flexibility of alignment and 
strategy and used them to underpin what he called ‘the alliance security dilemma’ 
(1984: 494)15. In a multipolar alliance, flexibility of alignment and rigidity of strategy 
create an acute dilemma over how to behave towards allies. Move too close to an 
ally and risk being entrapped into their divergent interests; move too far away and 
risk abandonment. Snyder departed from Waltz, however, in arguing that the nature 
of the alliance security dilemma was not only a function of system structure but could 
also be affected by intra-alliance relationship variables. Thus, the greater the equality 
                                                     
15 Snyder acknowledges his debt to Waltz on this point. 
 62
of state capability within an alliance, the higher the level of interdependence and thus 
the intensity of the alliance security dilemma (1996: 185). 
 
Under a bipolar structure, by contrast, there are only two great powers and so 
balancing is undertaken ‘internally’ (i.e., through domestic resources) rather than 
‘externally’ (i.e., through capability aggregation in an alliance). It is this feature, 
according to Waltz, that makes a bipolar system inherently more stable. Under 
bipolarity, there is no structural imperative for great powers to aggregate their forces 
with others because relative to other states they are powerful enough to rely on 
internal balancing alone (1979, 168). Thus, alliances under bipolarity become in 
effect ‘treaties of guarantee’ by the dominant states to their subordinate allies (Waltz, 
2000: 19; Snyder, 1984: 486). And, for the following reasons, politico-military 
interdependence is low between such allies. First, the defection of a subordinate ally 
to the other great power would make no real difference to the balance of power, and 
so the dominant state has less to fear from abandonment. Second, there is little 
advantage anyway in a subordinate state doing so because it will exert no greater 
influence over the rival superpower than its current ally. And finally, great powers 
hold high leverage over the actions of their lesser allies and would probably act to 
dissuade a subordinate state from defection. In short, there is little to gain from 
abandonment.  
 
Thus, a ‘rigidity of alignment’ arises and this in turn creates a ‘flexibility of strategy’ in 
the behaviour of both the dominant and subordinate states in the alliance; there is a 
certain tolerance of ‘unilateral’ behaviour because subordinates can, to a large 
degree, take their protection for granted (Waltz, 1979: 168-170). And, so long as 
they do not transgress the interests of the dominant power, subordinates can choose 
their own policies for managing their relationship with the dominant power and 
securing their interests without creating interdependencies with their subordinate 
allies. As Waltz argues,  
 
‘In alliances among unequals, the contributions of the lesser members are at once 
wanted and of relatively small importance. In alliances among unequals, alliance 
leaders need worry little about the faithfulness of their followers, who usually have 
little choice anyway.’ (Waltz, 1988: 621). 
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Again, building on Waltz’s structural claims, Snyder argued that the alliance security 
dilemma is weak under bipolarity because entrapment, of the political if not always 
the military kind, is clearly the predominant risk for the subordinate states (1984, 
483). Not only is the risk of abandonment low, but there is little that subordinate 
states can do to avoid or mitigate it by offer of military support since their own 
capability is of such little consequence to the balance of power. As such, there is 
little tension between the risks of entrapment and abandonment, and therefore a far 
less acute dilemma. The best means of mitigating the inevitable entrapment risk is 
thus not necessarily to ‘move away’ but rather to boost influence over the dominant 
in any way possible. This may include ‘moving closer’ (Snyder, 1997: 185), a 
strategy that simultaneously bolsters the alliance’s political cohesion and helps 
reduce the risk, albeit already low, of abandonment. On the other hand, given that 
the risk of abandonment is low and subordinate state military capability is not 
decisive to the balance of power, support for the dominant state need not be 
absolute nor always in the same form; the way in which it is provided, whether in 
military, economic or diplomatic form, can be undertaken with considerable flexibility.  
 
Regarding the role of interests in an asymmetric alliance, Waltz did not attempt to 
integrate a formal conceptualisation of state interests into his theory, but he did bring 
the concept into his analyses of empirical case studies in the latter chapters of 
Theory of International Politics. He argued that there are ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ 
interests. And that, 
 
‘Alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common. 
The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states. Divergence 
comes when positive interests are at issue.’ (1979, 166) 
 
Waltz did not expand on this distinction in relation to the effects of different forms of 
system structure on interests, but it may be helpful to conclude the foregoing 
paragraphs by attempting to do so here. Under a multipolar alliance, while negative 
interests are central to the purpose of an alliance, positive interests are logically 
more peripheral. As seen above, however, under given circumstances positive 
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interests can become, by extension, alliance-wide interests16. For a bipolar alliance, 
negative interests are equally vital to alliance cohesion. Positive interests, however, 
do not present the same risk of entrapment under bipolarity and can be dealt with 
through the greater flexibility of strategy inherent in the alliance. Thus, it can be 
assumed that where allies in a bipolar alliance have shared negative interests, close 
cooperation over military matters is less problematic. On the other hand, where they 
have divergent positive or idiosyncratic interests, deep military cooperation will be 
very difficult because of the greater flexibility in strategy. And, given that the same 
military capabilities will usually need to be available to defend both negative and 
positive interests, it will be very difficult to align them even where negative interests 
are closely shared. 
 
Positive and negative interests also help clarify the way in which politico-military 
interdependence is low in a bipolar alliance. Although subordinate states depend 
heavily on the dominant state for their security, they expect to have their negative 
interests defended automatically and not to have to support all the many positive 
interests of the dominant state to the same degree or intensity that they would under 
a multipolar alliance. This situation also means that politico-military interdependence 
between the subordinate states themselves, viewed as a group apart from the 
dominant state, is very low because they do not rely on each other for their security.  
 
Both Waltz and Snyder deployed this theoretical approach to explain the impact of 
Cold War bipolarity on interdependence between European NATO states. For Waltz, 
low interdependence due to the asymmetry of power in a bipolar alliance explained, 
for example, why European states have historically been reluctant to respond to US 
pressure to spend more on defence, 
 
‘Some European states could afford to do more. The additional contribution that any 
of them might make, however, would have little impact’ (Waltz, 1979: 207) 
 
The theoretical assertion that subordinate states in a bipolar asymmetric alliance 
have high flexibility of strategy also allowed Waltz to explain why France could leave 
                                                     
16 The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 is perhaps the classic example of an apparently 
idiosyncratic event of only local relevance sparking off war across a multipolar system.  
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NATO command structures without significantly undermining the alliance. De Gaulle 
was simply using the opportunity presented by flexibility of strategy to seek leverage 
by distance from the US as a ‘third force’, a notably different approach from the 
British strategy of remaining as close as possible to Washington (1979, 169). A 
further example, though not cited by Waltz, is the British reaction to US pressure for 
a military contribution to the Vietnam War. The UK was entrapped into political 
support for the war, but because its military capability would not make any decisive 
military difference to its ally, it was able to withhold support for this ‘positive’ US 
interest. Beyond the Cold War, when extra-European expeditionary operations 
multiplied, this unilateralist behaviour continued in the splintering of European NATO 
state support for US interests, for example, in both Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, in 
Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2013. The reason for the continuation of this ‘bipolar’ 
behaviour beyond the collapse of the Cold War will be considered in more detail 
below. 
 
This use of military capabilities to support the dominant state and mitigate 
entrapment through what Robert Jervis has called the ‘struggle for influence’ is the 
primary subordinate state behaviour in the asymmetric alliance configuration (Jervis, 
2011: 276). It might be objected that a more compelling reason for subordinate 
states to generate and deploy military capabilities is to provide capability to the 
dominant state not for influence but rather to avoid the risk of abandonment. And 
indeed, in relation to NATO, this is the essence of the longstanding ‘burden sharing’ 
argument, where European states are routinely accused of free-riding on American 
military power (Gates, 2010)17. It would probably not be empirically sustainable to 
argue that there is zero impact from demands by Washington for European states to 
increase defence spending and do more on military operations. But is it generally 
more plausible that Europeans generate and deploy military capabilities to avoid 
abandonment caused by American frustration over low spending? Such a claim 
would have to be examined empirically in any given case. What is important to make 
clear here, however, is that according to the theory outlined above, it would not make 
sense for states to fear abandonment for such a reason. Under the theory outlined 
above, the dominant state protects subordinate states not because they are making 
                                                     
17 For example, former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates argued in 2010 that there was an ongoing ‘de-militarisation of 
Europe’, which threatened NATO. 
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a military contribution but because it is in its interests to do so. And this will be so 
regardless of how much the subordinate states spend on military capabilities, 
recalling that in an asymmetric alliance, those contributions are regarded as almost, 
though never entirely, inconsequential.  
 
Furthermore, if for any reason the dominant state decided it was not in its interests to 
defend the subordinate states, the level of their military contribution could be trebled 
or even quadrupled and logically it would make no difference to the decision. That 
said, the ‘struggle for influence’ might usefully be considered in broad reputational 
terms, i.e., in that a reputation for loyalty, reliability and contribution in military 
matters may simultaneously assuage both the entrapment and abandonment risk. 
But from the theoretical perspective outlined here, subordinate state responses to 
calls for greater ‘burden sharing’ are better explained as diplomatic politesse or as 
motivated by a desire to retain influence, rather than a fear of abandonment; so long 
as abandonment is unlikely the preeminent strategic end of subordinate states will 
be that of mitigating entrapment (Bird, 2013: 119)18. 
 
To conclude, the significance of low politico-military interdependence between 
subordinate states, and the resultant high flexibility of strategy for dealing with the 
positive or idiosyncratic interests of the dominant state, is that there is little systemic 
pressure to support each other over the dominant state’s own positive interests. 
Thus, while subordinate states may share very closely their negative interests, on 
the crucial matter of the positive interests of the dominant state, or indeed of each 
other, there is significant flexibility. More generally, however, this logic of the struggle 
for influence is shared across subordinate states. Thus, there is a rationale for 
concerting influencing strategies where possible, but also a very significant 
constraint in that there is considerable uncertainty over whether, when and how 





                                                     
18 Tim Bird has argued convincingly that a perennial issue such as burden sharing is simply a ‘constitutive’ feature of NATO.  
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The durability of alliances 
 
Waltz made a second important claim about the effects of structure on alliances, 
again developed by Snyder, and that is the way in which the bipolar structure 
enables subordinate states to engage in deep cooperation by mitigating the effects 
of anarchy and relative gains concerns. Waltz noted that in the case of Western 
Europe under bipolarity its states could not effectively balance US power without 
amalgamation into a super-state, a possible development, but one that would breach 
the assumption that they seek to ‘survive’ as independent units (1979: 180). The 
subordinate state position does, however, come with an important structural 
advantage, and this is that the overwhelming power of the US means that Europeans 
no longer need to concern themselves with balancing each other. The suppression 
of balancing means there is no longer a security dilemma between subordinate 
states, or at least its significance is heavily diminished. Anarchy remains the 
condition of the international system at large, but the stability of bipolarity leads to 
rigidity of alignment, which for European states means something close to an 
absence of anarchy between themselves over a long duration. Waltz claimed that 
the absence of balancing between European states is itself a structural effect of the 
US security guarantee because, ‘Balancing among states is not inevitable. As in 
Europe, a hegemonic power may suppress it.’ (Waltz, 1991: 26) 
 
Josef Joffe has restated this perspective arguing that, 
 
‘[The US] guarantee is normally seen only as a cornerstone of the global Soviet-
American balance, with the United States providing a counterweight to Soviet power 
that the West Europeans were unable to provide for themselves. Yet by extending its 
guarantee, the United States removed the prime structural cause of conflict among 
states - the search for an autonomous defense policy’ (Joffe, 1984: 68).  
 
This lack of balancing among European states thus made possible deep cooperation 
in a wide variety of policy areas. As Waltz argued in Theory of International Politics, 
 
‘The emergence of Russian and American superpowers created a situation that 
permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states of Western 
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Europe… Not all impediments to cooperation were removed but one important one 
was - the fear that the greater advantage of one would be translated into military 
force to be used against the other… Because the security of all of them came to 
depend ultimately on the policies of others, rather than on their own, unity could 
effectively be worked for, although not easily achieved.’ (1979, 70) 
 
Christopher Layne has underlined the point, arguing that,  
 
‘In effect, the American military presence removed both the security dilemma, and 
the relative gains problem, from the agendas of its Western European allies’ (2000: 
74). 
 
Robert Powell made a similarly compelling argument, when he suggested that such 
structural conditions could explain a shift in state behavior from fear of others making 
relative gains to an embrace of absolute gains, 
 
‘If the use of force is no longer at issue, then a state's relative loss will not be turned 
against that state. Relative gains no longer matter, and cooperation now becomes 
feasible’ (Powell, 1991: 1316).  
 
To accept this explanation is not necessarily to argue that neorealist theory expects 
that conflict between European NATO states is impossible. It is rather to argue that it 
is highly unlikely because the main structural cause of war, i.e., the fear of the other 
under anarchy, is not present. The effect of US dominance on those states under the 
security guarantee is therefore to ‘turn off’, or at least ‘turn down’, the condition of 
anarchy between themselves. And, while European states may contribute to 
balancing other powers external to NATO, their contribution is not, according to the 
Waltzian analysis above, deemed sufficiently significant relative to the might of US 
protection. The consequences of this theoretical argument appear quite profound, 
yet few scholars have integrated them explicitly into theoretical accounts of 
European defence cooperation (Locatteli and Testoni, 2009; Collard-Wexler, 2006: 
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406) 19. David Lake has drawn on this situation to make the bold claim that the role 
of the United States in these circumstances changes the organising principle of the 
international system to one of hierarchy rather than anarchy (Lake, 2009). This 
thesis takes a different view, echoing that of Waltz (1970, 107) which is that anarchy 
has not disappeared from the system under such circumstances. Rather, its effects 
have been suppressed by the presence of a particular structural-relational context. 
This leads to a durable alliance, but it remains an alliance or a treaty of guarantee 
between sovereign states, and thus remains susceptible to dissolution at some 
unknown point in the future. 
 
Thus, it is argued here that the durability of an asymmetric alliance leads to a much-
diluted security dilemma and the greatly reduced fear of others making relative 
gains, and this means that deep cooperation such as capability mutualisation is 
possible. Such a conclusion opens up the possibility that, contrary to the general 
neorealist assumption that anarchy rules out international specialisation in matters of 
security, it may in fact be possible under certain conditions. Pace Howorth and 
Menon, then, the logic of international politics does not work ‘in much the same way’ 
within Europe as beyond it. On the contrary, a very different logic operates among 
subordinate states within an asymmetric alliance configuration and, when such a 
theoretical approach is applied, this has important ramifications for explanations of 
European defence cooperation and capability mutualisation. 
 
Unipolarity and alliance behaviour 
 
Before going any further with the explication of the theoretical approach undertaken 
in this thesis, it is necessary to consider the extent to which contemporary 
international politics can be described in terms of system polarity. The foregoing 
analysis, based on that of Waltz and Snyder, has been confined to consideration of 
the impact of multipolar and bipolar structures and relationship variables on alliance 
behaviour, with reference to NATO during the Cold War as an example. The 
international system, however, can no longer be reasonably described as bipolar. 
                                                     
19 Locatteli and Testoni are an exception, as they recognise that asymmetry ‘softens intra-allied competition’, although their 
broader approach is quite different from that undertaken here. Collard-Wexler speculates that a reduction in the intensity of 
anarchy might be a plausible explanation for deeper European cooperation. 
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And NATO’s persistence in the absence of a bipolar confrontation has presented a 
challenge to neorealist theory, which rests on the notion of balance of power as a 
fundamental condition of the system (Mearsheimer 1990, Waltz 2000). The question 
as to whether the contemporary international system is best classified as unipolar or 
multipolar remains controversial.  
 
Most neorealist scholars argue that the contemporary states system is unipolar 
because the US has unrivalled military capabilities (Wohlforth 1999; Jervis, 2011). It 
has been argued, for example, that the fact that the US spends more on defence 
than the rest of the world combined is evidence in favour of unipolarity (Wohlforth, 
2011: 9). In the absence of any clear balance of power, such questions involve large 
degrees of judgement. Empirical reality is complex, particularly given the possession 
of nuclear weapons by several states, and in the case of Russia, an arsenal still 
comparable to that of the US; indeed, some argue that nuclear-armed Russia and 
China have sufficient military capabilities to be described as poles in the system 
(Haine, 2015). The theoretical approach developed in this thesis will, however, 
assume that, from a neorealist perspective, the US has such unparalleled global 
military reach as to remain the unipolar power in the contemporary states system. 
 
Given this assumption, how might unipolarity impact on the conditions identified 
above in respect of states in such an asymmetrical alliance? As discussed, Press-
Barnathan has argued that the shift to unipolarity had a transformative effect on the 
nature of the alliance security dilemma for subordinate states within NATO. She has 
argued that in the absence of any structural pressure for the US to defend Europe, 
there would logically be a greater fear of abandonment among Europeans. 
Simultaneously, however, there would be a greater risk of entrapment as the US 
became less restrained in the absence of a balancing power (2006). Thus, the shift 
to unipolarity could be interpreted as increasing the intensity of the alliance security 
dilemma. Others have made similar claims, arguing that the shift from bipolarity to 
unipolarity has meant that fear of abandonment is now the main concern of 
European states (Matlary and Petersson, 2013: 6; Dyson, 2013: 428; Jones, 2007).  
 
And yet this may be to attribute too much importance to the effects of a change in 
system structure on an alliance whose internal relationship dynamics have in fact 
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changed little. The balance of power logic of an American defence of Europe is quite 
clearly lessened under unipolarity, but it does not logically follow that the US would 
no longer see Europe as a vital interest. Indeed, it has explicitly claimed to do so, at 
least within the period under examination here (US Department of Defense, 2012)20. 
Abandonment under unipolarity seems only marginally more likely than under 
bipolarity. Has the risk of entrapment grown any more likely? Because the power 
relationship remains fundamentally asymmetrical, divergence of most lower level 
interests may not be of any greater consequence than it was during the Cold War, 
despite what Waltz called the greater ‘capriciousness’ of a unipolar power (2000: 
29). So long as there is agreement on the negative interests that the dominant and 
subordinate states see defended in the continuation of the alliance, i.e., the territorial 
defence of Europe, divergences in other interests can still be managed. Flexibility of 
strategy may not be as high as it was during the Cold War when Western European 
states could use relations with the Soviet Union for diplomatic leverage. However, 
the vast capability asymmetry at the heart of the alliance ensures that there remains 
significant flexibility, for example, in the way in which European states provide 
military support for ‘Article 5’ commitments and to US-led operations ‘out of area’, 
and indeed whether they support the latter at all.  
 
Layne has argued persuasively from empirical evidence that the US saw a strategic 
interest in continuing to provide a security guarantee to European states even after 
the end of the Cold War, 
 
‘In the post-Cold War world, NATO was key to the US objectives of controlling 
Germany, preventing Russia's resurgence as a great power, and expanding the 
geographical and ideological scope of American interests in Europe.’ (Layne, 2000: 
68) 
 
And, for their part, European states themselves still required an alignment with US 
military power, as much to maintain the suppression of balancing between 
themselves as to defend against potential future threats such as a revanchist Russia. 
                                                     
20  The US Defence Strategic Guidance notes that: ‘The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and 
prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is critical to the security of Europe and 
beyond’. 
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Robert Art has explored the considerable concerns that were voiced over the 
‘renationalisation of defence’ among European governments following the end of the 
Cold War (Art, 1996). Thus, as Waltz argued, 
 
‘Accepting the leadership of a hegemonic power prevents a balance of power from 
emerging in Europe, and better the hegemonic power should be at a distance than 
next door’ (Waltz, 1991: 26). 
 
Thus, the ‘problem’ of the continuation of NATO is one for neorealist theory in its 
purely Waltzian structural guise, rather than to a generally plausible empirical 
explanation. A theoretical explanation for the continuation of NATO and the US 
security guarantee in the absence of a structural explanation is, however, aided by 
use of Snyder’s relationship variables if it can be shown that the continued alignment 
of interests is sufficient for the alliance to continue under unipolarity. As Snyder 
argued, ‘Alliances - for example, NATO today - may outlast a structural change that 
logically calls for their dissolution’ (Snyder, 1996: 175). And although he did not, 
perhaps could not, present it in neorealist terms given the limitations of purely 
structural analysis, the importance of an alignment of interests also appears to have 
been Waltz’s own conclusion on the matter (Waltz, 2000: 20). 
 
It is reasonable to conclude then, that the nature of the unipolar system structure and 
the continuation of the NATO alliance based on common, or at least convergent, 
interests provides sufficient continuity to allow for the same theoretical claims 
outlined above to remain relevant to the study of contemporary military cooperation 
in Europe. If the transatlantic alliance is understood as an alignment that exerts its 
own independent effects, then certain effects may be expected to continue even 
given a shift in polarity, as long as those shifts in polarity do not fundamentally 
undermine the logic of the relationship variables operating within the configurations 
set out above. In other words, the weak alliance security dilemma that is produced 
by low interdependence and durability is not necessarily a result of bipolarity alone. 
The asymmetry of the alliance does not necessarily require bipolarity to exert similar 
effects; asymmetric capabilities and aligned interests may be sufficient. As such, 
relationship variables can help to explain why state behaviour in the transatlantic 
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alliance has not changed greatly even following the major structural change of the 
end of the Cold War.  
 
The paragraphs above demonstrate that the combination of Waltz’s structural 
approach, and Snyder’s extension of neorealism to the relationship variables that 
explain the formation and subsequent internal dynamics of alliances can be 
combined to provide what is termed in this thesis a structural-relational configuration. 
Thus, the dominant-subordinate or asymmetric alliance configuration explains certain 
critical dynamics within a heavily asymmetric alliance in a bipolar or unipolar system 
structure. It is now necessary then to outline a model of behaviour and outcomes 
based on how the asymmetric alliance configuration shapes both the strategies of 
subordinate states and the shape of their military capabilities, and their interactions 
in the context of local alliance configurations. 
 
The logic of behaviour under an asymmetric alliance configuration  
 
First, then, taking subordinate state strategies in isolation, the asymmetric alliance 
configuration can be said to shape the form and intensity of the alliance security 
dilemma that they face (Snyder, 1984; 1986)21. Thus, whereas in a multipolar, 
broadly symmetrical alliance, allies will fear entrapment and abandonment 
simultaneously and equally strongly, in the asymmetric alliance configuration, the 
primary fear is one of entrapment into the policies of the dominant state. While 
complete abandonment is possible, given the structural-relational factors that sustain 
the alliance, it is less likely and therefore a secondary concern. As Snyder observed, 
such an alliance security dilemma is ‘weak’ in that there is little immediate tension 
between the entrapment and abandonment risk (1984: 484). Thus, from this 
asymmetric alliance security dilemma can be derived the strategic ends that 
subordinate states will tend to pursue. The identification of these strategic ends 
allows for the classification of concrete interests for which military capability is 
generated and deployed, and which is therefore instrumental to those strategic ends. 
The asymmetric alliance configuration set out above thus shapes a means-ends 
logic of behaviour among subordinate states in relation to their military capabilities, 
                                                     
21 This claim about the alliance security dilemma is indebted to Snyder, but is perhaps novel in its expression as a 
configurational function of both structural and relational factors. 
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the systemic logic of which is set out in figure 2.1. The strategic ends of subordinate 
states can thus be expressed as follows: 
 
Mitigating entrapment or ‘the struggle for influence’: the most important objective, 
and for which subordinate state military capability provides the means, is to garner 
influence with the dominant state to prevent, or at least to mitigate politico-military 
entrapment. As has been shown, however, this does not determine behaviour on 
every occasion because subordinate states also have considerable flexibility in how 
they support the dominant state’s positive interests.  
 
Hedging against abandonment: subordinate states may have faith in the longevity of 
the alliance, but they cannot be entirely sure of the extent of its durability. They 
therefore have an interest in maintaining some military capabilities, and the capacity 
to generate them autonomously, to hedge against an uncertain future. The extent to 
which subordinate states can do so will, of course, vary according to the level of their 
power resources. 
 
Autonomy for positive or idiosyncratic interests: subordinate states will seek to retain 
sufficient operational autonomy for core territorial defence and positive/non-alliance 




Figure 2.1. The shaping of strategic ends and concrete interests 
Level: unit action
Concrete interests:
e.g., UK supports US over Iraq in 2003 (mitigate entrapment)
e.g., UK maintains defence aerospace industry (mitigate abandonment)
e.g., UK retains capability to defend Falkland islands (idiosyncratic interest)
Level: aysmmetric alliance
'Strategic ends':
Mitigate entrapment - primary
Mitigate abandonment - secondary
Meet positive or idiosyncratic interests - 'residual'




The analytical purpose behind identifying these strategic ends is to provide a way to 
frame and explain the means-ends rationale of subordinate state behaviour in 
relation to the concrete, empirical interests that will arise in the analyses that follow 
in later chapters of this thesis. The formulation above requires clarification as to the 
definition of ‘concrete interests’. As Hedley Bull noted in relation to the idea of ‘the 
national interest’, what is critical is a definition of the ends that such interests are 
assumed to follow rather than the content of any given concrete interest. Thus, 
 
‘the criterion of ‘national interest’ or ‘interest of state’, in itself provides us with no 
specific guidance either in interpreting the behaviour of states or in prescribing how 
they should behave - unless we are told what concrete ends or objectives states do 
or should pursue: security, prosperity, ideological objectives or whatever’ (Bull, 1977: 
63). 
 
Contrary to Snyder’s approach to interests, which involves their division into 
instrumental and values-based or ‘intrinsic’ interests (1996: 176), this thesis will 
simply assume that concrete interests are derived from and are instrumental towards 
the strategic ends set out above, which are themselves derived from the ultimate 
neorealist end of survival22. The advantage of such a conceptualisation of ends and 
interests is that it provides a logic of action for subordinate states in relation to the 
generation and deployment of their military capabilities, i.e., an answer to the 
question as to why subordinate states under a heavily asymmetric alliance would 
feel it necessary to sustain any military capabilities at all. And it is this logic of action 
that shapes to a considerable extent the degree to which they can mutualise their 
capabilities with their subordinate peers. It therefore provides a conceptual map as to 
the likely divergence and convergence of concrete interests within any given local 
alliance configuration, and which may have implications for the possibility of 
capability mutualisation. 
 
                                                     
22 This is obviously a simplification of empirical reality for theoretical and analytical purposes. It is possible that some concrete 
interests may arise from value interests, such as the doctrine of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ or public opinion outraged over mass 
human rights abuses. But given that strategic ends are themselves assumed to be instrumental to the neorealist objective of 
survival, there is at least theoretical consistency in the simplification. 
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The logic of mutualisation: capability mutualisation within a local alliance 
configuration 
 
It is now necessary to consider how the asymmetric alliance configuration shapes 
the more particular local alliance configurations that may arise between states within 
the alliance, and which will have a crucial effect on the likelihood and form of 
capability mutualisation. Such divergences and convergences include those 
idiosyncratic interests identified above, as well as the different scale and function of 
their military capabilities that may or may not be well-aligned with each other. By 
drawing together the alliance and local configurations, it is now possible to set out a 
theoretical model that can encapsulate the necessary variables to explain the 
occurrence and form of military capability mutualisation. 
 
The situational context of the local alliance configuration, which is itself nested within 
the asymmetric alliance configuration, shapes whether and in what form capability 
mutualisation will arise between subordinate states, and it does so in four ways. 
First, the durability of the alliance, derived from the asymmetric alliance 
configuration, means that there is likely to be sufficient confidence for the long-term 
mutualisation of those aspects of military capabilities whose development and 
production takes place at a temporal distance from operational use (for example, 
aspects of defence industrial design and production). Second, while low 
interdependence mitigates against mutualisation at the frontline, there may be 
occasions where the alignment of a concrete interest is sufficiently high to create 
strong expectations of mutual support (for example, in the policing of territorial 
airspace). Third, the flexibility of policy inherent in a context of low interdependence 
and high durability may enable mutualisation of capabilities whose function enables 
use at a greater spatial distance from the operational frontline (for example, support 
services to vessels and aircraft) where the political risks are lower.  
 
Finally, some element of symmetry or balanced asymmetry in terms of the function 
of capability offered up for mutualisation by each partner is vital (Pannier, 2016) 23. 
                                                     
23 This ‘symmetrism’ has also been noted by Pannier in her study of contemporary Franco-British defence cooperation. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is regarded as axiomatic that states will behave in such a way in the pursuit of means-ends strategies, 
i.e., that tit-for-tat (in either positive or negative senses) defines international cooperation. 
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For partners to accept capability mutualisation, it is necessary for each side to offer 
to sustain important elements of that capability through sharing or specialisation, a 
situation that may be described as ‘win-win’. Without this ‘match-making’ aspect, 
capability mutualisation is impossible. This final variable thus places important 
material restrictions and opportunities on mutualisation between states. The different 
configurations of variables that may lead to the occurrence of different forms of 




Figure 2.2. Structural-relational configurations and capability mutualisation 
 
The inherent difficulty of capability mutualisation can be illustrated by sketching a 
utopian image of ‘perfect capability mutualisation’. If two states had exactly the same 
capabilities and future requirements and exactly the same concrete interests, all with 
complete certainty of mutual support at the same temporal points, then mutualisation 
would not be an issue at all. The variables of concrete interest, temporality and 
capability function would be in perfect alignment. There would be no entrapment or 
abandonment risk to worry about, and as such, autonomy would not be an issue 
either. States would retain their sovereignty-autonomy in the sense of strategic 
decision-making, but any need for autonomous control over aspects of particular 
capabilities would be made irrelevant by the identity of interests and capabilities. In 
absolute terms, such a situation is utopian; states could never be so clearly aligned, 
not just because of variations in systemic factors but also because of their myriad 
domestic differences in interests and capabilities. Waltz makes a similar point when 
he compares this kind of cooperation with oligopolistic markets and the impossibility 
of collusion across all variables (Waltz, 1979: 105). In more partial terms, however, it 
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is possible that there may be sufficient alignment of such variables under particular 
circumstances to allow for mutualisation of military capabilities at different points in 
the value chain or DLODs of their generation and deployment. It is possible to 
extract three hypotheses from the model set out above, and these will now be set out 
in turn below. 
 
i. Capability mutualisation at temporal distance from the frontline 
 
In an anarchic system an eternal alliance cannot be expected, but where there are 
beneficial structural-relational conditions, a highly durable alliance is possible. This 
may lead to a relaxation of the intensity of anarchy and thus concerns over the 
security dilemma and relative gains. The previous section posed the question as to 
how neorealism could explain those examples of mutualisation, such as defence 
industrial cooperation, that do not necessarily imply mutual dependence on the 
frontline of operations. It is argued that the answer lies in the temporal stability 
provided by the asymmetric alliance configuration. The dilution of the logic of self-
help and the relative gains conundrum provides the temporal space for mutualisation 
aimed at economic efficiency through specialisation and sharing. Beyond a certain 
timeframe, perhaps measured in a couple of decades, it cannot be known whether 
the benign conditions for cooperation will prevail. There is, however, sufficient 
confidence to significantly lower the risk of mutual dependence for military 
capabilities. There is therefore an alternative to self-help in the generation of military 
capabilities. The temporal longevity of the alliance together with the asymmetry of 
power with the dominant state, however, also allows for states to hedge against the 
risk of being entrapped or abandoned by their partners into divergent interests. Thus, 
states in this situation remain sovereignty-autonomous decision-makers, but they do 
not need to rely solely on self-help. This quasi-hierarchical condition means that they 
can work together to specialise or share in the provision of military capabilities 
without fear of an alliance security dilemma of entrapment or abandonment arising 
between them. As such, the following hypothesis can be put forward: 
 
H1: Aspects of capability mutualisation may be found at high temporal distance from 
the frontline, with or without a high alignment of concrete interests. 
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ii. Capability mutualisation at the frontline 
 
The problem of capability mutualisation at the frontline is the most challenging for 
subordinate states that seek efficiencies through specialisation and sharing. For 
even where there is a stable, long-term suppression of anarchy between the 
subordinate states of the alliance, there remains a significant variation in the 
alignment of concrete interests due to the inherent flexibility in the dominant-
subordinate configuration. Low interdependence means that there is an absence of 
pressure to meet any interest with temporally and functionally aligned deployment of 
military capability. Strategic ends provide some insight into where alignments of 
concrete interests and capability requirements may occur, but this insight is limited 
by the high variation in the interests and capabilities of subordinate states. States 
have high flexibility over the terms of both their pursuit of the struggle for influence 
over the dominant state and their own idiosyncratic positive interests. Regarding the 
struggle for influence, this flexibility means that states may choose the temporal and 
functional dimensions of their contribution to any concrete interest pursued by the 
dominant state interest. Because the aggregation of military capability is never vital 
to the dominant state in the asymmetric alliance it means that there is considerable 
flexibility for subordinate states over the timing and form of their military contribution 
particularly to positive interests. Thus, due to the low level of interdependence, the 
way in which subordinate states determine their own attitude to the concrete interest 
vis-à-vis that of the dominant state will tend to be an idiosyncratic combination of 
systemic and unit-level factors depending upon domestic politics and personalities.  
 
The inherent flexibility in the way in which subordinate states can carry out their 
struggle for influence over the dominant state, and some of their residual 
idiosyncratic interests, means that temporally immediate, functional alignment of 
capability is very difficult, and hence restricts mutualisation of capability on the 
frontline. Even if two subordinate states were to support the dominant state over a 
positive interest, whether that interest were shared or unshared, they could not 
necessarily guarantee doing so simultaneously or offer similar capabilities as a 
contribution24. This is despite the fact that there may be a very strong alignment 
                                                     
24 While it raises some potentially important issues, the question of command and control of mutualised military capabilities, 
which is obviously of particular relevance to frontline mutualisation, is not tackled directly in this thesis. It is sufficient to note 
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between all allies as regards the negative interest of territorial defence, as is the 
case, for example, for the NATO alliance’s ‘Article 5’ mutual defence clause. And 
were there only negative interests, frontline mutualisation would be far more likely. 
The problem, however, is that because military capabilities are rarely earmarked to 
concrete interests, even a strong alignment of interests cannot be easily translated 
into frontline capability mutualisation.  
 
There are, however, some exceptions. This is because some concrete interests and 
the capabilities required to meet them may also be relatively fixed. As will be seen in 
a forthcoming chapter, for example, territorial air policing may be such an exception. 
In these circumstances, ‘frontline’ mutualisation of capabilities is possible. As will be 
explored below, it is possible that through the mutualisation of support functions, 
cooperation for efficiency is also possible much closer, in both temporal and spatial 
terms, to the frontline. But frontline mutualisation will not occur unless there is a very 
high certainty that there will be a full alignment over a concrete interest. This can be 
expressed in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Capability mutualisation may be found at zero temporal-spatial distance from the 
frontline where there is a very high certainty of support for concrete interests. 
 
iii. Capability mutualisation at functional distance from frontline 
 
While it is the case that there is low interdependence between subordinate states 
vis-à-vis the concrete interests of the dominant state and thus high flexibility, there is 
in general a strong alignment between them because they have the same strategic 
ends. Subordinate states wish to exert influence over the dominant state to mitigate 
entrapment. It is this observation that has prompted scholars to explain some EU 
defence cooperation initiatives as attempts to concert such strategies. The 
hypothesis above suggests that this is very difficult to do as regards frontline 
mutualisation. There is, however, a way in which states can draw on their flexibility to 
pursue such mutualisation across functions that are removed from the frontline and 
                                                     
that neither command nor control need be under exclusively national control. All NATO states put their forces to some degree 
under NATO command, and states may create bilateral arrangements to put their forces under the direct command of an 
official of another state, such as the French and British in the later stages of World War I, potentially in the new Combined Joint 
Expeditionary Force (see Chapter 4), and in the BENELUX arrangements for joint air-policing (see Chapter 5). 
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thus carry less risk of entrapment and abandonment. Maintenance and support 
functions, for example, particularly for the air and maritime components of forces are 
likely to be at far less risk than frontline forces. Some functions may be literally in 
‘stand-off’ positions such as reconnaissance aircraft or satellites, and fixed 
infrastructure for training may be based within subordinate state territories. Such 
possibilities can be encapsulated in the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Capability mutualisation may be found at functional distance from the frontline, 
with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
Capability mutualisation and risk 
 
The previous paragraphs demonstrate that possibilities for the mutualisation of 
military capabilities are both enabled and constrained by the situational context 
provided by the alliance wide and local alliance configurations. The discussion above 
suggests that aspects of capability mutualisation are quite possible at high temporal 
and functional distance from the frontline and less likely, though not impossible, at 
low temporal and functional distance, i.e., when there is a high expectation that 
some concrete interest will be shared, both temporally and functionally. 
 
The logic of the model can be represented in figure 2.3. On the y axis there is the 
variable of concrete interests with the value of low to high alignment (defined as 
expectation of support) over any a concrete interest, whether negative or positive. 
On the x axis there is the variable of distance from the frontline with the value of low 
to high temporal and functional distance. Thus, the higher the expectations of 
support over a given interest, the lower the distance a mutually dependent capability 
can be from immediate frontline use. And the lower the alignment over a given 
interest, the further the distance from frontline use of the capability, both in temporal 




Figure 2.3. Relationship between frontline distance and interest alignment 
 
It can also be postulated that cases that can be found at the two extreme points of 
the curve involve relatively little risk for the partner states. If, however, cases fall 
between the two points there may be an element of risk of entrapment or 
abandonment by the partner. This is expressed in the penumbra of doubt in Figure 
2.3. There is an element of risk management in such cooperation. It would not be 
expected, however, that states would embark on frontline mutualisation where there 
is a low expectation of shared interests. This leads to a more general expectation for 
the thesis, which is that there may be higher or lower risk ‘intermediate’ possibilities 
within a penumbra of doubt. 
 
General and particular explanations of capability mutualisation 
 
Other than in setting out the systemic conditions under which it is possible, the 
model set out above cannot explain why any concrete, empirical example of 
capability mutualisation has occurred. For such explanations, it would be necessary 
to look to several other variables, particularly at the unit or domestic level. For the 
same reason, neither can the theory be expected to explain when such mutualisation 
will occur, other than in the general sense that it may occur when systemic 
conditions are favourable. The theory does, however, provide a more general 
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answer to the when and why questions, and this relates to efficiency as the 
fundamental motivation for capability mutualisation, achieved by reducing costs or 
sustaining the ability to generate capability through specialisation and sharing. 
Exactly when and why a state may need to find a more efficient way of sustaining its 
military capabilities is a matter for empirical investigation. We can, however, posit the 
general expectation that states will seek greater efficiency when it is possible due to 
favourable systemic configurations. It is also reasonable to assume, however, that 
mutualisation is more likely to be pursued when pressure is greater, i.e., when states 
have particular difficulty in resourcing those strategic ends identified above. This 
provides the theoretical underpinning for the section in each of the following case 
studies that considers the ‘logic of crisis’ in the resourcing of the strategic ends of 
European states, as set out above. 
 
The utility of the model outlined above then, is that it explains how it is possible for 
states to mutualise capability for efficiency and the likely form this will take, 
depending on the shape of structural-relational configurations. The logic of the theory 
also furnishes the broader assumption that states will generally seek efficiency 
wherever this is possible, and more particularly when the means to meet their 
strategic ends are pressure. Thus, the theory and the model abstracted from it sets 
out broad conditions for the ‘why’ and ‘when’ questions, and a set of more fine-
grained hypotheses as to the shape of the ‘how’.  
 
The theoretical challenge established at the outset of this chapter was that of the 
apparent neorealist proscription against capability mutualisation for efficiency in the 
face of empirical evidence to the contrary. It has been argued that by broadening the 
scope of neorealism by adding relational variables to Waltz’s structural approach to 
identify ‘structural-relational’ systemic configurations, it is possible to explain 
mutualisation through specialisation and sharing from a broadly neorealist 
perspective. The suppression of the security dilemma and relative gains concerns 
and the durability of the asymmetric alliance configuration means that mutualisation 
is possible at temporal distance from the frontline. Secondly, it is possible that the 
high bar for operational or ‘frontline’ mutualisation can be met, or that it can be 
approached very closely, when there is a high certainty that concrete interests will be 
aligned. Finally, the flexibility inherent in the asymmetric alliance configuration 
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means that capability mutualisation can also take place at a spatial or functional 
distance from the frontline. These theoretical expectations thus provide three 
hypotheses as to the conditions under which military capability mutualisation will be 








This thesis sets out to develop a neorealist theory of military capability mutualisation 
and test it against concrete cases in contemporary Europe. It is now necessary to set 
out the methodology by which the theory outlined in the previous chapter is to be 
deployed against empirical evidence. The meaning of methodology in this context 
has two dimensions. The first is that a chosen methodology ought to reflect the 
‘philosophical assumptions’ or core ontological and epistemological positions of the 
theory to be deployed. Secondly, and following on from these assumptions, it refers 
to the articulation of the concrete methods of gathering and assessing empirical 
evidence particular to the thesis (Jackson, 2011: 69).  
 
The first section of this chapter will therefore set out and respond to various scholarly 
controversies as to the meta-theoretical underpinnings of neorealism and the 
methodologies most appropriate to its application. It will argue that via a careful 
reading of Waltz’s own writings and his intellectual milieu, it is possible to put 
together a methodological approach that is based on a plausible interpretation of his 
philosophical assumptions. The section will emphasise how important it is to 
understand the role of causation and comparison in neorealist theory in order to 
underpin the choice and use of research methods. The second section of the chapter 
will then set out a ‘mixed methods’ approach that draws on both quantitative and 
qualitative research, and various empirical sources. It will consider issues such as 
the number of case studies to be examined and the nature and role of evidence from 
thirty elite-level interviews carried out for the thesis. Finally, it will explain how a 
series of three analytical narratives will provide a framework for each case study. 
 
i. Neorealism and methodology 
 
Neorealism – contested foundations  
 
For many theory-driven research projects, the understanding of methodology in 
terms of its core philosophical assumptions is not regarded as a key issue because 
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the link between a theoretical approach and its methodology is deemed relatively 
uncontroversial. Yet identifying an appropriate methodology for use in conjunction 
with neorealist theory is not such a straightforward task. Indeed, there is 
considerable disagreement among scholars as to Waltz’s ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, and therefore, the appropriate methodology by which 
neorealist research can be undertaken. His approach has been described variously 
as ‘positivist’ (Joseph, 2010; Humphreys, 2012), as having similarities to ‘critical 
realism’ (Waever, 2009), as ‘constructivist’ (Onuf, 2009), ‘structural-functionalist’ 
(Goddard and Nexon, 2005), ‘ideal-typical’ (Jackson, 2011) and ‘pragmatic’ (Buzan-
Jones, 1993). This diverse interpretation of Waltz reflects, as Adam Humphreys has 
argued, the ambiguity of his work on fundamental ontological and epistemological 
matters (Humphreys, 2013: 2012). There is not sufficient space here to set out and 
fully justify a novel ontological and epistemological reading of Waltz. It is important, 
however, to make clear the positions that this thesis takes on these matters, 
because it is on these foundations that the methodological approach is justified. 
Thus, there are four related areas on which to take a position and help to explicate 
the more concrete aspects of the methodology to be deployed. They are as follows: 
the ontological status of structure in neorealism, Waltz’s distinction between 
systemic and analytic theories, the conception of causation in neorealism and finally 
the place of comparison in neorealist analysis.  
 
First, regarding ontology, there is considerable debate as to the ontological status of 
system structure in neorealist theory. As Colin Wight asks, how can Waltz’s 
apparently highly abstract conception of structure have independent effects on ‘real’ 
states to the extent that it can ‘shape and shove’ their actions (Wight, 2006: 97)? Ole 
Waever has conjectured that Waltz may have conceived of structure in a similar way 
to adherents of critical realism, wherein social structures are ascribed ‘real’ 
tendencies and emergent properties that exert independent effects (Waever, 2009: 
204). Jonathon Joseph, however, has dismissed this notion, arguing that Waltz took 
an ‘empirical realist’ position in which structure was purely ‘instrumental’ and theory 
based on an ‘as if’ reading of reality, 
 
‘Structure exists in the theoretical model, not in the real world… There is nothing out 
there that Waltz’s theory of structure can be said to refer to.’ (2010: 487). 
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Thus, for Joseph, neorealism cannot call on the ‘real powers’ of emergent properties 
and tendencies in the way that critical realists may, because Waltz’s approach does 
not allow for such ‘real’ causal entities (487). Yet, this does not capture the position 
implied by Waltz at various points in his Theory of International Politics (1979); 
indeed, he argued that, 
 
‘Something works as a constraint on the agents or is interposed between them and 
the outcomes their actions contribute to. In international politics systems-level forces 
seem to be at work’ (1979: 39). 
 
Waltz does not use the language of ‘emergent properties’ as critical realists do, and 
instead writes of ‘forces’ and ‘unobservables’, but it is plausible that he regarded 
‘systems-level forces’ as equivalent to the concept of emergence in systems theory. 
And thus, contra Joseph, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Waltz did believe that 
there was ‘something out there’ in the form of independent forces that ‘seem to be at 
work’ in international politics. But how does Waltz translate empirical observation of 
real forces into his theory? As will be argued below, an answer is to be found in his 
view of neorealism as a systems theory and in an interpretation of Waltz’s view of 
causation drawn from acknowledged influences and his wider intellectual milieu. 
 
The second crucial aspect of neorealism is that it is a system theory. In Theory of 
International Politics, Waltz makes a crucial distinction between system theories and 
‘analytic’ theories. For Waltz, the analytic method is, 
 
‘preeminently the method of classical physics and because of its immense success 
often thought of as the method of science, [it] requires reducing the entity to its 
discrete parts and examining their properties and connections… By controlled 
experiments the relation between each pair of variables is separately examined’ 
(1979: 39). 
 
For Waltz, the ‘analytic’ approach or what John Stuart Mill called the ‘chemical or 
experimental method of social science’ (Mill, 2009: 1066), and Patrick Jackson 
describes as the ‘neopositivist’ case comparison method (Jackson, 2011: 70) is not 
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appropriate for the study of international politics. This is because in such a realm, 
‘the structure of the system and its interacting units mutually affect each other’ (1979: 
58; Goddard and Nexon, 2005: 10). This claim is also the source of Waltz’s central 
contention in Man, the State and War, i.e., that the international system as a 
‘framework for action’ must also be a regarded as causally important to outcomes in 
international politics, not merely individuals and the states to which they belong 
(1959: 231). This leads to the third issue, that of the neorealist view of causation. 
Here, Waltz posits that in a systems approach, causation is always running in two 
directions, from the units to the system and vice-versa. Thus, any actual historical 
outcome in international politics will always be explained as caused by both, perhaps 
one more than the other, but always by both. As a system-level cause, structure 
shapes and shoves (it does not determine), and the two types of causation must be 
disentangled through theoretically-informed analysis. 
 
This view of causation within a system leads the discussion back to the ontological 
status of structure, a matter that Waltz, sadly, did not deal with explicitly in his texts. 
A plausible explanation for the ontological status of structure can, however, be found 
within sociological thought and particularly the ‘structural functionalism’ that was 
prevalent during the early part of Waltz’s career (Goddard and Nexon, 2005: 11). For 
structural functionalism, causation is an inherently social concept. In social 
circumstances, behaviour or outcomes can be explained by the notion of ‘adequate 
causation’, i.e., the context for action provides for a set of norms against which it can 
be assumed that an individual (or state) will behave in a fairly consistent way 
(Weber, 1949: 80; Goddard and Nexon, 2005: 20). Thus, regularities of behaviour 
and outcomes can be expected in certain delimited contexts. But this does not imply 
causal necessity; for other reasons beyond the purview of the theory, behaviour and 
outcomes may not always comply with expectations. Such a theory includes the 
possibilities that social systems have emergent properties, such as structure, that 
exert independent effects. This notion is perhaps best put by Talcott Parsons, the 
influential structural functionalist sociologist, writing on Emile Durkheim, himself an 
important influence on Waltz (1979: 243),  
 
‘The decisive step was the distinction of social constraint from naturalistic causation. 
The social milieu constitutes a set of conditions beyond the control of a given 
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concrete individual, but not beyond the control of human agency in general. In fact, 
from this point of view its most conspicuous aspect turns out to be a system of 
normative rules backed by sanctions.’ (Parsons, 1968: 709) 
 
It can be argued then that Waltz is drawing on an inherently sociological view of 
causation within his systems approach, a view of causation distinct from what 
Parsons above describes as ‘naturalistic causation’ or what Joseph calls ‘Humean’ 
causation (Joseph, 2010: 487). This requires that Waltz’s system-level forces are 
socially generated, or in the language of Parsons, based on ‘normative rules backed 
by sanctions’. As Waltz argues, the predominant tendency to self-help behavior 
under neorealism, which can be conceived of as a normative rule, emerges from 
sanction and is advanced by emulation and competition (1979: 74). Thus, the system 
shapes behavior, and the structure of the system emerges from the behavior of 
states and in turn influences their behavior. For Parsons, such emergent properties 
are ‘real’ enough. And, while theory can never fully represent reality or causation of 
actual events in all its multi-faceted complexity, it can provide a simplified lens 
through the isolation of certain ‘frames of reference’, and thus the analytical 
components of such a theory may ‘have sufficient grasp’ of elements of reality (1968: 
730). While it is impossible to establish whether Waltz entertained such an 
ontological approach to neorealism, it is perhaps a more consistent and plausible 
analysis than those offered by scholars elsewhere.  
 
The final issue is that of the role of comparison in neorealist methodology. For 
Parsons, as apparently for Waltz, comparison was crucial. Only through comparison 
could the independent effects of a variable be established. And indeed, this appears 
to be the approach that Waltz takes in his Theory of International Politics. Thus, in 
the latter chapters of that work, Waltz tests for the independent variation of structure 
as an emergent property of the system, and he does so directly against empirical 
reality. He does this by arguing that variation in structure affects the level of stability 
in a system, and that different system structures affect the level of interdependence 
between allied states, hence the substantial differences in behavior and outcomes 
that can be observed consistently across European states, depending on whether 
they are allies in a multipolar or bipolar system (1979: 161).  
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Yet some scholars have objected to this apparently ‘positivist’ reading of Waltz’s 
methodology (Jackson, 2011: 149; Humphreys; 2012: 391). Jackson, for example 
argues that Waltz seems to advocate something more like that of Max Weber’s ‘ideal 
type’ approach, wherein a ‘theory’ is used as a framework for analysis of singular 
historical case studies; thus, no claims are made for the realism of the theory, and 
thus comparison is pointless because there is no ‘real’ independent variable to 
establish (Jackson, 2011: 142). The aim rather is to compare singular historical 
events to the ‘utopian’ ideal type to aid understanding. The confusion as to Waltz’s 
methodology relates, perhaps, to the dual purpose of Waltz’s theory, indeed of any 
theory conceived in such a way. In his The Structure of Social Action, Parsons points 
to Weber’s identification of a ‘bifurcation of scientific interest’ among researchers, 
 
‘in the one direction toward the understanding of concrete individual phenomena as 
such, in the other to the building of theoretical systems of general validity’ (1968: 
758). 
 
On this reading, the use of a theory such as neorealism can be interpreted in two 
ways. On the one hand, as a framework for analysis of concrete historical events 
where ‘testing’ is not required, but for which the theory provides a portion of the 
whole explanation and other factors of explanation are also brought in, either ad hoc 
or via another theoretical approach. Here, the theory is not tested but rather used 
more instrumentally to aid a general explanation of an historical event. On the other 
hand, neorealist theory offers a general insight into international politics, the validity 
of which can be tested through comparison to isolate the independent effects of 
structure, or in the case of this thesis, structural-relational variables.  
 
The preceding paragraphs have sought to make clear the position of this thesis 
relating to some foundational issues of neorealist theory that have clear implications 
for its methodological approach. It has been argued that system attributes such as 
structure, conceived of as emergent properties or forces, are ‘real’ and can be 
investigated as such, although their theoretical representation will necessarily be 
abstracted and simplified. And it has been argued that under neorealism the purpose 
of testing a theory is to establish that structure exerts independent effects, and that 
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this can be achieved through case comparison. The following paragraphs will now 
consider in more detail how in practice such testing may be undertaken. 
 
Structural-relational configurations and independent effects 
 
It has been argued that on the one hand, there is theory as the development of 
generalisations about behavior and outcomes, and on the other, as a kind of ideal 
type framework on which to hang a fuller explanation of a particular historical event 
or events by bringing in other explanatory factors otherwise excluded from the 
theory. In attempting to create a general theoretical explanation for military capability 
mutualisation, this thesis will follow the former conception of theory construction and 
validation. It is not claimed that the theory is able or aims to completely explain 
military capability mutualistion in all its complexity as a phenomenon or in relation to 
its empirical occurrence in contemporary Europe. It claims only to offer a theoretical 
explanation from the system level, or what might be called the perspective of 
international politics. This, of course, may offer a considerable part of the 
explanation, but it cannot offer every dimension of it, particularly as a causal account 
of an inevitably idiosyncratic historical outcome. 
 
While the fundamentals of the neorealist theory outlined in the preceding chapter are 
not new, the approach developed in this thesis does involve theoretical innovation 
aimed at the explanation of a more particular empirical phenomenon, i.e., the 
mutualisation of military capabilities under certain structural-relational configurations. 
Since this is the first iteration of the theory, therefore, it is necessary to test it against 
empirical reality and to attempt to evaluate its plausibility and claims to validity. The 
aim is thus to provide guarded generalisations as to why mutualisation of military 
capability occurs at all, and why the form and frequency of its occurrences regularly 
tend, to borrow Waltz’s phrase, to ‘fall within specified ranges’ (1979: 68). How then 
does one isolate and demonstrate the independent effects of systemic variables? It 
has been argued that comparison to isolate independent effects is essential, but how 
does this work in a systemic theory? For Waltz, there was no single methodological 
tool for testing the validity of his theory. He argued that, 
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‘We should test a theory in all of the ways we can think of - by trying to falsify and to 
confirm it, by seeing whether things work in the way the theory suggests, and by 
comparing events in arenas of similar structure to see if they follow similar patterns’ 
(1997: 916). 
 
While Waltz did not rule out falsification, he was sceptical of depending entirely on 
the approach, and he argued that ‘confirmation’ remained a legitimate means by 
which to test the validity of a theory (1979: 123). Confirmation is, he argued, 
particularly pertinent to the demonstration of systemic effects. A systemic theory 
might thus be tested by demonstrating how different units under the same structure 
exhibit similar patterns of behaviour and how similar outcomes occur within similar 
structural conditions. This is done by building a model from theoretical assumptions 
and from which expectations can then be extracted and verified against empirical 
actuality. Thus, in his Theory of International Politics, Waltz compared the behavior 
of states and outcomes under the two different system structures of multipolarity and 
bipolarity. He argued that certain differences in state behavior and outcomes could 
be explained by the different system structures, thus making a claim for the 
independent effects of structure. Observed patterns of behavior and outcomes 
provide evidence of the effects of structure as a constraining force in some directions 
and an enabling force in others. Thus, ‘The theory explains why a certain similarity of 
behavior is expected from similarly situated states.’ (1979: 122) It is this aspect of 
patterns and regularity of behavior and outcomes in a system that ‘opens the 
possibility of devising tests that confirm.’ This is because, 
 
‘If a theory depicts a domain, and displays its organization and the connections 
among its parts, then we can compare features of the observed domain with the 
picture the theory has limned. We can ask whether expected behaviors and 
outcomes are repeatedly found where the conditions contemplated by the theory 
obtain.’ (1979: 123) 
 
Thus, a hypothesis or model drawn from neorealist theory can provide expectations 
of behaviour and outcomes that will ‘fall within specified ranges’ (1979: 68), and 
subsequent testing may confirm or disconfirm expectations. In drawing on 
configurations of variables at the system level rather than Waltzian structure alone, 
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the methodological approach envisioned here also resembles that of the 
‘configurative comparative politics’, described by Ira Katznelson as,  
 
‘theory characterised by a cluster of ontological and methodological commitments; 
most prominently the claim that action and identity must firmly be placed inside 
structural macrofoundations that are not constantly in flux.’ (1997: 102) 
 
For Katznelson, ‘configurative comparatists’ place their focus ‘on how structures 
constitute and cause identities and actions by tilting and organising probabilities’ 
(1997: 102). Confirmation of such a configurative theory, then, is attempted through 
comparison of different states under similar structural-relational configurations to 
assess the extent to which behaviours and outcomes fall within expected ranges 
(Waltz, 1979: 72).  
 
The theoretical approach to explaining the mutualisation of military capability outlined 
in the previous chapter is a good deal less parsimonious than Waltz’s neorealism. It 
moves beyond system structure as a sole ‘independent variable’ for explaining 
regularities of outcomes in international politics. And, drawing on Snyder’s work, it 
brings in other ‘relationship’ variables through which the structure of a system is 
connected to unit behavior and outcomes. These variables are framed around the 
concepts of alignment, interdependence, interests and capabilities. Of these 
variables, both interests and capabilities may be said to arise from the ‘unit level’, but 
because they can be conceived in terms of how they constitute relationships 
between states, it is argued that the frame of reference for their evaluation remains 
that of the system or of international politics.  
 
In the theoretical approach set out in the previous chapter, the structural-relational 
configuration of the asymmetric alliance is assumed to operate like structure in 
Waltzian neorealism, acting as a relatively constant context for action that constrains 
some outcomes and enables others. The situational context provided by this 
asymmetric alliance configuration explains the tendency of states towards a 
particular logic of action, i.e., the pursuit of certain strategic ends shaped principally 
by a relationship of high capability asymmetry within an alliance of a dominant and 
subordinate states. By contrast, the local alliance configuration, which narrows the 
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focus specifically onto capability mutualisation between subordinate states within the 
alliance, is made up of interests and capabilities that are likely to vary considerably 
across the states within the alliance, even while the effects of the asymmetric 
alliance configuration remain relatively constant.  
 
Differences in local alliance configurations thus explain variation in the frequency 
and form of capability mutualisation across the case study states. The validity of the 
model is tested by showing that given the existence of a particular structural-
relational configuration, outcomes of capability mutualisation will fall reliably within 
the expectations of the model, including the absence of mutualisation where the 
conditions do not apply. This justification for the validity of a claim for independent 
effects is, however, little different from that of Waltz’s approach. The assumption is 
that despite their many differences, individual states will behave similarly and 
outcomes will fall within expected certain ranges, according to the logic of their place 
in the system and the similar structural-relational configurations that affect them. 
 
Yet because structure, or in this case a structural-relational configuration, does not 
determine outcomes, some consideration must be given to the role of other variables 
external to the theory, particularly domestic factors. This requirement to consider the 
degree to which other factors are responsible for the outcome means that to a 
certain extent even when testing a theory of this kind, the use of theory as a 
framework for historical analysis is necessary. Here, however, the primary aim is not 
to offer a full explanation of the phenomenon as a historical outcome, but rather to 
isolate structural-relational variables as an independent effect. Any explanation of 
empirical actuality must therefore acknowledge the interplay between the systemic 
and the unit-level. As Waltz argued, 
 
‘If structure influences without determining, then one must ask how and to what 
extent the structure of a realm accounts for outcomes and how and to what extent 
the units account for outcomes’ (1979: 78). 
 
Thus, the search for the extent to which system-level variables can be regarded as 
having exerted independent effects on behaviour and outcomes, and the way that 
they interact with domestic variables, requires the analysis of at least some unit level 
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factors. This is perhaps the most challenging methodological implication of the two-
way causal dynamics of a system theory. As Waltz noted,  
 
‘The difficulty of sorting out causes is a serious, and seemingly inescapable, 
limitation of systems theories of international politics’ (1986: 343).  
 
Understanding neorealist methodology in this way also explains why attempts at 
neopositivist falsification are ‘largely misguided’ when using neorealist theory 
(Goddard and Nexon, 2005: 28). This is due to the nature of causation in a systemic 
or societal analysis with emergent properties; if the conception of causation is one of 
‘adequacy’ or ‘objective possibility’ based on norms of behaviour and societal 
constraint, as opposed to one based on causation in the Humean sense as simply 
necessary, then falsification is a test that such a theory is unlikely to meet. Only in 
the general sense that the theory might not meet its expectations at all when 
confronted with empirical actuality, can the word falsification be used. 
 
And understanding neorealist theory as the isolation of a realm, i.e., international 
politics, with its own internal logic of behaviour and outcomes explained by systemic 
effects, has further implications for methodology. The approach outlined above does 
not necessarily challenge different theoretical approaches that emphasise different 
aspects of empirical actuality. As noted in Chapter One, strategic culture, domestic 
interest groups and so on may all play a role in a rounded causal account of any 
concrete, historical capability mutualisation initiative. If, however, theory is regarded 
as an attempt to generalise, and if not predict then at least set out a range of 
expected behaviours and outcomes, it must have a reasonable degree of parsimony. 
Theory cannot answer every aspect of every question in full; nor does a theoretically-
informed account necessarily need to exclude the importance of factors that are 
outside of its purview (1996: 56). A neorealist-informed analysis does not need to 
always conclude that the factors within its purview, i.e., system-structural forces, 
were decisive; other ‘residual’ variables may better account for a particular outcome. 
Thus, the validity of a theory rests not on a total explanation of any concrete 
outcome, but on the extent to which it can account for regularities or patterns and 
variations in outcomes. Other theories or approaches may also help explain the 
phenomenon or aspects of it, but they will do this within their own more-or-less 
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parsimonious approach. As such, neorealist theory does not require the comparison 
of a set of ‘rival’ theories of international relations to ascertain which offers the ‘most 
convincing’ explanation for the phenomenon in question; neither, for the same 
reason, will this thesis pursue a theoretical synthesis to attempt to get the best of all 
worlds. 
 
In summary, the challenge identified above is to seek out similar outcomes and 
behaviour in similarly situated states, but which occur regardless of their internal 
differences. The difficulty of such an approach is unpicking the unit level from the 
systemic, particularly when the theory itself has almost nothing to say about the 
relative importance of unit level variables. The extension of neorealist theory to 
Snyder’s process variables assists greatly, but there remain other important factors 
at the unit level, the ‘politics, personalities and preferences’ as Snyder puts it, along 
with issues of culture and identity. One approach to this conundrum would be to 
adopt a ‘neoclassical realist’ approach and attempt to integrate unit-level variables 
more formally into the theory. As argued, however, the danger with such an 
approach is that the theory then becomes unwieldy and incoherent. And neither is it 
theoretically necessary or helpful to do so when the aim of the research is solely to 
isolate and demonstrate systemic effects.  
 
This thesis will instead consider such unit level factors on an ad hoc basis, as and 
when they are encountered and in terms of the extent to which they may cast doubt 
on the strength of structural-relational effects. This will be particularly important for 
the first section of each case study, as this will set out to establish the degree to 
which European states act in accordance with the logic of subordinate state 
behaviour within an asymmetric alliance, i.e., the extent to which they generate and 
deploy military capabilities to mitigate entrapment by the dominant state. On this 
point, European states have very different histories; consider, for example, the role 
of the armed forces in British post-war foreign policy compared with that of Germany. 
In the case of both states, it might be argued that their behaviour is strongly 
influenced by very different political and military cultures. The goal of the argument to 
be deployed here, however, will be to demonstrate that even if these considerable 
differences are acknowledged, the role of structural-relational factors in shaping and 
shoving their behaviour will still be evident. And, as will be seen in the final chapter 
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sections on actual cases of capability mutualisation, it will be argued that they are 




ii. Selecting and interpreting empirical data 
 
Outcomes and behaviour – what is the ‘dependent variable’? 
 
It has been argued from basic ontological and epistemological premises that the aim 
of the methodological approach of this thesis is to establish the independent effects 
of structural-relational configurations on international outcomes, in this case the 
phenomenon of military capability mutualisation. This allows and requires a 
comparative approach, but one that entails a search for similarities in behavior and 
outcomes among states that are internally different but interact under similar 
systemic conditions. What kind of evidence is it necessary to gather for such an 
approach, and where is it located? A preliminary issue is that there is some 
controversy over what constitutes the dependent variable of neorealist theory (Jervis, 
1997: 93). Waltz himself referred to both outcomes and behaviour. He writes of 
‘outcomes’ throughout Theory of International Politics, but also noted, for example, 
that, ‘[A neorealist] explanation of states' behaviour is found at the international, and 
not at the national, level’ (1996: 54). Snyder cited both, together with a third variable 
of ‘interactions’ in the form of treaties, diplomatic talks and so forth (1996: 187). 
Despite the different terms, however, all these variables share the quality that they 
can be ‘shaped and shoved’, by systemic factors. While it will be argued that the 
mutualisation of military capability is an outcome of international politics, the effect of 
structural-relational variables on individual state behavior is at the core of any 
neorealist explanation. Behaviour is expected, to some lesser or greater degree, to 
conform regularly to the shaping and shoving of system variables.  
 
It could be argued that given that the dependent variable in this thesis is military 
capability mutualisation conceived as an outcome, the only data necessary is 
evidence of the existence of the expected form of capability mutualisation where the 
conditions envisaged by the theory obtain. Such confirmatory data would be 
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consistent with the neorealist methodology set out above. But such an approach 
would be unsatisfying for two reasons. First, as noted in chapter one of this thesis, 
there are very few cases of capability mutualisation that comply with the definition 
set out by this thesis. Although a large number of cases are not, strictly speaking, 
required to claim independent effects under the theoretical approach outlined above, 
it would perhaps lend more plausibility to an explanation if there were more cases 
spread across the three main hypotheses. Secondly, as noted above, causation in 
neorealism is two-way, between states and systems. To make the case that 
structural-relational variables are at work requires consideration not only of 
outcomes, evidence for which can be found in international agreements and 
subsequent cooperation, but also of official documents and statements outlining the 
motivations for mutualisation, and ideally, insight into the behaviour of those directly 
involved in decision-making. These two issues, one of case selection and number of 





In order to answer the research questions set out in chapter one, the cases selected 
for this thesis need to meet three basic criteria, first in providing examples of 
capability mutualisation that meet the definition set out above, secondly, as occurring 
between European states, and finally, taking place between the mid-2000s and until 
2013, thus encompassing the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. This requires a 
survey of potential cases of capability mutualisation across Europe. As already noted 
in Table 1.1 in Chapter One, however, there are relatively few cases that meet these 
criteria. Of the first criteria, which is identification of cases of capability mutualisation, 
the universe of principal cases is illustrated in Table 3.1. Although it is not claimed to 










Period Form of mutualisation Frontline distance 
Tornado fast jet 1960s - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Franco-British ‘Martel’ 
missile 
1960s - 1980s Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Franco-British helicopter 
cooperation Lynx, Puma, 
Gazelle 
1960s - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Franco-British Jaguar fast 
jet 
1960s - 2000s Industrial specialisation Temporal 




1970s - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Multinational Typhoon fast 
jet 
1980s - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Multinational A400M 
transport aircraft 
1980s - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Dutch-Belgian naval 
command 
1990s - present Operational sharing Functional 
‘Horizon’ frigate 1980s - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Germany-Netherlands I 
Corps HQ 
1990s - present Operational sharing Zero frontline distance 
‘European Participating Air 
Forces – Expeditionary 
Wing’ 
 
2004 - present Operational 
pooling/sharing 
Functional 
Strategic Airlift Capability 2006 - present Operational sharing Functional 
‘Matlog’ – Dutch-Belgian 
naval cooperation 




‘Centres of Excellence’ 
2010 - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
Airspace surveillance  
NORDEFCO 
2011 – under 
development 
Operational sharing Functional 
Franco-British Future 
Combat Air System 
(FCAS) 
2010 – under 
development 
To be decided Temporal 
Franco-British A400M 
support cooperation 





2010 - present Infrastructure 
specialisation 
Temporal 
Dutch-Belgian Air Policing 2012 - present Operational sharing Zero frontline distance 
Dutch-Belgian naval 
procurement cooperation 
2012 - present Industrial specialisation Temporal 
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Visegrad Air Policing 
Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia 
2014 – under discussion Operational sharing Zero frontline distance 
Table 3.1. Capability mutualisation – universe of principal cases25 
 
As the data in the table suggests, and as expected given the increasing financial 
pressures on the sustainment of military capabilities in Europe, there is a noticeable 
development over time from mostly temporal mutualisation initiatives, largely 
industrial collaboration, towards an increase in cases of ‘functional’ and ‘zero 
frontline distance’ forms of cooperation. Again, however, the small number of cases 
make it hard to draw firm conclusions from this pattern, though there does appear to 
be a discernible trend. Secondly, and relatedly, in terms of geographic focus, while 
defence cooperation need not necessarily be limited to Europe, the depth and 
breadth of military capability mutualisation in this region is unique. And, furthermore, 
within the subset of cases chosen for this thesis, i.e., Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK, it is in Western Europe that the most advanced 
mutualisation initiatives are to be found. The rationale for choosing these states is 
thus that within the period under investigation the bilateral initiatives between these 
states provide cases of mutualisation of particular frequency and depth; the selected 
cases are shown in Table 3.2 below. The other options, NORDEFCO and Visegrad 
may in future provide worthwhile case studies, but at the time of beginning the 
research, these cases lacked the kind of ground-breaking mutualisation initiatives 
that can be found among the states listed above; and there are also issues of 









                                                     
25 This is not an exhaustive list, there are many minor ‘smart defence’ and pooling and sharing initiatives, but this table sets out 
the major mutualisation initiatives. It also excludes major pooling initiatives such as EATC and the EDA/NATO-led air-to-air 
refuelling cooperation initiative on the basis they are not examples of mutualisation.  
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Framework case study Time-period Military capability initiatives   Distance from 
frontline 
France and the UK:  
Lancaster House Treaties 
 
2008 - 2010 Future Combat Air System  
Nuclear weapons testing  
Complex weapons (missiles) 
Combined Joint  
Expeditionary Force (CJEF) 









Belgium and the 
Netherlands: 
BENELUX Declaration 
2005 - 2012 MCM/Frigate replacement 
Joint air policing 




Germany and the 
Netherlands 
Declaration of Intent 
2008 - 2013 German-Netherlands I Corps 
Rapid Reaction Division 
integration 






Table 3.2 selected case studies26 
 
The cases have not been chosen according to their relative size or geographical 
location within Europe; neither are these factors specifically addressed by the 
research questions. That said, by chance there is a broad variation across the case 
study states of cooperation between large and large (France-UK), small and small 
(Belgium-Netherlands), and large and small states (Germany-Netherlands). And, as 
will be seen, although it is not central to the study, it may be possible to draw some 
conclusions as to the impact on these cooperative initiatives made by a state’s size 
and the symmetry and asymmetry between partners. There do appear to be some 
issues around relative scale of forces and the likely compatibility of capability needs. 
Internal differences between states are, however, more important from a 
methodological perspective. Despite their socio-economic similarities, European 
states do exhibit important political and cultural differences in relation to military 
capabilities, particularly as regards the use of force. As will be seen, there are 
significant differences between Belgium and Germany, for example, with their strong 
pacifist strands of opinion, and the UK and France with post-war histories of regular, 
high scale, high-intensity war-fighting in foreign interventions. 
 
                                                     
26 Those initiatives in italics are not clear cases of mutualisation according to the definition set out here, but are included in 
chapter four as case studies to highlight wider aspects of mutual dependence and the application of the theory.  
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Finally, in terms of the historical temporality of the cases, the rationale for choosing 
contemporaneous cases, in the dual sense that they are currently ongoing and have 
their origins in broadly the same temporal period, is twofold. First, it allows for 
systemic and historical conditions to be held more or less constant. All the initiatives 
can be considered to have occurred with the same structural backdrop, i.e., with a 
‘unipolar’ US, and with major allied operations of importance to the European case 
study states, notably Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing. Secondly, the assumption of a 
search for efficiency is integral to the explanatory logic of the theory as constructed; 
it is assumed that states will seek the most efficient ways to provide the means for 
their strategic ends. Thus, it makes sense to consider cases where the search for 
efficiency appears to be highly pressing on several states simultaneously. As has 
been seen, this is provided by the double-edged sword of long-term pressures on 
capability affordability and the immediate fiscal shock of the financial crisis.  
 
Regarding the number of cases selected, the methodological approach outlined 
above has elements of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the one 
hand, the approach is based on the observation of regularities of the phenomenon of 
capability mutualisation and the testing of hypothetical explanations for those 
occurrences based on certain structural-relational conditions. There are, however, a 
limited number of cases to study at each aspect of frontline distance. As such, the 
significance of the regularity or ‘quantity’ of cases of mutualisation is reflected in the 
aggregate number of initiatives considered. It should, however, be pointed out that 
high numbers of cases need not be crucial to the application of neorealist theory. 
Rather, the identification of regularities is conceived of as the means rather than the 
ends of the researcher (Waltz, 1979: 8; Weber, 1949: 80); the explanation of any 
regularity comes from theory, not the fact that the regularity is observed in high 
numbers. 
 
On the other hand, and from the qualitative perspective, it has been argued that a 
deeper examination of motivations at unit level is also required to assess the degree 
to which systemic factors can be considered to have influenced outcomes, and 
indeed whether the logic of behaviour that is assumed by the theory is plausible. 
This deeper, qualitative empirical analysis poses challenges for a study 
encompassing five European states and the nine cases of mutualisation that will be 
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considered here. Although a large number study is not strictly necessary for the 
theory and methodology outlined above, this number of cases represents a 
compromise between the depth of qualitative empirical analysis required and the 
notion of a ‘regularity’ of outcome. The low number of cases may in some ways be 
unsatisfying, but it reflects the reality of a relatively small universe of cases within a 
given temporal period, and the need to invest time and resources into in-depth 
qualitative analysis, including semi-structured interviews. And, even when there is 
only one case of a certain form of mutualisation, as with that of functional distance 
from the frontline, it is still a legitimate to test to see ‘whether things work in the way 
the theory suggests’ (1997: 916). 
 
The cases to be considered in the following chapters might be considered 
‘successful’ examples, but would consideration of ‘unsuccessful’ cases be fruitful? 
An ‘unsuccessful’ case, i.e., where mutualisation was attempted but did not occur, 
would not necessarily be that helpful. Because neorealism assumes that causation is 
a two-way process, an attempt at a mutualisation initiative may not occur for a wide 
range of reasons at the unit-level, for example, through a lack of political attention, 
due to misaligned procurement cycles and so on. In this sense, the structural-
relational configuration is causally permissive, it allows for mutualisation to happen in 
a certain way, it shoves states in a certain direction, but there may be many unit-
level factors that might potentially knock it off course. To be methodologically useful, 
‘unsuccessful’ cases would have to be those whereby a mutualisation initiative was 
mooted at the unit level in two states but did not go ahead due to reasons explicable 
by the theory, i.e., too high a risk of entrapment or abandonment. Unfortunately, no 
such cases were available with sufficient potential for research, perhaps because, if 
the theory is correct, it is axiomatic that they would be dismissed at an early stage27. 
As will be seen in the following case studies, however, some initiatives for very close 
cooperation that fall short of mutualisation, such as the Franco-British Combined 
Joint Expeditionary Force, can provide something close to such an ‘unsuccessful’ 
                                                     
27 Perhaps one such case is that which relates to the suggestion, reported in 2010, that the UK and France might share the 
patrols of their nuclear weapons-armed submarines (Borger and Norton-Taylor, Guardian, 19 March, 2010). The UK and 
France did not follow-up on this idea for reasons reportedly consistent with those outlined in this thesis (i.e., entrapment-
abandonment risk). Unfortunately, the secrecy surrounding such nuclear weapons cooperation tends to militate against its 
selection as a deep case study. 
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case, and therefore this special case and that of ad hoc mutual dependence 
between France and the UK has also been included.  
 
Presenting data within an analytical narrative 
 
The second issue is that of the analysis of state behaviour. The theory to be tested 
here is based on the view that structural-relational configurations have independent 
effects, and that these can be verified through comparison, based on the 
confirmatory logic that ‘states similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal 
differences’ (Waltz, 1996: 54). A methodological caveat has been added, however, 
which is that it is necessary to analyse outcomes in more depth to better assess the 
extent to which they can be regarded as being shaped by systemic variables; the low 
number of extant cases adds further weight to this caveat. The need to consider 
variables beyond the purview of the theory once more raises Waltz’s observation 
that, ‘Much is included in an analysis; little is included in a theory’ (1996: 56). It is 
necessary then to compare empirical actuality against the expectations of the theory. 
To frame this qualitative approach, the thesis will therefore draw on the method of an 
‘analytical narrative’. An analytical narrative can be defined as an account of a given 
historical period or periods of empirical actuality, which is guided by a pre-existing 
theoretical framework; as such, an analytical narrative always deals with historical 
empirical actuality even while the theoretical tool of analysis (in this case a structural-
relational configuration) is itself ahistorical in content (Jackson, 2011: 154). 
 
This aspect of the methodological approach also explains why it is necessary to 
consider capability mutualisation initiatives within the context of the whole bilateral 
relationship from which they arise. The importance of variables outside the purview 
of the theory is not whether or how they might enable or act against the realisation of 
mutualisation in particular instances, but the extent to which they need to be 
untangled as causally significant from the structural-relational explanation. For 
example, the theory outlined in the previous chapter assumes that the logic of 
behaviour for subordinate states in an asymmetric alliance configuration is primarily 
to mitigate entrapment, and secondarily that of abandonment, by the dominant state. 
The fulfilment of these strategic ends then help shape the likelihood of capability 
mutualisation. But might it be that the individual occurrences of various forms of 
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capability mutualisation in contemporary Europe are in fact better explained by a 
unit-level factor external to the theory, such as compatibility of idiosyncratic security 
cultures, defence industrial policies, threat perceptions or political personalities? And 
might one or more of these factors be consistently decisive across several or all of 
the cases?  
 
It is necessary then to first assess the expectations of the logic of behaviour of 
subordinate states under an asymmetric alliance before making the claim that such 
behaviour is vital to explaining the capability mutualisation. Comparison of the 
accounts of decision-makers allows that the plausibility of the theory may be 
questioned if another variable emerges in the analytical narrative as more 
persuasive across cases, or indeed if each case turns out to be so idiosyncratic as to 
be impervious to any kind of theoretical generalisation. In this way, the significance 
of unit level variables exogenous to the theory can be addressed in an ad hoc 
fashion as they arise over the course of the analytical narrative. Given that such 
variables may be of causal consequence alongside structural-relational variables, 
however, it does not make sense to set up ‘competitive hypotheses’; the aim is to 
focus on assessing the plausibility of the causal effect of structural-relational 
configurations. 
 
Thus, each case study chapter will be made up of three discrete analytical narrative 
sections, all of which are informed by the structural-relational theoretical approach 
set out above, and all of which assess the degree to which behaviour and outcomes 
align with three ‘logics’: that of behaviour, of means-ends crises and outcomes. 
These analytical narratives will draw on a variety of both primary and secondary 
sources as explained below. 
 
Section one: the logic of behaviour in an asymmetric alliance 
 
The purpose of this section is to assess the extent to which states’ ‘strategic ends’, 
concrete interests and thus military capabilities are shaped by the logic of behaviour 
within an asymmetric alliance. The sources for this analytical narrative are multiple 
and include secondary sources dealing with historical approaches to foreign policy 
and military capabilities, primary sources in the form of interviews undertaken and 
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other official documents relating to government policies. Regarding the first section 
of each case study chapter on the logic of behaviour within an asymmetric alliance, 
interviewees have provided practitioners’ insights into the nature of the US-European 
and European-European state relationships. Their reflections can be integrated with 
historical and secondary source analyses to make a judgement as to the plausibility 
of the logic of behaviour set out in the theory above. The justification of this logic of 
behaviour then provides the foundations for the subsequent two sections. 
 
Section two: the logic of the military capability crisis 
 
Section two of each chapter demonstrates how the logic of behaviour informs the 
states’ reactions to a crisis in the affordability and thus maintenance of a broad 
spectrum of military capabilities. Interviewees directly involved in the mutualisation 
initiatives provide direct evidence of the logic of the capability crisis and why it set in 
train a search for efficiency. This section also draws on arguments relating to the 
cause of the affordability crisis and on various data sets on European state defence 
spending. This analytical narrative will also provide valuable contextual material for 
deeper understanding of the subsequent section on concrete capability initiatives.   
 
Section three: the logic of military capability mutualisation 
 
The final section of each chapter will consider military capability mutualisation 
initiatives against the theory developed over previous chapters and the hypotheses 
as to a systemic explanation for the variation in occurrence and form of the 
phenomenon. Here, interviewees provide both an insight into the practicalities of 
capability mutualisation, which helps to assess the degree to which these concrete 
initiatives do in fact align with the definition of the phenomenon set out by the thesis. 
They also allow for a check against both the logic of the hypotheses and the 
potential role of unit level factors that may cast doubt on the plausibility of the 
structural-relational configuration as a causal explanation. Other key documents in 
this section are the formal international agreements within which mutualisation 
initiatives are framed. 
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The conclusion of the thesis will provide a final comparative assessment of the 
application of the theory, and the hypotheses extracted from it, to the empirical case 
studies. The extent to which the independent causal effect of the structural-relational 
configurations can be confirmed will then rest on two factors. First, the extent to 
which capability mutualisation initiatives fall as outcomes within the expectations set 
out by the hypotheses. And secondly, the extent to which in looking at individual 
cases in considerable depth, it is plausible to separate out systemic from unit level 
factors. The strength of factors beyond the purview of the theory will be assessed on 
an ad hoc basis, either responding to claims raised in interviews or in secondary 
literature. As Waltz remarked, when deploying neorealist theory ‘all sorts of 
information, along with a lot of good judgment, is needed’ (1996: 56). 
 
The preceding paragraphs reflect a need for a ‘mixed methods’ approach to 
answering the research questions and testing the hypotheses. In cases where there 
is a limited number of cases a more qualitative approach is often taken by 
researchers (Gallagher, 2013: 182). The thesis will bring in evidence not only from 
identifying and comparing regular outcomes by testing them against the hypotheses, 
but also through the deployment of qualitative techniques, including that of interviews 
with elite decision-makers directly involved in the genesis and operation of the 
mutualisation initiatives under investigation. Interviews thus enhance and bolster the 
quantitative aspect of the research methodology. 
 
Elite interviews  
 
While neorealism may provide certain expectations of unit behaviour, it is not a 
theory of foreign policy, i.e., it does not explain how internal decisions are 
deliberated and concluded, though it may suggest certain likely strategies or 
dispositions (Waltz, 1996). It does not mean, however, that systemic factors do not 
have a bearing on ‘internal’ policy making and policy-makers. As Waltz notes, ‘those 
who direct the activities of great powers are by no means free agents’ (1979, 176). 
Here, Katznelson’s conception of a ‘macroanalytical’ theoretical approach helps 
capture such a logic of behaviour. While configurations do not determine behaviour, 
they explain how behaviour is shaped by ‘situational orders within which individuals 
think, interact, and choose.’ And that,  
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‘Persons in this view, are embedded agents operating within relational fields that 
distinguish the possible from the impossible and the likely from the less likely.’ (1997: 
83) 
 
Thus, although the depths to which decision-makers are self-conscious of systemic 
pressures may vary considerably, it is a reasonable methodological step to assume 
that the actions of individuals, as well as states, are shaped by structural-relational 
configurations. Thus, interviews can provide crucial data for understanding state 
behaviour and assessing the extent to which structural-relational configurations may 
be claimed to shape outcomes (Lynch, 2013: 37). 
 
i. Nature of evidence sought and approach to interviews 
 
Interviews have been conducted for this thesis for two principal reasons. The first is 
to gather empirical data on the nature of the initiatives, not only on interviewees’ 
broader attitudes towards them. This is important because for most of the initiatives 
studied below, there is very little official literature available and what does exist goes 
into little detail on particular initiatives. It is necessary to establish whether such 
arrangements do in fact meet the definition of mutualisation set out in this thesis. As 
has been seen, while secondary literature is beginning to emerge, it is also relatively 
limited and does not cover all the cases in this thesis. Thus, interviewees with first-
hand expertise and experience can answer questions as to the empirical actuality of 
the cooperation, and how mutualisation works in practice. The second purpose of 
interviews, as explained above, relates more directly to the methodology set out 
above, and this is the need to examine the expected logics of behaviour, crisis and 
outcome in the form of capability mutualisation.  
 
Interviews were carried out according to a ‘semi-structured’ approach. A list of 
opening questions across a range of themes was sent to the interviewee in advance 
and then used as a framework for discussion in the interview itself (see Annex). If 
questions raised interesting responses that required departure from the framework 
this would be pursued (Gallagher, 2013: 193). Semi-structured interviews were 
chosen as they combine a basis for data comparison with the flexibility to depart 
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from the framework and explore understandings of key concepts and other 
explanations outside the purview of the theory. Interviews broadly followed the three 
logics set out above, i.e., of behaviour, crisis and outcome. Thus, they considered 
the dynamics of the relationship both with the US and with the partner state in each 
case, the specific political and economic context for the capability initiatives, and 
finally, regarding particular capability mutualisation initiatives, questions sought to 
understand how such cooperation was possible given the constraints and 
opportunities of international politics, conceived theoretically in the form of structural-
relational configurations. This was done by attempting to tease out concerns over 
autonomy (or ‘sovereignty’ as a synonym), dependency and mutualisation, and the 
degree to which conceptions of similar or divergent interests and the compatibility of 
capabilities had an impact on actual decisions. Unit-level factors that may have been 
of significance but were not addressed within the theoretical framework were also 
considered or tackled in follow-up questions, particularly the role of differing cultural 
or domestic economic policies of relevance. 
 
It is not a straightforward task to find evidence for the constraining and enabling 
force of structural-relational configurations on individual decision-makers. Analysis of 
the language used by decision-makers in interviews and in formal documentation is, 
however, made more simple by the relatively strong correlation between the terms 
set out in the theory and those used by decision-makers, such as interests, 
interdependence, autonomy/sovereignty and military capabilities. This is not to claim 
that the usage of such terms reflects those in the theory as a perfect representation, 
nor that decision-makers understand these terms in precisely the same way (Jones, 
1993)28. It is, however, assumed by the rationalist means-ends action schema 
inherent in neorealism (Waltz, 1979: 118), and that language reflects the norms on 
which the theory is based and the usage of words in the day-to-day practice of 
decision-makers. Thus, interviewees and documentation can be expected to 
demonstrate a collective understanding of terms such as interests, mutual 
dependence and capabilities. Indeed, as individuals involved in the practical 
                                                     
28 Charles Jones argues that neorealism assumes a positivistic approach to language use, but this is not necessarily correct; 
Jackson argues very much to the contrary (2011). This difference of opinion may be related to the differences over whether 
causation is conceptualised as societal, i.e., governed by norms, or Humean and therefore ‘efficient’ or ‘necessary’. 
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business of defence cooperation with other states, there must be a collective 
understanding of such terms.  
 
ii. Level of involvement, role and experience of interviewees 
 
The criteria for selecting interviewees reflect the aims set out in the previous 
paragraphs, and are as follows. First, the interviewees needed sufficient knowledge 
of the capability initiatives to be able to explain how they would work on a practical 
basis and thus whether there is a correlation with the definition set out in this thesis. 
Second, in order that research be informed by those with significant insight and 
influence over the shape and form of the capability initiatives under investigation, 
those with both seniority and direct involvement were approached; indeed, most of 
those interviewed have been directly involved in the initiatives under investigation29. 
These interviewees include government officials, military officers, political advisers 
and senior industry figures. Some politicians were contacted for interview but no 
responses were forthcoming; time and resources were also limited, particularly for 
research trips abroad. This omission is manageable, however, in part because many 
interviewees had first-hand insights into the attitudes of the politicians they worked 
with, and this can be compared against documentary evidence of motivations for 
political support for the initiatives. And politicians would be unlikely to have the level 
of technical knowledge over the mutualisation initiatives such that sufficient empirical 
insight could be gained; for this reason, officials and military officers were prioritised. 
Thirdly, another group was interviewed on the basis that they have insights into the 
field gained through experience, but not necessarily direct involvement in the 
initiatives under investigation; these interviewees include former government officials 
and military officers and independent analysts with expertise in these areas. 
 
iii. Finding interviewees 
 
Interviewees were contacted both by approaching existing contacts and via the 
technique of ‘snow-balling’, i.e., through recommendations and introductions from 
some interviewees to meet with others. Through professional experience, the author 
                                                     
29 See ‘References’ section for a list of interviewees. 
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has accumulated several contacts in the field of defence cooperation, both in the UK 
and across Europe. The author was Foreign Affairs and Defence Adviser in the 
Parliamentary Office of the Liberal Democrats between 2007 and 2010, providing 
research and advice to the party Leader and other Members of Parliament; and in 
2013 was Chair of the Liberal Democrat Working Group on Europe. He was also a 
Visiting Fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in 2010, where 
he wrote the paper Franco-British Military Cooperation: A New Engine for European 
Defence?, for which he undertook several elite interviews in London, Paris and 
Brussels. And finally, he was Director and Head of Defence and Security at Interel 
between 2010-2014, where he came into contact with senior figures in the defence 
industry from British, European and American companies. Existing contacts were 
approached for interview, and then asked to suggest others on the basis of the 
criteria outlined above. There are risks associated with snow-balling, particularly 
following particular professional or social networks (Rubin and Rubin, 1995: 68). The 
risk of this skewing the research is perhaps reduced by the nature of the 
phenomenon, which is that decision-makers involved in mutualisation are de facto 
small networks of professionals.  
 
iv. Number of interviewees  
 
Thirty interviews were carried out for the thesis. This represents a large body of 
empirical evidence given that all the interviews were focussed on the phenomenon of 
capability mutualisation in Europe, with an interview strategy accordingly directed at 
exploring issues involved in this phenomenon. On the other hand, the number of 
interviews related to the case study states and particular capability initiatives is 
somewhat smaller. The number is limited by three factors. First, not many individuals 
in any given state were involved in the genesis of the capability initiatives with 
sufficient insight into motivations and concerns, and as such there was a small pool 
of potential interviewees in every given case. Secondly, perhaps because capability 
mutualisation is a sensitive matter, not all those approached responded to requests 
for interviews. Finally, while the author is based in London, which enabled British and 
some other interviewees to be interviewed in one place (French officials were 
interviewed in London and Brussels), other interviews took place in Berlin and 
Strausberg in Germany, Brussels and Zeebrugge in Belgium and The Hague in the 
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Netherlands. Repeat visits were necessary and this was both time-consuming and 
expensive. One interview was conducted over the telephone, but given the nature of 
their roles, others preferred to be interviewed in their offices. As such, while there are 
several interviewees for each bilateral case study, there are fewer for some than 
others; it will be argued, however, that the methodological approach can 
accommodate a relatively small number of interviews per capability initiative.  
 
v. Issues of trustworthiness, secrecy and spin 
 
Regarding questions of the reliability of the interviews, there are several issues to 
explore here. First, defence is a field of policy which is more subject to secrecy than 
most, and indeed it is possible that technical matters of military capabilities that 
might have a bearing on mutualisation remain classified. This is a particularly 
pronounced issue in relation to cooperation in the field of nuclear weapons, special 
forces and intelligence. Mutualisation in these most sensitive areas is thus more 
difficult to explore than others, and is reflected in this thesis in the relative paucity of 
information available on nuclear weapons cooperation. Secondly, there is always a 
question as to general trustworthiness and particularly the risk of ‘spin’ when 
conducting research interviews with officials, wherein officials may exaggerate the 
official line, and remain silent on areas where they disagree, as well as provide 
personal bias in opinion that may skew a researcher’s assessment of wider 
motivations for actions. Thus, perhaps the greatest danger when interviewing those 
representing institutions, be they governments or armed forces, is that the 
interviewees will feel it necessary to provide ‘the official line’, and will not be candid 
with the interviewer.  
 
There are some techniques, however, to mitigate this challenge. First, interviewees 
were able to establish the terms on which their contribution would be included in the 
thesis. Two interviewees declined to allow any form of attribution of the information 
provided at all, and thus their contributions had to remain general, background 
material that informed the overall argument of the thesis. Others provided 
information on the basis of anonymity. As such, the trustworthiness of their 
comments and susceptibility to putting a spin on the facts is reduced by these 
conditions. Finally, the question of personal bias in opinion or offering an analysis 
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that may be idiosyncratic and not widely shared, is another challenge. The main 
technique to mitigate these issues is that of triangulation, and is discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
vii. Triangulation and saturation 
 
A means to reduce the possibility of distorting evidence and to account for any 
glaring discrepancies in accounts is to compare and contrast, or triangulate, 
interviews against each other (Gallagher, 2013: 194). The methodological choice of 
having three overarching case studies with nine initiatives within them and four 
different states ought to provide at least a corrective to misinterpreting idiosyncratic 
factors. But it remains the case that the concerns set out above require some further 
mitigation. First, this can be done by drawing on other resources, notably 
government statements, articles and interviews in order to compare and contrast 
evidence, although in some cases these are subject to the same caveats, particularly 
of ‘spin’ that are listed above. Second, the interviewing of expert opinion at one step 
removed from the institutions provides a potential corrective; these more detached 
viewpoints are offered by the retired officials and officers and independent analysts 
interviewed for this thesis.  
 
Regarding the relatively small number of interviews for each capability mutualisation 
initiative, these issues are a challenge, but are manageable. First, it should be 
remembered that in the final analysis, the dependent variable under investigation is 
not the behaviour of individual decision-makers, but rather the outcome of capability 
mutualisation. The purpose of examining behaviour is a secondary one that attempts 
to separate out the causal strands of systemic and unit level factors. Thus, the focus 
of the interviews, aside from better understanding the technical operation of 
mutualisation initiatives, is on the general, cross-cutting themes of autonomy, 
interests and mutual dependence, and from the ad hoc perspective, factors such as 
culture and domestic industrial policy. Secondly, the number of people involved in 
taking the decisions to go ahead with capabilities initiatives was small in each state. 
Thus, the ‘purposive sampling’ of key, senior individuals, triangulated with more 
independent but expert individuals provides a reasonably robust cross-section of 
opinion for each case study state (Lynch, 2013: 41). Finally, it is possible to consider 
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the thirty interviews in aggregate as representative of the phenomenon of capability 
mutualisation in Europe. From this perspective, the researcher has discerned 
considerable parallels in all the interviews, regardless of the states involved and the 
form of capabilities. It is the case that by the end of the thirty interviews, a ‘saturation 
point’ or repetition of similar reasoning and logic of arguments and themes became 
apparent, which will become clear in the following case study chapters (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995: 73). 
 
Other sources  
 
Interviews provide the bulk of primary evidence for the investigations into the 
concrete cases of capability mutualisation, i.e., the logic of mutualisation, and 
provide important supporting evidence for the other two sections on the logic of 
behaviour and crisis. The other key primary evidence is that of the formal bilateral 
agreements between governments themselves and of any other official supporting 
documentation on the workings of those agreements and concrete initiatives in 
particular. Some articles written in specialist military policy magazines and think-tank 
literature were also drawn on to further gather the perspectives of officials and 
analysts. In fact, there is rather little of such literature, hence the importance of 
interviews to gather basic empirical evidence. For the more historical analytical 
narrative on the ‘logic of behaviour’ research was done by drawing on historical 
works and journal articles that reflected the key debates around the foreign and 
defence policies of the case study states, focussing particularly on the post-war 
period. This was supplemented with elite interviews to probe the plausibility of the 
arguments in the secondary literature. For the second analytical narrative, on the 
logic of crisis, the thesis draws on a literature around the affordability of military 
capability and defence inflation. And finally, for figures relating to defence 
expenditure, the thesis draws on the figures collated by the Stockholm International 









Franco-British military cooperation is not a recent phenomenon. For over a century 
since the Entente Cordiale of 1904, the UK and France have had a cooperative, 
albeit mercurial partnership in international affairs (Waites, 1971; Boyer et al, 1989; 
Mayne et al, 2004). And while their policies and concrete interests have often 
diverged, they have shared vital security interests ever since. Allies during two world 
wars, NATO member states throughout the Cold War to the present day, 
collaborators at Suez and more recently partners in several post-Cold War military 
interventions, they have a long history of cooperation in foreign policy and military 
operations. The Cold War saw some significant Franco-British defence industrial 
collaboration, and over the post-Cold War period there has been a consistent 
deepening of the defence relationship across both industrial and operational fields 
(UK Government, 2000). The 2010 ‘Lancaster House’ treaties and associated 
cooperation initiatives thus represent on the one hand a degree of continuity with the 
recent past, but as will be seen, can also be viewed as a ‘step change’, underlining a 
new commitment to deeper forms of defence cooperation (Jones, 2010: 23; Pannier, 
2016: 16).  
 
The Treaty on Defence and Security Cooperation (TDSC), signed at Lancaster 
House in 2010, sets out and codifies for the first time the aims and objectives of 
bilateral Franco-British defence cooperation (UK Government, 2011a). Dubbed by 
the British media the ‘entente frugale’, the treaty was signed in the context of the 
2008 financial crisis and the cumulative impact of years of flat real-terms growth in 
defence budgets in both states (Robinson, 2010). The signing of the TDSC was, 
however, also accompanied by announcements of new bilateral military capability 
initiatives that represent unprecedentedly deep cooperation, touching on some of the 
most sensitive issues of autonomy. The treaty saw the emergence of a significantly 
higher aspiration for, and acceptance of, mutual dependence for the generation of 
military capabilities, and, albeit to a lesser degree, for their joint deployment. This 
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contemporary case study of bilateral defence cooperation thus provides fertile 
empirical ground for theory-guided research that seeks to explain why and how 
states are prepared to create conditions of mutual dependence of the generation and 
deployment of military capabilities, and the way in which structural-relational 
variables shape such cooperation. 
 
The first section of the chapter will take the form of an analytical narrative structured 
around the logic of behaviour expected within an asymmetric alliance configuration. 
The intention will be to demonstrate that despite the many differences in their 
approaches to foreign policy and defence, the strategies of the UK and France are 
consistent with the kind of behaviour expected from subordinate states in an 
asymmetric alliance configuration, and that this can be seen in the pursuit of the 
three strategic ends identified above. The second section will show how in recent 
years France and the UK have faced an acute challenge to the sustainability of their 
military capabilities. This section will explore the ‘logic of a crisis’ in their strategic 
ends as subordinate states in an asymmetrical alliance. It will be seen that their 
response has been to seek greater efficiency in the generation and deployment of 
military capabilities through the bilateral cooperation announced alongside the 
Lancaster House treaties. The final section of this chapter will use the theoretical 
approach set out above to demonstrate how structural-relational constraints and 
opportunities shape the occurrence and form of concrete capability mutualisation 
initiatives, and hence the possibility for greater efficiency through cooperation. To do 
this, the final section of the chapter will therefore focus on concrete cases selected 
from the capability initiatives that were launched alongside the TDSC in 2010 (UK 
Government, 2010a). 
 
ii. The logic of behaviour: the strategic ends of France and the UK under an 
asymmetric alliance  
 
Both France and the UK have a long history of fielding a broad spectrum of military 
capabilities at scale in the service of national territorial defence and considerable 
overseas interests. Both were regarded as Great Powers until the Second World 
War (Waltz, 1979: 162). However, the subsequent emergence of the US and Soviet 
Union as bipolar superpowers, and the cost of maintaining their colonies and 
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rebuilding shattered social and economic fabric reduced their post-war role to that of 
allies subordinate to the US. Many have highlighted American resistance to the 
Franco-British intervention at Suez in 1956 as the moment that the reality of this 
status was finally accepted by decision-makers. It is also often argued that France 
and the UK went on to draw very different lessons over how to relate to US power in 
the aftermath of Suez (De Durand 2010; Alford, 1989: 85; Hague, 1990: 20; Waltz 
1979: 162). The so-called ‘Suez paradigm’ of irreconcilable British Atlanticism and 
French Gaullism has come to characterise apparently fundamental differences in 
foreign policy in the form of a ‘Euro-Atlantic dilemma’ (De Durand, 2010: 5; Howorth, 
2005). Yet it will be argued that when it comes to the structural-relational 
configurations that shape the context for cooperation on military capabilities, the 
importance of this debate can be exaggerated. France and the UK wrestled with 
similar problems in their shift from considerable pre-war autonomy to that of 
constrained subordinate allies in a highly asymmetric alliance. And this had a 
profound effect on the ends to which their military capabilities would from then on be 
used. 
 
By drawing on the theory developed above, that subordinate states in an asymmetric 
alliance configuration tend to be pushed towards a set of strategic ends, shaped by 
structural-relational context, the following section will detail how the UK and France 
have used, and continue to use, their military capabilities to serve these ends. The 
first strategic end is that which this thesis defines as the ‘struggle for influence’ over 
the dominant state. As has been argued, the primary risk for subordinate states 
under a heavily asymmetric alliance is entrapment into the politico-military policies of 
the dominant state. The second strategic end is the need to hedge against the 
unlikely but potentially catastrophic risk of total abandonment by the dominant state. 
The final and more immediate strategic end is the retention of sufficient capabilities 
to act autonomously for the pursuit of core territorial defence and idiosyncratic or 







Mitigating entrapment - the struggle for influence 
 
Following Suez, the UK accepted that it was no longer possible to act militarily in 
defence of its interests without the tacit approval of the US (Hague, 1990: 20)30. 
British freedom of action in foreign policy was increasingly measured against the so-
called ‘special relationship’ with the US, which came to form the ‘bedrock reality of 
the UK’s international position’ (Clarke, 2008: 4).31 As Edward Heath, former British 
Prime Minister and Chief Whip of the Conservative party at the time of the Suez 
crisis later reflected, ‘it forced many of the British establishment to accept that the 
sun was setting on the British Empire and that America was the new superpower.’ 
(Heath, 1998: 177). After Suez, British foreign policy would no longer be managed 
according to an assumption of great power autonomy, but instead by drawing close 
to the US in an attempt to garner influence over politico-military strategy and 
particular military operations.  
 
The contention that the UK pursues a struggle for influence over its so-called ‘pre-
eminent ally’ (UK Government, 2010b: 59) holds considerable support among 
scholars, decision-makers and analysts. Colin Gray, for example, describes it as a 
‘geo-political fact’ that the UK must ‘follow in close or extended order in the wake of 
the policy course charted in Washington’ (Gray, 2008: 17). In a 2009 study drawing 
on interviews with policy-makers in the British government, William Wallace and 
Christopher Phillips observed that the desire for influence over the US remains 
dominant in UK thinking on defence policy, and reflects a longstanding view that 
policy is built on a ‘clear trade-off between defence contribution and expectations of 
influence’ (2008: 267). They add, 
 
‘this investment must be measured in additional British influence over the direction 
and detail of US foreign policy and in the contribution this added influence makes to 
Britain’s claim to ‘punch above its weight’ in world affairs.’ (2008: 282).  
 
                                                     
30 Suez is a watershed moment, but of course the UK’s dependence on American power developed gradually over the 20th 
Century. Very close ties were established during World War II. And an unavoidable need to act in coordination with the US was 
a strategic consideration for the UK as early as 1903 (Monger, 1963, 127).  
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This struggle for influence has direct consequences for the type and form of 
capabilities that the UK generates and deploys. As Bob Ainsworth, a former British 
Defence Secretary, has remarked,  
 
‘our ability to influence, our ability to participate, is what potentially maintains our 
position and we ought to recognise that in the decisions that we’re taking and the 
structures of the forces that we maintain.’ (Chatham House, 2010: 38)  
 
Michael Codner has drawn a similar conclusion, arguing that influence over the US is 
sustained and developed through a contribution which has the strategic significance 
to be genuinely influential.’ (Codner, 2009: 3) Interviews carried out for this thesis in 
the context of the Lancaster House initiatives strongly corroborate these analyses. 
The effect of the vast military power asymmetry in the relationship is clearly apparent 
to those who work in the field and thus provides a crucial strategic context for 
bilateral cooperation with France. British officials acknowledge that the constraints of 
US power on UK military autonomy are extremely high and that the UK is ‘unlikely to 
do anything that they [the US] would not want, or not mind’ (Interview 2, January 
2015; Interview 5, March 2015). Similarly, a former senior MOD official argues that, 
 
‘The fundamental point is the size and power of the US. Everybody wants to be 
close, or at least not to offend Washington. The reality of transatlantic security is that 
everyone wants to sit next to the big kid on the school bus.’ (Interview 1, September 
2015). 
 
The French response to the Suez aftermath and the subsequent approach to 
handling US dominance in Europe is often presented as the antithesis of that of the 
UK (Bozo, 2001; De Durand, 2010). Under the presidency of Charles De Gaulle, 
France came to guard and develop jealously the autonomy of French defence 
policymaking and capabilities. This is seen most prominently in the development of 
the fully autonomous ‘force de frappe’ nuclear deterrent and in the decision to leave 
NATO’s military command structure in 1966 (Bozo, 2001: 3). As Anand Menon puts 
it, these ‘notions of independence and military autonomy were central to the Gaullist 
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vision’ (Menon, 1994: 74) 32. And indeed, several interviewees stressed that the 
French commitment to autonomy, particularly over its nuclear weapons capability, 
remains stronger than that of the UK (Interviews 2, January 2015; Interview 5, March 
2015). 
 
French policy has, however, evolved significantly in the last twenty-five years. 
Scholars tend to highlight the end of the Cold War and the advent of the First Gulf 
War as the major turning point for France in its approach towards the US (Howorth, 
1997:26; De Durand, 2010; Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 350). The lack of presence 
and influence alongside the US during operations in Iraq compounded the negative 
impact of the largely vanished role of France as a Western territorial bulwark against 
Soviet forces, as well as the reduced salience of nuclear weapons in international 
diplomacy. Even if it had always been more rhetorical than substantive, the notion of 
France as a ‘third force’ was effectively redundant following the systemic shift from 
bipolarity to unipolarity (Howorth, 1997: 26). In the post-Cold War period it became 
clear that France would pay a price in terms of lost political influence and military 
effectiveness if it continued to stand aloof from the US and other NATO allies. 
Instead it began to push for a greater role in US and NATO-led operations (Blunden, 
2000: 20; Bozo, 2014). As Etienne de Durand has argued, 
 
‘the ability to participate in US-led coalitions at a significant level… emerge[d] as the 
new coin of international influence, thus validating in part Britain’s approach and 
leading to a reappraisal of the Gaullist roots of French strategy.’ (De Durand, 2010: 
5).  
 
And, as other scholars have pointed out, while it opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, during this time, ‘France continued to act as a firm ally of the USA, 
participating strongly in the American-led military campaign in Afghanistan’ (Howorth, 
2010: 14). A former British official describes the logic of the apparent French 
reconciliation towards the US, ‘Washington does bilateral relationships. They deal 
with everyone on a bilateral basis - and Paris is moving towards the US’ (Interview 1, 
September 2015).  




Although the decision itself was not unexpected and came after years of closer 
engagement (Howorth, 2010: 11; Rieker, 2013), the French return to NATO 
command structures in 2009 provides perhaps the strongest evidence of such a 
decisive shift in French policy (Bozo, 2014). In recent scholarship based on several 
interviews with French military officers and officials, Alice Pannier has argued that 
‘there is now a broad and thus possibly durable departure from the ‘Suez paradigm’’; 
France is now ‘an exceptionally good ally of the Americans and the British’ (Pannier, 
2016: 3). So much so, in fact, that the relationship remains ‘intensely competitive’ 
(Interview 2). There has been, for example, some disgruntlement inside the UK MOD 
over the success of the French in demonstrating that they can also be dependable 
allies for the US (Interview 1, September 2015). 
 
The French approach towards the US following the Suez crisis was undoubtedly 
different from that of the UK. And it remains different in important respects to the 
present day. The theoretical perspective of this thesis suggests, however, that such 
behaviour was not born of fundamentally different strategic ends from that of the UK. 
As Menon and Freedman have argued, the security policies of France and the UK 
during the Cold War were essentially shaped by the same strategic systemic 
constraints of the Cold War (Menon; Freedman, 1997: 157). Within the logic of an 
asymmetric alliance, the UK and France pursued a very different approach to the 
US, but for the same strategic end, i.e., the mitigation of entrapment into American 
policy, and the preservation of as much freedom of action as possible. 
 
Given the low risk of abandonment by the US in the Cold War, there was little threat 
to France in partially ‘moving away’ from the US in order to mitigate entrapment. And 
from a theoretical perspective, the high flexibility of policy in a bipolar alliance in fact 
encourages unilateralism because there is such a small risk of strategic 
abandonment (Snyder, 1984: 495; Waltz, 1979: 170). This divergence in approach, 
with the UK ‘moving closer’ and France ‘moving away’ does raise some questions 
over the coherence of Snyder’s bipolar alliance security dilemma. In a multipolar 
system the response is to move away to avoid entrapment, but Snyder argued that in 
a heavily asymmetric alliance both were plausible approaches (Snyder, 1997: 185). 
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The key point is that these are essentially different tactics towards the strategic end 
of the struggle for influence, whether achieved by negative or positive means. 
 
And while De Gaulle made much of positioning his country as a ‘third force’ in the 
Cold War, France never left the NATO alliance, nor cast doubt on its commitment to 
defend Europe from attack alongside the US (Bozo, 2001: 8). As one British official 
who has worked closely with the French MOD for many years argues, the degree of 
French strategic autonomy and the likelihood of any ‘European’ strategic autonomy 
was always overplayed, ‘Much of it was rhetoric. It was never realistic that France or 
Europe could balance US power.’ (Interview 1, September 2015). Thus, the clear 
divergence in French and British approaches to the US has tended to obscure a 
possibly more important observation, certainly in terms of defence cooperation, 
which is that since Suez, France and the UK pursued different policies but towards 
the same strategic ends. Some have noted this, however. Historian André Fontaine 
argued that the ‘essential differences’ were ‘less about aims than about method’ 
(Fontaine, 2004: 200). And a similar point is well put by De Durand, who argues that,  
 
‘Beyond the common willingness to rely on military prowess as a means to leverage 
international influence, the two countries have historically diverged in precisely how 
to pursue this quest for strategic importance at the political and military levels’ (2010: 
4). 
 
In this context, the significance of the Lancaster House treaties is seen by scholars 
as evidence that France and the UK have now reached a high degree of alignment in 
their approach to dealing with the US, as Pannier argues convincingly (2015: 3). As 
will be seen, however, the theory deployed in this thesis suggests that the flexibility 
of policy inherent in the asymmetric alliance configuration will remain a significant 
barrier to the closest forms of defence cooperation, and particularly for the 
mutualisation of capabilities close to or on the frontline. Scholars should perhaps be 
careful not to overstate the implications of Franco-British ‘strategic convergence’ or 
the end of the ‘Suez paradigm’ for defence cooperation (De Durand, 2010: 5; 
Pannier, 2016). On the other hand, while France and the UK have moved closer on 
operational cooperation, significant Franco-British bilateral industrial cooperation has 
a long pedigree. Even at the height of the French pursuit of a Gaullist defence policy, 
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there were negotiations with the UK about unprecedentedly deep cooperation in 
defence aerospace technology (House of Commons, 1967). The implications of this 
theoretical perspective will be considered in greater detail below. Nevertheless, it 
remains the case that there is an increasingly aligned French and British ‘struggle for 
influence’ over the US, and such behaviour is consistent with that of subordinate 
states under an asymmetric alliance. 
 
Hedging against abandonment  
 
The second strategic end for states under an asymmetric alliance is to hedge against 
the possibility of abandonment by the dominant state. While the attempt at influence 
over US policy is pivotal to British and French strategies, they also seek to ensure 
some autonomous military capacity in the event of dissolution of the alliance. 
Although the UK positioned itself ever more closely to the US following Suez, 
including through defence industrial dependencies, it remained (and remains) wary 
of sacrificing its defence industrial and operational autonomy completely. British 
decision-makers have continued to seek the means to act autonomously from the 
US where necessary and thus to hedge against future abandonment, however 
unlikely. This concern is clear in debates as early as the 1965 Plowden Report on 
the British aircraft industry, and the subsequent though eventually abortive Franco-
British cooperation over a principal fighter aircraft, the Anglo-French Variable 
Geometry (AFVG) jet (House of Commons, 1967). Contemporary political debates 
demonstrate that cooperation was then driven by fears that, in the absence of 
collaboration with France, the aerospace industries of both countries would decline, 
and that this would inevitably lead to dependence on American industry (House of 
Commons, 1967).  
 
In contemporary British security policy, hedging against future uncertainty still 
requires the preservation of key elements of an indigenous defence industry, 
including a critical mass of technological understanding or ‘body of knowledge’ 
(House of Common Defence Committee, 2012). While the most recent UK defence 
industrial policy is more ambiguous about sovereign requirements (UK MOD, 2012), 
industry sources argue that, ‘UK sovereign capability needs are more or less 
expressed in the Defence Industrial Strategy paper’ (UK Government, 2005; 
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Interview 7, April 2015). These capabilities include critical technologies and 
platforms, including for example, the ability to develop and build submarines and 
maintain autonomous cryptographic communications. Unit-level economic 
arguments associated with maintaining a wider technological base for spill-over into 
civilian technology and keeping jobs and investment onshore are also critical 
arguments for an indigenous defence industry, and it is very difficult to untangle 
these two arguments. But the strategic ends of hedging and autonomy remain 
important. As one senior British official involved in negotiations over the TDSC 
argues, ‘The capacity to make fast jets, drone technologies, to build modern 
warships is still pretty precious, and not necessarily economic.’ (Interview 5, March 
2015). This requirement for a hedge against future abandonment is well put by 
former British Defence and Foreign Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind. In the context of 
the TDSC he argued that, ‘in the long-term neither the UK nor France can be sure of 
the policy of the US or of Russia and so we need to preserve capabilities for an 
uncertain future’ (Jones, 2010: 20).  
 
Unlike the UK, France had to rebuild its industrial autonomy from the US in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. In line with its post-Suez policy, France has long 
placed a greater emphasis on indigenous defence industry than the UK. As Fluerant 
and Quaeu put it,  
 
‘Since the 1950s, industrial defense equipment has been widely understood as the 
foundation of national strategic autonomy, alongside nuclear deterrence.’ (Fluerant 
and Quaeu, 2014: 2).  
 
And, as one senior British official involved in negotiating the treaties argues, 
‘Autonomy matters more to France than the UK. The UK is accustomed to 
dependencies with US’ (Interview 5, March 2015). Thus, both France and the UK 
pursue this particular strategic end, but they do so differently, and to a matter of 
degree; it may not always be the case that both states are aligned as to which 





Autonomy for positive or idiosyncratic interests 
 
The final strategic end for states under asymmetric alliance is to retain immediate 
operational autonomy for the defence of their interests in the form of basic territorial 
defence tasks and for the pursuit of idiosyncratic or positive interests. While the UK 
no longer expects to launch major military operations without the US (UK 
Government, 2003), it retains significant overseas territorial commitments such as 
the Falkland Islands that could require advanced expeditionary capabilities to 
defend. The UK has also carried out smaller-scale autonomous operations such as 
that in Sierra Leone in 2001, a scenario that has not been explicitly ruled out for the 
future. For both states, a degree of defence industrial autonomy is deemed vital to 
underpin operational autonomy. And for France, autonomy for operations at 
significant scale is considered vital, and remains so even as the strength of Gaullism 
and the ‘Suez paradigm’ fade over time. This commitment was expressed in the 
2008 Livre Blanc (Government of France, 2008: 10) and has been demonstrated by 
successive recent operations in Africa, including Chad and Mali.  
 
Idiosyncratic or positive interests might also include those situations where the US 
might determine it has no interest but in which European states believe they do have 
significant interests at stake. Such interests reflect the fear of what might be called 
‘partial abandonment’ by the US (Snyder, 1984). And indeed, scholars have argued 
convincingly that such concerns were an important factor in establishing the EU 
CSDP (Howorth, 2007: 55). The fear that the US would abandon Europe in a critical 
area such as the Balkans or Mediterranean was important (Interview 1, September 
2015). In order, however, for such missions to be launched, states need to agree that 
they have a shared interest at stake. And, as has been pointed out in chapter two, 
such an alignment is very difficult for subordinate states to achieve in the absence of 
a strongly shared negative interest such as that embodied in Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty (Eilstrupp-Sangiovanni, 2014).  
 
Since the Second World War, the UK and France have resourced internally a 
considerable proportion of the military capabilities considered necessary to meet 
their strategic ends, as they are conceived in the foregoing analysis. In particular, 
they have ensured a degree of hedging against abandonment and operational 
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autonomy through the preservation of significant indigenous defence industries. And, 
since the end of the Cold War both states have maintained sufficient capabilities to 
contribute significant forces to American-led operations to mitigate entrapment risks. 
Developments in recent years have, however, brought the sustainability of the 
military means necessary to meet these strategic ends into question. It is impossible 
to quantify and describe precisely the scale and shape of military capabilities 
required to meet these strategic ends, and thus, when there is a potential crisis. 
There are, however, some useful ‘rule of thumb’ assumptions used by practitioners. 
As has been seen, Codner refers to an offer of strategic military significance to a US-
led operation (Codner, 2009: 3). And French and British officials often speak of the 
need for a ‘broad spectrum’ of capabilities or of a ‘balanced force’, which is of 
sufficient scale to meet concrete interests in the service of strategic ends, including 
the sustainment of a defence industrial base sufficient to provide the capabilities to 
sustain a high degree of operational autonomy (Jones, 2010: 13-15). It is therefore to 
the prevailing concerns over the shortfall between military means and strategic ends 
that the next section will turn.  
 
iii. The logic of a crisis: French and British strategic ends under pressure 
 
The affordability of military capability and the need for efficiency 
 
It has been argued that the strategic ends of subordinate states in an asymmetric 
alliance are shaped by structural-relational factors, but the crisis in the affordability of 
military capability for the UK and France can only be explained at both system and 
unit level. As Milward argued, states will resource their military spending according to 
a ‘strategic synthesis’ of system and unit-level factors (Milward, 1979: 18). To the 
extent that neither British nor French defence spending, at around 2% or just below, 
is anything close to what their respective gross domestic product (GDP) would in 
principle allow, resourcing of defence is an issue on which domestic explanations 
clearly have a vital bearing. There are, for example, domestic political pressures in 
both states to focus spending on ‘vote-winning’ areas such as health, education and 
pensions; in France at the time of the Lancaster House treaties, defence was 
identified as a priority area for cuts (Maulny, 2010: 2; Brune et al, 2010: 7). The wider 
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economic performance of both states in terms of total GDP is also a factor that either 
constrains or enables greater investment in military capabilities.  
 
Yet this shortfall in internal means to resource strategic ends is also shaped 
decisively by systemic factors. As argued in the previous chapter, the vast 
asymmetry of US military power serves both to pacify relations between European 
NATO neighbours and to guarantee security from external state-on-state aggression; 
this provides for the possibility of ‘free-riding’ to a greater or lesser degree on the US 
for security provision against external threats (Waltz, 1979; Joffe, 1984). Subordinate 
states do not free-ride to the extent where they abandon their military capabilities 
completely, however, because they must resource the strategic ends outlined above. 
Yet there is a degree to which there is a disconnection between national defence 
spending and the overall security provision of the alliance, and this is likely to create 
a downward pressure on spending (Waltz, 1979: ref). And there is a second pressure 
on defence capabilities, and that is the system-wide phenomenon of above-real-
terms inflation in the cost of generating and deploying military capabilities, as 
described in chapter one.  
 
The challenge of maintaining military capabilities to meet the strategic ends outlined 
above has become acute for France and the UK in recent years, but it is by no 
means wholly new. The difficulty of sustaining an indigenous industrial base for the 
generation of military capabilities has concerned the UK and France for decades, at 
least as long ago as the 1960s when they embarked on their first joint defence 
industrial programmes, including the Anglo-French Variable Geometry (AFVG) jet 
and the more successful cooperation on military helicopters, the Jaguar fighter jet 
and the Martel missile (Hussain, 1989: 129). While the defence inflation 
phenomenon also impacts the smaller, non-equipment producer states in terms of 
the unit-cost of the capabilities they acquire, it is critical for those very few states, 
among them the UK and France, that seek to maintain significant operational 
autonomy, or the major elements thereof, through an indigenous defence industrial 
base. In the absence of an indigenous industrial option, dependencies will be 
created on others and security of supply will be put at risk; in the case of European 
states this usually means reliance on American industry.  
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To a large degree, flat defence budgets have been an on-going trend in Western 
Europe since the Second World War (Alexander; Garden, 2001: 513). Up until the 
1970s, however, the UK and France could meet a shortfall in internal means by 
drawing down those forces allocated to their previous colonial commitments. The 
end of the Cold War provided another opportunity for both countries to put their 
resources and commitments into better balance; a gradual reconfiguration of forces 
away from territorial defence towards expeditionary operations continued throughout 
the 1990s. In 1996 France announced the end of military conscription, while the UK 
Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998 opted to prioritise the development of 
expeditionary forces over the large numbers of tanks and fast jets held over from the 
Cold War era (UK Government, 1998: 5). Over the last two decades, however, both 
states have found it increasingly difficult not only to maintain the viability of their 
national defence industries but also to sustain the breadth and scale of military 
capabilities necessary to pursue influence with the US and attend to their other 
strategic ends. The 2008 financial crisis and the major operations in Afghanistan 
(and in Iraq for the UK) gave greater urgency to decision-makers’ considerations 
over how defence spending efficiency might be made more efficient.  
 
The trend of flat-real terms budgets and the resulting effects can be observed in both 
the UK and France. According to Martial Foucault, in France ‘over the period 1980-
2010, GDP growth averaged 1.7% while the defence budget (not including pensions) 
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Figure 4.2. French defence spending as share of GDP 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
 
In the UK, there was significant real terms growth in overall defence spending from 
$55bn in 2001 to a peak of $71bn in 2009. This was in large part, however, due to 
major operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the costs of which were funded from 
outside the core defence budget (SIPRI). And over the same period defence 
spending as a share of GDP fell from 2.3% to 2%; these trends in UK spending are 
shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.3. Real terms British defence spending 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
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The 2008 financial crisis – capability crunch 
 
The fear of senior officials and officers in the UK and France in the few years leading 
up to the Lancaster House treaties was that there was an imminent threat to the 
‘broad spectrum’ of their capabilities in sufficient scale across the range of defence 
activities, and of a defence industrial base able to provide for the most sensitive 
technologies and capabilities to sustain operational autonomy. As has been 
discussed, France and the UK have arguably struggled to meet elements of their 
strategic ends since the 1960s at least, but two issues emerged in the last decade 
that would pile further pressure on the sustainability of their military capabilities. The 
first was the struggle to perform to expectations alongside the US, and the second 
was the fiscal fall-out from financial crisis, the gravity of which began to emerge in 
late 2008. 
 
In March 2008, the first Franco-British summit under Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
and President Nicolas Sarkozy took place against a difficult backdrop for both in their 
relations with the US. Both faced pressure to improve their contributions to US-led 
operations in Afghanistan, and for the UK, also in Iraq. Both were, however, 
struggling to demonstrate credibility to the US with their overstretched forces 
(Guardian, February 9, 2010). The British, fighting on two fronts, had badly damaged 
their reputation with the US by failing to maintain order in their sector in Southern 
Iraq (Porter, 2010: 371).  
 
The risk to the French and British struggle for influence over the US was thus an 
area of common concern. The Franco-British summit Communiqué of 2008, for 
example, noted that Afghanistan was a ‘strategic matter’ for both the UK and France 
and identified a joint initiative on increasing helicopter capacity to their operations 
(UK Government, 2008). And it was not only the ability to maintain credibility and 
influence acting alongside the US that was a cause for concern. There were also 
strong signals from Washington that the US would not always be present to assist 
with security in the European neighbourhood. According to one British official, there 
was ‘a common judgement that over the long-term US attention is moving away from 
Europe’ (Interview 2, January 2015). If such operations were to take place without 
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the US, a lack of breadth and scale of capabilities could limit or endanger their 
success. And both states were particularly concerned at the lack of ‘strategic 
enablers’, the ‘low density, high demand’ capabilities required to carry out 
autonomous missions, notably strategic airlift and key enablers such as intelligence 
and reconnaissance assets (Biscop, 2012: 78).  
 
The Franco-British discussions at the 2008 bilateral summit thus reflected a common 
problem of reconciling constrained defence spending and increased costs with the 
need to maintain sufficient breadth and scale in capabilities to retain influence with 
the US, and all the while to maintain indigenous defence industrial capacity and an 
ability to act autonomously for smaller operations. In this context France and the UK 
began to look more seriously at finding greater efficiencies through deeper 
cooperation. The rationale of cooperation for greater efficiency was noted in a 
meeting between French and American officials following the 2008 summit. In 
discussion with American counterparts, Francois Richier, President Sarkozy’s 
National Security Adviser, noted the importance of this shared Franco-British 
analysis and an ‘agreement on the need to focus on capabilities, and the ways and 
means to increase them without any increases in funds.’ (US Government Note, 
2008). 
 
The 2008 Franco-British summit thus began a new dialogue around this logic of 
cooperation for efficiency and saw the agreement of a small number of proposed 
cooperative initiatives, including potential cooperation on aircraft carriers and joint 
support for the A400M transport aircraft (UK Government, 2008), Subsequently, the 
2008 UK Green Paper on defence, put together by the then Labour Government in 
advance of the 2010 General Election also began to talk about cooperation with 
partners and introduced the concept of relying on others through deeper defence 
cooperation (UK MOD, 2008: 32). And then, against an already difficult context, the 
2008 financial crisis provided a new jolt to the British and French public finances. As 
one British official puts it in relation to the Lancaster House treaties,  
 
‘The problems pre-dated the financial crisis, but that only served to compound the 
effect. The cost of defence is likely to grow and neither of us can sustain everything.’ 
(Interview 2, January 2015).  
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In May 2010, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition took over under Prime 
Minister David Cameron. The new British coalition government was faced with both 
the accumulated effects of inflationary trends in capabilities since the defence 
reviews of a decade earlier, and intense short-term pressure in the form of Treasury 
demands to cut the defence budget in real terms by 8% over four years. According to 
a senior aide to Prime Minister Cameron the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR) was carried out within an ‘economic straitjacket’, 
 
‘The fiscal situation was perhaps worst in defence. The finances were completely out 
of control. They were carrying a huge ball and chain.’ (Interview 4, January 2015). 
 
As a result, the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), which was 
broadly contemporaneous with the Lancaster House treaties, amounted to a 
significant retrenchment on the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The review 
imposed an 8% cut on the defence budget over four years and brought into balance 
a ten year budget horizon widely regarded to be unfunded by at least £36bn and 
possibly considerably more (House of Commons Defence Committee, July 2011: 
72). The review did not delete any discrete military capability, but both aircraft carrier 
and maritime patrol capabilities were withdrawn for several years, representing 
historically unprecedented capability gaps for the UK, and reinforcing the fear that 
the broad spectrum of capabilities was under threat (Interview 8, June 2016). In 
tandem, the risk to the sustainability of indigenous industry also threatened to 
undermine operational autonomy. As one senior British official remarks,  
 
‘without investment our national capacity atrophies and our ability to modify 
capabilities ourselves. The US will get you over a barrel and you’ll have no 
alternative.’ (Interview 5, March 2015). 
 
Concern over the scale of military capacity was equally evident in France. As 
Foucault pointed out in a 2012 analysis, ‘the choice between quality and quantity is 
becoming an urgent issue in the defense domain’ (Foucault, 2012: 19) Like the UK, 
France was also suffering from unrealistic future commitments compared to likely 
costs, and the resulting impossibility of matching capabilities with defence policy 
goals for any longer than a few years after the publication of a major review. 
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Foucault concluded that France’s ‘Military Program Law’, the cycle of planning for 
forthcoming defence spending, would be ‘unable, or only barely able, to ensure a 
defence model that is credible and consistent with the 1994 or 2008 White Papers’ 
(Foucault, 2012: 50).  
 
In terms of the sustainment of a broad spectrum of capabilities, the lack of strategic 
airlift to support operations at distance and a second aircraft carrier to meet a 
requirement for continuous at-sea carrier-strike capability, was also of increasing 
concern to French officials (US Government Note, 2008). In 2008, in parallel with the 
launch of the French Livre Blanc on defence and security, France had made deep 
cuts to all three services (BBC News, 2008). And in July 2010, Defence Minister 
Hervé Morin announced a €3.5bn cut to the 2011-13 defence budget, reducing the 
equipment budget by €1.7bn over the period. While not as severe as British cuts, it 
still represented a significant row-back on previous plans made only two years 
previously (Brune et al, 2010: 6). 
 
A senior NATO official argues that by this stage it was becoming increasingly clear 
that the US was lacking European partners with autonomous capabilities of sufficient 
breadth and scale, 
 
‘There was no European ally left that had a full spectrum war-fighting capability of its 
own. Post-2010, the UK had got rid of its maritime patrol aircraft and its carrier strike 
capability, at least for some time. Germany and France were in exactly the same 
position’ (Interview 8, June 2016). 
 
This concern over failing military credibility, and the resulting risk to strategies for the 
mitigation of entrapment, played a major role in prompting renewed discussions 
between the UK and France after the 2010 General Election in the UK. As one 
French official involved in talks with the UK recalls, ‘The main driver was our shared 
perception that we were observing strategic shrinkage’ (Interview 9, June 2016). A 
former RAF Air Chief Marshal and experienced senior industrialist argues that the 
need to retain the confidence of the US was at the heart of early discussions in 2008,  
‘As two leading military nations we had to do something to preserve US confidence 
in us. We constantly have to do things to preserve US confidence in us’ (Interview 3, 
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April 2015). This view was echoed by a French official who observed at the time of 
the Lancaster House discussions that the need ‘to preserve sufficient capability to be 
credible partners of the United States’ was central to the logic of cooperation 
between the two states (Jones, 2010: 19).  
 
The 2010 discussions over Franco-British cooperation built on the logic identified at 
the 2008 summit and a dialogue already opened between President Sarkozy and 
David Cameron’s Conservative party when in opposition, which had led to a strong 
personal relationship between the two leaders. There is little doubt that this personal 
rapport played a key role in making the Lancaster House treaties happen (Interview 
1, September 2015). Unsurprisingly, however, as a senior aide to Prime Minister 
David Cameron remarks, ‘Finances were a dominant theme in Franco-British talks… 
They faced similar budgetary constraints and shared interests in pooling and sharing 
costs.’ (Interview 4, January 2015). Cameron and Sarkozy thus directed their 
defence ministries to look for bold new areas of cooperation to be underpinned by a 
new framework treaty on defence and security cooperation. Launching the treaties 
alongside President Sarkozy in November 2010, David Cameron set out publicly the 
rationale for the new accord, 
 
‘[Cooperation] will also help us to maintain and strengthen our defences at a time 
when national finances are severely challenged… If we do all of these things, then 
we can expand our sovereign capability even at a time when resources are tight.’ 
(UK Government, 2010c) 
 
Cooperation for efficiency – the Lancaster House treaties 
 
The ‘Lancaster House’ treaties build on significant pre-existing cooperation; France 
and the UK had already signed a Memorandum on Co-operative Defence Research 
and Technology, which was updated in 2000. Perhaps the most significant 
development prior to the Lancaster House treaties was the establishment of a 
Franco-British ‘High Level Group’ (HLG) by Prime Minister Tony Blair and President 
Jacques Chirac in 2006. Made up of both government and industry representatives, 
the High-Level Group was tasked with seeking potential areas of defence industrial 
cooperation, particularly around sensitive technologies. The 2010 Treaty on Defence 
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and Security Cooperation (TDSC) sets out a framework for cooperation by which 
greater efficiencies may be achieved. It provides a vocabulary for systematic 
cooperation across the entire process of capability development and deployment, 
from early discussion on ‘concepts of operations’ through to industrial cooperation, 
development and battlefield deployment. It covers the whole spectrum of capability 
development, providing for,  
 
‘the sharing and pooling of materials and equipment including through mutual 
interdependence, the building of joint facilities, mutual access to each other’s 
defence markets, and industrial and technological co-operation’ (UK Government, 
2011a).  
 
The core assumption of the TDSC is that such forms of cooperation will lead to 
greater efficiency, which will help sustain and even increase the availability of 
capabilities to the partners. First, through realising real cost-savings, and secondly 
through the provision of a scale of force on a combined basis that neither state could 
provide alone and which is sufficiently well-integrated to ensure that it will be ‘greater 
than the sum of its parts’; thus, France and the UK set an open objective for 
relationships of ‘mutual interdependence’ for the generation and deployment of 
capabilities (UK Government, 2011a).  
 
 
iv. The logic of mutualisation: Franco-British Lancaster House treaties and the 
mutualisation of military capabilities 
 
The theory developed in this thesis is that structural-relational variables within an 
asymmetric alliance configuration shape the occurrence and form of capability 
mutualisation initiatives. It is argued that the two key effects of the asymmetric 
alliance configuration are the temporal durability of the alliance and the flexibility of 
policy that arises from the low politico-military interdependence within the alliance. It 
is further argued that the two key variables for the occurrence and form of capability 
mutualisation within the subordinate-subordinate relationship or ‘local’ alliance 
configuration are the extent of alignment of interests and capability requirements. 
From these theoretical assumptions, it has been hypothesised that there will be three 
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forms of capability mutualisation. First, at temporal distance from the frontline, due to 
the durability of the alliance; second, on the frontline where interests are perfectly 
aligned; and finally, at a functional distance from the frontline where alliance 
durability and policy flexibility allow for mutualisation of certain forms of military 
capability.  
 
The preceding section has shown that as their military capabilities have struggled to 
meet their strategic ends, the UK and France have sought deeper cooperation, 
including aspects of mutual dependence, to gain greater efficiency in the use of finite 
resources. It has been argued that while Waltzian neorealism precludes such 
specialisation for security at the international level, the structural-relational 
configuration of an asymmetric alliance under unipolarity or bipolarity allows for such 
mutualisation. This opportunity for cooperation arises from the strong expectation of 
mutual support from the alliance, at least over the most existential negative interests 
of allies, and the future stability of the alliance based on an expectation that these 
shared interests are highly likely to remain aligned into the future. Such an 
expectation mitigates the risk that a mutualisation partner may in future become an 
adversary, and thus dilutes or dissolves relative gains and security competition over 
the technical superiority of military capabilities vis-à-vis allies is also negated. The 
expectation of future support, or at least absence of opposition for almost all likely 
concrete interests means that mutual dependence in the generation of military 
capabilities can be separated from their actual deployment. Partner states can be 
mutually dependent for the generation of particular capabilities but choose to deploy 
them at different times in different ways, thus preserving significant flexibility in their 
policies. Furthermore, this expectation of a durable alliance can also underpin 
flexible arrangements for mutual reliance and for mutualisation at functional distance 
from the frontline. 
 
Evidence for the effects of the durability of the alliance can be seen in the long-term 
faith of the UK and France in the alignment of their most fundamental interests. This 
is of vital importance to the Lancaster House treaties, and as will be seen, to the 
concrete initiatives announced alongside. Since the 1995 Franco-British summit 
(Croft, 1996: 787), France and the UK, have recognised that cooperation is 
 137
underpinned by shared vital interests. This was reiterated as the basis for bilateral 
cooperation under the Lancaster House treaties, 
 
‘[France and the UK] do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either 
Party could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being 
threatened’ (UK Government, 2011a). 
 
This fundamental condition of alignment is also reflected in the responses of 
interviewees for this thesis. Asked why France and the UK were able to countenance 
the creation of mutual dependencies envisaged by the treaties, interviewees made 
comments such as, ‘It made sense’ (Interview 4, January 2015); ‘It makes obvious 
sense. Why would we not be cooperating with France?’ (Interview 5, March 2015); 
‘It’s a strategic no-brainer’ (Interview 2, January 2015). Another argued,  
 
‘Both UK and France have the same political and military aims, UN Security Council 
members, both have nuclear deterrents, they deploy armed forces and neither can 
afford to do so to the extent done in the past.’ (Interview 7, April 2015).  
 
And, as a former senior adviser to Prime Minister David Cameron puts it, 
 
‘Look around Europe - in both defence and foreign policy terms France is closest to 
the UK in terms of global outlook. They can still project power, they have global 
interests, use soft and hard power. We have similar sized armed forces. Frankly they 
are the only European partner we can do serious defence cooperation with across 
the board’ (Interview 5, January 2015). 
 
In such comments the most striking thing is the sense of absence of any significant 
structural-relational barriers to closer defence cooperation, and this would suggest 
that the opportunities for efficiencies are highly significant.  
 
Yet the other effect of the asymmetric alliance configuration is that of low politico-
military interdependence between subordinate states. And this continues to 
constitute a significant barrier to mutualisaton. By virtue of huge alliance asymmetry 
in the breadth and scale of American military capabilities, the US is critical to British 
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security in a way that French military capabilities cannot be; and the same applies for 
France vis-à-vis the US and the UK. The defection of France from alliance 
commitments to the UK need not necessitate the end of the US security guarantee 
for the UK. Thus, France and the UK are not bound by any great politico-military 
interdependence when it comes to choosing whether to support and how to 
contribute to American-led missions. As recent history shows, over Iraq in 2003 and 
Syria in 2013, they can find themselves on opposite sides over the case for 
supporting US action. They are also largely free to resource and pursue their own 
strategic ends and concrete interests as they choose. And, while they share a 
negative interest in NATO’s mutual defence clause that might underpin 
mutualisation, actual military capabilities are rarely earmarked to any given concrete 
interest.  
 
Thus, mutualisation of frontline capabilities, either for the pursuit of the struggle for 
influence over the US or for idiosyncratic interests remains very difficult, if not 
impossible. To take a fictional mutualisation initiative, if France were to provide 
aircraft carriers and the UK the aircraft to fly off them, they would gain potentially 
vast efficiencies. But such an arrangement would open each up to considerable 
entrapment and abandonment risks, significantly reducing freedom of action. As will 
be seen, however, between the possibility for mutualisation on the one hand, and the 
constraints of entrapment and abandonment on the other, much remains possible 
under the asymmetric alliance configuration, and it is to concrete initiatives that this 
chapter now turns. 
 
The ‘Lancaster House’ cooperation initiatives 
 
While the general approach to future Franco-British defence cooperation was set out 
in the TDSC, several actual cooperation initiatives were announced alongside the 
treaty (UK Government, 2010a). The following section will consider a selection of 
these initiatives against the theoretical approach developed above. Some of these 
projects built on initiatives already outlined at the 2008 Franco-British summit, 
including aircraft carrier group interoperability and defence-industrial cooperation 
over missiles (UK Government, 2008). New initiatives, however, included a 
commitment to create a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) by 2016 and to 
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embark on a major defence aerospace research and feasibility study for a joint 
Franco-British drone or Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV), later named the Future 
Combat Air System (FCAS). New and deeper cooperation in the field of nuclear 
weapons was also set out in a stand-alone treaty providing a framework for 
cooperation on the safety and surety of nuclear warheads (UK Government, 2011b). 
As a former RAF Air Chief Marshal and experienced senior industrialist involved in 
the Franco-British High Level Group puts it, 
 
‘When it came to putting real meat into a treaty the prospect of a joint rapid reaction 
force, a collaboration over nuclear testing and ultimately the industrialisation of 
combat air vehicles become obvious candidates.’ (Interview 3, April 2015) 
 
This wide range of initiatives can be categorised into the three forms identified in 
previous chapters: specialisation, sharing and pooling. Thus, for example, the 
agreement to deepen cooperation in the field of the development and manufacture of 
missiles is an example of specialisation within industrial production. By giving up full 
autonomy over all aspects of the production of a particular missile, and with a view to 
expanding cooperation to other missiles, the two parties become reliant on each 
other for supply, thus creating an element of mutualisation. The agreement to share 
nuclear weapons research facilities by creating a joint facility for testing and surety of 
nuclear warheads is also a form of mutualisation. In this case both states are 
dependent on each other for an element of their nuclear weapons capability. By 
contrast, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force is an example of the pooling of 
capabilities to create a larger force through cooperation and interoperability. While 
the latter is not an example of the mutualisation of capability, it may produce some 
economies of scale when capabilities are deployed under its framework. The 
remainder of this section will now go on to consider how the structural-relational 
variables of the asymmetric and local alliance configurations serve to constrain and 
enable the occurrence and particular form of concrete mutualisation initiatives. 
 
Mutualisation of industrial and support elements of military capability 
 
Regarding the defence industrial or supporting infrastructure of military capability, the 
following hypothesis has been drawn from the model: 
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H1: Aspects of capability mutualisation may be found at high temporal distance from 
the frontline, with or without a high alignment of concrete interests. 
 
It has been argued that the position of subordinate states within an asymmetric 
alliance enables the possibility for efficiency through mutualisation; this possibility is, 
however, in tension with the low level of politico-military interdependence between 
those states. A logical way to avoid problems over the divergence of concrete 
interests is thus to take advantage of mutualisation at a temporal remove from the 
frontline deployment of the capability, namely in its industrial design and construction 
or through the mutualisation of non-frontline supporting elements. Such industrial 
cooperation already exists to a considerable degree. The UK, for example, has 
collaborated with other Western European partners for its principal fighter jets, the 
Panavia Tornado, and subsequently the Eurofighter Typhoon. The production of 
these aircraft has involved extensive specialisation among partner states in the 
manufacture and assembly of its component parts33. It is also the case, however, 
that there is a qualitative difference in the level of mutualisation intended in the 
Lancaster House era and previous defence industrial cooperation initiatives.  
 
In general, European defence industrial projects have focussed on cooperation in the 
design and development of equipment by pooling resources for research and 
production. Although such projects may have helped to preserve industrial capacity, 
they did not necessarily maintain the viability of this capacity in themselves. In the 
past, there was thus not only a great temporal distance between industrial 
interdependence and operational autonomy, there was also a buffer in terms of 
existing national industrial breadth and capacity. In some cases, for example 
regarding Franco-British cooperation over the Puma, Lynx and Gazelle helicopters, 
research and development costs were pooled, but the industrial capacity for design, 
production and maintenance of military helicopters remained onshore in both states. 
It is also significant that, unlike the UK, France has never yet followed through on a 
bilateral or multilateral collaboration for its principal fighter jet. Thus, despite these 
                                                     
33 In this sense, there is a case to be made that much European defence industrial cooperation since the 1970s can be brought 
within the scope of the theory set out here; unfortunately there is not sufficient space to elaborate such an argument, and the 
thesis will focus on the Lancaster House initiatives. 
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projects, indigenous industrial capability remained significant in the UK and 
particularly so in France. By contrast, the Lancaster House treaties and 
accompanying industrial projects represent a significant shift in intention, both in 
terms of the temporal distance between industrial mutualisation and operational 
autonomy, but also in terms of creating mutual dependence in the sustainment of 
discrete areas of defence industrial capacity. There is thus, a useful distinction to be 
drawn between capability mutualisation within a project and the mutualisation of the 
elements of a defence industrial base necessary to produce that capability at all.  
 
Under the terms of the TDSC and its parallel initiatives, in principle mutual 
dependence is accepted and expected by France and the UK, not just at the level of 
individual projects, but also within and across entire areas of the two states’ 
respective industries, and, in the case of nuclear weapons, in supporting 
infrastructure and facilities. Mutualisation is thus accepted for future temporal periods 
(sometimes defined, sometimes indefinite) for the provision of some of the most 
sensitive capabilities and technologies that underpin operational autonomy. This is 
evident in three initiatives announced at the Lancaster House summit, and which will 
be considered in detail below. These are the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), the 
initiative on simulated nuclear weapons testing (UK Government, 2011b), and 
cooperation on complex weapons. 
 
i. Future combat air system (FCAS)  
 
In parallel with the signing of the TDSC, the UK and France agreed funding for an 
assessment phase for a joint future combat air system (FCAS), generally envisaged 
at the time as a ‘drone’ rather than a manned or ‘inhabited’ aircraft34. As outlined 
above, France and the UK have collaborated on aircraft in the past, although they 
have also failed twice to jointly produce their principal fast jets, first over the AFVG 
and then over the Eurofighter Typhoon. In the past, as Marc De Vore and Moritz 
Weiss have argued convincingly (2013), these projects have failed primarily for 
domestic reasons related to differences in French and British defence industrial 
relations between government and contractors. There is, however, arguably a more 
                                                     
34 At time of writing, an inhabited FCAS has not been ruled out. 
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intense imperative for cooperation on this occasion, which is the very survival of 
national defence aerospace sectors with the capacity to produce such aircraft. FCAS 
is thus driven by a need to preserve a defence industrial base in aerospace 
technology rather than simply to gain efficiencies from the production of a single 
aircraft. As such, it meets the strategic ends of both hedging and maintaining 
operational autonomy. As a former RAF Air Chief Marshal and experienced senior 
industrialist puts it,  
 
‘It keeps the Europeans in the market. It preserves at a level very close to critical 
mass those specialist design and development skills that would otherwise disappear’ 
(Interview 3, April 2015). 
 
Unlike France, the UK has opted to purchase the American F-35 ‘Joint Strike Fighter’ 
(JSF), and is a junior partner in its production. As such, looking towards the 2040s 
there is highly uncertain funding for indigenous British aerospace programmes 
beyond the manufacture of the Eurofighter Typhoon. As British defence analyst 
Malcolm Chalmers argues,  
 
“We are losing the capability to build European aircraft. The next decision to come 
along will be the future generation combat aircraft. Will we piggyback on US 
[development] or work with France? If we don’t design, the capability will atrophy.” 
(Hollinger, 2015) 
 
Neither, on current projections, is the French defence ministry likely to have 
anywhere near the level of resources necessary to embark on a new programme 
comparable in scale to the Rafael jet. As a former RAF Air Chief Marshal and 
experienced senior industrialist argues, 
 
‘It’s not rocket science to say here we are in Europe with 4th and 5th generation 
fighters. In Europe, if there’s a market, we’ll compete Rafale, Typhoon, Grippen. 
Well, the JSF is going to occupy space for a lot longer than this generation so you 
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have to be in a position to jump that, and that’s exactly the motivation for Anglo-
French work on the UCAV35.’ (Interview 3, April 2015) 
 
Thus, without FCAS it will be extremely difficult for the UK and France to retain a 
depth of operational autonomy, as they see it, in the autonomous delivery of air 
power. Unless they were to make substantial financial commitments to sustain their 
aerospace industries on a national basis, they would both likely become completely 
dependent on the US for their air defence and strike capabilities in the long-term.  
 
While both the UK and France are thus committed to working together to maintain 
their defence aerospace sectors, it is less clear whether FCAS will deliver efficiency 
in terms of unit-costs. There is a large literature on whether collaborative aerospace 
programmes do deliver savings at a unit-cost level and the question is highly 
complex (Hartley, 2005; Quinlan, 2001). Collaboration at this level is less motivated 
by efficiency for direct cost savings than the viability of any kind of national 
programme at all. In this sense, ‘efficiency’ is derived from the aggregation of funding 
and generation. As Michael Quinlan argued,  
 
‘even where a project undertaken collaboratively will cost 3X whereas the 
uncomplicated national route would cost only 2X, if each of the countries can afford 
no more than X, collaboration may still be the only realistic way of making the project 
possible’ (Quinlan, 2001:11).  
 
Keith Hartley makes the same point, noting that ‘on average UK cost share is about 
one-third of total development costs’ (Hartley, 2005). And a former RAF Air Chief 
Marshal and experienced senior industrialist argues that this is the case regarding 
the Eurofighter Typhoon, ‘We wouldn’t have produced an aeroplane like that any 
other way than with the nations we collaborated with’ (Interview 3, April 2015). In 
terms of mutual dependence, FCAS is a bigger step for France than for the UK, 
which has for many years collaborated with European states and the US for its main 
fighter jets and thus has already embraced mutualisation or, in the case of the F35, a 
condition closer to dependence.  
                                                     
35 UCAV stands for ‘Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle’. 
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The FCAS programme is currently at the early stages of development. If it proceeds 
it will involve elements of both specialisation and the sharing of very sensitive 
technologies. It may be that when it enters service the temporal distance between 
industrial mutual dependence and operational deployment remains high, as with 
previous aircraft collaboration. It is not yet clear the extent to which there will be 
mutualisation in future support services to the aircraft such as training and 
maintenance, although it would seem highly likely in the context of the TDSC. In 
industrial terms this would mean specialisation in aspects of production, and 
operationally through the rationalisation of support services for the aircraft through 
further specialisation and sharing. This would of course further reduce the temporal 
distance between industrial interdependence and operational autonomy and create 
further mutual dependence, but it remains a plausible option. 
 
ii. Nuclear weapons testing – shared infrastructure 
 
Franco-British cooperation on nuclear weapons is not entirely new (Croft, 1996); 
serious discussions can be traced back to the late 1980s when there were talks over 
British procurement of a French stand-off nuclear-armed missile, although the UK 
ultimately decided not to have this capability at all (Croft, 777). This was followed by 
the setting up of a Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine in 1993 (Croft, 
1996: 779). Cooperation had thus been on the agenda for many years but had never 
translated into work on actual capability. This changed during the Lancaster House 
negotiations, which produced a separate treaty on nuclear weapons testing (UK 
Government, 2011b). The agreement to share facilities in both the UK and France 
for hydrographic testing will provide very large efficiency savings for the partners, 
apparently extending into the ‘hundreds of millions’ of pounds (Tertrais, 2012: 15). 
By ending duplication, cooperation might be expected to reduce by around half the 
costs involved in the operation of the testing facilities as fully autonomous national 
entities. Efficiency is the driving force, as made clear in the previous section. As 
Matthew Harries remarks, it results from ‘acute financial pressures, symptomatic of 
severe structural deficiencies’ (Harries, 2012: 15). 
 
Due to the highly sensitive nature of the project, there is a limit to the amount of 
publicly-available information. What is perhaps most striking about this deep 
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cooperation on nuclear weapons is the extent to which, though far more so for 
France than the UK, the capability has in the past been regarded as requiring very 
high levels of sovereign control. As late as 2001, Michael Quinlan, the British MOD 
official responsible for nuclear deterrence policy saw little prospect for Franco-British 
nuclear cooperation (Harries, 2012: 15). Whereas the UK has long had a certain 
asymmetric dependence on the US for its nuclear weapons capability, in that its 
Trident missiles are American-made and drawn from a pool maintained in the US, 
such a significant form of external dependence is a new development for France’s 
‘force de frappe’, and therefore represents a dependence, albeit mutual.  
 
This mutualisation of elements of nuclear weapons capability draws on the notion of 
alliance durability assumed by the model. There is a considerable temporal distance 
between mutualisation through shared testing facilities and frontline operational 
autonomy. Given that both states are signatories to the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty and share an interest in reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism, the initiative 
involves ‘relatively uncontroversial’ tasks of managing warhead stockpiles (Harries, 
2012: 17). The treaty is also quite specific in its temporal dimension, containing a 
ten-year notice period for abrogation (UK Government, 2011b: Article 18). The 
temporal aspect of the initiative underlines the confidence that the parties have in 
each other over a durable period. Furthermore, there is a clear and pronounced 
symmetry in the mutual dependence entailed in the sharing of a facility; both sides 
would harm each other equally were they to pull out of the cooperative 
arrangements. From among the initiatives undertaken at Lancaster House, a former 
British MOD official cites nuclear weapons cooperation as the strongest example of 
the creation of a mutual dependence (Interview 1, September 2015). 
 
In both cases considered above, the structural-relational configuration provides for 
the mutualisation of capabilities without great risk of any conflict of interest or 
entrapment/abandonment dilemma. The shared strategic ends of hedging against 
abandonment and the need to maintain high levels of operational autonomy are 
clearly important here. More particularly, the way in which France and the UK seek 
to meet those strategic ends in terms of capabilities is very similar in a material 
sense. While the asymmetric alliance configuration provides for the possibility of 
mutualisation of those elements of capabilities at significant temporal distance from 
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the frontline, the alignment of the shared strategic ends of operational autonomy and 
hedging against an uncertain future are also crucial. In this sense, the Lancaster 
House treaties provide an attempt to hedge against US abandonment in that they 
contain an element of what one senior British official involved in the talks regards as 
‘reinsurance’ (Interview 5, March 2015). Overall, however, this form of mutualisation 
at a distance from the frontline can be regarded as fairly low risk, as is demonstrated 
in figure 4.5. There is little chance of the creation of entrapment/abandonment 
dilemmas between the partners.  
 
Figure 4.5. FCAS temporal distance from frontline 
 
iii. Complex weapons cooperation 
 
The UK and France are by far the highest spenders on complex weapons (or 
missiles) among European states. It is an expensive and high-tech field and the 
continued viability of such an industry in the UK and France has been under 
pressure for some time. As such, the consolidation of the European missile industry 
began during the late 1990s under Franco-British agreement. The pan-European 
company MBDA was created through a wave of mergers of the complex weapons 
divisions of three companies, the Franco-German EADS, the British BAE Systems 
and the Italian Finmeccanica. Although MBDA can share certain costs across the 
products it produces for different European armed forces, it has remained to a large 
degree organised around the production of different missiles for different national 
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customers. And, where there has been cooperation on missiles, the most sensitive 
areas of production have remained duplicated across national silos. This national 
focus is in part an historical inheritance from the constituent national companies. It 
has also, however, been driven by the company’s parent states to retain certain 
technologies indigenously, and thus maintain autonomy in the production and use of 
missiles.  
 
The financial cost of retaining autonomous technological capability is high, however, 
and across the major European states there is duplication of cost and effort in the 
most expensive areas of the manufacture of missiles for different national armed 
forces. Industry sources say that rationalisation has become necessary to preserve 
the entire sector itself, and that this requires a trade-off in terms of addressing issues 
of mutual dependence. One industry source argues that, 
 
‘It’s about being pragmatic around freedom of action, sovereign advantage and 
industrial sovereignty, essentially because of cost’. (Interview 6, April 2015).  
 
Thus, the driving factor behind cooperation, as explored above, is the affordability of 
high-tech military capability. Even before the Lancaster House treaties were signed 
there was, however, a shift towards greater interdependence within MBDA. As one 
industry source explains, ‘some of the cooperative programmes that were pre-
Lancaster House, provided the political confidence that we could do more business 
in this area’ (Interview 6, April 2015). Complex weapons cooperation was singled out 
by the UK and France for higher political support as part of the Lancaster House 
treaties, in large part because of its strategic importance as an industry that requires 
operational autonomy and high levels of sovereign technological content. It was also 
to be considered something of a test case for wider industrial cooperation. The 
Lancaster House treaties thus provided political backing for deeper mutual 
dependence within the company and a move towards a ‘One MBDA’ approach. This 
was driven by the concept of national ‘Centres of Excellence’, which is a move 




‘The idea of Centres of Excellence under Lancaster House is to look beyond the 
missiles themselves and towards how the industry is organised. That’s a real next 
step because what we’re saying is ‘if you want to make real savings, they can be 
done if you become co-dependent on the other party’ (Interview 6, April 2015). 
 
This has the benefit of greater efficiency by creating ‘an industrial jigsaw that’s less 
duplicated in both countries’ (Interview 6, April 2015). It also raises, however, the 
matter of security of supply, which is a prerequisite for retention of full operational 
autonomy and means that ‘you need absolute political confidence that those 
arrangements will be honoured no matter what’ (Interview 6, April 2015). As the 
model set out above explains, the necessity for political confidence is met by the 
temporal confidence of the UK and France in the durability of the alliance. As an 
industry source says, 
 
‘The reality is we’re all singing off the same western geo-political hymn sheet. That’s 
why there’s the confidence to do this’ (Interview 6, April 2015). 
 
This reflects the possibility of efficiency in an asymmetric alliance configuration as 
explored in the discussion above. Complex weapons cooperation goes deeper than 
FCAS, however, because of bilateral agreement to a ‘process of specialisation within 
‘centres of excellence’ freed from national constraints’ (Bouvier, 2014: 48). Henri 
Shricke, the former French Defence Attaché to the UK describes this as, ‘the start of 
managed inter-dependence for missile sub-systems’ (2014: 41). There is therefore 
mutualisation at temporal distance from the frontline. 
 
And yet, in this example, the temporal distance between industrial interdependence 
and frontline use, while variable, can also potentially be very short. Although the UK 
and France both retain autonomous ‘war stocks’ of missiles, it is not implausible that 
a conflict could exhaust these supplies, and that industrial mutualisation could 
become directly relevant to an on-going operation. As one industry figure argues,  
 
‘The biggest challenge is how to gain confidence around security of supply and 
balance between the partners’ (Interview 7, April 2015).  
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If both countries are involved in the same operation, or only one is involved but 
without controversy, then there is no issue. There is, however, the possibility that 
one would have to support the other over a mission that the other opposed. That the 
UK and France could enter such an arrangement suggests that even as regards their 
potential concrete interests, either in supporting the US or acting alone, the two 
states believe that the likelihood of a serious conflict of interests is very slim. As 
such, this form of industrial mutualisation does not endanger the flexibility of the 
other’s policy, including their own continued ability to launch autonomous operations.  
 
On the other hand, there remains a risk of entrapment, at least into political 
embarrassment. Take, for example, a situation analogous to Iraq in 2003. If the UK 
needed a continuous supply of missiles and relied on components made in France, 
there might be a risk of entrapment for France into the political embarrassment of 
indirectly supporting an operation it opposed. Any abandonment of the UK, however, 
would not only contravene sensitive security of supply agreements, it would also 
produce equally dangerous harm to French interests. As one industry source argues, 
if either state were to withdraw production of an element of a joint missile,  
 
‘They would damage themselves equally by fundamentally challenging the nature of 
surety of supply, which would have fundamental impacts on even broader relations 
outside of defence. That’s why it’s unlikely’ (Interview 6, April 2015). 
 
Thus, the dilemma of entrapment and abandonment, while present to a degree in 
this example, is lessened by two factors. First, the likelihood of shared or at least 
non-conflicting interests, and secondly, the depth and high symmetry of dependence 
in the cooperation itself. It should also be said, however, that even within this form of 
cooperation, both the UK and France are hedging to a degree by retaining 
autonomous expertise, even if reduced in capacity, across the most sensitive areas 
of missile production (Pannier, 2016: 344). This would provide the ability to 
reconstitute capabilities more easily than beginning from nothing, but it would still be 
a very expensive and time-consuming process. The apparent paradox in this 
situation is that in seeking to maintain operational autonomy in a particular capability, 
the UK and France have both, to a degree, given it up in favour of mutualisation. But, 
for the reasons given above, there is not a great risk of a contradiction between 
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mutualisation and operational autonomy because of the durability of their alliance 
and a general expectation of alignment, or at least not serious divergence, over any 
concrete interest. The level of risk involved in mutualisation of missile production can 
be expressed in figure 4.6 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Missile cooperation distance from frontline 
 
Across these case studies, however, there are important unit-level differences 
between the UK and France regarding their respective defence industries and thus 
the potential for mutualisation. Several interviewees point to differences that reflect 
the contrast between the higher French demands for autonomy and the contrast 
between French dirigisme and British free-market competition. As a former RAF 
Air Chief Marshal and experienced senior industrialist involved in the High Level 
Group says, 
 
‘In terms of the internal views of the state, you probably couldn’t have picked a more 
difficult set of circumstances; given the way in which the French regard their defence 
industry as a strategic national resource, given the alignment that they achieve 
between requirements of national government on one hand and the requirement of 
industry on the other, given that there is a unified view of essentially what is good for 
France. And then trying to align that with our free-wheeling, free-market approach in 
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the UK, which is globalised, that was a significant challenge.’ (Interview 3, April 
2015). 
 
While these unit-level differences are indeed significant, interviewees in both the UK 
and France argue that the UK still takes a sufficiently strong line on the retention of 
indigenous defence industrial capabilities to make an alignment with France 
possible. As one British official remarks, ‘We also have limits as to how far we want 
to mortgage industry to the US.’ (Interview 2, January 2015). Indeed, it could be 
argued that the fact that mutualisation is pushed for at the political level, despite a 
strong awareness of very different approaches to defence industry, underlines the 
importance of the strategic ends of hedging and autonomous action. As long as the 
UK and France have sufficiently similar views on the technologies and capabilities 
they want to retain as an indigenous requirement, then the alignment of these 
strategic ends is possible.  
 
Aside from the expectations drawn from structural-relational variables, however, 
there is always the chance that the UK, or perhaps even France, may choose to 
solve their means-ends dilemmas not through mutualisation of industrial capacity but 
by compromising on their autonomy and risking the future without hedging, perhaps 
by looking to the US for the supply of capabilities previously deemed to be sovereign 
requirements. The parties are thus vulnerable to abandonment in the sense that one 
state may interpret its strategic end of operational autonomy and hedging against 
abandonment in a different way. As one industry source argues in relation to 
cooperation over missiles, 
 
‘Because of the funding driver there is a risk that you will be tipped towards ‘off the 
shelf’ acquisition. Will the UK go to France or to the US if it becomes too expensive? 
France seems less likely to do so because it is more dirigiste.’ (Interview 7, April 
2015). 
 
Under these circumstances one partner, most likely France given its attitudes to 
operational autonomy, would need to regenerate its indigenous capability, which is 
not impossible but is expensive and time-consuming, and there is a risk that 
technical expertise will have been completely lost. Thus, the foregoing analysis 
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suggests that there will remain a tension between unit-level factors and systemic 
effects. 
 
Mutualisation of capabilities on the frontline  
 
Turning to the mutualisation of capabilities at the ‘frontline’ or operational level, it is 
possible to draw from the model the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Capability mutualisation may be found at zero temporal-spatial distance from the 
frontline where there is a very high certainty of support for concrete interests. 
 
i. The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) 
 
The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) is a high-profile initiative 
announced alongside the TDSC. While it will be seen that it falls short of the 
definition of mutualisation, it is considered here at some length because the way it 
does so provides a useful perspective on the inherent difficulties in the mutualisation 
of capabilities at the operational level. The Lancaster House treaties and associated 
initiatives do not provide examples of operational mutualisation in the form of shared 
or specialised capabilities. Why is this the case? The strategic end of the struggle for 
influence identified above requires that France and the UK provide military support to 
the US as quickly and across as great a range of capabilities as possible to 
demonstrate relevance and commitment. The strategic end of operational autonomy 
for their own idiosyncratic or positive interests implies the same. Where concrete 
interests diverge, however, mutualisation risks creating entrapment and 
abandonment dilemmas and constraining the flexibility required to meet strategic 
ends. On the other hand, given that many concrete interests under strategic ends 
are still likely to be often more or less aligned between subordinate states, it may be 
possible to use the pooling of forces, enabled by enhanced interoperability and 
training, to find solutions to the problems of efficiency and scale, while falling short of 
operational capability mutualisation. 
 
In principle, mutualisation through specialisation and sharing will produce significant 
cost savings. Neither France nor the UK, however, can guarantee that they will 
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always identify the same concrete interest in supporting US operations on exactly 
the same timetable, to a similar degree, or even at all, nor that they would be able to 
support each other over their autonomous concrete interests. In the decade between 
the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the threat of US action against Syria in 2013, 
the UK and France found themselves on opposite sides of American interests. Unit-
level factors, including different arrangements for the authorisation of the use of 
military force, as well as domestic shifts in opinion on military intervention, also make 
immediate alignment very difficult if not impossible. Even if both are committed to act 
alongside the US as closely and as often as they can, it may not be possible in every 
case. For this reason, as well as to preserve the ability to act on their own 
idiosyncratic interests the UK and France still seek to maintain autonomous 
operational capabilities, unencumbered by the risk of entrapment or abandonment. 
The ability to deploy a highly interoperable, jointly commanded, combined force 
could therefore provide a solution to the problem of how to increase their scale of 
contribution to US-led missions or shared concrete interests. Capability mutualisation 
would be minimal or absent but the efficiencies gained through joint deployment 
could help to meet some of the means-ends challenges identified above. Such an 
approach has similarities with the notion of the CSDP as a means to concert power 
for influence that was discussed in chapter two. 
 
The Franco-British CJEF is not a standing force but is available ‘at notice’ for use in 
support of UN, EU and NATO operations, as well as bilaterally. It provides for a 
combined Franco-British force of air, land and sea components, comprising the 
rapid-reaction elements of both armed forces. It can be scaled up from relatively 
small non-combat tasks through to high-intensity war-fighting, and has been 
available for operations from 2016. As a military force, the extent to which CJEF is a 
new concept is viewed differently by practitioners. One interviewee argued that it 
builds on the established concept of joint forces such as the Allied Rapid Reaction 
Corps and the NATO Response Force, within which the French and British have 
worked closely in the past on the air component, 
 
‘In terms of a joint force, there is nothing really new other than it is bilateral, which is 
axiomatic because the UK and France are the only two European nations who could 
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deploy at brigade-level plus with their own logistics and with command and control, 
and that’s been the case for a very long time’ (Interview 3, April 2015). 
 
Others argue, however, that the CJEF does represent a departure of some kind, 
precisely because it operates bi-nationally ‘as one set of armed forces’ in a way that 
has not been done before (Interview 2, January 2015). Another difference is that the 
CJEF may need to work outside, as well as within, NATO command structures, and 
therefore without an American presence. The absence of a single dominant partner 
from the force, a role usually played either by the US, UK or France, leads to an 
unusual, highly symmetrical relationship of equals. 
 
Given that the CJEF is based neither on capability specialisation nor on the sharing 
of assets, it is unlikely to reduce direct financial costs significantly in the short-term. 
In the longer-term, if and when industrial mutualisation is present across a number of 
capabilities, then it may lead to efficiencies. The CJEF is, however, driven by the 
European crisis in the affordability of military capability, particularly as regards the 
viability of forces at scale, in terms of both overall deployable force and more 
specifically on the ‘enabling capabilities’ available to France and the UK, such as air-
to-air refuelling, sea and air transportation, command and control and surveillance 
and target acquisition. Both the 2010 UK SDSR and the 2008 French Livre Blanc 
reduced the scale of deployable expeditionary forces, in the case of the UK by as 
much as a third (UK Government, 2010b)36. Since the First Gulf War, the UK had 
aimed to be able to offer a division-scale force to a major operation, but this was less 
realistic following the 2010 SDSR. Without scale in forces and supporting strategic 
enablers, the UK and France have far less to offer the US, or indeed to act 
autonomously of the US if necessary. 
 
Thus, the CJEF offers a way to mitigate this loss of scale. According to one senior 
official involved in the Lancaster House negotiations it can be seen as part of the 
wider efficiency agenda, ‘it reflects a clear intention to get more bang for our buck, 
it’s collaboration across the board: use the same equipment and do programmes 
together’ (Interview 1, September 2015 ). And, as British General Simon Mayall has 
                                                     
36 The 2015 SDSR claims that the UK can field a division of three brigades and a total of 50,000 armed forces personnel (UK 
Government, 2015). 
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remarked, ‘The capacity of the British armed forces to deploy a full division 
nowadays is going to be under strain because of resources’ (House of Lords, 2011). 
For Mayall, cooperating with France by ‘pooling’ critical capabilities could thus lead 
to a multiplication effect, larger than the sum of the parts of both states, 
 
‘Our connection technically with the French may also allow us to put a larger joint 
contribution into a force. Things like airlift, sealift, unmanned aerial vehicles; there is 
a range of joint enablers absolutely critical to the capacity to conduct these very 
complex operations nowadays that each individual nation can only afford so many of 
them. So, there are areas not so much being interdependent but just saying, “If we 
pool them”; it does not stop us operating independently at this level but by pooling 
them we can jointly operate at a much higher level’ (House of Lords, 2011). 
 
The CJEF thus provides some answers to the challenges of the Franco-British 
means-ends crisis identified above. It provides for a means of addressing concerns 
over influencing the US as well as meeting interests where the US may not be 
involved.  
 
On the one hand, therefore, the CJEF is an attempt at reinforcing both French and 
British strategies towards the US, continuing to emphasise the mitigation of 
entrapment risks through the political influence brought by the offer of military 
capability. The CJEF could, in principle, provide a larger scale contribution to an 
operation than either country could provide nationally, and which may, as Mayall has 
suggested, be greater than the sum of its parts. And given that the CJEF can 
operate outside NATO and EU structures, it could support US operations quickly 
without the need for multinational agreement or for wider consultation with allies. 
CJEF thus potentially provides the flexibility to act rapidly alongside the US, which 
remains the premier concern, certainly for the UK and increasingly so for France. 
 
On the other hand, the Lancaster House treaties also occurred against a backdrop of 
concerns over US disengagement from Europe. In 2010, the notion of a ‘division of 
labour’ between the US and Europe was raised, with the UK and France taking more 
responsibility for their wider neighbourhood while the US would focus on Asia-Pacific 
(Interview 2, January 2015). In relation to this partial abandonment risk, the CJEF 
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provides options for the UK and France. Because it is intended to be operationally 
autonomous, it could provide for a contribution to a NATO mission in which the US 
played a more reserved role, such as that in Libya in 2011. In terms of EU action, 
while the CJEF and Franco-British cooperation more broadly has been viewed as a 
reproach to the failures of the EU CSDP, it does not undermine the possibility of EU 
military action (Jones, 2010). While there was widespread disappointment in both 
London and Paris at the lack of progress from the St Malo agenda, the CJEF could 
provide the military core of a CSDP mission37. In terms of bilateral action, the UK 
and France could deploy CJEF in the wider European neighbourhood and Africa, 
and would not need to rely on their EU partners. 
 
As with capability mutualisation at the industrial level, the CJEF is enabled by the 
asymmetric alliance configuration to the extent that such cooperation assumes an 
absence of balancing and relative gains concerns with the partner. Because the logic 
is one of interoperability rather than mutualisation, however, the CJEF can in 
principle support all strategic ends without compromising flexibility of policy and 
risking entrapment or abandonment. The challenge for the CJEF, however, is 
whether, given the absence of mutualisation, it will ever be used for any significant 
operations. With no capability interdependencies built into the force, neither partner 
can be dragged along with the other by necessity. Officials and senior military figures 
in both the UK and France do insist, however, that it is highly likely that it will be used 
(Interview 10, September 2015). On the other hand, if it is not used then it will lose 
its credibility. There is, thus, a kind of reputational risk built into the CJEF; it must be 
used if it is to be taken seriously, particularly by the US. The second major drawback 
of the CJEF is that because it is not based on sharing or specialising it cannot deliver 
major cost savings and thus will be of limited benefit to maintaining national 
capabilities. 
 
The Lancaster House treaties thus avoided any moves towards mutualisation of 
frontline capabilities. As a senior French official involved in negotiations for the 
Lancaster House treaties notes, 
 
                                                     
37 Assuming, given the 2016 British decision by referendum to leave the EU, that the UK and EU find arrangements to include 
the UK in CSDP missions. 
 157
‘That will not change overnight because it very much touches on sovereignty. British 
and French assets will come together effectively. That we can see. But if you really 
want to stop strategic shrinkage we will have to take things further, which we’re not 
prepared to do, probably for political reasons, but it’s better than nothing. It’s as far 
as it gets for the time being.’ (Interview 9, June 2016). 
 
As can be seen from figure 4.7, mutualisation of a frontline force without high 
expectations of shared interests would be a considerable risk and almost certainly 
raise issues of entrapment and abandonment. Thus, the frontline mutualisation of 
capabilities remains unlikely for the UK and France.  
 
 
Figure 4.7. CJEF distance from frontline 
 
H3: Capability mutualisation may be found at functional distance from the frontline, 
with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
‘Mutual reliance’: ad hoc operational interdependence 
  
As has been seen, the Lancaster House negotiations did not produce arrangements 
for the mutualisation of operational capabilities. And yet there are examples whereby 
ad hoc operational mutual dependence, termed by officials as ‘mutual reliance’, has 
been established. Here, one partner supports the operations of the other by 
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providing a particular capability, which the other state is lacking. Thus, for example, 
following the Lancaster House treaties, the UK provided strategic air-lift assistance to 
France for Operation Serval in Mali in January 2013 in the form of C17 aircraft, a 
capability of which France has a shortfall; the UK also provided some 
reconnaissance assets to the French mission (Interview 1, September 2015; 
Interview 8, June 2016). As a senior NATO official remarks, 
 
‘France relied heavily on the UK for ISR support. They were genuinely doing the 
heavy-lifting on the ground, and hats off to them for that, but it was enabled by other 
allies. I think they would have got on their own eventually, but would it have taken 
longer to get there? Yes. It would be far more of a struggle and less well-informed, 
and therefore the planning is different. And it would mean a greater cost in terms of 
time, resources and blood. No European ally can do anything but the smallest thing 
alone’ (Interview 8, June 2016). 
 
Likewise, since 2010 the UK has been without maritime patrol aircraft and has relied 
to a degree on French capability to support these operations (Telegraph, November 
2015). As one British official familiar with the offer of British support to France in Mali 
puts it,  
 
‘The needs are neatly complimentary, France needs strategic transport help. On the 
other hand it has better tactical air transport. And France still has maritime patrol 
aircraft, which is part of the UK mitigation of capability gaps through allies’ (Interview 
2, January 2015). 
 
Such cooperation reflects mutual reliance in the form of a general commitment to 
assist where the other has capability gaps, and is based on a reasonable level of 
expectation of assistance. It provides an ad hoc and de facto specialisation of 
capabilities. These capabilities tend, however, to be of a certain functional kind such 
as air-lift and reconnaissance and not ‘frontline’ troops or combat aircraft. As such 
there is a functional distance from frontline operational autonomy. This reduces the 
risk involved for the party contributing the assets, and means that support can be 
provided without high-profile domestic political decisions being necessary. This form 
of cooperation does not fit comfortably as either one of mutual dependence or 
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aggregation through interoperability. It is perhaps best described as ad hoc 
operational mutual dependence enabled by functional distance from the frontline. As 
with the other forms of mutual dependence, however, such cooperation is 
underpinned by the durability of the alliance and general expectations of future quid 
pro quo arrangements. Such agreements are, however, short-term, case-specific 
and perhaps not sufficiently robust for either state to be able to plan definitively on 




This chapter has demonstrated that the UK and France largely pursue the strategic 
ends assumed by the asymmetric alliance configuration, but as the two most 
significant military powers in European NATO, both value a high level of autonomy, 
which includes an indigenous defence industrial capacity. Indeed, the preceding 
section has shown that capability mutualisation between France and the UK occurs 
almost exclusively at temporal distance from the frontline. This builds on 
longstanding cooperation in the defence industrial field. But the 2010 Lancaster 
House treaties also represent a significant shift to the mutualisation of capabilities. In 
the highly sensitive field of nuclear deterrence, France and the UK have mutualised 
crucial elements of their capability, and are now bound together for the sustainment 
of their role as nuclear powers, at minimum for a decade, but probably for far longer. 
The FCAS programme has been pursued on the basis that neither France nor the 
UK can afford to maintain indigenous defence aerospace industries sufficient to 
produce their principal fighter jets.  
 
Given the UK’s already extant dependencies in the field of nuclear weapons (the US) 
and defence aerospace (Europe), this is perhaps a more momentous move for 
France than the UK. And indeed, in terms of ad hoc variables outside of the 
theoretical framework, there are noted differences, whether for domestic cultural or 
economic reasons, between the French attachment to indigenous capability and the 
more relaxed British attitude to dependence on the US. Some interviewees 
speculated that these different views may threaten such cooperation in future. For 
now, however, there is sufficient alignment over the requirement for indigenous 
industry across a similar field of capabilities. 
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Regarding the frontline or ‘functional distance’ mutualisation of capabilities, there are 
no strong examples between the UK and France. In terms of frontline mutualisation, 
the theoretical approach suggests that concrete interests must be very tightly 
aligned. As seen in the section on the logic of behaviour, France and the UK invest 
very heavily in their credibility with the US. Yet at the same time, and in line with the 
theory developed in this thesis, in recent years they have found themselves on 
opposing sides of the argument over support for American operations. Furthermore, 
they retain some important idiosyncratic interests with, for example, the UK’s need to 
defend the Falkland Islands, and the French requirement to deploy significant forces 
autonomously, for example in North Africa. The CJEF, however, demonstrates how 
both states seek a flexible way around this problem of different interests, because, 
as the theory suggests, though their concrete interests are not guaranteed to be in 
alignment, they often will be.  
 
Finally, as noted above, an ad hoc mutual dependence or ‘mutual reliance’ has been 
established between the UK and France, and the capabilities that each offers the 
other tend to fall into the functional category, i.e., in such areas as strategic airlift and 
maritime patrol. Yet, for now at least, neither state is prepared, or ready, to formally 
mutualise capabilities or elements them at functional distance from the frontline. This 
would be a major step for two states that still seek to deploy significant forces with a 
high degree of autonomy. It should be noted, however, that while it has not yet 
happened, if the very existence of capabilities is threatened then even the UK and 
France may embrace mutualisation at functional distance. The next case study 







BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS: THE BENELUX DECLARATION 2005-2012 
 
i. Introduction  
 
By contrast with the previous case study, Belgium and the Netherlands are two of 
the smaller European NATO member states. They do not have a long history of 
fielding large armed forces with a broad spectrum of capabilities drawn from 
indigenous defence industrial resources, nor of playing pivotal roles in grand 
alliances. Before the Second World War, when both states pursued policies of 
neutrality from the great power alliances, their relations were often difficult 
(Kossmann, 1978; Wels, 1982; Mallinson, 2010). In the aftermath of the war, 
however, they quickly found common interests within the new transatlantic security 
architecture of NATO. Discussions over defence cooperation began as early as the 
mid-1940s, and in the following decades cooperative initiatives grew ever-more 
developed in depth and breadth, particularly between the two navies. 
 
As such, today Belgium and the Netherlands have perhaps the most advanced and 
closest defence cooperation relationship of all European states. The challenges of 
flat-in-real-terms defence budgets and the growing cost of sustaining military 
capabilities have become more acute in the post-Cold War period, serving as a 
further incentive for the two states to agree ever-deeper defence cooperation 
initiatives. The 2008 financial crisis dealt a further blow to their already fragile force 
structures. As will be shown, and as with the previous chapter, the 2012 Benelux 
Declaration can be viewed as a response to both long-term trends in the affordability 
of military capability and a more immediate crisis in funding. Thus, Belgium and the 
Netherlands have sought to build on an already deep relationship to find further 
efficiencies from defence cooperation. 
 
The chapter will use the framework of the asymmetric alliance configuration to first 
provide an assessment of the strategic ends of the Netherlands and Belgium and the 
role of their military capabilities in meeting these ends. It will then consider the 
means-ends crises of both states, which came to a head in the aftermath of the 2008 
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financial crisis. The final section will then use the model of capability mutualisation to 
demonstrate how structural-relational variables provide the constraints and 
opportunities that shape the form of capability mutualisation initiatives. To do this, 
the final section of the chapter will focus on concrete cases selected from capability 
initiatives announced as part of the 2012 Benelux Declaration and the crucial shift in 
the depth of naval cooperation that began in 2005. While this element of cooperation 
occurred prior to, and is therefore not linked to the 2008 financial crisis, it will be 
argued that it still reflects the same, and broadly contemporary, challenges around 
the affordability of military capability. 
 
ii. The logic of behaviour: the strategic ends of Belgium and the Netherlands 
under an asymmetric alliance  
 
Before NATO – the politics of neutrality  
 
The modern state of Belgium was created following a nationalist uprising in the 
southern provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830. The great powers of 
Europe formally recognised the new state in 1831, though it was not until the 1839 
London Conference that the Netherlands recognised Belgian independence. The 
1839 Treaty of London also declared that Belgium would be ‘an independent and 
perpetually neutral State’ (London Treaty, 1849). Neutrality served Belgian security 
well for over seventy years until the increasingly precarious European balance fell 
apart. The German invasion in 1914 violated Belgium’s neutral status, providing the 
UK with its casus belli for entry into the war. For Belgium, the invasion was ‘proof of 
the inadequacy of neutrality’ and led to the search for an alternative policy 
(Kossmann, 1978: 574). At the Versailles Conference in 1919 Belgian diplomats 
successfully argued for the removal of the constitutional requirement for neutrality 
(Wels, 1982: 76). Between the wars Belgium sought security guarantees from the 
UK, France and the Netherlands. The UK refused, preferring that Belgium retain a 
policy of neutrality, while the Netherlands chose to maintain its own ‘aloofness’, 
having avoided Belgium’s fate in the First World War (1978: 576-580). 
 
While for a period Belgium became closely allied to France, the heavily asymmetrical 
nature of the relationship meant that it was difficult for Brussels to make its voice 
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heard. Alignment with France also caused great internal friction in Belgium, 
particularly among nationalistic groups in the Dutch-speaking population of Flanders 
(Stein, 1990: 3). By the 1930s, this tentative alliance had also broken down and 
Belgium returned to the position of a neutral in the international system (Rothstein, 
1968: 65). In 1940 its armed forces were once again overwhelmed and the country 
fell under German occupation for a second time. The lesson that neutrality could not 
guarantee Belgian security was thus made twice in less than thirty years, and with 
devastating force. It is perhaps unsurprising then that Belgium emerged from the 
Second World War as an interested and willing partner in a post-war security 
settlement for Western Europe. 
 
The Netherlands is an older and once far stronger power. Its rise through the 17th 
and 18th century was based on its proximity to global sea trading routes and to 
commercial relationships with other European states. The Netherlands came to 
occupy a distinctive position as ‘an important European maritime power, uninterested 
in territorial expansion in Europe, unlike most continental powers’ (Mallinson, 2010: 
6). Trade was, and remains, vital to the Dutch economy, with very high rates of 
international commerce as a proportion of its national wealth. As early as the 1815 
Congress of Vienna, however, the Netherlands had abandoned great power 
pretentions and, ‘Non-involvement became the mainstay of Dutch foreign policy’ 
(2010: 7). The Netherlands remained neutral throughout World War I, avoiding 
invasion and profiting to a degree from its position. 
 
During the interwar years, the Dutch remained unaligned. There was little debate 
among decision-makers as to whether the policy remained credible in an 
increasingly unstable Europe. Cornelis Wels has argued that neutrality was ‘hardly a 
policy, rather a faith or a hope.’ (Wels, 1982: 82). The German invasion of 1940 
appears, however, to have come as a profound shock. It led Eelco Van Kleffens, the 
Dutch Foreign Minister in exile, to pronounce that ‘our pre-war policy of aloofness is 
stone dead’ (Mallinson, 2010: 8). The post-war situation presented an immediate 
challenge to the strategy of aloofness from great power politics. Germany, by far its 
most important trading partner, was divided, occupied and weak. The destiny of the 
Netherlands was in the hands of the allied powers for whom the future of Dutch trade 
was hardly a priority. The Netherlands was also concerned about the future balance 
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of power in Europe and wanted to see strong American and British involvement in 
any new settlement.  
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Dutch and Belgian policies came to align 
far more closely. Although previously there had been tensions between the two 
states, including territorial disputes and an unsuccessful Belgian attempt to forge an 
alliance, the changed situation in Europe brought their interests into greater 
alignment. Both sought a stable and prosperous Germany through its re-integration 
into Western Europe, and both sought the firm commitment of the US and UK to any 
future European security arrangements. These shared interests, and the potential for 
increasing their influence through a collective voice towards the larger powers, 
brought them together with Luxembourg as the ‘Benelux’ grouping of states. In 1948 
the UK approached the Benelux states with a proposal for extending the 1947 
Franco-British Dunkirk Treaty on mutual defence to include them and to lay the 
foundations for the Western European Union. On their agreement, the treaty was 
amended to become the 1948 Brussels Treaty. At the same time, Belgium and the 
Netherlands had begun talks on closer defence cooperation including commissioning 
work on joint procurement and research (2010, 63). The Brussels Treaty was 
therefore an historic departure for the Netherlands and Belgium and brought an end 
to longstanding policies of formal or informal neutrality. 
 
The new dominance of the US in Western Europe, and to a lesser but important 
extent the new influence of the UK and France in Germany, caused a dramatic shift 
in the security strategies of the Netherlands and Belgium. It became clear in the late 
1940s and early 1950s that their pre-war security concerns would be solved one way 
or the other by a new European security settlement. To reduce fears of entrapment, 
or even absorption into the policy priorities of either France or Germany, or both in 
concert, it was vital for them that the US and UK played a balancing role in that 
settlement (Stein, 1990: 8). But this, in turn, required sufficient voice and presence 
from the Netherlands and Belgium within the alliance to influence their allies and 
protect their concrete interests. Historic strategies were thus turned on their heads. 
Rather than enforced neutrality or studied aloofness, both states needed to 
maximise voice and commitment, hence the utility of the Benelux grouping to its 
members. Membership of the new Western alliances and political organisations 
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became the means for the Benelux states to exert influence as a new Western 
European security architecture was constructed and managed in the aftermath of the 
Second World War.  
 
Mitigating entrapment - the struggle for influence 
 
The logic of the asymmetric alliance configuration suggests that the predominant 
fear of Belgium and the Netherlands within NATO is one of entrapment rather than 
abandonment. And indeed, this behaviour is apparent in the way in which both states 
built their voice and credibility with the US through a significant contribution of 
military capability. Their armed forces were redirected away from symbolic or last-
ditch territorial defences towards integration into a large military alliance, requiring 
significant long-term investment in defence. This necessitated the development of 
relatively small but still credible armed forces, balanced across three services, 
working with their NATO counterparts across sea, air and land domains including 
‘forward defence’ positions in West Germany (Stein, 1990: 85).  
 
The transition to this new posture was challenging for both states given their 
previously high levels of policy autonomy and their mercantilist preference for not 
upsetting great powers (Mallinson, 2010: 65,104). Both were concerned about 
involvement in a militarily aggressive posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. As a trading 
nation with some colonial commitments in Asia, the Dutch preference was for a 
strong navy, and it had not had the tradition of a large standing army for its territorial 
defence (1990: 2). Although Belgium had experience of fighting a major land war in 
Europe, it had twice disbanded its navy. It was abolished first in 1862, only to be 
resurrected again during the First World War, and then disbanded again in 1927 for 
budgetary reasons, and then hastily reassembled in 1939. Both states faced 
challenges but within a few years, however, they had made a major transition from 
limited armed forces for neutrality to loyal allies with major defence investments. 
 
i. Belgium – struggling with the struggle for influence 
 
For most of the Cold War period Belgium was a relatively strong defence spender; 
between 1960 and the mid-1980s it allocated more than 3% of its GDP to defence. 
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This contribution was at similar levels to those of its European NATO allies, and only 
0.5% of GDP behind French defence spending for much of the 1970s and early 
1980s. In the 1970s, Belgium was the only NATO country that underwent a constant 
annual increase in its defence budget as a share of GDP (Coolsaet, 2009: 3). As 
Coolsaet argues, ‘The low diplomatic profile that Belgium adopted, coupled with its 
steadily growing defence budget, earned the country the image of a ‘loyal ally’.’ 
(2009: 30). This is echoed by Sven Biscop, a security analyst and defence policy 
adviser to the Belgium government, who argues that during the Cold War, ‘There 
was loyalty to the Americans, at that point the politicians imbibed the Atlanticism - 
sometimes even against public opinion’ (Interview 14, June 2016). There was 
criticism of the credibility of Belgium’s military contribution to NATO’s policy of 
‘forward defence’ in West Germany (1990: 77), but relative to other European NATO 
states its commitment in terms of spending and organisation remained substantial. 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, however, Belgium took the so-called ‘peace 
dividend’ more quickly and dramatically than most NATO states. In 1991 the armed 
forces had a total of 85,000 active personnel, 23,000 of which were stationed in 
Germany (IISS, 1991). In the early 1990s Belgium became one of the first European 
states to end conscription. By 2012, total armed forces personnel stood at 34,000, 
and at 1% of GDP its defence spending was, alongside Hungary, the lowest in 
NATO (IISS, 2012). Together with this dramatic fall in defence spending, the post-
Cold War period saw a shift away from Belgium’s robust Atlanticism and a return to a 
pre-NATO European idealism. According to Biscop, the Belgian position ‘turned full 
circle’ towards ‘an independent European force or entity, and the initial Spaak 
position of Europe as a third way.’ (Interview 14, June 2016). In the late 1990s, the 
Belgian government under Guy Verhofstadt sought an ‘autonomous role’ for Europe. 
Foreign Minister Louis Michel argued that Europe ought to be strong enough to 
ensure that the world was not dominated by a single superpower (2009: 44). Such 
concerns were amplified by the unabashed unilateralism of the early years of the 
administration of US President George W. Bush, and led to a serious diplomatic rift 
among Europeans with the so-called ‘chocolate summit’ on European defence 
cooperation with France, Germany and Luxembourg in April 2003.  
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Given Belgium’s limited military capacity, not only vis-à-vis the US but also in relation 
to other subordinate states in the alliance, it is perhaps understandable that Belgium 
has feared an even greater risk of entrapment into the interests of the US in the post-
Cold War period. With little means of influencing the US, a common EU defence 
policy might provide a stronger mitigation of US entrapment with greater 
opportunities for European influence, particularly given that deeper EU integration 
and an avowedly ‘federalist’ perspective are not controversial positions in Belgium 
(Matellar, 2014: 4). There are, however, paradoxes in the Belgian position on EU 
defence, as Biscop argues, ‘There is a strong commitment to European defence 
cooperation and often a very proactive attitude to that. But then there is also a lack of 
defence spending. There is a kind of faith in miracles, as though European defence 
will fall from the sky’ (Interview 14, June 2016). This view was echoed in a memo 
leaked to the Belgian press in 2012; senior officers complained of under-funding and 
a lack of strategic direction in defence policy. They claimed that, it was ‘a dream’ to 
expect the ‘sudden salvation’ of an ‘integrated European army’ (Belgian MOD, 2012). 
 
This same reticence to act according to self-professed values is seen in the paradox 
of strong support for multilateralism together with a pacifist streak, as seen in 
Belgium’s lukewarm support for the First Gulf War in 1991. There is also, however, a 
widespread concern that reflects Belgium’s relative power, which is that even if it 
spent considerably more on defence, its armed forces could only ever make a 
relatively small contribution to the alliance. Thus, regardless of effort, it is difficult for 
Belgium to gain significant influence over any particular dimension of the foreign 
policy of the US. Such a view appears to be held among the public and some 
Belgian decision-makers. As Biscop argues, 
 
‘What people have in their mind, including some of the politicians, is that Belgium is 
a small country so nothing is expected from us… there’s no expectation from public 
opinion that Belgium does something: “No. We’re a small country.”’ (Interview, 14: 
June 2016). 
 
The theory developed in this thesis suggests that as a subordinate state in an 
asymmetric alliance Belgium will primarily seek influence to avoid or at least mitigate 
entrapment. But the clear difficulty for Belgium is its relative paucity of military 
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capacity through which to attempt to exert influence. It is perhaps unsurprising then 
that there is a such strong emphasis on ideas around defence cooperation through 
the European Union, which might serve Belgium’s interests more effectively, giving it 
greater voice and influence. As Coolsaet argues, in the absence of significant 
military capabilities, ‘This is the only way to at least partially shield a small country, 
lacking the very instruments of power, from a return to the bullying of the balance of 
power and the unpredictability of great powers’ politics’ (Coolsaet, 2009: 48). On the 
other hand, while there is support for European autonomy in defence and security, 
there also remains strong political support for NATO. In another policy shift, defence 
Minister Pieter De Crem argued in 2008 that ‘transatlantic relations should be 
resumed urgently’ (2009: 49).  
 
And, crucially, when it comes to the form and deployment of its military capabilities, 
Belgium does in fact appear to use them in pursuit of a struggle for influence, just as 
the asymmetric alliance theory would suggest. Despite the decline in defence 
spending as a share of GDP, and despite apparent preferences for more 
autonomous EU defence structures over US domination, Belgium has sought to try 
and maintain a balanced force structure as the best means to influence and 
contribute to NATO and US-led operations. As Biscop describes, 
 
‘Belgium’s ambition has been to create in every component - army, navy and air - a 
less wide-ranging but well-chosen capability mix that allows each to operate across 
the entire spectrum of operations’ (Interview 14: June 2016).  
 
While Belgium has greatly reduced personnel numbers and units of equipment such 
as aircraft, tanks and ships since the end of the Cold War, it still seeks to be able to 
contribute combat capability to air and maritime operations and to deploy a battalion 
of around 1200 troops as part of a multinational expeditionary force. Belgium only 
maintains lightly armoured vehicles, having chosen to retire its Leopard 1 main-battle 
tank. While this partly reflects the shift towards lighter expeditionary forces seen 
across all NATO states in the post-Cold War years (Belgian Government, 2000), 
Belgium has gone further than most in reducing its heavy armour and it has thus 
narrowed its spectrum of capabilities. Thus, while it maintains a small group of 
capable Special Forces troops, it has risked its credibility over combat land 
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operations, choosing to rely more often on air and maritime capabilities and offering 
its land forces in supporting roles such as force protection, as it did in Afghanistan 
(Belgian Foreign Office, 2016). Biscop insists, however, that arguments over a 
balanced force remain compelling for Belgium as a prerequisite for flexibility and 
influence, 
 
‘You need a serious combat capacity in every force so that in every scenario where 
you want to do something you can. In that way you have maximum political flexibility. 
Otherwise very quickly you’ll be in cases where you want to do something but you 
don’t have anything that’s relevant. So you become irrelevant militarily and also 
politically’ (Interview 14: June 2016). 
 
The logic of military capability for influence is also emphasised by the Belgian 
military. The Belgian Ministry of Defence emphasises that, ‘Small countries whose 
economies depend on other countries definitely need to develop a solid reputation 
on the international scene’ (Belgian Ministry of Defence, 2014: 27). And a senior 
Belgian officer also argues that, ‘Balanced forces are important because they 
provide for strategic agility; we still want to retain a spectrum of capabilities.’ 
(Interview 17: June 2014). Although interviewees note that there is often a debate 
among decision-makers about the shape of their armed forces, Belgian officials and 
most politicians understand the notion that military capability is necessary to 
preserve influence and fend off political irrelevance. Similarly in the Foreign Ministry 
the logic of influence through military contribution is clear. As Biscop argues,  
 
‘Often it’s the Foreign Ministry pushing on operations because they know we have to 
be there at some point because if not it will cost us in other dossiers… diplomats 
always want us to do our bit and fly the flag’ (Interview 14: June 2016). 
 
Thus, while the preference of some, though not all, Belgians is for an EU-based 
foreign and defence policy that might better mitigate the risk of entrapment into US 
policies, it remains the case that it is largely by acting alongside the Americans that 
Belgium demonstrates its commitment and relevance. It has supported most NATO 
operations, playing important combat air and maritime roles in the Libyan operations 
in 2011, providing air strikes and force protection for coalition airfields in Afghanistan 
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and air strikes in Iraq and Syria. The number of Belgian air sorties in operations in 
2011 over Libya, for example, were proportionately high for the size of the state, 
winning praise from US defence officials, “Every time there was a really hazardous 
mission, they [the Belgians] put their hands up” (Rachman, 2011). Thus, while the 
relative scale of the Belgian contribution to NATO and US-led operations is clearly 
an issue, Belgium does make a small but visible and credible contribution, 
particularly in the air and maritime domains. It may be that Belgium is struggling with 
the struggle for influence, but decision-makers still value the role played by its armed 
forces in ensuring influence and mitigating the risks of entrapment. 
 
ii. The Netherlands – ‘aspiring to the A-Team’ 
 
Much like Belgium, the Netherlands ‘played the role of faithful ally’ to the US during 
the Cold War. According to Alfred van Staden, during the 1950s and 1960s ‘the 
country demonstrated an extreme loyalty to the USA and to NATO policies’ (van 
Staden, 1995: 39). And, as with their Belgian counterparts, Dutch leaders stood their 
ground against huge domestic protests over American policies on nuclear weapons 
in the 1980s (van Staden, 1997: 92). The Netherlands also maintained comparatively 
high defence spending levels throughout the Cold War. Dutch scholars also argue 
that the Netherlands pursued a policy for influence through its military contribution to 
the alliance. van Staden argues that, ‘The Dutch attempted to capitalise on their 
loyalty to the USA in order to strengthen their position in Western Europe’ (1995: 41). 
Van Staden argues that the Netherlands contributed significant military forces to 
ensure that the role of larger European states was not dominant and that there was 
also a strong voice against European alternatives to NATO; Dutch governments 
remained particularly resistant to non-NATO European defence initiatives throughout 
the Cold War. Despite this emphasis on loyalty to the US and NATO, however, the 
Dutch came in for criticism during the Cold War for not putting sufficient troop 
numbers into the alliance’s ‘forward defence’ strategy (1990: 91). The Netherlands, 
like many European NATO states, placed more faith in the deterrent power of 
strategic US nuclear forces than conventional territorial forces in Europe (1990: 39). 
 
In the post-Cold War period the Netherlands followed a similar spending trajectory to 
that of Belgium, although it did not fall quite so precipitously at the turn of the 
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century, standing at 1.3% of GDP in 2012 (SIPRI). Historically, the key difference 
between the Dutch and Belgian armed forces lies in the superior scale and breadth 
of Dutch naval capability. While Belgium has minesweepers and multipurpose 
frigates, the Netherlands has these capabilities together with submarines, destroyers 
and amphibious forces, though their air forces are similar, and have grown more so 
in scale in recent years. As with Belgium, the Dutch also limited their land-fighting 
capabilities by removing heavy armour, although as will be seen in the next chapter, 
this was highly controversial and has been ameliorated to a degree through 
cooperation with Germany. 
 
Like Belgium, the Netherlands also has a strong tradition of multilateralism going 
back to the contributions of Hugo Grotius to the study of international law in the 17th 
Century. And there remains a concern in Dutch politics with making multilateralism 
work, which is evident in the historically relaxed attitude to European integration; it 
might be argued that this culture is an understandable reflection of the interest that 
small states have in shaping a more rules-based world around them. On the other 
hand, Dutch multilateralism has not significantly diluted its Atlanticism. The 
Netherlands has not promoted the path of European integration as an alternative 
means of defence to the same degree as Belgium, although it has supported the 
development of a defence and security role for the EU. And in the post-Cold War 
period, the Netherlands has strongly maintained its approach of contributing forces 
for influence; as with Belgium, it is this that has justified the retention of forces 
balanced across services and capabilities. As Philip Everts argues, 
 
‘…governments of all political persuasions preferred to keep a relatively small but 
‘multi-purpose’ army that could fight alongside the major allies, the United States in 
particular, albeit in the role of ‘junior partner’ (Everts, 2012: 85). 
 
And Rem Korteweg has argued that a desire for the Netherlands ‘to belong to the A-
Team’ can be observed in the attitudes of decision makers towards defence policy, 
 
‘Rather than focus on any specific threat, following the end of the Cold War the 
opportunity arose to use the military instrument to increase Dutch international 
political influence by participating in expeditionary crisis-management operations. It 
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was declared in terms of an international political ambition; relevant military 
capabilities could increase international political influence.’ (Korteweg: 2011).  
 
While Belgium and the Netherlands have both reduced defence spending as a share 
of GDP by a considerable amount in the post-Cold War period (see tables 5.1 - 5.4 
below), they have not significantly altered their foreign policy and levels of ambition 
in the deployment of their armed forces, here conceived of as strategic ends. They 
continue to retain balanced forces and use them to provide support for US foreign 
policies and US-led military operations. It can be argued, therefore, that both states 
exhibit the logic of behavior we would expect to see in an asymmetrical alliance, i.e., 
a focus on military contribution in order to maximise influence to mitigate entrapment. 
This is despite the significant differences between the Netherlands and Belgium and 
their other subordinate allies at the unit-level. In Belgium in particular, the effects of 
relative size among allies, of a federalist view of European integration and of a 
historically pacifistic disposition among the population can be seen to have an effect 
on Belgian policy. Yet, the logic of deplying their forces for influence remains strong. 
 
Hedging against abandonment – defence industry 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, the UK and France still have sufficient economies 
of scale to retain significant indigenous industrial capacity and critical technologies, 
even if this increasingly requires cooperation with others to sustain. For Belgium and 
the Netherlands there has never been a credible aspiration to such indigenous 
industrial capability across all capabilities. A return to anarchic conditions in Europe 
following the withdrawal of the US security guarantee would be likely to leave 
Belgium and the Netherlands exposed once again and forced to seek new alliances 
or revert to previous policies of neutrality. The capacity for conventional territorial 
defence drawn from autonomous industry would be limited. For Belgium the situation 
is particularly pronounced, as Dick Zandee et al argue with regard to Belgian 
defence industrial capacity, ‘arms production in Belgium is not, and never was, a 
privileged instrument for expressing sovereignty or power on the international stage’ 
(Zandee et al, 2016: 7). As such, defence industrial policy tends to be largely driven 
by domestic economic factors and the viability of certain industries and technologies. 
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The federalisation of Belgium with arms export licenses granted at the regional level 
also hinder a truly national strategy (2016: 4),  
 
‘Even speaking of a “Belgian” defence industry may be an exaggeration, as the 
decisions guiding the sector are mainly influenced by local job and territorial 
development issues, with no or little concertation with the federal level or the other 
regions.’ (2016: 7) 
 
By contrast, the Netherlands does have an explicit defence industrial strategy, and 
there is input from the MOD and armed forces as to what is required and priority 
technology areas are set out, 
 
‘Despite its small size, the NL-DSI is considered important for serving the interests of 
the Dutch armed forces, the defence and technological base in the country and the 
economy in more general terms. The Dutch navy and the air force are the main 
customers. The national technological base is particularly relevant for these two 
armed services’ (2016: 3).  
 
This does not mean, however, that the Netherlands can approach the levels of 
autonomy sought by France and the UK. While the Netherlands can prioritise the 
retention of certain onshore technologies, the general approach is for ‘off the shelf’ 
acquisitions. Both Belgium and the Netherlands can also use their leverage in 
purchasing major equipment platforms from larger producer states to seek ‘industrial 
offsets’, i.e., reciprocal investments or niche elements of the production of 
equipment, which provide a certain percentage of the purchase cost. In the case of 
the F16 both Belgium and the Netherlands were involved in co-production of the 
aircraft (Hartley, 2004: 130). 
 
In the absence of the strategic autonomy provided by an indigenous defence 
industry to the national armed forces, it is difficult for Belgium and the Netherlands to 
envisage a role for their armed forces in hedging against abandonment by the US. 
Yet there is some hedging value in simply maintaining armed forces for an 
unpredictable future, and as potential contributions to any future alliances, were 
NATO to fail and be replaced by, for example, a common defence under EU 
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auspices. Alexander Mattelaer argues, for example, that the Belgian defence budget 
ought to be viewed as ‘a strategic insurance policy’ that, ‘forms the ultimate stopgap 
solution for any unexpected disaster that may befall the population.’ (Mattelaer, 
2014: 3).  
 
Autonomy for positive or idiosyncratic interests 
 
Neither Belgium nor the Netherlands can aspire to operational autonomy 
underpinned by an indigenous defence industrial base. They cannot afford to 
produce their own aircraft nor do so through mutual dependence with others, as 
France and the UK are seeking to do. Both must therefore accept more constraints 
on their operational autonomy than France and the UK, particularly in the domain of 
aerospace, where both rely on American-made and supplied F16 jets. Thus, they 
both retain immediate operational autonomy in terms of decision-making over the 
capabilities that they operate, but expect to operate with allies in a more integrated 
fashion, and so the need for deep strategic autonomy over the design and 
modification of their equipment is not so important as it is to France and the UK. 
 
With regards to defence of their airspace, both states retain a ‘quick reaction alert’ 
(QRA) capability for air defence, which is provided by their F16 aircraft, and the 
development of deeper cooperation in this field will be considered in more detail 
below. Given that Europe’s two largest ports are at Rotterdam in the Netherlands 
and Antwerp in Belgium, the two states must also ensure the security of these ports 
and the waters around them. Both states retain mine-counter measure (MCM) 
vessels and frigates. According to a senior Belgian officer, ‘We still maintain a broad 
spectrum for the navy; the security of Rotterdam and Antwerp are core sovereign 
requirements.’ (Interview 18: June 2014)  
 
In terms of positive or idiosyncratic interests, neither Belgium nor the Netherlands 
has the capacity to make any significant military intervention alone in the defence of 
non-territorial interests. Both can, however, provide their forces to multinational 
missions; they have, for example, provided ships to the EU’s Operation Atalanta anti-
piracy mission. And they have considerable economic interests in trade and maritime 
transportation; exports accounted for 82% of the GDP of both the Netherlands and 
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Belgium in 2012; this compares with a global average of 31% (World Bank, 2016). 
Thus, the clear mutual interest in the security of trading routes is well-noted (Belgian 
MOD, 2012). 
 
Military capabilities as means to strategic ends 
 
It has been shown that Belgium and the Netherlands structure and use their military 
capabilities in line with the expectations of behaviour under the asymmetric alliance 
configuration. While they may emphasise values such as multilateralism in their 
foreign policy objectives, there is little support for the notion that they generate and 
deploy military capabilities predominantly in defence of multilateralist principles and a 
commitment to the observation international law. Dutch support for the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, was viewed by many as running counter to the 
very notion of legitimate multilateral action that decision-makers in the Netherlands 
often claim to champion (Everts, 2012). And both Dutch and Belgian contributions to 
Afghanistan were viewed as transactional contributions intended to maintain 
influence and credibility with the US, rather than to defend any particular Dutch or 
Belgian interests, values-based or otherwise (Eilstrup 2014: 93) As Korteweg says of 
Dutch operations in Afghanistan, it was intended to ‘demonstrate that [the 
Netherlands] was a serious and reliable member of the ‘A-team’.’ (Korteweg, 2011: 
255) These cultural ‘value-interests’ cannot be discounted entirely and will no doubt 
be weighed in the balance by decision-makers, but they do not offer a compelling 
alternative explanation for the generation and use of military capabilities by Belgium 
and the Netherlands. The ‘struggle for influence’ thesis provides a more plausible 
general explanation for the retention and deployment of balanced forces.  
 
It is, however, also the case that the financial commitment to the struggle for 
influence cannot be described as wholehearted, particularly as regards Belgium’s 
armed forces. During the period in question, Belgium was accused by senior 
members of its own armed forces of lacking any clear policy direction at all, and of 
being confused as to the strategic ends that its military should serve. And both 
Belgium and the Netherlands have recently narrowed the breadth of their warfighting 
capabilities by deleting heavy armour from their inventories. On the other hand, high-
end, war-fighting capabilities are still recognised by decision-makers in both states 
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as the most important means by which to retain influence and fend off political 
irrelevance in the eyes of the United States and larger European states38. 
Autonomous military capability remains important, both for influence and for territorial 
defence, and some discretionary contributions to operations for positive interests. 
Even here, however, during the period in question there have been increasing 
concerns as to the viability of maintaining capabilities, even for the defence of 
sovereign airspace and waters. As such, and as observed in the previous chapter on 
France and the UK, the strategic ends of the Netherlands and Belgium are also 
increasingly vulnerable to the cost of maintaining military capabilities. It is to this 
issue that the chapter now turns. 
 
iii. The logic of a crisis: Dutch and Belgian strategic ends under pressure 
 




As is the case with the UK and France, explanations for the decline in Belgian 
military capacity can be found at both unit and system level. Spending is a central 
factor. In 1991 Belgium spent 2.3% of its GDP on defence. While spending fell 
significantly as an immediate response to the end of the Cold War, it made a further 
rapid decline as a share of GDP from the turn of the century, falling from 1.3% in 
2000 to just 1% in 2012 (see figure 5.1). In real terms, however, Belgian spending on 
defence was broadly flat between the mid 1990s and the financial crisis, and real 
terms spending was in fact greater in 2008 than it was in 1995, presumably due to 
operations, as can be seen in Figure 5.2. As with the UK and France, until the 
financial crisis of 2008, Belgium was not making significant reductions in real 
defence spending, rather it was choosing to spend the proceeds of economic growth 
in other policy areas, including its struggle to bring down public debt to meet the 
criteria for joining the Euro (Kuipers, 2006 :114). 
 
                                                     
38 And more recently, in December 2015, the Belgian Government announced the ‘Strategic Plan for Defence 2030’, which 
included a commitment to spend €9.2bn on capital investments such as replacements for F16 fighters, frigates and MCM 
vessels (Belgian Defence Ministry, 2015) 
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Figure 5.1. Belgian defence spending as share of GDP 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Real terms Belgian defence spending 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
 
The failure to maintain higher levels of GDP spending has clearly had an impact, 
however, on the scale and breadth of Belgium’s military capabilities. As argued by 
some analysts, it may be that those unit-level aspects of Belgian domestic political 
culture addressed above have eroded the once-strong Atlanticism of the political 
leadership and thus the case for higher defence spending. As the Belgian MOD 
notes, 
 
‘Belgium lacks a well-established tradition of strategic reflection and there has never 
been a broad societal debate on defence. This can probably be explained by the fact 
that Belgian society is characterised by a deep-seated pacifism. Security, which 
partly results from more than 60 years of efficient transatlantic defence cooperation, 
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Given such a disposition among the public, it is perhaps unsurprising that few 
Belgian politicians make the case for greater defence investment, focussing instead 
on more popular issues. As explored in the previous chapter, however, the problem 
with ‘flat in real terms’ defence budgets is that they fail to keep pace with the defence 
inflationary trends associated with technological advances in military equipment and 
in personnel costs. Throughout the post-Cold War period the position of the Belgian 
navy in particular has been increasingly perilous.  
 
As with the UK and France, Belgium has failed to align its defence budget with its 
defence planning assumptions for any significant length of time; successive attempts 
to bring capabilities into line with aspirations have been overtaken by insufficient 
funding and over-optimistic planning. As Biscop notes,  
 
‘Invariably the budgets included in successive capability plans were revised 
downwards before the plan could be fully implemented…. savings made on 
personnel have never been reinvested in defence but have served to fill the overall 
deficit in the federal budget’ (Biscop, 2011: 2).  
 
A memo written by senior Belgian officers and leaked from the Belgian MOD in 2012 
noted that the last three strategic plans for the armed forces have failed to hold 
personnel numbers at the level required. To maintain the ability to deploy a battalion-
size force of around 1200 troops and current air and sea capabilities, total personnel 
numbers of around 30,000 will be ‘the minimally required critical mass’ (Biscop, 
2011: 2). And even if Belgium were to immediately replace its ageing equipment it 
risks not having trained staff in place to operate it; the average age of Belgian 
officers is ten years older than in similar armed forces (Belgian MOD Memo, 2012). 
The memo concluded that, 
 
‘The armed forces are facing a capacity versus commitments dilemma today. This is 
caused by the gap between the available numbers of personnel, equipment, 
logistical support and training resources on one hand and the demand and 




As such, the ability of Belgium to continue to maintain balanced forces on current 
trends is increasingly improbable. Relatively low defence spending is compounded 
by the fact that much of the armed forces’ equipment was purchased during the Cold 
War or shortly afterwards; replacement will be expensive, particularly if Belgium 
seeks to maintain similar defence planning assumptions. Replacements for its most 
expensive platforms, such as F16 aircraft, frigates and MCM vessels risk 
overwhelming the defence budget and will require significant additional spending 
(Interview 14, June 2016). 
 
It has been argued in the previous section of this chapter, however, that despite its 
reluctance to increase real-terms defence spending, Belgium continues to pursue the 
strategic end of a struggle for influence within the NATO alliance. As such, Belgium 
can be viewed as prone to the same systemic problems of increasingly expensive 
personnel and capability costs. Belgium faces the additional difficulty that even if 
defence spending were to stabilise at around 1% of GDP or even to rise significantly, 
it will find it very difficult to sustain the balanced forces necessary to pursue its 
struggle for influence due to the increasing cost of maintaining military capabilities. 
While Belgium had not sought to keep up with its peers in terms of defence spending 
as a share of GDP, the financial crisis of 2008 precipitated real terms cuts and thus 
created a sense of crisis. 
 
As with the situation in the UK and France, the financial crisis thus exacerbated 
problems already apparent in a fragile force structure. In response to the crisis 
Belgium cut its defence budget by 10% between 2009 and 2011 amounting to 
annual cuts of around €130m. The bulk of the savings came from losing bases and 
cutting army numbers (European Parliament, 2011). In interviews for this thesis, 
some Belgian decision-makers spoke of their fears of falling below a point of critical 
mass at which particular capabilities would no longer be sustainable. In the light of 
the financial crisis, the Belgian military was particularly concerned about the Army’s 
ability to maintain an artillery battalion (Interview 16, June 2014) and even basic 
territorial defence functions such as the protection of its own airspace (Belgian MOD 
Note). There was a growing concern that the use of the Belgian armed forces as a 
means for visibility and influence was at risk. Officers warned about the threat to 
Belgium’s political influence in terms of its military credibility with its allies, 
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‘This means the political commitment to participate fully in international decision-
making…. It also means participating in military operations to a proportionate degree 
and bearing the risks of solidarity. For this, military power must also be credible.’ 
(Belgian MOD, 2012) 
 
Given Belgium’s deep and long-standing defence cooperation with the Netherlands, 
there were also fears that it would no longer be a credible partner for such 
cooperation if capabilities declined any further. Biscop notes the concerns among the 
Dutch armed forces, ‘Are the Belgians going to be able to continue paying their 
share of this? If not, we should be looking to other partners.’ (Interview 14: June 
2016) Similarly, senior armed forces officers wrote that,  
 
‘It is illusory to assume that other countries would be interested in extensive 
cooperation when the Belgian military capabilities would have little operational or 
other added value.’ (Belgian MOD, 2012) 
 
It has been seen that despite the apparent defence policy vacuum decried by its 
military leadership in 2012, Belgium has shown no intention of renouncing its long-
standing foreign policy approach and the role that the military plays within that, 
conceptualised in this thesis as the ‘struggle for influence’ within an asymmetric 
alliance. And it is this dilemma that forced Belgium, and more specifically its military 
officers and officials, to look towards deeper cooperation with others to seek greater 
efficiency and maintain capabilities that might otherwise be at risk. Due to strikingly 
similar problems and a track-record of successful bi-lateral cooperation, the 
Netherlands represents an unsurprising partner of choice. 
 
ii. The Netherlands 
 
In 1991 the Netherlands spent 2.4% of GDP on defence and had a total of 101,000 
active armed forces personnel, including an armoured brigade (IISS, 1991) deployed 
in Germany (Stein, 1990). Like Belgium, following the end of the Cold War the 
Netherlands had phased out conscription by 1996, and drawn down the scale of its 
forces. In 2000 defence spending as a share of GDP stood at 1.4% and by 2012, 
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had fallen to 1.3%, with the number of active personnel falling to 37,000, as is shown 
in figure 5.3.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Netherlands defence spending as share of GDP 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
 
As with other states under consideration in this thesis, in real terms the picture looks 
different; the Netherlands spent more on defence in 2011 than it did in 1994, as can 
be seen in figure 5.4. This is partly explained by its major commitment to US-led 
operations in Afghanistan. As with Belgium, it is the 2008 financial crisis that caused 
spending to fall significantly in real terms, with the cuts in 2011 causing a sharp real-
terms decline.  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Real terms Netherlands defence spending 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
 
The 2000 Defence White Paper set out plans for Dutch armed forces to field a broad 
spectrum of capabilities relevant to the 21st century security environment 
(Government of the Netherlands, 2000). And the Dutch armed forces were described 
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as ‘a motivated and professional force capable of participating in demanding joint 
operations in an Alliance context’ (IISS, 2012: 138). Despite the aspiration to retain 
balanced forces, however, the Netherlands has found it increasingly difficult to 
maintain such a balance across and within its three services. It has followed a 
familiar pattern of ‘salami-slicing’ its major platforms, such as fighter jets and ships, 
in favour of an attempt to maintain capability across a broad spectrum. While the 
2000 Defence White Paper set out ambitious plans, it also outlined cuts of 136 
Leopard 2 tanks, two frigates, three mine-counter measure (MCM) vessels and 18 
F16 fighter jets. Even the aspirations of the White Paper quickly proved difficult to 
meet, however, with the Orion P3 maritime patrol aircraft fleet reduced in 2000 and 
then completely removed from service in 2006 and sold to Germany (Chuter, 2015).  
 
The financial crisis of 2008 led to significant fiscal retrenchment from which defence 
spending was not exempted. A letter from the Dutch Minister of Defence to 
Parliament in 2011 set out the seriousness of the situation, and the need for ‘radical 
measures’ to bring spending under control (Netherlands MOD, 2011). The cuts 
reduced the defence budget from €8.5bn in 2011 to €7.5bn by 2015, and reductions 
in capability were significant. In terms of retaining balanced forces, the most serious 
cut was the complete deletion of the Dutch main battle tank, the Leopard 2. In the 
absence of a main battle tank, the Dutch Army would no longer be capable of 
leading combined arms maneuver on the battlefield, a capability it had retained since 
the end of the Cold War39. Once more, the armed forces faced the ‘salami slicing’ of 
capabilities, with the navy losing four MCM vessels and the air force having its F16 
fighters reduced from 87 to 68. The Dutch MOD voiced particular concern about the 
operational impact of cuts to F16 fighters and the ability to contribute to international 
missions, with ‘fewer opportunities to provide air support to its own units and those of 
allies in operations’ (Netherlands MOD, 2011: 19). 
 
The cuts led to concerns over the credibility of the Dutch armed forces. Former 
military figures and the Government’s own advisory board argued that the cuts would 
cause lasting damage, and cautioned that, ‘the exercise of political power is neither 
credible nor effective if it is not backed up with military power’ (AIV, 2012). One 
                                                     
39 The impact of the decision to divest from tanks and the mitigating steps taken by the Dutch Government will be considered in 
greater detail in the next chapter. 
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former Dutch Army officer argued that defence cuts in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere would ‘decrease Washington’s willingness to give Europe’s own concerns 
a sympathetic ear’ (Hernandez, 2013: 9). The Netherlands thus found itself in a very 
similar position to Belgium regarding the challenge of maintaining a balanced force 
and the threat to its ability to exert influence with the US and other allies. 
 
Common problem, common solution? 
 
There is a long history of Dutch-Belgian defence cooperation dating back to the late 
1940s (Parrein, 2011; Homan, 2012; Sauer, 2015). It grew increasingly more 
significant during the Cold War, particularly in the maritime domain through close 
naval cooperation. In the 1950s the two states agreed on a joint command structure 
for their navies at times of war. They cooperated through NATO on the security of 
the English Channel through the standing naval force, STANNAVFORCHAN. In the 
1970s further naval cooperation was institutionalised through the ‘BENESAM’ 
arrangements40. The 1970s saw a collaboration with France to acquire the tripartite 
mine-hunter ships. In 1987, together with Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands 
signed a further agreement on cooperation and coordination in defence. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the Dutch and Belgian air forces took a joint approach to acquisition of 
their F16 jets from the US and collaborated over support through the European 
Participating Air Forces initiative, and through which there is now substantial 
cooperation for support to their aircraft (NATO, 2012).  
 
Though not exclusively driven by moments of budgetary crisis, Dutch-Belgian 
cooperation has reflected a need to find efficiencies, particularly in the post-Cold War 
years when spending was quickly and drastically curtailed, and in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. While defence cooperation is long-standing, moves towards the 
mutualisation of elements of military capability involving deep cooperation are, 
however, a more recent development. In these deeper forms of cooperation, it will be 
seen that a common causal component is the imminent threat of falling below a 
threshold beyond which a capability is unsustainable, and the force structure loses 
its balance, in turn reducing military and political flexibility. It has been shown that the 
                                                     
40 Be-ne-sam stands for Belgisch-Nederlandse marinesamenwerking, which translates into English as ‘Belgium-Netherlands 
naval cooperation’. 
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trend of flat or declining budgets and gradual escalation in the cost of acquiring and 
maintaining military capabilities combined with the shock of the financial crisis 
brought about an immediate need to consider ways to improve efficiency through 
cooperation. Given that defence cooperation between Belgium and the Netherlands 
was widely regarded as successful, particularly between their navies, there was 
confidence among the military to consider proposals and high-level political interest 
in doing so. The success of naval cooperation was viewed as a potential role model 
for other services (Interview 14: June 2016; Interview 16: June 2014). As a Dutch 
official says in relation to the moves towards new initiatives that began in 2012, 
 
‘One of the drivers is the acknowledgement that in the past two decades we have 
had so many budget cuts - it’s true of all European countries - that you need 
cooperation to keep some capabilities that you cannot afford to keep on your own.’ 
(Interview 24: June 2016) 
 
And Dutch defence analyst Dick Zandee notes that the need to look towards deeper 
forms of defence cooperation to drive efficiencies and maintain capabilities is now 
widely accepted among senior officials and politicians,  
 
‘Since 2010 the line has been “multinational defence cooperation is not a choice, it is 
a must”. This is the official line of the Ministry of Defence, presented time after time 
in Parliament. The Belgians have exactly the same view’ (Interview 21: September 
2014). 
 
Indeed, senior officers in the Belgian armed forces argue that cooperative measures 
were required to at least mitigate the effects of the cuts, and that both Belgium and 
the Netherlands were at risk of losing entire capabilities. According to one senior 
officer, 
 
‘Both our countries once again had to reduce their personnel strength and military 
capabilities and to limit capital investments. These problems happened in Belgium 
and the Netherlands almost at the same moment. And what was important with 
regard to this driver was that both our countries went underneath what I call the 
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‘capability threshold’ to maintain a set of capabilities within our national inventories.’ 
(Interview 16: June 2014) 
 
With both states potentially facing the loss of discrete capabilities or the ability to use 
capabilities for anything more than territorial obligations, decision-makers faced 
critical decisions as to the future of the policy of maintaining balanced forces. A 
senior Belgian officer argues that the choice facing the armed forces was between a 
balanced force and whole capability specialisation, 
 
‘We chose to maintain, for as long as is possible, a balanced force structure. That’s a 
force structure with all the services, and within the services all the necessary 
capabilities to act in an autonomous way: that’s a balanced force structure. We could 
have chosen another option. We could choose to no longer maintain a balanced 
structure but choose to specialise, to no longer maintain an artillery battalion, an 
ISTAR battalion etc. We could have said: “Okay we’ll get rid of artillery as we got rid 
of heavy tanks and the money we save by doing that we invest in other capabilities”. 
This is specialisation versus a multi-purpose force structure. When you’re getting 
that small it’s an unavoidable choice. But once we chose to maintain a balanced 
force we had to go to other countries. Then you need to go down the multinational 
route’ (Interview 16: June 2014). 
 
Officers from the Belgian and Dutch armed forces thus began discussions on ways 
and means to drive efficiency, but with the particular aim of maintaining capabilities 
through cooperation. The outcome of these discussions and those between political 
counterparts in both states was the 2012 Benelux Declaration. 
 
2012 Benelux Declaration 
 
The 2012 Benelux41 Declaration represents an evolution of existing cooperation and 
an attempt to build on previous successes, particularly that between navies (Belgian 
Government, 2012). New initiatives were driven ‘bottom-up’ from the military level, as 
                                                     
41 While this agreement is also relevant to Luxembourg, this thesis will focus only on the Netherlands-Belgium bilateral aspects 
of cooperation. 
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historically has been the case with Dutch-Belgian cooperation. As a senior Belgian 
officer explains, 
 
‘It was a military decision. It was a military initiative. It was tasked by our Chief of the 
Defence Staff, and all the initial discussions happened with only military officers 
around the table. Once all possible fields of cooperation were examined, explored 
and developed, and once we had high confidence with all the service chiefs then we 
went to the political level. Only then did we start the discussions on the political-
military level’ (Interview 16: June 2014). 
 
Given the difficult fiscal positions in both the Netherlands and Belgium, the 
respective governments embraced the plans, particularly as they might offer 
opportunities for mitigating the most negative aspects of the cuts that had been 
announced in 2011. A Dutch official claims it as ‘an easy decision’ for politicians to 
make,  
 
‘The only alternative was losing military capabilities or losing political autonomy or 
losing sovereignty. Moreover, we had the previous experience. There was the effect 
of making savings in the mid-term. Our colleagues abroad quickly saw the benefits 
for themselves.’ (Interview 24: June 2016). 
 
As such, the 2012 Declaration represented a new search for opportunities in an 
existing relationship. The 2012 Benelux Declaration notes, ‘the field of tension 
between operational demands on the one hand, and shrinking defence budgets on 
the other.’ The goal is therefore, ‘to improve the efficiency of our defence efforts’, 
while recognising ‘the preservation of autonomy in fulfilling the national level of 
ambition’ (Government of Belgium, 2012). The remit for cooperation outlined is very 
wide, including ‘logistics and maintenance; education and training; the execution of 
military tasks; and procurement.’ In terms of concrete initiatives, the Declaration calls 
for feasibility studies in the following areas:  
 
 maintenance and operational cooperation regarding the NH90 helicopter; 
 synergies in Air Policing;  
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 shared paratrooper training at one location;  
 sharing and specialisation of exercising and training facilities across a wide 
range of military activities; 
 cooperation between armies; 
 possibilities for joint procurement, standardisation and interoperability based 
on respective long-term investment plans. 
 
The primary motivation for the 2012 Benelux Declaration was thus to seek new 
cooperative initiatives to maintain a balanced force with a broad range of capabilities 
through greater efficiency. It was, in this sense, a direct answer to the challenges 
raised by long-term ‘flat in real terms’ budgets and the shock of the financial crisis. 
The question arises, however, as to how Belgium and the Netherlands could 
cooperate more deeply in these areas. This will be the subject of the final section of 
the chapter. 
 
iv. The logic of mutualisation: the 2012 Benelux Declaration  
 
Cooperation for efficiency – structural opportunities and constraints 
 
The theory developed and deployed in this thesis is that the asymmetric alliance 
configuration shapes the behaviour of subordinate states, both in terms of the 
generation and use of their military capabilities, and the scope for cooperation with 
others. The alliance provides for a temporal period in which suppressed balancing 
between states dampens concerns over relative gains and enables cooperation, 
even in the most sensitive areas of providing military capability. In this vein, Dutch 
defence officials refer to the development of ‘a kind of theoretical framework’ against 
which states are classified for their potential as close defence cooperation partners. 
Partners are divided into three groups, ‘strategic partners’, ‘EU and NATO partners’ 
and a final more flexible grouping of ‘partners of opportunity’ for example states 
where operations are taking place or their neighbours (Dutch MOD, 2014). As a 
Dutch official explains, 
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‘Strategic partners include the US, UK, Norway, France, Belgium, Germany and 
Luxembourg. The Germans and the Belgians are the most closely involved, and that 
has to do with common interests in foreign policy, geographical location, basically 
the same outlook on international affairs, and all are EU or NATO members. We still 
regard NATO as one of the foundation blocks of our foreign and defence policy’ 
(Interview 24: June 2016). 
 
Such a statement underlines the importance of the NATO alliance and the presence 
of common interests. Belgian officials use similar language when they talk about 
what they regard as the ‘facilitating factors’ for defence cooperation, 
 
‘The facilitating factors are the same: trust, a huge overlap on foreign and security 
policy and more or less similar strategic culture. Those are valid for every kind of 
cooperation.’ (Interview 16: June, 2014) 
 
As has been argued in relation to France and the UK, however, while the structural-
relational condition of suppressed balancing in an asymmetric alliance provides the 
possibility for cooperation by removing a fundamental constraint of an anarchic 
system, there are still powerful constraints on cooperation. 
 
The asymmetric alliance theory suggests that interdependence is low between 
subordinate states in the alliance. The asymmetry of power within the alliance means 
that the aggregation of military capabilities is not critical, as it would be in a classic 
multipolar or ‘balancing’ alliance. This has important implications for the flexibility of 
subordinate states in the ways and means by which they may meet their strategic 
ends. It has been seen that subordinate states seek to preserve their flexibility 
through the maintenance of balanced forces. The specialisation of whole capabilities 
is therefore seen as a risk to flexibility. As a senior Belgian officer argues, 
 
‘As long as you have a balanced force structure you can do your own thing, 
regardless of the position of your partner. But once you have decided to specialise 
you are depending on your partner for certain things and you have constraints on 
your foreign policy’ (Interview 16: June 2014). 
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Thus, while Belgium and the Netherlands have a closely aligned worldview, there are 
still likely to be important differences in how they deal with any given interest related 
to their strategic ends. This makes perfect alignment over the handling of all their 
interests highly unlikely. Primarily, as with the UK and France, the main problem lies 
in aligning their approaches to the strategic end of the struggle for influence over the 
US. Because the temporal and functional deployment of Dutch and Belgian support 
for US interests is not critical to the US nor the wider alliance, they may or may not 
align over a given interest under this strategic end. And if they do align over an 
interest they may or may not support the US at the same time, nor provide the same 
form of military contribution in terms of function. As Biscop notes, despite their many 
similarities, shared outlook and strong history of close defence cooperation with the 
Netherlands, there are times when Belgium takes a different view over participation 
for US-led operations:  
 
‘In recent years there has been relatively good participation in operations. But it’s 
entirely unpredictable. You cannot call the trends. It’s really very much case-by-case 
and ad hoc, so you never really know: “Will we be there or not?” Nobody thought we 
would do Libya, I didn’t, but we did.’ (Interview 14: June 2016) 
 
The timing and nature of their support for the positive interests of the US is inherently 
unpredictable because interdependence remains low and policy flexibility is high. 
Thus, there is a lack of internal alliance pressure to deliver an immediate military 
support of any particular function. As such, there are difficulties even for very closely 
aligned states such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Support for the US-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 was a point of major diplomatic difference between the two states. As 
a senior Belgian officer argues by reference to a fictional scenario, even for these 
two states there are limits, particularly as regards whole capability specialisation, 
 
‘Suppose that the Netherlands and Belgium had agreed that Belgium will specialise 
in engineering support and the Dutch in ISTAR. Then the Dutch Government 
decided in 2003 to go to Iraq, then the Belgians would need to go. The Belgians 
would have had to go to Iraq. The sovereignty issue is much bigger when you have 
specialised your forces. Then you can no longer say no’ (Interview 16: June 2014). 
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The inherent flexibility in the asymmetric alliance also leads to a functional flexibility 
in terms of what is contributed to missions. In the case of Belgium this has led to a 
focus on contributing air and maritime capabilities, in large part because of the 
reduced political risk of being at a greater distance from the frontline. As Biscop 
argues, ‘[Belgium is] always there if it’s for air or naval operations, but it’s very tricky 
to deploy the Army for anything that could be risky, ever since Rwanda.’ (Interview 
14: June 2016). To a degree the effects of this flexibility of capability function can be 
seen in the erosion of the capabilities of Belgian land forces; the Army has divested 
itself of its heavy armour but retains higher-level war-fighting capabilities in the air 
and maritime domains. Functional flexibility can also be illustrated by the fact that 
due to controversy over engagement in Libya, the Netherlands chose not to fly 
combat missions over Libya (Reuters, 2011). Instead it provided airspace patrols and 
intelligence gathering. It is now necessary to consider actual cases of capability 
mutualisation to consider how these effects of low interdependence and the 
possibility of cooperation afforded by the assumed durability of the NATO alliance 
have shaped concrete cooperation initiatives. 
 
Explaining the mutualisation of military capabilities – the Netherlands and Belgium 
 
As has been shown, the period under examination reflects two major challenges to 
Dutch and Belgian military capabilities. The first is the longstanding and ongoing 
impact of flat-real terms spending on military capabilities, often apparent in the 
continued ‘salami slicing’ of units of military capabilities such as army battalions, 
ships and fighter jets. The second is the effects of the international financial crisis, 
which led to fiscal retrenchment and defence budget cuts. The remainder of this 
chapter will consider examples of cooperation from this period, including one 
example from the period before the financial crisis, which is that of the mutualisation 
of support services to the Dutch and Belgian navies. This has been included 
because, although it is not related to the search for efficiencies following the financial 
crisis, it is chronologically contemporary and reflects the already constrained defence 
spending in both states due to real-terms flat budgets.  
 
The other initiatives considered are drawn from the 2012 Benelux Declaration, which 
was driven by a combination of both challenges. The Declaration represents a 
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considered and holistic attempt to respond to the challenge of sustaining military 
capabilities, although most of its initiatives reflect capability challenges made more 
acute by the financial crisis. The following section will now focus on a selection of 
these initiatives in detail, using the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model to 
do so.  
 
Mutualisation of capability at high temporal distance from frontline 
 
H1: Capability mutualisation may be found at high temporal distance from the 
frontline, with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
i. Replacement Mine Counter-Measure (MCM) vessels and frigates 
 
The BENELUX Declaration committed the parties to launching ‘exploratory studies’ 
into, ‘possibilities for joint procurement, standardisation and interoperability based on 
the respective long-term investment plans’ (Declaration, 2012). While not referred to 
directly in the Declaration, Belgium and the Netherlands had already begun 
preliminary discussions over the need for replacement of their ageing MCM vessels 
and frigates. Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation is one the closest forms of defence 
cooperation in existence. The two navies operate the same types of ship, have a bi-
national headquarters, ‘Admiral Benelux’, and have specialised the support services 
to their frigates and MCM vessels. Together with France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands developed and acquired the ‘tripartite’ MCM vessels in the 1970s and 
1980s. In 2005, Belgium purchased two ‘multi-purpose’ Karel Doorman class frigates 
from the Netherlands, meaning that both had the same MCM and frigate types. As 
will be considered in more detail below, this has had profound implications for 
current and future cooperation. Having the same ship types has enabled cooperation 
of unprecedented depth, but with both classes of ships due to be retired within the 
decade, attention had turned to their replacement during the period under 
investigation, and the implications for future cooperation.  
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The acquisition of new ships is of critical importance to BENESAM cooperation42. If 
either party fails to replace their frigates or MCM vessels, acquires a different type, 
or moves at a very different speed to replace them, then BENESAM cooperation will 
be at risk of dissolution. A senior Belgian officer argues that naval cooperation has 
demonstrated that ‘having the same equipment is vital, a key success factor’ 
(Interview 18: June 2014). A senior Dutch official agrees, 
 
‘Having the same equipment is really important… Ships are expensive, but for both 
Belgium and the Netherlands the objective is to go on as we have in the past, so we 
must buy the same frigates and MCM vessels. It is true that only if you do this you 
can keep up the deep form of integration. The navies both know what they want, but 
have to pay for it’ (Interview 24: June 2016). 
 
The logic of buying new ships together also provides further opportunities to deepen 
cooperation at the earliest stages. The combination of a bi-national command in the 
form of Admiral Benelux alongside joint acquisition provides scope for shared 
concepts of operations and doctrine (Interview 18: June 2014). As a senior Belgian 
officer explains, by planning for the acquisition of ships at the earliest stage, further 
opportunities for alignment and efficiency may be available, 
 
‘The next step of naval cooperation is to begin from concepts, a joint Dutch-Belgian 
vision document for a common concept of multi-purpose frigates. Most of the 
benefits of cooperation can be obtained when you have the same equipment. 
Training, education, maintenance, same infrastructure.’ (Interview 16: June 2014). 
 
The joint acquisition of ships based on joint concepts of operation is significant 
because it is an example of the mutualisation of a capability at almost every stage: 
from planning, acquisition and HQ command to support. Ships will remain, however, 
national in ownership and crew. In terms of the hypothesis drawn from the model, 
then, the joint acquisition of the ships mean that concrete interests need not 
necessarily be closely aligned. On the other hand, the emphasis on common 
concepts of operations suggests that the two states believe it highly likely that 
                                                     
42 In 2016, Belgium and the Netherlands signed a Memorandum of Understanding on building new minehunters and frigates 
together (Naval Technology, 2016) 
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concrete interests will largely be aligned for the majority of operations. And, as has 
been discussed, this is reflected in the similarity of Dutch and Belgian concrete 
interests regarding the security of territorial waters, of trading routes at sea and of 
the need to contribute capabilities to ensure credibility and influence with the US. 
The extent to which joint acquisition enables mutualisation of maritime capabilities 
ever-closer to the frontline of operations will be considered in more detail below. 
 
Defence cuts in the Netherlands in 2011 had the potential for serious disruption to 
the Benesam arrangements. Given that the Netherlands has a more advanced fleet 
of frigate-destroyers, the shared type of M-class frigates, which are less capable and 
ageing, were vulnerable to complete divestment. According to Pieter-Jan Parrein this 
would ‘certainly reduce cooperation for support services as two Belgian M-class 
frigates would be vastly different from the four remaining Dutch air defence and 
command frigates’ (Parrein, 2011: 162-163). Thus, while it is clear that there are 
substantial domestic political constraints on Dutch-Belgian defence industrial 
cooperation, the logic of joint acquisition of ships is strong, and meets the 
expectation that capability can be mutualised at high temporal distance from the 
frontline, as is shown in figure 5.5. It will be seen below, however, that Benesam 
cooperation goes much further than mutualisation at the defence industrial stage. 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Surface ship joint procurement distance from frontline 
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Mutualisation of capabilities on the frontline 
 
H2: Capability mutualisation may be found at zero temporal-spatial distance from the 
frontline, where there is a very high certainty of support for concrete interests. 
 
i. Air Policing 
 
The centre-piece initiative of the 2012 Benelux Declaration was a commitment to 
draw up plans for joint air policing of the airspace of Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The Declaration states that, 
 
‘We will jointly execute feasibility studies to prepare the ground for decision-making 
in the short term on… synergies in the area of Air Policing including Quick Reaction 
Alert and Renegade’ (Government of Belgium, 2012). 
 
According to a senior Belgian officer, the logic behind the initiative was as follows, 
 
‘The idea is to organise the securing of BENELUX air space in a common way using 
a flip-flop arrangement. Quick Reaction Alert, in principle is no problem. But the 
same planes will also be responsible for what we call ‘renegade’ operations. That is, 
for instance, terrorist planes threatening Brussels or the Hague. That would be if, for 
instance, you have two Belgian F16s flying above the Netherlands and they need to 
shoot down the renegade terrorist plane above the city of Rotterdam.’ (Interview 16: 
June 2014) 
 
Officials understand that this raises fundamental questions over the link between 
sovereignty and lethal force, the chain of command and responsibility for the most 
fundamental elements of state security. Certain questions arise, 
 
‘Okay, who should give that order to shoot down the plane above the city of 
Rotterdam? That’s a real issue of sovereignty. Is that a Belgian authority that gives 




In December 2016, Belgium and the Netherlands signed a technical agreement, 
which sets out the lines of command when handling such a renegade operation. 
Under a ‘flip-flop’ arrangement, Belgium will provide two fighter jets for cover for 
Benelux airspace for four months, and will be followed by the Netherlands and so on. 
Under circumstances envisaged by the agreement a Dutch fighter pilot can use 
lethal force against an aircraft on the command of the Belgian authorities, and vice 
versa. The Belgian Minister of Defence would give the order over Belgium and the 
Dutch Minister of Security and Justice would give the order to a Belgian pilot over the 
Netherlands. In such circumstances, one government is unable to veto the actions of 
their own pilots when commanded by the other. Operational command of a particular 
asset is thus ceded to another state. Officials are aware that such arrangements run 
against the grain of established notions of military force and sovereignty. As a Dutch 
official remarks, 
 
‘It is pushing the boundaries on sovereignty because we basically give the authority 
to Belgians to use our fighter aircraft to use lethal force for a major event without the 
possibility of a direct veto by the Dutch authorities.’ (Interview 24: June 2016). 
 
Belgian officials agree, and argue that such thinking may be typical of future 
agreements, where ‘by exploring new fields and areas for cooperation we are 
reaching those limits of sovereignty.’ (Interview 16: June 2014)  
 
The new arrangement will produce significant efficiencies for both states. It will 
increase the number of jets available for deployment thus increasing flexibility. This 
is particularly important because both the Netherlands and Belgium will soon replace 
their F16s with fewer F35s or similar, and will therefore be operating smaller fleets of 
aircraft43. Joint air-policing goes some way to mitigating the effects of the 2011 
defence cuts on Dutch air power. As a Dutch official describes, 
 
‘This arrangement is very advantageous to us because we are going to buy 37 F35 
fighters whereas we now have over 60 F16s; we had over 200 during the Cold War. 
You need a substantial number of those planes and the pilots to maintain this 24/7 
                                                     
43 At the time of writing, Belgium has not yet decided on the aircraft that will replace the F16. 
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arrangement. You need several for training, which means some permanently in the 
US. What it comes down to is that if you don’t have this arrangement with the 
Belgians then for international operations you can have four aircraft and they can 
each fly one mission a day, which is not very much. Now with this arrangement it 
does not just double capacity but you can have multiple missions a day so it 
improves your output for multinational missions’ (Interview 24: June 2016). 
 
A former senior Dutch air force officer confirms that the air policing cooperation will 
allow the Netherlands to maintain its role in international operations,  
 
‘We already shared a common picture of airspace. The big step was to share 
responsibility for a renegade situation. That is a big step. And that cooperation 
means that we will have something available for crisis management operations’ 
(Interview 22: September 2016). 
 
According to the definition of mutualisation used in this thesis, joint-air policing is a 
form of sharing, although it does not require the physical sharing of equipment, nor 
indeed for the equipment to be absolutely identical, only to have the same capability 
to achieve the task. A Dutch official argues that, ‘It’s a kind of pooling and sharing 
because we use each other’s capabilities on a rotational basis’ (Interview 24, June 
2016). There is a symmetrical mutual dependence at the heart of the cooperation, 
and the reliance on the capability of the partner is absolute. How is it possible then 
that the Netherlands and Belgium can mutualise such a ‘frontline’ capability?  
 
The hypothesis drawn from the model is that capability mutualisation may occur at 
zero temporal distance from the frontline when there is very high certainty of support 
for concrete interests. In this case, the strategic end of autonomous control over the 
defence of territory is identical, as are the concrete interests that fall underneath that 
end, such as the protection of civilian lives and economic interests44. The temporal 
distance of mutualisation from the frontline is zero; and, because the interests are 
near-identical, the functional and temporal deployment of the capabilities can also be 
identical. This can be illustrated in figure 5.6. Another important aspect of this form of 
                                                     
44 Clearly, the economic and security interests at risk from a ‘renegade’ attack are not physically identical in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, but an attack would likely be of similar magnitude in either state. 
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mutualisation is that fighter jets can be expected to be permanently assigned to this 
task, a rare occurrence for military capability, but one that adds to the mutual 
confidence between the parties, i.e., that territorial defence is not an ‘optional extra’. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Air policing distance from frontline 
 
There is, then, no structural-relational pressure for Belgium and the Netherlands to 
create such a critical interdependence over air-policing, other than the more general 
pressures for greater efficiency explored in the previous section. Yet it is also the 
case that structural-relational conditions enable them to do so with very little risk. 
One paradox, however, and one that challenges some conceptions of state 
sovereignty, is that the strategic end of autonomous capability for the defence of 
territory is now maintained through mutual dependence on another state. For the 
reasons described above, however, it is not regarded as problematic; neither was 
the arrangement deemed politically controversial in the Netherlands or Belgium 
(Interview 24: June 2016). 
 
Approaching the frontline - risk for efficiency 
 
The forms of cooperation considered above can be described as low risk because 
the chances of an entrapment-abandonment dilemma are very low. There are, 
however, ‘grey areas’ where the level of risk is higher but deemed to be worth taking. 
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While partners may believe it likely that concrete interests will be closely aligned, it is 
also the case that due to low interdependence they may not always be so. In such 
cases, risk is mitigated by a degree of temporal or functional distance from the 
frontline, but to a far lesser extent than, for example, that of defence industrial 
cooperation. The following hypothesis is taken from the model: 
 
H3: Capability mutualisation may be found at functional distance from the frontline, 
with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
i. Naval cooperation 
 
Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation, or BENESAM, began in 1948 when the two states 
made a secret agreement to put their navies under joint command in case of war. 
Throughout the 1950s there were staff-level discussions and joint exercises. 
Collaboration over MCM capabilities began in the 1950s, and a joint school was set 
up in 1966. As noted, the same MCM vessels were acquired with France in the 
1970s and 1980s. During the Cold War, Belgium and the Netherlands made up 
BENECHAN, a regional sub-group of NATO’s Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), 
which was responsible for ensuring allied access to Dutch and Belgian ports. At 
times of war, BENECHAN would become a single bi-national command under a 
Dutch admiral with a Belgian deputy (Interview 25, June 2014).  
 
Following the end of the Cold War, Belgium and the Netherlands significantly drew 
down the scale of their armed forces but opted to retain a broad spectrum of 
capabilities. The BENECHAN arrangements provided the basis for a major 
agreement in 1994 that was intended to lay the groundwork for deep efficiency 
savings through bilateral cooperation. BENECHAN would provide the basis for the 
eventual establishment of Admiral BENELUX, which in 1996 became an integrated 
peacetime bi-national command. Parrein notes that the end of the Cold War provided 
the shock to kick-start the cooperation, but that it was also built on previous Cold 
War initiatives (Parrein, 2011: 114). As a senior Belgian naval officer notes, ‘When 
you appreciate that the future of your own navy is at stake because budgets and 
personnel are being reduced, well there’s only one solution - to work together’ 
(Interview 25: June 2014). Admiral BENELUX provides a bi-national command but 
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Belgium and the Netherlands retain the ability to command autonomous national 
operations within its structure. As a senior naval officer explains, 
 
‘We take all decisions autonomously. All decisions are respected and supported by 
the staff. Whatever direction one or the other wants to go it is supported by the other. 
We are free to decide to do things separately or in common. But the organisation is 
such that we can support either together or apart. The only exception is when the 
Dutch conduct a national operation with special forces or submarines. But day-to-day 
operations are supported by a bi-national staff.’ (Interview 25: June 2014) 
 
Zandee et al point out that the major significance of Admiral Benelux lies in the 
‘workup and training aspects’ around which planning is aligned, and note that ‘So far, 
ABNL has not commanded combined Belgian-Netherlands deployments.’ (Zandee et 
al, 2016: 43) As Parrein points out, however, in practice even national commands 
now rely to a degree on shared resources and personnel from the partner state 
(Parrein, 2011a: 71). Thus, he has concluded that, 
 
‘even for strictly national operations some people from the other country are 
responsible for some operational aspects. Up to now, this situation hasn’t led to 
political difficulties.’ (Parrein: 2011b: 25).  
 
Admiral Benelux is therefore a highly integrated approach to the running of the two 
navies, to the extent that it is questionable as to whether even an ‘autonomous’ 
Dutch or Belgian operation can be described as such. Nevertheless, the political 
decision-making and most crucial elements of operational command still reside with 
the states themselves. 
 
The increasing depth of the naval cooperation has been driven by a continuing 
search for efficiency and the confidence built on long-standing cooperation. It is built 
on decades of agreements and close cooperation to overcome technical barriers. As 
one senior Belgian officer observes,  
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‘It is a growing process that takes time and that was facilitated by some events in 
operations, logistics, materiel, personnel and meant that at a certain time we can go 
further’ (Interview 24: June 2014).  
 
And, while the relationship was initially more critical to the viability of the capabilities 
of the smaller Belgian navy, a senior naval officer argues that the relationship is now 
one of mutual dependence, 
 
‘In 2014 the situation is completely different because the Dutch Navy cannot survive 
without the Belgian Navy. They are now in the situation that we were in twenty years 
ago. There’s much more of a win-win situation in balance than it was many years 
ago’ (Interview 25: June 2014). 
 
Mutual dependencies have increased as support functions have become 
increasingly specialised. Specialisation has occurred within the lines of capability 
development of the capabilities of the MCM vessels and M-class frigates. These can 
be conceptualised as occurring at various degrees of temporal remove from the 
frontline, with training and infrastructure cooperation quite far removed. A critical 
decision, however, was the relatively recent move towards specialisation within the 
maintenance of their ships, as this moves the cooperation considerably closer to the 
frontline.  
 
The critical development that enabled this shift was the acquisition by Belgium of two 
Dutch ‘Karel Doorman’ or ‘M-class’ multipurpose frigates in 2005. This meant that 
the two navies now shared two of the same ship types, the MCM vessels and the 
multipurpose frigates. Having the same frigates offered further opportunities for 
cooperation for the rationalisation of support to their ships. In 2006, the two states 
signed a Material-Logistics Agreement (MATLOG), through which the Netherlands 
became the ‘lead nation’ for the maintenance and logistics of the frigates and 
Belgium the ‘lead nation’ for MCM vessels (Parrein, 2011: 86)45. Differences in the 
technical configurations of the respective Dutch and Belgian versions of these ships 
                                                     
45 This initially proved difficult because although Belgium and the Netherlands shared the same MCM vessels, they were 
equipped with different sub-systems. They also had different frigates until the Belgian purchase of two Karel Doorman class 
frigates in 2005, which were refitted for service in 2007-08. Both ship types and systems are now closely aligned (Zandee et al, 
2016). 
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were then gradually removed through joint modernisation programmes, and since 
2008, there have been moves towards common holdings of ammunition for the ships 
(Parrein, 2011a: 89).  
 
The possibility for the further mutualisation of elements of their naval capabilities, 
however, can be viewed as introducing further risk into the relationship. For naval 
capabilities, most support will be carried out at a temporal and spatial distance from 
the frontline, i.e. at a naval base. As Biscop notes, where navies are concerned there 
may be less risk than for land forces because ‘the only thing that gets deployed is 
the ship, the support doesn’t move.’ (Interview 14: June 2016) It is the case, 
however, that there may be occasions when Belgian or Dutch support personnel 
would need to assist the ship directly on an ongoing operation (Zandee et al, 2016: 
44). As Parrein notes, ‘National operational control does not mean that Belgian and 
Dutch units do not support each other in the field.’ (Parrein, 2011a: 72). 
 
This brings the level of mutual dependence far closer to the operational frontline, 
both temporally and spatially, as can be seen in figure 5.7. With mutual dependence 
present in such a critical aspect of the capability and with such close temporal 
proximity to an operation, there are potentially serious political ramifications. As 
Zandee et al argue, there are potentially scenarios in which political differences 
‘could create serious difficulties’ including potentially the refusal of one state to send 
maintenance support to the other (Zandee, et al, 2016: 44). The arrangement clearly 
presents an erosion of the autonomy of Dutch and Belgian naval capabilities. For 
three reasons, however, there is apparently little concern among officials and 
officers. The first regards the high expectation of shared concrete interests between 
the two states. Senior officers believe that common interests are sufficiently well-
aligned,  
 
‘We have Rotterdam and Antwerp, two big harbours, we have a big merchant navy in 
Belgium and in the Netherlands. We are two open economies so we share the same 
interests and therefore we engage our navies based on the same arguments.’ 
(Interview 25: June 2014).   
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Figure 5.7. Naval ship support distance from frontline 
 
As with the defence of territorial airspace, the shared strategic end of autonomous 
territorial defence of their ports and other very similar interests provide an important 
alignment that underpins mutual confidence. So too does the shared strategic end of 
a ‘struggle for influence’ and thus the kinds of operations the two states are likely to 
be involved with. The second reason for confidence is that although the temporal 
distance from the frontline could on occasion be reduced to almost zero - in the case 
that mission critical support must be provided to a ship on an ongoing operation - 
there is also a spatial-functional distance from the frontline that further reduces risk. 
Providing urgent maintenance to a ship is not the same as authorising a ship to 
engage in hostilities with an enemy. The function also usually, though not always, 
means that there is a spatial distance from the frontline. And the capability functions 
of MCM vessels and frigates are not necessarily the hardest edge of warfighting 
capability. As a former senior Dutch officer argues,  
 
‘With all respect to the Navy, ships on the sea are very different from soldiers on the 
ground, particularly as perceived from parliament. Soldiers on the ground become 
hampered by hundreds of different caveats.’ (Interview 22: September 2016). 
 
The lesser risk associated with naval capabilities stems partly from the nature of the 
contemporary conflicts NATO states have been involved with, and for which the risk 
to land-based personnel has been far higher than that for those at sea. Given the 
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evolution of threats and tactics, there is no guarantee that such a situation will 
always prevail. Nevertheless, even if risks to personnel may be lower in such a 
scenario, the potential for political embarrassment remains. In such a situation, the 
pressure will be on the supporting partner that disagrees with the mission to assist. 
Failure to do so would throw their cooperative arrangements into a deep diplomatic 
crisis and endanger their own future support. As with UK-France missile cooperation, 
the tendency in such arrangements is towards entrapment, but one of political 
embarrassment rather than any serious conflict of interest.  
 
Thus, although Zandee et al are correct in principle that one could abandon the 
other, it seems highly unlikely that either state would regard its political opposition to 
a military mission as more important than an agreement that is vital to the functioning 
of its navy. Although such a political decision is impossible to predict with any 
certainty, the logic of the relationship would suggest that in such circumstances, the 
highest likelihood would be that the objecting state would have to suffer entrapment 
rather than run the risks of abandoning a partner. Yet due to the likelihood of shared 
interests and the flexibility that comes from not having to commit to the same 
operation that senior officials appear confident in the relationship. Even where one 
party carried out a mission and the other did not, officials struggled to envisage such 
a scenario where the supporting party would abandon the other (Interview 25: June 
2014; Interview 17: June, 2016). Thus, in line with the model presented in this thesis, 
there does appear to be a degree of flexibility in part because the absolute alignment 
of interests is not necessary for this form of cooperation. On the other hand, such 
cooperation clearly entails greater risks than would a wholly autonomous capability, 
and this is expressed in the penumbra of doubt in figure 5.7. 
 
Regarding the efficiencies generated from BENESAM cooperation, there is no 
precise method of accounting for them. Neither are the navies involved particularly 
keen to do this, as their primary concern is the preservation of capabilities, not 
saving money. A senior Belgian naval officer does, however, provide the following 




‘In 1990 the Belgian navy consisted of four frigates, two command and support 
ships, ten mine hunters and a few smaller ships. We were deployed in the Adriatic 
and the Gulf. In 2014 we have two frigates, six minehunters and one command ship. 
So, in 25 years we have reduced the Navy by 50% but still the Belgian politicians 
have the same options to deploy their naval assets. Not in the same way, not the 
same amount, but still we are present with MCM, along the coast of Africa, in 
Europe’ (Interview 25: June 2014). 
 
Moreover, this deep form of cooperation with the Netherlands has enabled Belgium 
to continue to meet the strategic end of the struggle for influence. As a senior naval 
officer argues, 
 
‘You still have a navy which is relevant. Showing the Belgian flag in all the theatres, 
which puts the Belgian politicians in international fora, with a comfortable chair in 
fact. That is the benefit of this kind of cooperation. And, of course, we have reduced 
the people from 4000 to 1600, so you no longer have to pay 2400 people, and we 
are still capable of doing what we can’ (Interview 25: June 2014). 
 
Belgian officers believe that BENESAM cooperation has now however reached a 
logical conclusion in terms of specialisation, at least under current constraints. As a 
senior naval officer argues, 
 
‘We are now at the level when you reach the critical mass to maintain the 
knowledge, training and know-how. We can’t go further than this except if you have 
one BENESAM flag, and a Belgian-Dutch crew etc. This is impossible because of 
legal, political views. We are politically not ready at all for that kind of step. And at 
this stage there is no will, neither from Belgium nor the Dutch navy’ (Interview 25: 
June 2014). 
 
Neither is there any appetite for the specialisation of whole naval capabilities. A 
senior Belgian naval officer echoes the concerns that other interviewees for this 




‘If you went for full specialisation you would remove options from the politicians. If 
Belgium did mine-hunting and the Netherlands did frigates that would imply that the 
Belgians would supply mine-hunters in support of Dutch ships, and we are not there 
yet.’ (Interview 25: June 2014). 
 
When considering how specialisation for support to MCM vessels and M-class 
frigates came to be, it is worth pointing out that the events leading to such an 
arrangement were quite haphazard. While the potential benefits from sharing ship 
types was well understood, Belgium sought at one point to acquire frigates from the 
UK, and the Netherlands may have found other buyers, both of which would have 
seriously undermined the potential for cooperation (Parrein, 2011: 74). Thus, the 
explanation provided here is not so much concerned with the actual historical 
outcome itself, but rather with the question as to how such a deep level of 
cooperation is at all possible. 
 
The form of cooperation outlined above, which can be described as specialisation 
within the lines of development of a given capability but with a balanced and broadly 
equivalent trade-off (i.e., Dutch support for frigates, Belgian support for MCM 
vessels), provides greater efficiency in meeting the strategic ends of the partner 
states than a national solution. It does so while retaining the political flexibility that 
the low interdependence of the asymmetric alliance allows for its members. It avoids 
acute entrapment-abandonment risks, although it is not entirely risk free, and if 
anything, tends towards a risk of entrapment. It is possible to conceive of situations, 
however unlikely, in which states must contribute military support to operations that 
they do not regard to be in their interests. Given, however, that decision-makers 
believe the choice is one between losing an entire capability and having one that is 
less than fully autonomous but without considerable political risk, then the decision to 
cooperate is wholly ‘rational’ and in line with the model outlined in this thesis. 
 
The cooperation reflects the alignment of strategic ends and the concrete interests 
that are instrumental to those ends, which are very similar. This can be seen in the 
interest in the protection of major ports, trading routes and the ‘struggle for influence’ 
within the alliance. BENESAM cooperation also demonstrates a high level of 
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mutuality in almost every aspect of cooperation, which is finely balanced between 
the two parties. A senior Belgian officer explains that, 
 
‘We keep a sort of balance of what is happening from the navy point of view. We 
keep a balance on material, education, the number of Belgians in Den Helder is 
about 25, same with Dutch in Belgium. We don’t think about investing here and there 
for material and infrastructure. There is an adult trust, where we don’t really want to 
make the financials balance, we have the feeling that for the moment it’s break even 
for the two navies’ (Interview 25, June 2014). 
 
This leads to a high level of mutual dependence, ‘If you remove one capacity from 
one country, the other will fall because we no longer have the expertise to sustain 
that capacity’ (Interview 25: June 2014). And Parrein argues that while it is not 
impossible that either could go back to fully national capabilities, it would come at 
considerable temporal and financial cost (Parrein, 2011a: 157).  
 
Finally, it should be noted that BENESAM is categorised by some as a form of ‘task 
specialisation’ (Parrein, 2011a; Zandee et al, 2016: 44). The capabilities are 
‘mutualised’ in that they require both states’ input to function, but the mutual 
dependence itself is not within the capability, as it would be when sharing a particular 
fixed asset, but rather it cuts across the capabilities offered by two quite different 
ships. In this sense, it is the completely equal and high risk of abandonment that 
makes the cooperation quite robust. And, together with the close alignment of 
strategic ends and concrete interests the politico-military risks of cooperation are 
deemed to be low. The foregoing section thus provides a theoretical explanation as 
to how it is that Belgium and the Netherlands have successfully worked around the 





In terms of the mutualisation of military capabilities, the relationship between 
Belgium and the Netherlands is perhaps the most advanced between any two 
European states, certainly in the air and maritime domains. It has been seen that 
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there is significant cooperation between them across the whole range of capability 
mutualisation arrangements as defined by this thesis. In terms of temporal 
mutualisation, the two have a longstanding relationship including the acquisition of 
the tripartite minehunters in the 1970s. This temporal mutualisation will continue at a 
more advanced level into the future as both states will acquire the same minehunters 
and multipurpose frigates. Because the two navies have established such deep 
cooperation, they now require essentially identical capabilities to be able to continue 
their cooperation. 
 
Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation also demonstrates the possibility of mutualising 
elements of a capability at functional distance from the frontline, and achieving 
considerable efficiencies in doing so. Through specialisation of support to their 
frigates and MCM vessels the two states effectively halve an expensive element of 
their capabilities. This specialisation is achieved, however, in a novel way. The 
capabilities offered by frigates and MCM vessels are in isolation mutualised through 
dependence, not mutual dependence. The mutual dependence occurs across the 
capabilities taken together, not in isolation. Thus, the efficiency benefits of 
specialisation are taken without compromising on a breadth of capabilities and 
political flexibility. Finally, Dutch-Belgian cooperation also provides a rare example of 
‘frontline’ capability mutualisation in the form of an agreement to share air defence 
responsibilities. As noted by interviewees, this arrangement pushes at the 
boundaries of accepted notions of state sovereignty, and yet the efficiencies involved 
allow both states to continue to offer air power to NATO and other international 
coalitions.  
 
While the Netherlands and Belgium are relatively small states in Europe, it has been 
shown that they attempt to pursue their strategic ends in largely the same way as 
larger states such as the UK and France. And, while they share some cultural 
similarities with each other through geographical proximity, they are susceptible to 
the same structural-relational dilemmas as the UK and France, as can be seen in the 
divergent positions that both states have taken over support for US operations, 
particularly those in Iraq in 2003. And, as made clear by interviewees, both retain 
significant red lines over authorisation for the use of their forces and the related limits 
of defence cooperation. It should not, therefore, be assumed that the advanced 
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nature of capability mutualisation between the Netherlands and Belgium is caused 
by their internal idiosyncrasies. Rather, these two states find themselves on the 
frontline of the economic and strategic pressures identified in the second sections of 
the case studies in this thesis. They are, in response, finding new ways to improve 













GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS:  
THE 2013 DECLARATION OF INTENT (2008-2013) 
 
i. Introduction  
 
Defence cooperation between the Netherlands and Germany dates back to the Cold 
War when the 1st (Netherlands) Corps and 1st (West Germany) Corps were stationed 
alongside each other in northern Germany. This shared geographical location 
encouraged cooperation on logistics and training, which was also facilitated by 
common equipment. Cooperation was given a further push following the end of the 
Cold War when the need to rationalise NATO’s shrinking force structures led to the 
development of a single binational army corps headquarters, the 1 
(German/Netherlands) Corps. In part because of this historical cooperation, today 
Germany and the Netherlands share perhaps the closest bilateral army relationship 
in Europe. There are, however, some important differences between Dutch-German 
cooperation and that of the previous two case studies. The first is an obvious 
asymmetry of scale between the two parties. It will be seen that while asymmetry of 
scale does not in itself undermine the logic of capability mutualisation as developed 
in this thesis, it does have a material impact on the likelihood of some forms of 
cooperation, particularly in the defence industrial field. 
 
A second important difference from the previous two case studies is that Germany 
has a starkly different historical experience from its European allies with regards to 
the role of the military instrument in its foreign policy and its place in wider society. 
Germany’s actions and experiences in the Second World War, and the subsequent 
development of its post-war foreign and defence policies have left a markedly 
different attitude to military force, which is clearly apparent in Germany’s approach to 
the generation and use of its military capabilities. It will be argued, however, that 
despite this unique history, the strategic ends that Germany pursues remain broadly 
like those of the other states considered in this thesis. And, while Germany has often 
chosen to use its military means to support its strategic ends in different ways from 
its allies, the difference has become increasingly slight in the post-Cold War world.  
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As with the other states under consideration in this thesis, Germany has also faced 
the problem of a ‘flat-in-real-terms’ defence budget, which has failed to keep pace 
with the escalating cost of generating and deploying military capability. By 
comparison with the states considered above, however, the 2008 financial crisis did 
not have such a negative impact on the German fiscal position. While the overall 
defence investment picture remained highly constrained, Germany thus faced far 
less immediate pressure on the viability of its capabilities. By contrast, as explored in 
the previous chapter, the financial crisis had a major impact on the Netherlands’ 
ability to finance its military capabilities and this played the central role in the 
subsequent push towards deeper military cooperation with Germany. For Germany, 
the imperative for cooperation was partly political as well as financial, in part as a 
response to the new alignment between France and the UK at Lancaster House, and 
as a demonstration to the US and other allies that Germany would help NATO and 
the EU to sustain military capabilities by cooperating to achieve a more efficient 
allocation of resources. 
 
As with the previous case studies, the first section seeks to demonstrate how the 
asymmetric alliance configuration shapes the strategic ends that subordinate states 
pursue, for which military capabilities provide a crucial means. As with previous 
chapters, this will focus on the logic of behaviour in the post-war period up to the 
broadly contemporary period. The second section focuses on the period from around 
the 2008 financial crisis up to the agreement of the 2013 German-Netherlands 
Declaration of Intent on the Further Enhancement of Bilateral Relations in the Field 
of Defence (Netherlands Government, 2013), and attempts to explain how a crisis in 
the viability of means-ends strategies pushed Germany and the Netherlands towards 
seeking greater efficiency in the generation and deployment of their military 
capabilities through defence cooperation, including the mutualisation of capability.  
 
As with previous case studies, the narrative will consider a selection of cases from 
the concrete initiatives agreed by the parties. And, as with other cases, it will be seen 
that some elements of these initiatives have their origins in the post-Cold War period 
before the 2008 financial crisis. It will be argued, however, that such initiatives reflect 
the same broadly contemporary challenges around the affordability of military 
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capability.  The aim here is to use the explanatory model of capability mutualisation 
to show how structural-relational variables provide a constraining and enabling 
context that shapes the form of capability mutualisation initiatives, and hence the 
possibility for greater efficiency through cooperation. The focus is thus on 
demonstrating how it has been possible for Germany and the Netherlands to create 
mutual dependencies in their capability despite the constraints on autonomy that this 
entails. 
 
ii. The logic of behaviour: the strategic ends of Germany under an asymmetric 
alliance  
 
Germany – the path to ‘Westbindung’ 
 
According to historian John Breuilly the formation of the first German nation-state in 
1871 was viewed positively by contemporary opinion. It represented a shift away 
from the statelets and multinational dynasties of the past and ‘towards the fashioning 
of a Europe made up of constitutional nation states’, and thus towards a more 
modern future (Breuilly, 1996: 1). In retrospect, however, the arrival of the German 
state is more often viewed as an ominous portent of the collapse of a European 
balance of power that had held since the Napoleonic wars (Breuilly, 1996: Kundnani, 
2011: 31). As AJP Taylor argued, 
 
‘Ever since the defeat of the French revolution Europe had conducted its affairs 
merely by adjusting the claims of sovereign states against each other as they arose. 
In 1914 Germany had felt strong enough to challenge this system and had aimed to 
substitute her hegemony over the rest’ (Taylor, 1988: 568). 
 
The increasingly uneasy peace that followed Germany’s formation was shattered by 
the First World War, which set in train over thirty years of political crises and 
cataclysmic change across Europe. This period of conflict culminated in the 
unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945 and the partition of Europe into territory 
dominated by the new superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union and their smaller 
allies. Germany itself was divided in two, with its east and west and former capital 
Berlin turned into microcosms of the new bipolar world. 1945 also represented a kind 
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of ‘year zero’ for West German politics and society, with a clear rejection of its 
militaristic past deemed necessary but its future approach to security unclear 
(Kershaw, 2015: 170). Under allied occupation for the following decade, the political 
entity that would become the Federal Republic of Germany gradually reclaimed its 
lost sovereignty and moved to completely redefine its foreign and defence policy46. 
 
The struggle for influence – mitigating entrapment 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the allied powers faced a new and 
different ‘German problem’: what role should West Germany be allowed to play in 
the defence of Western Europe? The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 had 
heightened fears that the Soviet Union might make an aggressive move in Europe 
while allied attention and resources were diverted elsewhere. As relations 
deteriorated rapidly between the western allies and the Soviet Union, the US and UK 
increasingly saw a need to rearm West Germany as a bulwark against potential 
Soviet aggression. Yet the prospect of German rearmament prompted deep 
concerns in France, understandably so given the history of catastrophic military 
confrontation between the two. The first attempt to find a solution came from French 
Defence Minister René Pleven in October 1950. The Pleven Plan proposed a 
European Defence Community that would bind West Germany’s military into a 
supranational European structure (Fursdon, 1980). By 1954, however, the proposals 
had been rejected by French parliamentarians as overly restrictive of French military 
autonomy. New British commitments through the Western European Union (WEU) to 
permanently maintain substantial forces in Germany helped to persuade the French 
that renewed German military power would be contained by the wider alliance 
(Macmillan, 1969: 482). Thus, France eventually accepted West German NATO 
membership as the only plausible answer to the rearmament question. But West 
Germany neither sought, nor would it be allowed, a military instrument comparable 
with its major NATO allies. 
 
The terms for allied recognition of the West German state were set out in the 1954 
Final Act of the London Conference (NATO, 2001). The treaty ended the occupation 
                                                     
46 The historical section of this chapter will focus on the experience of West Germany during the Cold War period. 
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by allied forces and provided elements of the sovereignty and equality that West 
German leaders had sought since 1949, including accession to NATO and the WEU. 
Heavy constraints on West Germany’s armed forces were, however, also made 
central to the agreement. West Germany’s 1949 constitution had already limited the 
role of the German armed forces solely to ‘defence’ (Bundestag, 2012: Article 87a). 
Under the Final Act, Germany pledged not to develop atomic, chemical or biological 
weaponry, long-range missiles, strategic bomber aircraft and certain classes of 
warship (NATO, 2001: II,15). The Final Act also made it clear that forces allocated to 
NATO could not be used for any other purpose unless specifically agreed between 
member states (IV, a). Since Germany’s military was to be used only in self-defence, 
this left little space for any other strategic use. As Johannes Bohnen has argued,  
 
‘In essence, NATO itself was Germany’s defence policy, since the defence of 
Germany formed the core of the common defence, a fact most clearly illustrated by 
the Bundeswehr, whose decentralised structure was symbolised by the absence of a 
general staff. In contrast to their British and French counterparts, German generals 
could plan military strategy only within NATO.’ (Bohnen, 1997: 56). 
 
These fundamental constraints on the use of military force left West Germany in a 
unique position among its NATO contemporaries; its defence policy was constrained 
within a multilateral framework. Yet while in this sense West Germany was 
constrained by its circumstances and commitments, in another sense it also derived 
considerable influence from its very weakness and geographical vulnerability on the 
Cold War frontline. As Patrick Keller notes,  
 
‘Almost all scenarios of war between NATO and the Soviet Union played out on 
(Western) German territory, and after Germany’s accession to NATO in 1955 the 
Bundeswehr was always a crucial factor in the West’s response planning to possible 
Soviet aggression’ (Keller, 2012: 98). 
 
Thus, from the American and British policy of supporting a rearmed West Germany, 
it could derive a high level of influence from its weakness. West Germany’s first 
Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was able to link allied acceptance of rearmament with 
the restoration of sovereignty, and use the new military commitment as a means to 
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exert further influence over the US (Grunbacher, 2010: 157). Indeed, as noted 
above, the Final Act linked the formal recognition of West German sovereignty with 
an agreement on the shape and terms of rearmament. 
 
1955 saw the launch of the new West German armed forces or Bundeswehr, which 
were focussed almost exclusively on territorial defence from Soviet attack. The 
Bundesmarine (West German navy) was denied power projection capabilities such 
as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault vessels and was ‘limited to coastal 
defence (including mine warfare, submarine operations, and air defence) in the North 
Sea and the Baltic Sea.’ (Bruns, 2016). West German land forces, however, came to 
make a substantial military contribution to NATO, particularly to the implementation 
of the ‘forward defence’ and ‘flexible response’ doctrines, which from the 1960s 
onwards required a high density of conventional forces to be permanently deployed 
on West German territory (Stein, 1990). With its three Army corps and twelve 
divisions, West Germany maintained more conventional forces on its territory than 
any other NATO member, including the US.  
 
Like its counterparts considered above, West Germany thus built a role as a 
dependable ally for the US, providing significant conventional military forces to 
NATO. Unlike the UK and France, however, West Germany did not face the 
dilemmas of allocating military resources to non-NATO ‘out of area’ operations in 
pursuit of its own idiosyncratic interests. As a latecomer to colonial conquest and the 
defeated party in two world wars, West Germany did not inherit a post-war retreat 
from empire with the concomitant military burden. Moreover, West Germany’s 
constitutional restrictions meant that it would likely have been heavily restricted in its 
ability to use force in connection with overseas interests. 
 
Indeed, history and unique constitutional arrangements also gave West Germany an 
element of protection from entrapment in US interests pursued ‘out of area’. The 
constitutional commitment to use military force solely for self-defence provided, for 
example, a strong legal argument for resisting the pressure from President Lyndon 
Johnson’s administration to send troops to Vietnam in the 1960s (Blang, 2004). 
Despite private misgivings over the wisdom of the intervention and considerable 
public opposition, West Germany remained outwardly loyal to the US over Vietnam 
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and responded to White House demands to make ‘offset’ investments in American 
military equipment to compensate the US for the role of its overstretched forces in 
defending West Germany (Zimmermann, 2003: 60). Yet despite American requests, 
no direct military contribution was provided. As Eugenie Blang argues, West 
Germany ‘supported Washington's Vietnam policy only because they believed that it 
would be detrimental to German interests to criticize America openly’ (Blang, 2004: 
346).  
 
There were other significant policy tensions between West Germany and the US in 
the first decades of the Cold War, including Adenauer’s move towards De Gaulle 
with the Franco-German Élysée Treaty of 1963 and the pursuit of reunification 
through Chancellor Willy Brandt’s controversial Ostpolitik policy of outreach to East 
Germany. Through these diplomatic initiatives West Germany used the political 
autonomy it had acquired to further mitigate the risk of entrapment into US policies, 
build flexibility for greater political manoeuvre and develop its own foreign policy and 
reunification goals. Adenauer, for example, could use his relationship with De Gaulle 
to draw on French diplomatic clout as a hedge against American policies with which 
West Germany disagreed (Kissinger, 1965: 205). Against this diplomatic context, 
West Germany’s military contribution to NATO was an important source of influence, 
though perhaps not so great as that of its geostrategic importance to the US and its 
relations with its neighbours, particularly France and East Germany. As Henry 
Kissinger remarked in a 1965 study of NATO, West Germany could draw on a 
‘bargaining position conferred on it by its central position’ (Kissinger, 1965: 206). 
These factors, regardless of the scale of West Germany’s military contribution to 
NATO, would always ensure attention from Washington.  
 
Throughout the Cold War, West Germany’s interest in defence against the Soviet 
Union was in clear alignment with the other member states of the NATO alliance. 
The risk of a conflict of idiosyncratic German interests with its allies, at least in 
relation to military matters, was of no consequence, because West Germany lacked 
the kinds of overseas territorial and political interests that concerned the UK and 
France. And the political and legal restrictions placed on its armed forces served to 
remove both the threat and opportunity of military involvement with American 
interests out of the NATO area. At the same time, however, West Germany’s vital 
 216
geostrategic position and its ability to use relations with France, East Germany and 
the Soviet Union via European integration and the policy of Ostpolitik demonstrated 
that it had considerable flexibility in pursuing its strategic ends. In this sense, the role 
of military capabilities in supporting West Germany’s struggle for influence over the 
US was, by comparison with other states in this thesis, important but perhaps not so 
critical to strategy.  
 
The profound changes to the international system that began in 1989 led some 
neorealist scholars at the time to raise the prospect of a re-emergence of the 
‘German problem’ for the European balance of power (Mearsheimer, 1990; 
Kundnani, 2011). For some, neorealist theory indicated that the end of bipolarity 
would necessarily push Germany towards a more ‘normal’ and thus more ‘autonomy-
maximising’ and ‘self-interested’ foreign policy (Baumann et al, 2001; Duffield, 1999). 
John Duffield, for example, argued that neorealists could expect German policy in 
the post-Cold War period to have become more classically ‘realist’ in approach and 
thus, 
 
‘characterised by increased unilateralism and assertiveness as Germany once again 
sought to play the role of a Great Power (Duffield, 1999: 767)’.  
 
For Duffield, the fact that Germany did not take this path is best explained not by 
structural-relational factors, but by its unique history and the development of a 
political culture that was more in tune with the continued pursuit of multilateralism 
through cooperation with allies and international organisations. And there is certainly 
a strong logic in this proposition; Germany’s political culture was surely set against 
any kind of push for ‘maximising autonomy’ through unilateralist policies and a 
complete rejection of the constraints of post-war multilateral institutions.  
 
Yet, the point depends upon how the neorealist argument is deployed. Duffield 
assumes that the end of bipolarity implied new autonomy for European states. As the 
threat from the Soviet Union fell away, the UK and France might also have made 
bids for greater autonomy from the US. Yet there was no discernible appetite for 
such a dramatic shift in their policies either. If Germany appeared to have taken on a 
form of self-abnegation ill-suited to neorealist explanation, so too did Europe’s other 
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large powers. The more compelling ‘neorealist’ explanation for Germany’s behaviour 
is the one that runs through this entire thesis. It is that for Germany, as for other 
European states, the continued role of American power was welcome as it promised 
to suppress any risk of a return to military balancing in the region. If neorealism 
assumes that states are motivated by ‘maximising autonomy’, as Baumann et al 
(2001) have argued, then it may indeed be problematic for the theory, but there is no 
such assumption, not in Waltz’s theory at least, nor that set out here. Rather, it is 
assumed that states seek security to preserve their survival in the form of the 
exercise of sovereignty-autonomy, but, as has been explained, this is wholly 
compatible with willingly-agreed constraints on concrete aspects of their autonomy.  
 
Thus, the alternative explanation to that of the causal primacy of German strategic 
culture over this period is simply that the subordinate European NATO states all 
recognised that the alliance had considerable benefits for their security, even in the 
absence of any clear external threat. So long as the US offered to continue the 
arrangement, it was not beneficial for any of them, large or small, to seek ‘greater 
autonomy’ by pursuing more assertive unilateralism and threatening NATO. This is 
not to argue that cultural dispositions relating to the use of military force are causally 
irrelevant in explaining German behaviour in the aftermath of the Cold War. Quite the 
contrary, they are crucial, but they can be seen to support, rather than undermine, a 
structural-relational explanation. 
 
Thus, rather than a collapse of NATO and the re-emergence of the ‘German 
problem’, there was instead a shift in alliance dynamics towards military contributions 
to ‘out of area’ operations led by the US. As with France, Germany had lost its 
influential position as a frontline state in the Cold War confrontation and needed new 
means by which to pursue its struggle for influence over the US. Following the end of 
the Cold War and reunification, German foreign and defence policy was thus at once 
newly liberated and newly constrained. While the geo-strategic constraint of a nation 
divided across the Cold War frontline was gone, ‘normal’ behaviour was increasingly 
expected by Germany’s allies and indeed sought by German decision-makers keen 
to retain influence. This, however, entailed material support for US-led expeditionary 
operations. Here, Baumann and Hellmann have identified a tension between the 
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impact of the end of the Cold War and the continuing domestic constraints of a 
deeply imbedded culture of restraint regarding the use of force,  
 
‘The structuralists are correct that the federal government was confronted with 
growing demands by its allies resulting from the structural changes after the end of 
the Cold War, on the one hand, and with existing domestic constraints created by an 
established anti-militarist political culture, on the other.’ (Baumann and Hellmann, 
2001: 73) 
 
This tension characterised the German response to demands from allies for 
expeditionary military support, which began almost immediately after reunification 
with the advent of the 1991 Gulf War. The US made a request to Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl’s government for military assistance in the 1991 Gulf War. Due to political and 
legal uncertainties over such a policy, however, contributions to the campaign did not 
extend to the provision of warfighting capabilities. Yet German decision-makers 
increasingly framed a new narrative on the use of military force based on the 
demonstration of wider ‘responsibility’ in the new era. As Baumann and Hellmann 
have noted,  
 
‘Representatives of the Kohl government repeatedly argued that the unified 
Germany was expected by its partners to ‘take over more responsibility’ by 
contributing to international military operations.’ (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001: 71).  
 
NATO interventions in Yugoslavia in the 1990s following the outbreak of civil war 
presented a dilemma for Germany. The case for deploying force for humanitarian 
assistance and peacekeeping was politically strong, particularly given Germany’s 
own history during the Nazi era, but there was deep uncertainty as to whether such 
operations were compliant with the constitution. Eventually a coalition of political 
parties forced a ruling, and in 1994 the German Constitutional Court declared that 
such actions were lawful, so long as they were approved by the Bundestag and 
undertaken from a collective security perspective (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). 
Views on the use of force outside the context of territorial defence changed radically 
over a short space of time. In NATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign the Bundestag 
authorised the use of force, and the Luftwaffe flew combat missions for the first time 
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in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. During the Kosovo crisis 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had told US President Bill Clinton that Germany was 
ready to assume its responsibility as a ‘normal ally’, and support the US position 
(Baumann and Hellmann, 2001: 76). Similarly, when the US launched operations in 
Afghanistan following the ‘911’ terror attacks he argued for strong support to the US, 
 
‘Schröder stressed the need for German foreign and security policy to be seen as 
consistent and in line with multilateralism, to be seen as a reliable ally, able and 
willing to make contributions to international security alongside allies and partners’ 
(Buras and Longhurst, 2004: 233). 
 
Thus, while the end of the Cold War may well have precipitated moves towards more 
‘out of area’ or expeditionary operations, this thesis has argued that there was no 
concomitant shift in the strategic ends pursued by subordinate European states. 
Rather, as has been seen with regard to France in chapter four, the role of military 
capabilities in mitigating entrapment through a struggle for influence over the US 
shifted decisively away from territorial defence towards expeditionary operations. 
Germany thus had to prove its relevance to the US in new ways that may have been 
politically and constitutionally uncomfortable. And yet, as the actions of Chancellors 
Kohl and Schröder attest, Germany moved against the grain of its apparent cultural 
preferences surprisingly quickly, and indeed to a ‘stunning’ degree in Kosovo in 1999 
(Baumann and Hellmann, 2001: 75).  
 
Some scholars have argued that more recent military operations, particularly the Iraq 
War of 2003 and Libya in 2011, tell a different story. It has been argued that because 
Germany declined to take part in these operations it has turned its back on its 
tradition of steadfast loyalty both to the US and to the multilateralism embodied by 
NATO. Kundnani, for example, argues that German positions over Iraq and 
Afghanistan demonstrate that ‘Germany no longer needs multilateral institutions in 
the way it used to.’ (2011: 35) Germany’s size and economic weight thus once more 
threaten to unbalance the international system. As Kundnani puts it, ‘the ‘German 
question’ was resolved in geopolitical terms but has re-emerged in geo-economic 
form.’ (2011: 43) Such a risk of a new German unbalancing of Europe has even 
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been highlighted by the UK MOD, though it does not identify Germany by name 
(MOD Global Strategic Trends: 119). This argument reprises that of earlier concerns 
over post-Cold War German power disparities in Europe and the proposition that 
such is the extent of German economic power that it need not contribute to NATO or 
US-led operations. 
 
Yet Germany’s ‘unilateralism’ over Iraq and Libya is not incompatible with behaviour 
within the asymmetric alliance configuration. Indeed, as has been shown, 
unilateralism is highly likely in an asymmetric alliance where rigidity of alignment 
leads to flexibility of policy. Neither has Germany been alone in declining to take part 
in out of area operations; France and others opposed the 2003 Iraq War, and even 
the UK was unable to support the US over Syria in 2013. All military interventions 
have become controversial in recent years across all NATO allies. Furthermore, if 
Germany were prepared to rely solely on its economic clout for influence then it 
might be expected that German military contributions would slide across all 
multilateral operations, including those for collective defence under NATO’s Article 5. 
Instead, as scholars and analysts acknowledge, Germany has moved a very long 
way in quite a short space of time, particularly towards the provision of expeditionary 
capabilities to NATO. Germany’s contribution in Afghanistan was significant and 
sustained, and it has more recently made forces available to play an important role in 
Mali. Furthermore, German elites remain convinced that Germany should do more 
rather than less in the military sphere (Keller, 104)47.  
 
This commitment to a defence policy embedded within NATO and under US 
leadership remains Germany’s official policy and has been reiterated in several 
policy documents. It was espoused in the 2006 defence and security white paper, 
 
‘The central goal of German foreign and security policy continues to be to shape the 
transatlantic partnership in the Alliance with the future in mind, and to cultivate the 
close and trusting relationship with the USA. Now and in the future, the fundamental 
issues of European security can be only addressed together with the USA’ (German 
Government, 2006: 21). 
                                                     
47 While it is beyond the timeframe of this thesis, the most recent German security and defence White Paper published in 2016, 
also suggests a more important role for its armed forces in the future. 
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And in the Defence Policy Guidelines of 2011, 
 
‘The North Atlantic Alliance remains the centrepiece of our defence efforts. Alliance 
solidarity and making a reliable and credible contribution to the Alliance are part of 
Germany’s raison d’état’… The commitment of the United States to the security of 
Europe, as it is most prominently and effectively reflected in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, remains a vital interest of Germany and its European allies.’ 
(DPG, 2011: 6-7). 
 
Thus, Germany continues to see American engagement in Europe as a ‘vital interest’ 
that must be preserved. And, as has been shown in the case study states 
considered in previous chapters, the form of Germany’s armed forces is shaped by 
the strategic end of the struggle for influence over the US. This is reflected in the 
balanced forces that Germany seeks to maintain, as is noted in the Defence Policy 
Guidelines of 2011, 
 
‘By enabling the employment of armed forces across the entire intensity spectrum, 
Germany will be in a position to make an adequate political and military contribution 
in accordance with its size, thus ensuring its influence and, in particular, its say in 
planning and decisions’ (DPG, 2011: 9) 
 
Thus, like the other states considered above, Germany also pursues the policy of 
balanced forces as the best means for influence. The German armed forces seek to 
maintain forces balanced across the services with a preference for ‘breadth rather 
than depth.’ The level of ambition is described in the 2012 IISS Military Balance as, 
 
‘the ability to conduct the full spectrum of operations up to high-intensity combat, to 
be able to serve as a framework nation for multinational operations, and to be able to 
sustain up to 10,000 troops on international crisis-management operations.’ (IIIS, 
2012: 80) 
 
There is, however, an undoubted reticence to use military force, which can best be 
explained by considering Germany’s unique political culture, and this has 
 222
ramifications on the form and use of its military capabilities. Yet Germany does use 
and shape the military instrument to exert influence in broadly the same way as the 
other states in this study. As one senior German officer puts it,  
 
‘We are not the British and we do not follow the US on every adventure and they 
know it. On the other hand, they know what we are able to do’ (Interview 29, June 
2015). 
 
And, regarding Germany’s apparent unilateralism over Libya, it has been argued that 
such unilateralism is well accounted for by the structural-relational configuration; in 
common with other European allies, it is unsurprising that Germany will use this high 
flexibility to shape its military contributions, if any, to military missions led by the US 
or others. And while German influence in Europe continues to grow, and is one 
means for Germany to meet its strategic end of a struggle influence, the military 
instrument remains a vital means of influence over the US and its pursuit of its 
interests. And it is one that remains for Germany firmly fixed in a multinational 
perspective. The policy of westbindung, through which West Germany integrated 
itself decisively into Western institutions under American security leadership, 
remained and remains at the time of writing, a foundation of contemporary German 
foreign and defence policy.  
 
Hedging against abandonment  
 
In the early post-war years, Germany was largely reliant on the US for its military 
equipment. As its economy grew more sophisticated, however, Germany began to 
develop its own tanks and armoured vehicles and joined with the UK and other 
European partners in the multinational Tornado and subsequent Typhoon fighter jet 
programmes. As such, in most high-tech areas of defence industrial production, 
Germany has not been self-sufficient on an exclusively national basis since the 
Second World War. The shift towards domestic production and multinational 
collaboration is perhaps best seen as a move to reap the industrial and economic 
advantages of indigenous capacity, rather than to develop autonomy for strategic 
ends, whether as a hedge or to underpin operational autonomy. There is little 
evidence that Germany has viewed its defence industry as a foundation for 
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autonomous action in the same way that, for example, France and the UK have done 
in the post-war period. Instead, Germany’s focus on multilateralism is evident in the 
way in which it frames its defence industrial policy. By contrast with the UK and 
France, no mention is made in public documents of the need for defence industrial 
autonomy for strategic reasons; in fact, the emphasis lies on multinational 
cooperation instead. As the 2006 Defence White Paper set out, 
 
‘German security policy is multilateral in character. Together with the member states 
of the European Union, Germany is committed to active multilateralism. No state in 
the world nowadays is able to ensure its security on its own. Germany therefore 
safeguards its security interests primarily in international and supranational 
institutions and plays an active role in shaping their policies’ (German Government, 
2006: 21). 
 
This outlook remained central to the Defence Policy Guidelines paper of 2011, 
 
‘Germany’s security objectives and interests can only be pursued in cooperation with 
its partners. The United Nations, the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union 
are the international framework of our security and defence policy.’ (DPG, 2011: 5) 
 
And this multilateralism fits comfortably with an emphasis on multinational defence 
cooperation, 
 
‘In the light of decreasing quantities, closer military cooperation among European 
countries must be reflected in the cooperation of European defence industries, too. 
Agreeing on synergies when it comes to developing, procuring and operating military 
systems will be crucial for securing indispensable military capabilities in Europe.’ 
(DPG, 2011: 16). 
 
So deeply ingrained is the multilateralist approach, there is no explicit or even implicit 
German conception of a hedge against the disappearance of the NATO alliance. 
While the UK and France do not deal directly with such a risk, the greater emphasis 
on autonomy suggests that both, particularly France, do see their military capabilities 
and industrial capacity as a hedge against an uncertain future (Jones, 2011: 20). 
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On the other hand, there is a German defence industrial policy, and one of its goals 
is to retain technologies and expertise at the domestic level. This is phrased as a 
requirement for ‘indigenous defence technology capabilities in order to co-shape the 
European integration process in the armaments sector’ (German Government, 2006: 
63). Thus, the commitment to ‘multilateralism’ does not extend to the creation of 
significant one-sided dependencies on others for high-tech industrial sectors such as 
defence aerospace, nor has it yet resulted in significant defence industrial 
specialisation for whole capabilities. On the contrary, Germany seeks to retain its 
indigenous defence industrial capacity, 
 
‘The political leadership and industry must jointly define the strategic positioning of 
German defence technology in Europe. The Federal Government will do its utmost in 
this regard to preserve a balanced mix of defence technology, including its high-
technology areas, in Germany’ (German Government, 2006: 63). 
 
Thus, from the defence industrial perspective, while multilateralism underpins 
specific projects, German defence industrial capacity is predicated on a national 
perspective. And the 2011 DPG is clear that, ‘The role of the defence industry is to 
serve the Bundeswehr’ (DPG, 2011: 16). Germany may not make any explicit case 
for its defence industry as a hedge against uncertainty, and yet de facto it does 
provide a hedge because there is a firm policy to retain at least some important 
defence technologies in Germany. Yet there is also a strong sense that due to its 
political culture German official documents cannot speak in such terms. As security 
analyst Henrik Heidenkamp argues, 
 
‘The whole idea of autonomy is somewhat alien to German security culture as well 
as to German policy making. That being said, in defence industrial terms many 
German governments have taken steps to ensure that there is an autonomous 
capability within Germany but that’s more of an industrial, economic argument that 
they are following rather than a defence argument’ (Interview 28, May 2015). 
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Thus, there is here an important distinction between France and the UK and 
Germany. Other than to rely on the de facto sense in which Germany has a hedge 
against abandonment, there is no evidence of such a policy in a positive sense. 
 
Autonomy for positive or idiosyncratic interests 
 
Throughout the Cold War, German defence policy was equated with NATO and the 
territorial defence of western Europe. Restricted to such a role, the need for 
operationally autonomous forces was limited. In the post-Cold War period, for 
Germany autonomy has come to mean autonomous control over forces, but to the 
extent that the decision to deploy them should be a national one. And this relates to 
contributions to NATO, US-led or EU missions, and does not reflect any ambition to 
deploy an autonomous German force in the way that France or the UK, to a lesser 
degree, seeks to do. One exception to this would be the German-led EU battlegroup, 
which while ‘multilateral’ in remit would still need to be sustained autonomously. It 
would likely need, however, to draw on assistance from other EU states for various 
critical capabilities. Above all, a single battlegroup is not intended for high-level war-
fighting where a capability for ‘escalation dominance’ is necessary. Germany also 
has no specific, out of area territorial interests that it would need to defend with the 
military instrument. Its interests in defending against terrorism and the threat of 
piracy to international trade are essentially shared with its allies. The multinational 
‘framework nation concept’ developed by Germany may suggest the emergence of 
Germany leadership in this field, but as will be seen, the concept remains by its very 
nature firmly anchored in a multilateralist approach (DPG, 2011).  
 
Military capabilities as means to strategic ends - Germany 
 
Few would argue that the defence policy of Germany can be understood without 
consideration of the political culture that grew out of the German experience of 
Nazism and the public memory of decades of instability, deprivation and the 
destruction of two world wars. It is often argued that the people of West Germany 
and then Germany came to see their country as a different sort of power from others. 
It would be a ‘civilian power’, focussed on developing economic rather than military 
power (Maull, 2000). While the development of such a culture is surely of historical 
 226
importance in explaining West German behaviour, it does not necessarily clash with 
expected behaviour within an asymmetric alliance, nor does it fully discount 
neorealist-informed theory, as Duffied has argued (1999). The military contribution of 
West Germany to the alliance, limited to a posture of self-defence through the 
Bundeswehr, was compatible with West Germany’s cultural emphasis on military 
restraint but did not detract from a considerable military contribution to the alliance 
interests of NATO. And, from the perspective of a subordinate state seeking to avoid 
entrapment by the dominant power, it may even have been beneficial.  
 
As Kundnani argues, 
 
‘the Federal Republic did not adopt a civilian power identity in an act of altruism. 
Rather, it did so because it saw it as the best way of achieving its own post-war 
foreign-policy ambitions and objectives’ (Kundnani, 2011: 33). 
 
In the post-Cold War period Germany has had to adapt. It can be argued that in so 
far as German decision-makers tend to agonise over balancing domestic cultural 
constraints with the need to exert influence over the US, Germany has indeed 
become more ‘normalised’ in the post-Cold War as a subordinate state in an 
asymmetric alliance. German political culture goes a long way to explaining the high 
levels of reticence among decision-makers for ‘out of area’ interventions. As Keller 
notes, ‘Germany’s political leadership is instinctively reluctant to use hard power’ 
(2015: 105). On the other hand, Germany is a powerful economic player and 
increasingly regarded as a natural leader in the EU. In more recent years, Russian 
aggression towards Ukraine and the risk to NATO members that border Russia has 
put territorial defence back on NATO’s agenda, once more highlighting Germany’s 
geo-strategic importance. To this extent, Germany hardly wants for an influential 
position in Europe or for attention from Washington. This advantageous position 
might lead to there being less pressure on Germany to confront its anti-militaristic 
culture. As such, Germany can balance a range of means for influence over the US 
against that of military contributions. 
 
None of this means, however, that Germany has so much influence in Europe that it 
can neglect that of the US, which in relative terms has a far larger economy, much 
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greater military power and far greater security interests around the world. Germany’s 
important political and economic position in the EU does not in itself provide an 
opportunity to influence Washington when it comes to the American use of hard-
edged military power or the shape and longevity of the US commitment to European 
security. It is perhaps more plausible then to argue that were it not for Germany’s 
continued geostrategic and economic power and its cultural predispositions, it would 
need to do more to ensure influence over the US through the role of credible military 
ally. Even then, due to the inherent flexibility of the asymmetric alliance configuration 
that would not entail loyalty to the US in all circumstances. Despite these factors 
concerning its idiosyncratic culture and economic strength, however, Germany has 
moved towards a commitment to the use of force on expeditionary operations. The 
analysis above suggests that German behaviour does reflect the expectations of 
behaviour for a subordinate state in a dominant-subordinate configuration. That said, 
the impact of German’s cultural predispositions cannot be dismissed, and neither 
can the impact of Germany’s outsize economic weight in Europe.  
 
iii. The logic of a crisis: German strategic ends under pressure 
 
The affordability of military capability and the need for efficiency 
 
German defence spending in the post-Cold War period follows a very similar pattern 
to that of other European NATO states. Figure 6.1 shows that the first half of the 
1990s saw a dramatic drop in German defence spending as a share of GDP, which 
obviously corresponds with the end of the Cold War. This was followed by a more 
gradual decline between 1994 and 2007, then a small increase reflecting operations 
in Afghanistan and a subsequent small decline. Figure 6.2 shows that since the mid-
1990s, as with other European NATO states, real terms defence spending in 




Figure 6.1. German defence spending as share of GDP 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Real terms German defence spending 1990-2014 (source: SIPRI) 
 
Thus, as with other European NATO states, Germany has not significantly reduced 
defence spending in real terms over the last twenty years. Rather, it has not passed 
on the proceeds of its economic growth to the defence budget. Keller argues that 
German defence thus,  
 
‘rests on a modest but solid base of steady budgets in recent years and acquisition 
programmes that, while modest in scale, are technologically advanced’ (2015: 106).  
 
The challenge of inflation in the costs of defence acquisition and personnel has, 
however, undermined the scale if not necessarily the breadth of German military 
capabilities. And the share of the defence budget allocated to R&D and procurement 
has also declined in absolute terms (2015: 101). This familiar problem of flat in real 
terms defence budgets and high cost inflation in the provision of military capabilities 
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equipment rather than the wholesale deletion of military capabilities; initial unit orders 
for major equipment have been pared back across all capabilities. Thus, Typhoon 
aircraft have been reduced from a planned 177 to 140; numbers of NH90 helicopters 
have been halved in their support role and cut by a third in the multipurpose role; 
naval mine countermeasure ships have been halved and Leopard 2 tank numbers 
cut back by over a third to 225 (2015: 103).  
 
Compared with some of its European peers, the 2008 financial crisis did not hit the 
German fiscal position particularly badly. However, given the high levels of debt that 
had been built up over many years following reunification the crisis did prompt 
Germany to introduce a ‘debt-break’, which set a constitutional limit to structural debt 
of 0.35% of GDP. The Government was to bring down public debt over a transitional 
period starting in 2011 to be ready to apply the rule from 2016. This process led to 
public spending cuts in Germany, and initially to a demand for defence spending to 
make savings of €8.3bn between 2011 and 2014. These cuts were, however, 
subsequently withdrawn, and instead there was a marginal increase in defence 
spending thus continuing the broadly flat in real terms trend. The financial crisis did 
not, therefore, lead to anything like the kind of impact on German military capabilities 
that it did for the states considered in previous chapters. The long-term effects of flat 
investment and the rising cost of military capabilities did, however, create similar, if 
less immediately acute, problems for German military capabilities in the same period. 
 
Strategic ends under pressure 
 
As with other European NATO states, the situation in Afghanistan was placing 
considerable strain on Germany’s official policy of ‘credible partner’ to the US and 
‘responsible’ state in the international system. For example, Timo Noetzel (2011) has 
argued that Afghanistan heightened longstanding tensions in the German 
government and armed forces between the preference for a culture of military 
restraint and the need for an effective operational force in the Kunduz province for 
which Germany had responsibility. This tension manifested itself in conflict between 
those who saw the operation as an aberration but one that should continue to be 
labelled a ‘stability mission’ to avoid signalling any great break with German policy, 
and those who regarded it as a ‘war’ that required an aggressive counter-insurgency 
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(COIN) strategy in line with that being deployed by the US (Noetzel, 2011: 408). The 
tension was in part resolved, at the operational level at least, by successful pressure 
from the US to shift the Bundeswehr towards a COIN strategy involving greater risks 
for its personnel.  
 
This same tension was also manifest, however, in the capabilities available to 
German armed forces. Noetzel notes that German defence planning was still 
focussed on large-scale conventional warfare, and as a result the Bundeswehr was 
‘critically short of capabilities that are essential to the successful conduct of COIN 
operations’. Operations in Kunduz revealed that, ‘the Bundeswehr lacks vital 
technological platforms in areas such as unmanned surveillance, tactical air mobility 
and close air support’. As with other European NATO allies, there was also a critical 
shortage of helicopters to move forces quickly around vast areas of terrain (2011: 
403).  
 
Germany’s difficulties in Afghanistan, both operational and in terms of materiel, 
prompted major reforms to the German army. Defence Minister Karl Theodore zu 
Guttenberg presided over radical policies, including a shift from conscript to 
volunteer armed forces and a new ambition for the Bundeswehr to be able to sustain 
an expeditionary force of 10,000 troops, bringing Germany more into line with British 
and French planning assumptions. American pressure on Germany to improve its 
performance in Afghanistan thus led to a significant shift in its approach to the use of 
armed force48, but it also served to highlight stark capability gaps. Deficiencies in 
capabilities were not, however, only related to those of out of area operations. While 
the operations in Afghanistan continued, questions were raised over the level of 
readiness of conventional forces for territorial defence, a far less controversial issue 
in German politics. A Bundestag report leaked in 2014 highlighted substantial 
problems with the availability of military equipment. Only one out of four attack 
submarines was operational, only 70 of 180 Boxer armoured vehicles were fit for 
deployment and only seven of the navy’s fleet of 43 helicopters were available 
(Guardian, October 7, 2014) Thus, as with the previous case studies under 
consideration in this thesis, Germany was not able to sustain sufficient breadth and 
                                                     
48 US General David Petraeus asserted that in Afghanistan Germany undertook its first counterinsurgency operations since the 
Second World War (Spiegel Online, 19 September, 2010). 
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scale in its capabilities in order to meet its strategic ends, particularly as regards the 
‘struggle for influence’ over the US, but even with regard to its own basic territorial 
self-defence commitments. 
 
By contrast with the UK and France, however, there is far less concern in Germany 
over idiosyncratic interests, as the assumption remains that Germany operates 
within a multilateral framework. As one senior German officer remarks, 
 
‘Compared to states like the UK and certainly France, Germany is much more 
relaxed about being dependent, but that’s because we don’t have the ambition to 
necessarily deploy a force abroad alone’ (Interview 28, May 2015) 
 
Common problem, common solution? 
 
It has been seen that ministerial concerns over the performance of Germany’s armed 
forces in Afghanistan provided the impetus for a fresh consideration of defence 
policy. At the same time, as with the other states considered in this thesis, the 
potential for greater cooperation was viewed as a potential solution to the problem of 
capability shortfalls. The 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines, prepared under zu 
Guttenberg, looked towards ‘intra-European coordination’ to meet shortfalls in 
German and wider European capabilities. The policy paper called for new 
mechanisms to increase the efficiency of alliance deployments, recognising that ‘the 
challenge of providing security has to be met with more limited resources’ (DPG, 11). 
To this end, the policy paper outlined a new ‘level of ambition’ specifically in the 
context of multilateral deployments, with Germany playing the role of ‘framework 
nation’. Thus, the paper set out the option of, 
 
‘assuming command responsibility as a framework nation…. providing the required 
capabilities for the entire task spectrum, into which contributions of other nations can 
be integrated in a flexible and synergetic manner’ (DPG, 2011). 
 
Germany subsequently developed this ‘framework nation concept’ (FNC) and 
presented it to NATO in 2013 as a policy proposal for addressing the problem of 
capability shortfalls among European allies. As Diego Ruiz Palmer explains, 
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‘This initiative aimed at forming functional groupings around a larger Ally, with the 
objective of ensuring that, together, the participating Allies would possess, in the 
mid-to long term, an entire military capability, as identified in the NATO Defence 
Planning Process, which the larger Ally would not be able to field, in toto, on its own. 
Such arrangements would give smaller Allies an opportunity to contribute their 
smaller, often specialized, but important capabilities.’ (Ruiz Palmer, 2016: 3) 
  
Germany’s proposal for adoption of the FNC by NATO coincided with policy 
developments at NATO on how to address the problem of a loss of depth and 
breadth of capability among European NATO forces. As a senior official at NATO 
explains, 
 
‘The concept behind it was that America has a full spectrum war-fighting capability; it 
could do WW3 on its own without any assistance from the rest of us if it needs to. 
There was no European ally left that had a full spectrum war-fighting capability of its 
own. Post 2010, the UK has got rid of maritime patrol aircraft, the aircraft carriers 
and harriers etc. Germany and France were in exactly the same position. But across 
European allies you could create a full spectrum capability. It would never equal the 
size of the Americans’ but at least you could do it and demonstrate some form of 
commitment to the US beyond just the political’ (Interview 8, June 2016) 
 
From a purely operational perspective, the notion of a framework nation is not new. 
Operations in Afghanistan worked on this basis, for example, as have NATO 
multinational formations, which were developed following the end of the Cold War; 
and the EU battlegroups use a similar concept. The break with the past came, 
however, with the combined attempt to integrate specific plans for cooperation into 
the NATO capability planning process, together with a link to bi-national and small 
‘clusters’ of capability cooperation. A central challenge for the FNC is that specific 
capabilities are not linked directly to NATO roles; as a senior NATO official remarks, 
‘nations are always compromising between what they need themselves and what 
NATO is asking them for’ (Interview 8, June 2016). 
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It is also suggested that the FNC was in part a German response to the Franco-
British defence cooperation launched under the Lancaster House treaties in 2010. 
Henrik Heidenkamp, a defence policy analyst and former German official argues that 
the FNC allowed Germany to demonstrate it had its own offer to tackle the problems 
of shrinking European capabilities, 
 
‘they were clear that the UK and France would do something, because they are the 
two countries that are most frustrated about this. So, the option for Germany was 
either to stay out of this and let France and the UK take the lead, or they could 
propose something that would on the one hand actually make a difference - if it’s 
efficiently and effective implemented - but at the same time would not only echo 
British-French policy but would allow for the introduction of German thinking and 
German policy’ (Interview 28, May 2015). 
 
The FNC thus provides crucial context for Germany’s approach to defence 
cooperation since the 2011 defence reform process began. The approach ‘allows 
Germany to take the lead in areas where they feel comfortable, such as logistics 
training and strategic enablers. It would speak to the strengths of German 
capabilities but also the way the German political system works’ (Interview 28, May 
2015). Over this period, Germany sought partners with which to develop the concept 
into concrete projects. As has been explored in chapter five, the Netherlands was at 
the same time suffering from acute budgetary difficulties in the funding of its military 
capabilities. There was therefore a concurrence of interests in considering 
deepening an existing defence cooperation relationship.  
 
2013 Dutch-German Declaration of Intent 
 
As with the Dutch-Belgian cooperation initiative considered in the previous chapter, 
the Declaration of Intent on the Further Enhancement of Bilateral Relations in the 
Field of Defence (DoI) signed on 28th May, 2013, built on strong foundations laid 
over previous years, particularly during the post-Cold War period. As Dutch defence 
analyst Dick Zandee explains, historically the core of Dutch-German cooperation has 
been in the land domain, 
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‘They know us and we know them. We were next to the Germans on the North West 
plain in the Cold War. The equipment is more or less the same. There is mutual trust 
and their defence cultures are not that far apart. Language is not a problem as most 
Dutch military speak German, though English is the common lingua at staff levels. 
So, the 2013 DoI is a logical extension, built on existing experience, structures and 
human capital.’ (Interview 21, September 2014). 
 
Zandee describes Dutch-German defence cooperation as ‘a curve which dates back 
to the Cold War and the curve has gone up over time.’ During the Cold War, as part 
of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), the 1 (Netherlands) Corps was deployed 
in northern Germany, immediately north of the 1 (West Germany) Corps. Bilateral 
cooperation involved joint training, exercises and logistics support. It was not until 
after the Cold War, however, that there was deeper, more integrated military 
cooperation. In 1991, during the drawdown of forces in Europe, the ‘multinational 
formation concept’ was announced, principally to tackle the problem of maintaining 
viable force structures. Multinational formations would thus maximise efficiency in 
preserving force structures and maintain the role of smaller states in command 
structures (Durrell Young, 1997: 2). It was in this context that the bi-national Dutch-
German Corps Headquarters arose, ‘there was the idea that we have to do 
something with the Germans because all we’d gained during the Cold War might be 
lost.’ (Interview 21: September 2014) 
 
Initially, 1 (Netherlands) Corps was to be maintained by taking on German divisions. 
By 1993, however, it was clear that cuts were too deep and too fast, and so a 
decision was taken to combine the two corps. This led to the creation of the 1 
(German/Netherlands) Corps with a completely integrated bi-national headquarters. 
The emphasis of the corps shifted from commanding standing heavy armour 
divisions on the North German plain towards commanding rapid reaction 
expeditionary forces. Cooperation has grown steadily on this foundation and 
particularly in the land domain. Cooperative initiatives are, however, increasingly 
common between the navies and air forces. The intergovernmental framework for 
Dutch-German cooperation was laid out in the 2006 Agreement between the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands on Bilateral Defence Cooperation, providing a 
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framework for cooperation including a bilateral steering group to develop and 
oversee further initiatives.  
 
It is in this context of established cooperation that the Declaration of Intent on the 
Further Enhancement of Bilateral Relations in the Field of Defence (DoI), signed on 
28th May, 2013, must be understood. The DoI is not a ground-breaking initiative in 
terms of creating new structures and political terms for cooperation, as is the case 
with the Franco-British TDSC; instead, the aim is ‘further enhancement’ of existing 
cooperation. Yet while the DoI does not provide new principles or motivations at the 
general level, the initiatives it outlines do suggest a deeper push into the 
mutualisation of military capabilities and show the influence of the FNC. The new 
initiatives also reflect the 2011 reforms and the German emphasis on a shift to a 
more expeditionary capability built around the formation of the Division Schnelle 
Kräfte into which, as will be seen, the Dutch Air-Mobile Brigade will be integrated.  
 
The concrete initiatives are derived ‘bottom-up’ from the armed forces themselves, 
where efficiencies can be generated. And, as with the initiatives covered in previous 
chapters, the DoI is an attempt at comprehensiveness across all services and 
capabilities,  
 
‘All possibilities for bilateral cooperation will be exploited, within all areas of concept 
& capability development, command and control, combat as well as combat support 
and combat service support’ (DoI, 2013). 
 
German officials view the significance of the DoI as marking a shift from ‘cooperation 
to integration’. And analysts view the DoI in the context of German policy in 
developing the FNC and making it concrete, seeing the agreement as a centrepiece 
for the development and justification of the concept. As security analyst Christian 
Mölling notes, 
 
‘The Dutch-German initiative is put in the context of the framework nation concept, 
and more cooperation partners and more bilateral agreements - Poles, Czechs, 
Norwegians etc. Dutch-German cooperation looks very easy to deliver something, 
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there is something there and the experts can distinguish what is new and what is old’ 
(Interview 27, October 2013). 
 
As such, the DoI serves a more political objective for Germany than it does for the 
Netherlands. Mölling and Major have also argued that there is a political perspective 
on the German side in terms of binding future governments into cooperative 
arrangements because it is more difficult to cut capabilities associated with 
‘internationalised structures’. 
 
‘It legitimates the preservation of the present bandwidth of national military structures 
and capabilities – so as the “width before depth” idea envisages. The depth, i.e. the 
mission sustainability which is now dwindling owing to the planned cutbacks in the 
Bundeswehr, is supposed to be offset by partners. If Berlin found partners who are 
willing to hold on to Germany for the long term, the German government would no 
longer be able to change, at least not unilaterally, these then internationalised 
structures without suffering political damage.’ (2014: 13) 
 
The political purpose of the cooperation is, however, secondary to its objective of 
providing greater efficiency from military expenditure. The DoI makes clear the 
objectives of cooperation as viewed by the two states are to deliver on efficiency, 
 
‘The two sides underline that closer cooperation will improve efficiency in the area of 
capability development, thus creating a long-term advantage for both countries… 
Both sides will additionally strive for an optimum resource allocation and cost-
efficiency in all defence-related areas.’ (DoI, 2013). 
 
The previous chapter outlined the budgetary problems of the Netherlands and the 
role this played in their push towards deeper cooperation. The loss of the Leopard 2 
main battle tanks was deeply controversial within the Dutch armed forces 
(Steinglass, 2011). German officials also recognise the ‘very strong economic 
perspectives’ present in the Dutch push for defence cooperation in 2012-2013, and it 
has been seen these pressures did not exist for Germany to the same degree 
(Interview 26, October 2013). Yet while the Bundeswehr did not face similar pressure 
to find immediate savings, interviewees believe that despite the greater flexibility in 
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the German defence budget, the longstanding problem of flat budgets and rising 
costs was a fundamental concern for Germany, and the primary motivation for the 
FNC initiative and the DoI. While there may be more funding available for Germany it 
is not seen as a panacea for its own capability shortfalls, 
 
‘We don’t see the money as a chance to avoid cooperation but to be more attractive 
to others and to set up cooperation. Because whatever you do you will never have 
enough.’ (Interview 29, June 2015).) 
 
The 2013 DoI was driven by the search for greater efficiency in tandem with a 
German political desire to ensure the success of the FNC agenda. Yet there are 
serious questions as to the reliability of military formations based on close 
partnerships and high integration. The concept is predicated on multinational 
agreement for launching missions, and while this may be a reasonable assumption 
for NATO Article 5 scenarios, it is less clear that any such formation could be relied 
upon for ‘out of area’ missions (Mölling and Major, 2014: 14). This is an important 
issue given the controversial nature of recent out of area missions such as that in 
Afghanistan, not least among the German public. And there are also questions as to 
the viability of making a linkage between the FNC and the mutualisation of military 
capability through bilateral or cluster arrangements. Yet mutual reliance and role and 
task sharing was raised as a policy goal for Germany in its 2011 DPG. The paper 
classified the status of military capability from exclusively national to mutually 
dependent: 
 
‘capabilities that are of critical national importance and are therefore kept available 
on a strictly national basis; 
 
capabilities that allow closer cooperation with partners without compromising 
national capability (pooling);  
 
capabilities where a mutual, coordinated reliance on European partners is 
conceivable (role and task sharing).’ 
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The expectation that a multinational military formation can rely on the mutualisation 
of capabilities is perhaps the most challenging assumption of contemporary German 
defence policy. And this will be the focus of the next section, as this chapter turns to 
the concrete initiatives set out in the 2013 DoI. 
 
iv. The logic of mutualisation: the Dutch-German 2013 Declaration of Intent  
 
The structural-relational opportunities and constraints on mutualisation for efficiency  
 
It has been argued that the two key effects of the structural-relational context of the 
asymmetric alliance configuration are the temporal durability of the alliance and the 
flexibility of policy within that alliance. First, then, it is argued that the alliance 
provides a future temporal period over which suppressed balancing between states 
can be expected to dampen the security dilemma and concerns over relative gains, 
and thus enable cooperation in the most sensitive areas relating to the provision of 
military capability. By contrast with the other European states considered in previous 
chapters, Germany ought to be uniquely well-suited to making efficiency gains by 
drawing on the possibility of efficiency inherent in NATO. Due to its development 
under the historical circumstances outlined above, German defence policy has never 
valued industrial and operational autonomy to the same extent as the UK and 
France, or even Belgium and the Netherlands. Neither does Germany have the post-
colonial interests or influence that the UK and France have, and which has some 
impact on the kinds of forces they require. And, as a result of the post-war 
restrictions on the form and type of Germany’s military capability, it lacks the hard-
edged expeditionary capabilities that the UK and France, and to a degree the 
Netherlands, have in their inventories. Rather, military force is always viewed in a 
multilateral context, as a contribution to the wider alliance. As has been seen, 
German officials and officers often draw on these arguments to underpin a positive 
view of defence cooperation. As German Lt. General Bruno Kasdorf notes, 
 
‘Germany’s security objectives and interests can only be pursued in cooperation with 
its partners. The United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
European Union are the international framework of our security and defence policy.’ 
(Kasdorf, 2014: 200) 
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And it is also claimed that these common foundations underpin cooperation between 
the Netherlands and Germany, 
 
‘Both sides share common interests and values. These will remain the firm basis of 
their bilateral relations and be at the core of their enhanced cooperation in the future. 
Both sides intend to further strengthen the ability of NATO and the European Union 
to take action in matters of security, defence and armaments policy’ (Netherlands 
Government, 2013). 
 
Despite this emphasis on mutlailateralism, however, Germany has not been 
significantly more prone to mutualisation of military capabilities than any other 
European state. One explanation for this is that while one side of the German coin is 
multilateralism, the other side is the relative reticence to deploy force as considered 
above. As has been argued in the first section of this chapter, Germany is subject to 
the same structural-relational constraints as its European peers, and therefore 
shares the same strategic ends. For historical and cultural reasons, however, it does 
not necessarily use the military instrument as a means to achieve these ends in the 
same way as other states. Part of the explanation for this lies in the second structural 
aspect of the asymmetric alliance, which is the constraint of low interdependence on 
the possibility of efficiency. 
 
Low interdependence means that there are few structural-relational imperatives for 
allies in an asymmetric alliance to support each other across all interests. The 
constraint of low interdependence is the negative print of Germany’s openness to the 
possibility of efficiency. While Germany may be especially open to multinational 
cooperation it is also especially reticent about using out of area military force in 
support of the US, or for that matter, the UK or France. This is not necessarily to say 
that Germany will not deploy its forces, because of course it may do, as the Kosovo 
and Kunduz experiences demonstrate. The challenge, as with the other cases 
considered in this thesis, is that of aligning temporality in the use of force, which is 
very difficult, particularly given the close scrutiny of military operations by the 
Bundestag. And aligning capability type with a potential partner is also difficult, given 
that Germany has historically had a more limited range of expeditionary capabilities. 
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While Germany is slowly moving closer to the UK and France in terms of its 
conception of the use of military force it remains the case that its domestic political 
culture is one of restraint. This has ramifications for the kinds of military capabilities it 
seeks; Germany is not about to acquire, for example, an aircraft carrier. Neither is 
Germany under great pressure to shift that culture to exert more influence on the US, 
because as Europe’s leading economy in a crucial geostrategic location, it can rely 
on a high degree of influence in Washington for reasons other than its military 
capabilities. For the UK and France, the military instrument plays a much more 
important role in the struggle for influence over the US, and even here, as has been 
shown, Franco-British cooperation still falls short of the mutualisation of operational 
capabilities. As such, Germany is not an attractive partner for mutual dependence 
close to the operational frontline, at least in terms being a swift and capable ally for 
the US, and by extension, the UK and France. 
 
On the other hand, where concrete interests are shared across the alliance, most 
notably in the form of territorial defence, as embodied in NATO’s Article 5, then the 
possibility of extracting greater efficiency from resources is much higher. The 
problem, as has been discussed, is that particular military capabilities are not 
exclusively earmarked for the territorial defence of Europe. The crisis in the Ukraine 
began in late 2013, after the signing of the 2013 DOI, and as such is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but the subsequent attention that it brought to the territorial 
defence of Europe does serve to highlight the dilemma of mutualisation of 
capabilities in relation to territorial defence and out of area operations. As 
Heidenkamp puts it, 
 
‘The fact that the centre of attention for most Western European countries is to re-
learn collective defence speaks to the benefit of these bilaterals… It’s not a ‘lucky’ 
coincidence but it’s helpful that it’s this strategic change. If we had to advance 
bilateral and other multinational cooperation in a crisis management scenario 
somewhere in Africa that would be more much more difficult to do than to advance 
cooperation for collective defence’ (Interview 28, May 2015). 
 
As Claudia Major and Christian Mölling have pointed out, there are concerns that 
Germany’s reticence might have an impact on potential partners.  
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‘some nations are concerned that the FNC could adversely affect the European 
operational readiness because German mission scepticism might spread to its 
partners. If go-getting nations like the Netherlands or Poland commit themselves to 
the framework nation Germany, they will become dependent on Germany with 
regard to their decisions’ (Major and Mölling, 2014: 14). 
 
There is thus an apparent tension between the efficiencies that could be delivered by 
the mutualisation of military capabilities and the differences in the way that Germany 
and others pursue their strategic ends. Yet Germany and the Netherlands have also 
gone quite some way towards mutualisation in elements of the initiatives announced 
in 2013. The final section will consider these concrete cooperation initiatives against 
the same model that has been deployed in the previous two case studies. 
 
Mutualisation of capability at high temporal-spatial distance from frontline 
 
As with previous chapters, the hypothesis on the mutualisation of capability at a high 
temporal distance from the frontline has been extracted from the model. Such 
elements of capability include, for example, defence industrial development and 
production, training and supporting infrastructure: 
 
H1: Capability mutualisation may be found at high temporal distance from the 
frontline, with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
The first area of potential cooperation under this heading relates to defence industrial 
development and production. Defence industrial cooperation between Germany and 
the Netherlands is based on the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding concerning 
defence materiel cooperation. As Dick Zandee notes, defence industrial cooperation 
does not play a large role in the Dutch-German military relationship (Interview 21, 
September 2014), but the 2013 DoI did suggest some significant areas in which 
industrial cooperation might be developed, notably in the maritime field for 
submarines and mine-counter measure vessels (MCM). The DoI stated that, ‘Shared 
knowledge and expertise can be used for the design and development of a new 
class of submarines for both countries’ (Netherlands Government, 2013). It also 
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committed to explore possibilities for Germany and the Netherlands to work with 
Belgium on ‘knowledge acquisition and sharing, in the field of mine countermeasures 
in order to investigate common replacement of MCM capabilities’ (Netherlands 
Government, 2013). 
 
At the time of writing this thesis, little progress had been made on either of these 
projects, although the Netherlands and Belgium have separately agreed to pursue 
an MCM replacement programme on a bilateral basis. As has been seen in previous 
chapters, defence industrial cooperation is difficult to deliver, particularly when 
national requirements differ. And this is the case as regards Dutch and German 
submarine capabilities; the Netherlands has a requirement for deep ocean-going 
submarines to operate in the Atlantic, while the German requirement is for 
operations in more shallow seas, such as the Baltic (Interview 21, September 2014). 
 
The second mitigation of deeper defence industrial cooperation is the significant 
asymmetry between the two states’ industrial bases across all areas of capability 
development and generation. Germany retains an industrial capability to build 
submarines while the Netherlands no longer does so. Short of very significant 
investment, the Netherlands is therefore likely to have to find a more asymmetric 
relationship, which may lead to some form of industrial dependency for the 
generation of its future submarine capability. As such, there is unlikely to be any 
Dutch-German mutual dependency created in this field, although the Netherlands 
may be able to sustain some of its current submarine expertise through a joint 
development with a larger partner, and in the field of MCM vessels, there may be 
areas where mutual dependencies over the development of certain technologies 
might be possible. 
 
Thus, while the Netherlands and Germany could in principle create mutual 
dependencies in the defence industrial field, there are significant unit-level factors 
that militate against any such development. While the model suggests that there is 
no systemic reason in principle why there could not be mutual dependencies at the 
defence industrial level, this asymmetry of scale narrows the potential considerably. 
This can be seen by contrast with the Franco-British cooperation initiatives outlined 
in chapter four where there is a stronger symmetry of scale in defence industrial 
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output and requirements. Fundamentally, the situation reflects the constraints of 
internal resources on the ability of the Netherlands to hedge against abandonment; 
the Dutch economy is not large enough to sustain broad indigenous industrial 
capabilities, though it may try to retain expertise in niche areas through cooperation 
with larger parties. 
 
The second field of cooperation under this heading relates to shared training and 
infrastructure, and here there is a great deal more scope for cooperation. Indeed, 
bilateral army cooperation on training has been an important component of the 
relationship since during the Cold War. The 2013 DoI sets out a number of potential 
areas for deepening this cooperation, including ‘common joint fire support training’; 
‘intensification of Dutch-German training & exercise including UN training and para 
training & exercises’; and training in the navy and air force in various fields. Much of 
this cooperation takes place under the umbrella of the 1st German-Netherlands 
Corps HQ. The similarities in Dutch and German equipment and the decision to 
embrace English as a common language means that common training is now 
recognised as an area where there is great potential for savings (Bundeswehr, 
2014). The new focus on areas such as joint fire support training reflects the push 
towards deeper integration of the two armies, and the ramifications of this will be 
considered below. 
 
As the model suggests, these aspects of capability mutualisation are possible 
between partners because, in terms of concerns over entrapment or abandonment, 
they represent a very low risk. The mutualisation of these aspects of capability 
necessarily takes place at considerable temporal and spatial distance from the 
frontline. In terms of training, while staff, facilities and concepts may be shared, the 
partner states retain some level of expertise in the field and thus the ability to deploy 
the associated capabilities autonomously. The considerable challenges to such 
cooperation derive mostly from differences in industrial scale, requirements, 






Mutualisation of capabilities on the frontline 
 
Turning to the mutualisation of capabilities for immediate deployment on the 
‘frontline’ of operations, the following hypothesis is drawn from the model: 
 
H2: Capability mutualisation may be found at zero temporal-spatial distance from the 
frontline, where there is a very high certainty of support for concrete interests. 
 
i. 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps Headquarters 
 
The 2013 DoI states that,  
 
‘Both nations intend to enhance the use of 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as a 
platform for combined training as well as the leading command and control element 
for multinational operations’ (Netherlands Government, 2013). 
 
As outlined above, the 1st German/Netherlands Corps (GNC) Headquarters is a 
completely integrated bi-national command. Based in Munster, Germany, the corps 
is under the rotating command of either a Dutch or German officer working alongside 
a deputy commander from the partner state. The HQ has the capability to plan and 
oversee major exercises and other training as well as to function as an operational 
HQ commanding up to 60,000 troops (NATO, 2017b). It has a permanent bi-national 
staff and support battalion (GNC, 2017). As with other rapid reaction corps assigned 
to NATO, only the HQ is a ‘standing’ component of the corps, with forces assigned to 
it as necessary for training or operational deployment. In 2003, the 1st GNC took 
responsibility for the NATO International Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters in 
Kabul, Afghanistan (NATO, 2017b). It is a certified land HQ for the NATO Response 
Force and was recently certified as an HQ for land-orientated joint operations. As 
German Lt General Bruno Kasdorf explains,  
 
‘The common goal is to support NATO and the EU, to provide an efficient force 
potential capable of commanding land-centric operations and to bring this to bear in 
an international context’ (Kasdorf, 2014: 204). 
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The binational integration of staff into a standing corps HQ is a unique military 
arrangement. The Netherlands and Germany have no other corps HQ at their 
exclusively national disposal. As such it represents a significant mutualisation of 
capability and a corresponding restraint on flexibility. As Zandee observes, ‘this is 
deep integration… you cannot deploy the command for a mission without the 
agreement of both parties.’ (Interview 21, September 2014) The Germans and the 
Dutch effectively share the capability required to train for and command large-scale 
operations. As one senior German officer notes, this sacrifice in autonomy stands in 
considerable contrast to that of France or the UK, 
 
‘Germany does not have a corps HQ of its own. The French go another way, they 
have their own corps HQ in Lilles, there is an international contribution but they can 
go it alone’ (Interview 29, June 2015), 
 
Likewise, while the UK does not have an exclusively national corps HQ it acts as the 
framework nation for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), itself arising from the 
former 1st British Corps based in the north of West Germany, which was disbanded 
following the end of the Cold War. While the ARRC has a multinational staff, it is 
predominately staffed by UK officers and could presumably be reconstituted as a 
national corps HQ if necessary. 
 
Thus, while the GNC does not provide the same level of operational autonomy in 
principle open to the UK and France, the mutualisation of the HQ does provide the 
Netherlands and Germany with the possibility of retaining the skills, experience and 
influence that come with the staffing of a NATO certified corps HQ. And the 
mutualisation of a corps HQ does not mean that the Netherlands and Germany are 
restricted in terms of the more discrete capabilities they can contribute to 
multinational missions under NATO or other auspices. It does, however, limit the 
contribution of the corps HQ capability only to those missions where there is 
agreement between the two parties. 
 
Considering this case against the theoretical model, it is clear that when the HQ itself 
is deployed there is zero temporal distance from the frontline. According to the model 
set out in this thesis, such frontline mutualisation of a capability ought only to occur 
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when there is a very high certainty of support for concrete interests. The previous 
chapter gave the example of shared Dutch-Belgian air policing, and in that case the 
particular interest is virtually identical. In this case, however, it cannot be assumed 
that the concrete interests of Germany and the Netherlands, as related to the 
deployment of a corps HQ, would always be so identical. This is represented in 
figure 6.3. This anomaly against the model can be explained by considering the 
differences between NATO’s Article 5 territorial defence obligations on the one hand, 
and multinational ‘out of area’ missions on the other.  
 
 
Figure 6.3. Germany-Netherlands HQ distance from frontline 
 
In one sense the case does meet the hypothesis set out above. In terms of the use 
of the HQ as a contribution to NATO’s role in the territorial defence of its European 
member states through the provision of deterrence, and a potential role in 
coordinating the response to a hostile attack that triggered Article 5, the concrete 
interests of Germany and the Netherlands are highly likely to be identical. They 
would share close to identical interests in ensuring the integrity of the alliance and 
the security of their own territories. The picture is far less clear, however, as regards 
out of area operations. The reason for this is suggested in the discussion on the FNC 
in the previous discussion. According to the model, any particular interest in an out of 
area mission, with the exception perhaps of civilian extraction or humanitarian 
assistance, is likely to come under the strategic end of the struggle for influence over 
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the US. As far as such ends are concerned, subordinate states have considerable 
flexibility in the way they choose to support the dominant state or indeed each other. 
It is therefore very difficult to predict, even for states with similar political cultures and 
security perspectives in general, whether or not both would share a given particular 
interest under such scenarios. The model would therefore suggest that Germany and 
the Netherlands are taking a great risk in mutualising their corps HQ, and that there 
is a high risk of entrapment or abandonment in the relationship when it comes to the 
deployment of the HQ in support of concrete interests under the strategic end of the 
struggle for influence.  
 
Yet the risk is not as considerable as the model suggests, and there are two reasons 
for this. The first relates to the similarity of the way in which Germany and the 
Netherlands pursue their strategic ends and the second relates to the nature of the 
capability itself. First, neither Germany nor the Netherlands seek operational 
autonomy over their forces at the corps scale. Even for the UK and France there are 
few scenarios where such a scale would be necessary at a national level, though 
both apparently retain the ability to do so. By contrast the Dutch army lacks sufficient 
scale, so there is no prospect of the autonomous use of such a level of forces. And, 
while for Germany sustaining an autonomous corps might be a more realistic 
prospect given its considerable economic resources, its defence policy has long 
been conceived in a purely multilateral framework and focussed on territorial defence 
rather than expeditionary operations. As such, the nature of a corps HQ as a 
capability is rather different for Germany and the Netherlands than it might be 
conceived by France and the UK. Furthermore, as with previous cases considered in 
this thesis, given the probability of alignment of their interests, the likelihood remains 
that even for an out of area operation, the Netherlands and Germany would probably 
be in agreement over the deployment of the corps HQ, as indeed was the case in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Secondly, mutualisation at the corps level is perhaps something of a special case, in 
that it represents a military capability of a different form and order from the others 
under consideration in this thesis. A shared corps HQ binds relatively few personnel 
into a potential entrapment-abandonment dilemma. Thus, regardless of whether 
Germany commits to an out of area operation, the Netherlands will still have forces 
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and capabilities available to offer its allies, and vice versa. And a corps HQ is not the 
most visible, nor the riskiest military contribution that might be deployed to 
demonstrate commitment to the US.  
 
Nonetheless, there is a risk in the mutualisation of the 1st German /Netherlands 
Corps HQ because its deployment cannot be fully assured by either state under all 
circumstances. It therefore represents a restriction, not necessarily on the ability of 
either state to contribute forces for political influence, but rather on one part of their 
repertoire of military means by which to win political influence. It also means, 
perhaps more significantly, that the partner states must be prepared for some risk of 
entrapment. It would not be easy to quickly extract a mutualised HQ from an out of 
area mission if, for example, domestic political conditions in one of the partner states 
became hostile to the deployment. Given, however, that neither the Netherlands nor 
Germany pursues its strategic ends in such a way that requires an autonomous 
corps HQ, there is less concern over mutualisation. As one senior German officer 
puts it, ‘autonomy for operations is a question of scale’ and is ‘relative to ambition’ 
(Interview 26, October 2013). It is, by contrast, very difficult to imagine France and 
the UK agreeing to transform their corps HQs into fully integrated Franco-British bi-
national structures, not only for reasons of language and culture, but also because 
their ambition for autonomous action remains at the corps level; the UK, for example, 
plans to be able to deploy in extremis an expeditionary force of 50,000 (UK MOD, 
2015). And this would mean a stronger risk of entrapment or abandonment. For 
these reasons, even though the corps HQ represents mutualisation of capability at 
zero temporal-spatial distance from the frontline, the risks inherent in such 
cooperation remain reasonably low for the Netherlands and Germany.  
 
ii. Army cooperation and ‘modular integration’  
 
The centre-piece of the 2013 DoI is the cooperation between the Dutch and German 
armies. This is based on ‘Project Griffin’ which was outlined in the 2012 Letter of 
Intent on Intensified Army Cooperation (July 2012). The two most important areas of 
cooperation under this heading are the integration of the 11 (Netherlands) Airmobile 
Brigade (AMB) into the German Rapid Forces Division or Division Schnelle Kräfte 
(DSK), and the integration of German and Dutch armoured brigades. This includes 
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integrating a Dutch tank company into the 114th German Tank Battalion, which is 
part of the Netherlands 43rd Mechanised Brigade, itself integrated into the German 
1st Panzer Division.  
 
Rapid reaction forces integration 
 
The DSK was formed in the light of Germany’s 2011 defence reforms, and is 
intended to integrate Germany’s air manoeuvre, extraction of citizens and Special 
Forces operations. Army aviation, paratroopers, and special forces are brought 
together ‘to make available complex air manoeuvre capabilities’ (Kasdorf, 2011: 
202). The Netherlands 11th AMB was created following the end of the Cold War as a 
rapid reaction force (Schoeman, 2017). Thus, the two forces provide capabilities for 
similar operations, although the Dutch provide specialist equipment and personnel. 
The German brigades that make up the DSK are experienced in airborne, i.e., 
paratrooper operations, and by contrast the Netherlands 11th AMB is equipped with 
Apache attack helicopters which can facilitate an ‘air manoeuvre’ capability. As 
Zandee notes, 
 
‘For the Germans the added value of the cooperation with the Netherlands is to learn 
about air assault and air manoeuvre operations, which involves fire support from 
armed helicopters and fighter aircraft. The Dutch very much learned this from the 
Brits and the Americans, the only others with this capability, needed for attacking 
heavily armed forces on the ground. For that you need coordination with fighter 
aircraft and you need armed helicopters closely operating with airborne infantry.’  
(Interview 21, September 2014). 
 
As a Dutch official argues, the deal between the two parties is that the Netherlands 
can provide ‘our expertise in helicopter operations, and we can learn from their 
expertise in airborne operations.’ (Interview 24, June 2016.). The Dutch also gain by 
placing senior officers into positions at a greater scale of formation than they have 
access to on an exclusively national basis. This means the Dutch have,  
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‘division level access, and a higher-level capability. They [the Bundeswehr] have a 
higher-level capability, specialised in evacuation operations, strong medical 
component, an element that the Dutch would gain’ (Interview 21, September 2014). 
 
The DSK now operates under a combined Dutch-German HQ with a German 
commander and a Dutch deputy. For Zandee, this represents a form of integration in 
the Division Headquarters, as well as ‘modular cooperation’, the latter because the 
model offers a mutualised capability at scale but with the ability to extract coherent 
capabilities from it for exclusive national use. As he explains, 
 
‘It doesn’t mean that the Dutch air mobile brigade no longer exists as a separate unit. 
The combined HQ can be used for a real deployment, if both parties will agree to 
deploy of course. But we still have the possibility, like the Germans, to deploy our air 
mobile brigade in whatever formation, with or without air assault, separately. We can 
still do it nationally. It’s not completely integrated where you are completely 
dependent on the other to deploy the core forces.’ (Interview 21, September 2014). 
 
As such, this form of cooperation differs from that of the binational corps HQ. There 
is integration but it is ‘modular’ and national forces can be withdrawn for use 
elsewhere at will. But the integration of the Dutch air mobile brigade into the German 
DSK does represent a form of specialisation to create a military formation greater 
than the sum of its parts, and as such there is an element of mutualisation. The DSK 
with the Dutch included is a more capable military force, a different capability, but 
one that can only be deployed with dual consent. Yet because the component 
capabilities within the DSK remain autonomous, the national capabilities are not 
bound together as they are in other examples of mutualisation.  
 
Armoured division integration 
 
A different (non-modular) approach underpins the integration of a Dutch tank 
company into the German 414th Tank Battalion. The 414th Tank Battalion falls under 
the command of the Dutch 43rd Mechanised Brigade, which is part of the German 1st 
Panzer Division. In this case, perhaps the main beneficiary of the cooperation is the 
Dutch Army, which controversially lost its tank capability following the financial crisis. 
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Theoretically, the Dutch tank company could act on its own, but that would be a very 
small formation and, according to Zandee, will in future be completely dependent on 
battalion level support from the Germans. A Dutch official explains that, 
 
‘The decision was taken in 2011 when defence had to absorb very large budget cuts. 
And one of the drivers of abolishing the tank capability is that you can do away with 
the whole supply organisation with really quite substantial amounts of money 
involved’ (Interview 23, June 2016). 
 
The decision has left the 43rd Mechanised Brigade without the tank capability, and 
some in the Netherlands expressed considerable concern about to this gap. As 
Zandee explains, 
 
‘The northern (43rd) mechanised brigade lost its tanks, but that created a serious 
problem when NATO began to criticise The Hague that the brigade could no longer 
participate in ground operations against heavy mechanised forces of an opponent, 
because it was lacking heavy fire power. That was the international pressure to look 
for a solution. At the same time the Dutch Army itself was also looking for a ‘back 
door’ to get the tanks back. (Interview 21, September 2014). 
 
By working with the German army, however, the Dutch army is able to operate a 
tank company within a German tank battalion, which is integrated into the 43rd 
Netherlands Mechanised Brigade, itself integrated into the German 1st Panzer 
Division (Interview 29, June 2015). 
 
A Dutch official explains, 
 
‘The arrangement we now have is 18 tanks, you would commit 5-6 in an operation. 
However, financially this is very advantageous to us. They are German tanks, the 
Germans maintain them and adapt them in a tactical way, and of course we pay a 
certain amount of money to the Germans for using these tanks. If we would have to 
do it all by ourselves it would be a major cost. Through this cooperation we have to 
invest something, but far less than we would have to pay if we had to maintain this 
capability all by ourselves’ (Interview 24, June 2016). 
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As Kasdorf explains, 
 
‘Training Dutch tank crews and providing them with updated knowledge about 
manoeuvre warfare closes their capability gap. This unique project, Dutch crews 
training with and using German armour, could serve as a format to be used on other 
weapon systems as well. Here I have the cooperation [of tanks and] armoured 
infantry in mind. We are more than happy to be able to help the Dutch Army keep a 
unique capability alive… This example again shows the basic notion of our 
cooperation: we must not permit one nation’s capability gap to open up wider 
security gaps for the defence community as a whole.’ (Kasdorf, 2014: 203) 
 
The cooperation is not, however, entirely without self-interest on the German part. 
Germany is suffering from acute recruitment problems and there is a payment for the 
leasing of the tanks. One official notes that, ‘It’s partly political but also Germany has 
some difficulty finding personnel’ (Interview 24, June 2016). 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Force integration distance from frontline 
 
These two initiatives, integration of the Dutch AMB and a tank company into German 
structures can be viewed as mutualisation, as shown in figure 6.4. It is, however, of a 
different form from previous examples. The model predicts that there may be 
frontline capability mutualisation where there is a very high certainty of alignment of 
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interests. As discussed, the modular approach means that there is a mutualised 
capability at a higher level, but its component elements are not entirely bound to the 
partner. Thus, in principle, interests do not have to be closely aligned to pursue 
integration. As a Dutch official explains, 
 
‘The helicopter brigade [11th AMB] is completely independent. The red line for both 
Germany and the Netherlands is the political decision to commit forces, and this is 
still a national decision’ (Interview 24, June 2016). 
 
And yet, the model is also accurate in that interests would have to be very closely 
aligned if the states were to actually deploy any of these formations for a particular 
interest. Although there is the ‘red line’ of national authorisation, a senior Dutch 
official notes the ramifications of such a deployment, 
 
‘We have to realise, and the Minister always tells parliament, that if you have 
committed to a joint operation with a partner and things get hot you can’t just 
withdraw. You lose some of your ability to operate independently. You cannot just 
walk away if you do something together. We haven’t done anything before in that 
way. But you have to realise that if you have committed yourself to an operation you 
cannot just drop everything and walk away’ (Interview 24, June 2016). 
 
As such, while the ‘red line’ to commit forces is retained by national parliaments, 
once committed the risk of abandonment or entrapment is unavoidable. And the risk 
is more likely to be one of entrapment due to the potentially dire political 
consequences of abandoning a partner on a mission. Furthermore, there may be 
greater political pressure on one partner to agree to use the capability in a situation 
where it is required than there would be if no integration of forces had taken place. 
Due to the high bar of very closely aligned interests, officials tend to view such 
cooperation more in the context of territorial defence than ‘out of area’ missions, 
 
‘The nature of this integration is more likely to be Article 5. In practice when talking 
about deploying divisions you are talking about Article 5 type scenarios where the 
basic security of the alliance is in play. I don’t think if you have, for example 
operations in Africa, you would have that problem. For example, in Mali, in terms of 
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numbers it’s small scale operations: ten helicopters, 1200 personnel. There is no 
impetus to use a division on an operation like that’ (Interview 24, June 2016). 
 
Thus, unlike some other examples of capability mutualisation, the risks involved in 
modular integration arise not from the decision to go ahead, but rather the risk in its 
use thereafter. If such cooperation is intended chiefly to retain scale for Article 5 
scenarios, then alignment of interests is likely to be high. Such integrated divisions 
could be deployed on other operations, but interests in any such mission would have 
to be very highly aligned in order for the partners to have the confidence to deploy 
together. 
 
One step from the frontline – greater risks for efficiency 
 
While partners may believe it likely that concrete interests will in general be closely 
aligned, it is also the case that due to the low politico-military interdependence of the 
asymmetric alliance, they are not reliably so. In such cases, risk can be mitigated by 
a degree of temporal-spatial distance from the frontline, but to a lesser extent than 
that associated with, for example shared defence industrial development or training 
infrastructure. The following hypothesis is thus drawn from the model,  
 
H3: Capability mutualisation may be found at functional distance from the frontline, 
with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
For the time-period under consideration in this thesis, Dutch-German cooperation 
has not produced any clear examples of capability mutualisation that could be 
classified in this way, although there may be an element of functional distance from 
the frontline in the GNC HQ considered above. There are also hints in the DOI for 
future cooperation and some elements of the army integration outlined above may 
fall in this category. For example, the DoI refers to ‘Fields for medium and long-term 
(Army) feasibility studies are: common logistic support, logistic role specialization’ 
(Netherlands Government, 2013). Building on the integration under the corps HQ 
and the two German divisions, there is clearly an obvious benefit in mutualisation 
through specialisation and sharing of certain logistical support functions. 
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The issue of logistical support also arises in relation to the arrangements for the 
Dutch tank company. In any scenario where the 1st Panzer Division is deployed as 
an integrated Dutch-German force, there are no issues over logistical and 
maintenance support, but the question does arise as to whether the Netherlands 
could deploy the 43rd Mechanised Brigade independently with its tank company of 
German tanks operated by Dutch crews. Officials argue that some other 
arrangements would be required; Germany would have to authorise the involvement 
of its army, and such direct involvement of Germany could not be assumed 
(Interview 24, June 2016). Such a situation is less a case of mutual dependence 
than an asymmetric dependence of the Netherlands on Germany. It may be 
plausible, however, that other arrangements could be made with private companies 
and hiring some temporary expertise of technical experts that can maintain the 
tanks. This kind of arrangement might provide the necessary support at temporal-
spatial distance from the frontline. 
 
The relative lack of mutualisation under this final heading may in part be explained 
by the focus in Dutch-German cooperation on army cooperation and land operations. 
As suggested by some interviewees in the previous chapter, mutualisation of 
logistics and maintenance are more easily undertaken at an intermediate temporal-
spatial distance from the frontline in the air and maritime domains, whereas this is 





It has been seen that Germany and the Netherlands have established perhaps the 
closest bilateral army relationship in Europe, and certainly the deepest in terms of 
the mutualisation of military capabilities. It has been noted, however, that as regards 
mutualisation at temporal distance from the frontline, there is little of substance 
between the two states. It appears that the high asymmetry between them in terms 
of the scale and depth of indigenous defence industry militates against mutualisation. 
It is not in principle impossible, but it is unlikely given the disparity in scale and 
requirement. On the other hand, it has been seen that Dutch-German cooperation 
offers an innovative, although somewhat partial example of capability mutualisation 
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at the frontline. The ‘modular integration’ of Dutch and German forces means that 
different capabilities are provided to create a higher-level capability at division level.  
 
The theory set out in this thesis suggests that if states are to embark on frontline 
mutualisation, then concrete interests must be very highly aligned. Yet the theory 
also suggests that such scenarios are rare, particularly vis-à-vis support for US-led 
operations. One important exception, however, is the ‘negative interest’ embodied in 
NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence clause. It can be assumed that in the face of 
territorial aggression European allies would share the interest in deterring or 
repelling any attack. Thus, as interviewees note, Germany and the Netherlands have 
confidence in mutualising their capabilities at the division level, i.e., the kind of force 
structure necessary for territorial defence under Article 5. The modularity of the 
integration means, however, that the capabilities are extractable and thus flexibility 
for use in other missions is retained. One important ad hoc unit-level variable here is 
Germany’s cultural reluctance (and relatedly, its lack of capability) to deploy 
expeditionary force at a scale comparable to that of the UK and France. In 
combination with the Dutch inability to do so, the mutualisation of such a capability is 
perhaps less of an issue of autonomy than it would be for the UK and France, as 
seen in relation to the CJEF. 
 
The 1st German-Netherlands Headquarters provides something of a hybrid of 
frontline distance, it operates at zero-temporal distance from the frontline but its 
function provides some element of spatial distance. It is, however, a high level of 
mutualisation because it represents a shared capability that can only be deployed 
with the consent of both parties, and for which neither state has an alternative 
capability without the other. It is also a critical function at the heart of an operation 
and thus has a perhaps higher political profile. It is very difficult to imagine a scenario 
in which it could be deployed without a high level of commitment from both. Thus, for 
the use of this capability, concrete interests would have to be aligned, and thus it has 
more in common with the conception of mutualisation at the frontline, than functional 








The concluding chapter to this thesis will now set out to bring together the case 
studies above and attempt to provide answers to the initial research questions. It will 
begin with a comparison of the case studies and the specific mutualisation initiatives 
within them. It will assess the extent to which structural-relational factors provide an 
explanation to the central puzzle of the thesis as to why some European states have 
foregone autonomy in favour of mutualising aspects of some of their most vital 
military capabilities. The second section of this chapter will then turn to the 
theoretical and empirical implications of these conclusions, and finally it will briefly 
discuss new avenues for future research that arise from the thesis. 
 
i. Military capability mutualisation: comparing cases 
 
This thesis has developed a novel theoretical approach derived from established 
neorealist concepts and assumptions. It claims that configurations of structural-
relational variables at the system level exert independent effects on states, and that 
these effects can explain regularities or patterns of outcomes among states, in this 
case that of military capability mutualisation. A system theory can be tested on the 
basis that where different units interact under similar structural-relational 
configurations, unit behaviour and outcomes will tend ‘to fall within certain expected 
ranges’ (Waltz, 1979: 72). It is also argued, however, that while the dependent 
variable under consideration in this thesis is military capability mutualisation 
conceived of as a system-level outcome, it is also necessary to consider elements of 
behaviour at the unit-level, to gain a deeper understanding of how those outcomes 
come about, and thus to isolate systemic from unit-level causes. The following 
section will now consider the case studies examined above from a comparative 
perspective, and will attempt to demonstrate that the occurrence and variability in 





The logic of behaviour: subordinate states under an asymmetric alliance 
 
Each case study chapter set out to first establish the degree to which the behaviour 
of the states under inquiry conformed to the expectations of the logic of behaviour 
under an asymmetric alliance. The framework for this analysis is the assumption, 
derived from theoretical premises, that states under an asymmetric alliance 
configuration tend to follow certain ‘strategic ends’, for which their military capabilities 
provide the means. Thus, subordinate states seek primarily to mitigate entrapment 
by the dominant state, secondarily to mitigate abandonment by the dominant state, 
and finally, to maintain military capabilities sufficient to defend their own residual or 
idiosyncratic interests. Unit-level factors that were judged to conflict with this 
explanation for behaviour, or provide an alternative explanation for it, were 
considered on an ad hoc basis, as raised in existing literature or through the 
interviews carried out for the thesis.  
 
i. The struggle for influence – mitigating entrapment 
 
As the theory expects, it has been shown that European states use their military 
capabilities primarily to pursue a ‘struggle for influence’ over the US, the dominant 
state in the highly asymmetric NATO alliance. While it has been seen that there is 
variation in the intensity by which the case study states pursue this strategy, all 
showed evidence of such behaviour. The behaviour is most pronounced in the case 
of the UK, with its military capabilities overtly recognised by decision-makers and 
analysts as the most important means by which to retain and build on its political 
influence with the US. In the case of France, it has been seen that since the end of 
the Cold War there has been a shift from a Gaullist focus on national military 
autonomy, which had bolstered French ambiguity over its role in the NATO alliance, 
towards an approach now remarkably like that pursued by the UK since the Suez 
crisis. Scholars and analysts of contemporary French defence policy have claimed 
that the ‘end of the Suez paradigm’ now enables deeper Franco-British cooperation 
(Pannier, 2015; De Durand, 2010). It has been argued here, however, that this shift 
ought not to be viewed as a radical change in politico-military strategy, but rather as 
a shift in tactics towards a different means of mitigation of entrapment in the light of 
the collapse of Cold War bipolarity and a shift to American unipolarity. Thus, while 
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France undoubtedly maintains strong aspirations to military autonomy and a 
commitment to the EU CSDP, as noted by several interviewees above, it has 
increasingly come to view its military capability through the prism of influence over 
the US. 
 
Belgium and the Netherlands provide useful counter-points to French and British 
military power. While the UK and France have long maintained a broad spectrum of 
military capabilities and deployed their armed forces at considerable scale in Europe 
and around the world, Belgium and the Netherlands were neutral states before the 
Second World War. Yet within a few years of the formation of NATO their militaries 
had been transformed into significant force structures with a broad spectrum of 
military capability. In the post-war period they came to maintain a high degree of 
loyalty to the US. The Netherlands developed a particularly strong Atlanticism, using 
its military capabilities to demonstrate commitment and to seek to influence the US 
and its larger European partners. And, as has been seen, Dutch decision-makers 
continue to aspire for their armed forces to be viewed as part of the ‘A-Team’ of 
NATO, able to make high-end military contributions to warfighting across land, air 
and sea. By contrast, in Belgium the post-Cold War period has seen a marked 
retreat from the unswerving Atlanticist loyalty of the previous decades. Belgian 
decision-makers have oscillated between Atlanticism and a ‘Europeanist’ alternative 
to NATO. In tandem with this vision of autonomous European defence, Biscop has 
noted the effects of the identity of ‘a small country’ and of a tendency towards 
pacifism (Interview 14, 2016). These factors have surely made their mark on Belgian 
military capabilities. Belgium’s defence spending as a proportion of GDP is among 
the lowest in NATO, and its army has abandoned its previously held heavy armour 
capabilities. Yet as was shown in the case study chapter above, despite this, the 
logic of military capability as a crucial means in the struggle for influence remains 
very strong among key decision-makers. And, as underlined by recent decisions on 
naval capability, Belgium still seeks to hold onto high-end capability contributions 
across a range of military capabilities (Chakraborthy, 2016). 
 
The political and military culture that Germany has inherited from its historical 
circumstances, and the impact this has on its military capabilities, has no parallel in 
Europe. Major constraints were imposed on German military capabilities as a 
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condition of its re-emergence as a sovereign state following the Second World War. 
Scholars and analysts have noted the importance of this unique culture in 
understanding Germany’s defence policy and the attitudes of its decision-makers to 
the use of force. Duffield, for example, has argued that such is the strength of this 
culture that it serves to negate any explanation of German behaviour in terms of the 
neorealist conceptual vocabulary (1999). And indeed, Germany does not so readily 
deploy hard-edged war-fighting military capabilities as does, for example, France 
and the UK. Yet it has also been seen that the essential logic of the struggle for 
influence is equally applicable to German military capability, both in terms of 
responses from interviewees, and as seen in relation to the Bundeswehr’s harder-
edged deployments in Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
 
Thus, it is argued that despite the significant differences among the case study 
states in terms of historical and cultural idiosyncrasies, the similarities between them 
in terms of their strategies for influence over the dominant state, and the impact this 
has on the generation and use of their military capabilities, is most striking. As made 
clear by several interviewees across the cases above, the key requirement for all the 
case study states is the retention of a ‘balanced’ or ‘broad spectrum’ of military 
capabilities. It is this that provides for the flexibility in the contribution that they may 
make in pursuit of influence and credibility in the eyes of the US. Yet it has also been 
seen that the ways in which these struggles for influence are pursued in any given 
concrete example may be very different. It is an assumption of the theory that under 
an asymmetric alliance configuration, there is a high level of policy flexibility among 
states. Thus, there is little pressure to deploy forces in exactly the same way, i.e., in 
terms of capability function, at exactly the same time, or even at all in some 
circumstances; quite the opposite, in fact. This low politico-military interdependence 
creates space for unit-level factors to play a greater role. The possibility of flexibility 
thus leads to divergent policy positions over support for the ‘positive’ interests of 
allies, particularly the US. There is, therefore, unpredictability in the extent to which a 
subordinate state will align with the concrete interests of the US.  
 
Thus, even with identical strategic ends, the asymmetric alliance places a major 
constraint on possibilities for military capability mutualisation close to the frontline, as 
the expectation that interests will be shared to a high temporal and functional degree 
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is not guaranteed, and cannot be reliably predicted. As Biscop notes above in 
relation to Belgian support for US-led missions, ‘it’s entirely unpredictable, you can 
never call the trends’ (Interview 14, June 2016). The same issue arises, even with a 
historically very reliable partner of the US like the UK as seen with its parliamentary 
veto on supporting US military action over Syria in 2013, and its refusal many 
decades earlier to commit forces to Vietnam. By contrast, where subordinate states 
can be more confident of aligned interests, such as in the ‘negative interest’ of 
NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence clause, the impediment to frontline mutualisation 
ought not to be so great. Yet military capabilities tend not to be ear-marked to 
concrete interests in this way; and so, the possibility of divergent interests tends to 
obstruct the potential for mutualisation on the frontline. This inherent need for 
flexibility and the transferability of capabilities across interests is, as has been noted 
by practitioners such as Henius, a major obstacle to mutualisation through 
specialisation and sharing on the frontline (2012: 31).  
 
ii. Hedging against abandonment 
 
The second element of the logic of behaviour in an asymmetric alliance is that of the 
need for a hedge against abandonment through the maintenance of military 
capabilities, and where plausible, their autonomous generation. This need to hedge 
relates to the residual uncertainty of the future in an anarchic international system, 
an inherent uncertainty that exists regardless of the apparent longevity of an alliance 
such as NATO. It has been seen that explicit recognition of a need for hedging in the 
form of retaining indigenous defence industries is apparent among British and 
French decision-makers. But it has also been noted that there are key differences in 
approach. The UK is, for example, more relaxed about dependencies on US 
industries, while France has embarked on significant industrial mutualisation with 
other European states. Thus, the assumption that retention of an autonomous 
defence industrial capacity is a ‘strategic end’ is not wholly corroborated by the 
evidence; there is an ambiguity among the larger case study states as to the ends of 
an indigenous defence industry. Is it for strategic or purely domestic economic 
reasons? Regarding Germany, some have argued above for the latter, regarding 
France the former (Interview 28, May 2015; Interview 5, March 2015). In the chapter 
above on France and the UK, some interviewees raised the difference in conception 
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as to which military capabilities ought to be indigenously supported was raised as a 
concern for the future of industrial collaboration (Interview 6, April 2015). It can be 
argued, however, that while it may not be a deciding factor, the retention of defence 
industrial capacity is at least a key criterion of decision-making in both the UK and 
France.  
 
In Germany, the notion of retaining defence industrial capacity for strategic reasons 
has perhaps been something of a political taboo given that it would raise the 
prospect of planning for a post-NATO German military policy. Thus, there is some 
political ambiguity on this point in Germany, but the reality for the larger European 
states is that the economic and the strategic justification cannot be easily separated, 
and thus one may conceal the other. For the Netherlands and Belgium, the question 
is of a far lesser magnitude. While for the UK, France and Germany, an indigenous 
defence industrial base that preserves key technologies across a breadth of military 
capability remains an increasingly difficult but credible aspiration, it has never been 
credible for the Netherlands and Belgium in the post-war era and even before then. 
Thus, while there may be niche areas of focus, particularly for the Netherlands, the 
issue is less ambiguous and much more closely related to the domestic economy. 
This difference in scale of defence industry has important ramifications for the range 
of cooperation that is possible between states of different industrial capacities. While 
defence industrial initiatives are central to both the Franco-British and Dutch-Belgian 
case studies above, there appears to be far less scope for such cooperation 
between the Netherlands and Germany, perhaps in part because there is greater 
asymmetry in defence industrial requirements.  
 
iii. Maintaining capabilities for residual or idiosyncratic interests 
 
The third strategic end of subordinate states under the asymmetric alliance is that of 
the retention of military capabilities for residual or idiosyncratic interests that are not 
related to the alliance. Here, only the UK and France maintain such a perspective, 
and the UK increasingly less so than it has in the past. Defence of the Falkland 
Islands remains a major expeditionary scenario for the UK, and for France autonomy 
of action in North Africa remains important (Government of France, 2013: 55). For 
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, a combination of lack of post-imperial 
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interests and relatively small-scale capabilities means that these states do not have 
such interests. The ability to mutualise capabilities for the most idiosyncratic of these 
residual interests, such as the British defence of the Falklands is likely to be low, 
given the obvious lack of common interest with any other partner. There may, 
however, be non-Article 5 interests in Europe and neighbouring regions over which 
the US does not act, but which European states believe requires a collective 
response. For such issues, without formal alliance arrangements to underpin them, 
the problem for European states is the degree to which their interests align. This 
alignment is once again susceptible to the problem of low politico-military 
interdependence. And, as Dyson has pointed out, European states tend to have 
different material interests in the wider European neighbourhood, and thus, the 
likelihood of frontline mutualisation of capabilities to defend these interests is also 
very low (2013a). It has been seen that interoperability initiatives such as the Franco-
British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force are more likely to support state action in 
such scenarios as they do not entail any ongoing mutual dependence and can be 
deployed as and when necessary. All five states considered in the thesis, however, 
have residual ‘self-help’ interests in terms of responsibility for the basic territorial 
security of their airspace and waters. And, as has been shown, given that these 
responsibilities are largely fixed, there is a greater potentially for ‘frontline’ 
mutualisation. 
 
The preceding case study chapters have demonstrated that such a logic of 
behaviour provides a plausible explanation for the way in which European states 
generate and deploy their military capabilities. And, given the similarity of behaviour 
across states of different size, political leadership, culture and history, the claim that 
the generation and use of military capability is shaped by the effects of the 
asymmetric alliance configuration is plausible.  
 
The logic of a crisis: means-ends strategies under pressure 
 
The second section of each case study chapter has shown how the sustainability of 
subordinate states’ attempts to meet the strategic ends outlined above have come 
under great strain in recent years. It has been seen that the 2008 financial crisis 
provided a shock that exacerbated the fiscal impact of longer-term trends, pushing 
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efficiency and the preservation of military capability up the political agenda in several 
European states. The introductory chapter of the thesis set out the context for the 
increasing cost of military capabilities, which appears to be, at least for those states 
that seek a technological military edge over others, a system-wide phenomenon. 
Relatedly, it has been argued that it is primarily a need for greater efficiency that 
explains ‘why in general’ states have sought out capability mutualisation initiatives 
with others. The case study chapters thus set out to explore the very similar 
predicaments faced by the European states under consideration. While the impact of 
the financial crisis was not even across all the states considered, in combination with 
the long-term accumulation of affordability issues and the gradual erosion of 
capabilities through ‘salami slicing’, it has been argued that it led to a situation of a 
broadly comparable crisis in each case study. 
 
The capability affordability crisis has been conceptualised in this thesis as a means-
ends crisis. As has been seen across the states considered here, it was not a direct 
fear of insecurity, but rather one of a fear of losing influence or ‘credibility’ in the eyes 
of the US, that primarily pushed the states to action. This concern was further 
exacerbated by the overstretch of European armed forces in the operational theatres 
of Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, as shown in the chapters above, it was the risk to the 
‘balanced’ or ‘full spectrum’ status of European armed forces that was the greatest 
concern within the case study states. As with the logic of behaviour identified above, 
the notion of a logic of crisis is not made at the exclusion of unit-level variables. 
Indeed, it is surely impossible to consider the question of the resourcing of defence 
budgets from a solely systemic perspective. As noted in the introduction, and as Alan 
Milward argued, the resources a state dedicates to its armed forces must be 
considered as a strategic synthesis of domestic and international factors (Milward, 
1979: 18). For contemporary European states, there are increasingly strong 
demands for spending on social security, health, education and infrastructure. Yet 
the considerable similarities in the predicaments of European states suggest that 
systemic factors are also vital. It is striking that while the states considered above 
spend different shares of their GDP on defence, the difference between them is all 
within a single percentage point (see tables in chapters 4-6). And this similar effect 
ought to be expected under the asymmetric alliance configuration where strategic 
ends create pressures to maintain defence spending, but where security is 
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asymmetrically provided by the dominant state, and where marginal extra investment 
by all states, particularly the smallest of states, is systemically negligible (Waltz, 
1979; 169). 
 
Given the means-ends crisis outlined above and explored in detail in the case study 
chapters, it has been assumed that the primary aim of capability mutualisation is that 
of efficiency. But this general assumption must be qualified. Historically in Europe, 
there are other motivations for close defence cooperation that may involve aspects 
of mutualisation. Major European defence industrial collaborations, for example the 
NH90 helicopter, also have very strong diplomatic dimensions (Krotz, 2011: 74). And 
the problems of multinational collaboration are well-documented in terms of cost 
increases and delays that may be so high as to negate efficiency entirely (Hartley, 
2011). Once more, however, these issues reflect the ambiguity and the difficulty in 
separating the strategic from the economic. Efficiency simply conceived of as a unit-
cost price for a piece of military equipment might be better served by buying it ‘off the 
shelf’ from American industry. But this would not account for any negative impact on 
indigenous civil manufacturing, input into the domestic economy and matters of 
military autonomy. Thus, efficiency in this wider sense means meeting a broad set of 
economic and military criteria. And ultimately, collaboration may be the only means 
of preserving technological autonomy in any given field of capability; this is certainly 
the view of interviewees and analysts as regards Franco-British cooperation on 
FCAS and complex weapons.  
 
The case that the efficiency motive is dominant in the cases above is more easily 
made for mutualisation in functional aspects of capabilities at a distance from the 
frontline, and that directly on the frontline. Here, specialisation and sharing have led 
to considerable savings because a significant cost is shared or forgone entirely. 
Such examples considered in case study chapters above include Franco-British 
shared nuclear weapons testing facilities, the sharing of air defence between 
Netherlands and Belgium, the shared 1st Germany-Netherlands Corps Headquarters 
and specialisation in support services to Dutch and Belgian frigates. In these cases, 
the evidence set out above points to high levels of efficiencies. 
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Finally, it has been seen that the political imperative for efficiency is not the same 
across all case study states. In the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the UK, 
capabilities were at risk of disappearance or being very seriously curtailed; in 
Germany, such a risk was not so urgent. For Germany, there is also perhaps a more 
political case for defence cooperation as a component or building block of wider 
European defence, a conception that was much weaker or absent across other 
states, wherein the focus was almost exclusively on maintaining a broad range of 
military capabilities. It has been seen that this more political ‘vision’ from Germany is 
apparent in the notion of the ‘framework nation concept’. Yet German interviewees 
also emphasised that the long-term constraints of capability affordability were 
essentially the same and that greater efficiency was therefore required from 
Germany as much as for any other European state. Thus, despite unit-level 
differences among the case study states, the ‘logic of crisis’ was pervasive across 
them all as the context for moves towards deeper cooperation with partners. 
 
The logic of mutualisation – military capability initiatives in contemporary Europe 
 
This section has thus far argued that the similarities across the cases considered in 
depth in this thesis suggest evidence for a systemic shaping of state behaviour 
towards the pursuit of certain strategic ends within an asymmetric alliance. And it 
has argued that systemic factors can help explain the logic of a crisis in the 
sustainability of the military capabilities required to meet those ends. The final 
section of each chapter has sought to demonstrate how this logic of behaviour is 
compatible with a search for efficiency through capability mutualisation. This section 
of each chapter has been guided by three formal hypotheses, as they relate directly 
to explanation of the outcome under investigation, which is that of military capability 
mutualisation and the reason for its occurrence and its variation in form. 
 
i. Capability mutualisation at temporal distance from the frontline 
 
The first hypothesis draws on the assumption of durability in an asymmetric alliance 
configuration and the flexibility that this creates for states to mutualise aspects of the 
generation of their military capabilities at a temporal distance from the frontline: 
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H1: Aspects of capability mutualisation may be found at high temporal distance from 
the frontline, with or without a high alignment of concrete interests. 
 
This form of capability mutualisation takes place at a temporal remove from frontline 
action for concrete interests; as such, it does not create risks for future situations 
where concrete interests diverge. Capability mutualisation at this point in the 
generation of capabilities may support all the strategic ends identified above, and the 
concrete interests that flow from them, even where those ends may be pursued 
differently by partner states, for example, in the case of support for the dominant 
state or the pursuit of a state’s idiosyncratic interests. Confidence in the durability of 
the alliance provides subordinate states a means by which they can more efficiently 
hedge against abandonment by retaining their indigenous defence industrial 
capacity. These concrete forms of temporal mutualisation may take the form of 
defence industrial collaboration or shared infrastructure and facilities required for the 
generation of capabilities. The initiatives explored in the previous chapters broadly 
confirm the expectation that this form of capability mutualisation is undertaken with 
the aim of improving efficiency, and without great concern over entrapment or 
abandonment risks. In line with the hypothesis, interviewees did not express any 
concern that this form of mutualisation would embroil their governments in the 
divergent interests of their partners.  
 
Thus, the element of temporal distance from the frontline, underpinned by the 
inherent durability of the dominant-subordinate configuration, does seem to provide a 
high degree of mitigation of entrapment and abandonment risks such that states may 
enter into mutual dependence arrangements for the generation of their military 
capabilities. This has been shown to be the case across a range of Franco-British 
initiatives, including FCAS, missile cooperation and nuclear weapons testing, and in 
the Dutch-Belgian agreement to jointly procure new frigates and MCM vessels. 
Investigation into the case studies has, however, also identified three important 
nuances to this conclusion. These include the depth of mutual dependence when it 
applies not only to the generation of a concrete capability but to the ability to 
generate that kind of capability well into the future; the relationship between the 
degree of temporal distance from the frontline and concrete interests; and finally, as 
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noted above, the assumption that states retain defence industrial capacity for 
strategic security ends. 
 
The first issue relates to the depth of mutualisation in the generation of military 
capabilities. Here it is important to note that there are significant differences between 
large and small states. Whereas France, and to a lesser degree the UK, have long 
sought to retain autonomy over the design and production of key military capabilities, 
smaller states have either never been able to do this or have lost the ability in recent 
years. A prime example is that of defence aerospace. In the post-war period, France 
has been able to design and build its principal fighter jets autonomously. And, while 
the UK has collaborated with other European states on its principal fighter jet, most 
recently the Typhoon, in doing so it has retained considerable onshore capability. 
Thus, while the UK may have specialised within the design and production of the 
Typhoon, it has in principle retained the ability to design its own aircraft. As has been 
explained in the chapters above, however, the future viability of such onshore 
capacity in both states is now in extreme doubt. The Franco-British initiative on 
FCAS thus goes further than capability mutualisation within a single project. If it goes 
ahead, it is expected to sustain the ability of both states to maintain a significant 
defence aerospace capacity. And in the field of missile production, the two states 
have made a commitment to specialise aspects of industrial production. Whereas in 
the past Franco-British defence industrial cooperation may have been concerned 
with the efficiency of particular programmes, it now appears to be concerned with the 
very survival of defence industrial capacity. This takes mutualisation to a much 
deeper level, whereby it is not only a given programme that is at issue, but the 
industry itself. This raises further issues. 
 
It may then be that France and the UK are helping each other to hedge against 
abandonment and to preserve the higher level of operational autonomy that comes 
from an indigenous capability. This creates a significant new mutual dependence 
between the two states. On one hand this may, as assumed throughout this thesis, 
demonstrate considerable confidence in the durability of the alliance. It may also be, 
however, that this confidence goes beyond even that of the durability of the 
asymmetric alliance configuration, a possibility hinted at in the words of the senior 
British official who said that there was an element of ‘reinsurance’ vis-à-vis the US in 
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the Lancaster House treaties (Interview 5, March 2015). Thus, in extremis, i.e., in a 
return to a European regional anarchy where the UK and France no longer had 
confidence in each other’s intentions, they would have helped each other to sustain 
indigenous capability to a point where it might be possible to reconstitute a fully 
autonomous capacity. This kind of industrial mutualisation thus most prominently 
meets the strategic end of hedging against an uncertain future. 
 
Secondly, it has been seen that the degree of temporal distance from the frontline 
may affect the level of risk in any given initiative. While there is little concern over 
defence industrial cooperation from the perspective of entrapment and abandonment 
dilemmas, this concern is more sensitive to temporality to the frontline. It has been 
seen that Franco-British cooperation over the design and production of missiles 
entails a greater element of risk in that it will lead to mutual dependencies in security 
of supply. The distance of such production from the frontline, however, combined 
with autonomous war-stocks, the durability of the alliance and a likely (though not 
certain) expectation of aligned concrete interests, thus significantly reduces 
entrapment and abandonment risks.  
 
Finally, there is the question of the motives for states to retain indigenous defence 
industries. The theory assumes that the primary motivation is a strategic one, i.e., for 
purposes of autonomy, and that mutualisation is therefore driven by a need to 
maintain strategic ends more efficiently. In empirical reality, however, the motivation 
to retain an indigenous defence industry is complex and multi-causal. Arguments 
have been found in the analyses above to support the contention that such a 
motivation is primarily strategic for the UK and France, but a plausible case can also 
be made that the reasons are primarily economic. As such, the challenges to 
bilateral defence industrial cooperation, which are made plain in the case of Franco-
British cooperation, may emanate equally or even more from the ‘unit level’ because 
domestic economic policy must take priority. Thus, there may be an expectation that 
different states’ policies will be very different and embody diverse policy choices over 
the balance between efficiency and security needs. Likewise, the Netherlands and 
Belgium will use domestic capacity to build their new ships not primarily for security 
reasons but rather than to ensure the resources are spent within their own 
economies so far as is possible. Regarding Germany, it has been difficult to 
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demonstrate that there is any clear policy commitment to sustaining a defence 
industry as a hedge against an uncertain future, although this will happen as a de 
facto, perhaps unintentional result of sustaining a defence industry for economic 
reasons. 
 
In the case of the UK and France, however, the question is more open. And it is a 
crucial point, because if states hold different views as to the purpose for retaining 
industrial capacity then that may threaten future mutualisation initiatives. As seen in 
the chapter on Franco-British cooperation, if the UK were to make the decision that it 
could more efficiently procure certain capabilities from the US and dropped a 
strategic requirement for onshore capability then that may well endanger future 
cooperation with France, assuming that France maintained its current approach to 
industrial autonomy. At the time of writing, there does appear to be a shared 
commitment to the view that operational autonomy is underpinned by indigenous 
capability, and that it provides a hedge against an uncertain future. It has been seen 
that both the UK and France both have sufficiently similar conceptions of operational 
sovereignty and their industrial indigenous requirements to embark on a number of 
defence industrial initiatives. Yet in empirical actuality this will always be a relative 
question and may apply differently to different capabilities; an alternative way to 
meet the means-ends gaps is to buy directly from the US. If this were to occur in 
ever more areas of capability then the alignment would begin to break down. Thus, 
in the field of defence industrial cooperation, when it comes to the causal 
components of the decision to undertake any given mutualisation initiative, unit level 
factors are likely to be as important as structural-relational factors. 
 
Capability mutualisation at temporal distance from the frontline thus rests on alliance 
durability, but deeper industrial mutualisation may also provide a ‘re-insurance’ 
hedge against abandonment by the dominant state in future. It means that states can 
retain some technological expertise albeit through mutual dependence on another. It 
has also been seen that symmetry between states in terms of the scale of their 
defence industrial capacity may also affect the likelihood of mutualisation at temporal 
distance. This is because alignment of a capability requirement is also necessary, 
and this helps to explain why there were no major industrial mutualisation initiatives 
between Germany and the Netherlands. While the asymmetry of scale of the two 
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states does not rule out such cooperation, it makes it less likely in comparison to the 
other case studies considered wherein the partner states are more equally balanced 
in terms of defence industrial requirements.  
 
ii. Capability mutualisation on the frontline 
 
The second hypothesis builds on the assumption that there is confidence in alliance 
durability and that there is an alignment of capability requirement, but that for 
capability mutualisation to occur on the frontline, concrete interests must also be 
temporally and functionally aligned to a very high degree: 
 
H2: Capability mutualisation may be found at the frontline where there is a very high 
certainty of support for concrete interests. 
 
Of the three forms of capability mutualisation considered over the previous chapters, 
examples of ‘frontline’ mutualisation are the scarcest among the wider universe of 
cases (see Tables 3.1. and 3.2). There are two major constraints on frontline 
mutualisation, both of which have been explained as effects of the structural-
relational configurations outlined above. First, it has been argued that for states to 
mutualise frontline capabilities they must have a very high expectation that their 
concrete interests will be temporally identical and be met with a broadly equivalent 
functional contribution. This is a high bar to set for any concrete initiative, and 
indeed, is at odds with most situations in which subordinate states would expect to 
deploy their military capabilities. Secondly, even where concrete interests might 
feasibly be aligned in such a way as, for example, the territorial defence of NATO 
states under the Article 5 mutual defence clause, military capabilities are transferable 
across different interests. For example, a British armoured brigade might undertake 
duties in Estonia, ostensibly under NATO’s Article 5 commitment, but might also be 
expected to be deployed for many other contingencies, including those outside of 
Europe. In an alliance where policy flexibility is high, capabilities are unlikely to be 
earmarked to concrete interests. These two constraints explain why frontline 




The case study chapters have demonstrated why combined multi-national forces are 
based not on mutualisation but on aggregation with a focus on improved 
interoperability. The Franco-British combined force demonstrates the limits of 
mutualisation for frontline deployment. Although it seeks deeper interoperability and 
may draw on the various strengths of the partners, the forces remain wholly 
separable. This form of cooperation may provide a way for states to aggregate their 
military capabilities in support of their strategic ends of mitigating entrapment by the 
dominant state, in this case the US, but the significant efficiencies of mutualisation 
through specialisation and sharing are unavailable to this form of cooperation. Even 
though decision-makers in the UK and France understand it is likely that they will 
deploy their forces for the same mission in support of the US or other allies, they 
cannot be wholly certain. As a senior French official involved in the Lancaster House 
negotiations remarks on Franco-British military cooperation, ‘It’s a bit of a third way 
between pretending that we can do things on our own and accepting the implications 
of becoming dependent on a partner’ (Interview 9, June 2016). While some scholars 
and analysts have hailed France’s apparent emulation of a more British approach to 
the US as a ‘strategic convergence’, and the ‘end of the Suez paradigm’, (De 
Durand, 2010; Pannier, 2016), there remain very considerable limits on effectively 
concerting their capabilities to meet their strategic ends more efficiently.  
 
This effect of the asymmetric alliance also explains why the otherwise exceptionally 
close Dutch-Belgian naval cooperation has its limits. Interviewees do not believe it 
possible, for example, to fully specialise in capabilities, for example to have Dutch 
frigates and Belgian MCM assets that would serve both states; nor do they believe it 
possible to fully share their ships to create a completely integrated ‘Dutch-Belgian 
navy’ (Interview 25: June 2014). As has been demonstrated, however, the structural-
relational configurations considered in this thesis do not completely rule out frontline 
specialisation. The Benelux air policing agreement demonstrates that a capability 
may be mutualised for a ‘frontline’ concrete interest, in this case the defence of 
national airspace. How then is it possible for two states to rely on each other for such 
a sensitive security task as air policing? After all, it is a responsibility made more 
pressing by recent terrorist attacks in Belgium and the risks from the use of hijacked 
airliners as deadly weapons is well understood. The answer is provided for by the 
structural-relational configuration and the nature of the concrete interest itself.  
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First, the problem of the transferability of capability across interests is not at issue 
here because territorial air policing relies on military capabilities that are permanently 
assigned to the task. And secondly, in terms of the task itself, the concrete interests 
of the two states are temporally and functionally identical; both states need to be 
able to act immediately and with the same capability function. Under these 
circumstances, then, frontline mutualisation of capabilities is possible. And there is 
also an element of this form of cooperation in German-Netherlands army 
cooperation. As explored, the integration of the Dutch air mobile brigade into the 
German rapid reaction division is not likely to be tested outside of an Article 5 
commitment. Thus, while the component capability parts remain separable and 
therefore autonomous, it can be argued that the commitment to deploy the division 
as a mutualised force in an Article 5 scenario can be taken as reliable by both parties 
because of identical temporal and functional interests. 
 
Regarding the role of ad hoc unit-level variables, interviewees for Dutch-German 
Army cooperation emphasised long-standing geographical and functional 
cooperation over logistics and training during the Cold War. Yet it can be argued that 
the Netherlands and Germany are no more well-aligned in terms of their cultural 
attitudes to the use of force than any other states under consideration in this thesis. 
The more reliable guide to their behaviour is that set out above, i.e., the structural-
relational configuration. The comparison of initiatives with zero distance from the 
frontline, accepting that the number of cases are few, suggests that, as expected by 
the theory, it is not strategic culture that allows for mutualisation on the frontline but 
rather the reliable alignment of concrete interests. And this appears to be aided by 
those interests being fixed, either strategically in the sense that Article 5 territorial 
defence remains a bedrock commitment of NATO, or in terms of a fixed role, such as 
that of territorial air defence. 
 
iii. Capability mutualisation at functional distance from the frontline 
 
The final hypothesis is based on the theoretical claim that low politico-military 
interdependence within the alliance leads to high policy flexibility and that this, 
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together with the assumption of alliance durability and an alignment of capability 
requirement, enables mutualisation at a ‘functional distance’ from the frontline: 
 
H3: Capability mutualisation may be found at functional distance from the frontline, 
with or without high certainty of support for concrete interests.  
 
It has been argued that low politico-military interdependence and therefore high 
policy flexibility tends to frustrate the possibility of frontline capability mutualisation. 
Flexibility does, however, enable another form of mutualisation which may occur at 
the mid-point in the chain of capability generation and deployment, i.e., with those 
military capabilities that play a supporting role to the frontline, for example, air and 
sea transportation or air-to-air refuelling, and those support functions within frontline 
capabilities, for example, for the maintenance of a frigate or fighter aircraft. The 
foregoing case studies have provided examples of this form of mutualisation, the 
most striking of which is the ‘BENESAM’ cooperation between Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Here, mission critical maintenance support has been specialised for the 
frigates and MCM vessels of the two navies.  
 
The entrapment and abandonment risk from such mutualisation is deemed low 
because even if the parties’ interests have diverged, leaving only one state taking 
part in a mission, the other will be able to support it without, or with minimal, political 
controversy. This form of mutualisation does entail risks, however. There may be 
political embarrassment from being seen to enable a mission that the state does not 
agree with. Furthermore, the definition of what constitutes the ‘frontline’ is relative to 
the nature of threats. It may be that frigates in the Mediterranean are at less risk than 
soldiers patrolling on the ground in a hostile environment. But it is plausible that 
threats will shift and that the risk to ships or to airbases may become greater than it 
is today.  
 
The ad hoc mutual reliance between France and the UK noted in Chapter Four 
works on a similar functional principle. While there is no within capability 
mutualisation, there is a form of quid pro quo mutual dependence in, for example, 
the UK’s reliance on France to cover for its lack of maritime patrol aircraft and 
France’s reliance on the UK for strategic airlift into Mali. The two states thus cover 
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capability gaps on an ad hoc basis. This is not a formalised mutual reliance but can 
work because of the functional distance of the capabilities involved. The example of 
the 1st Germany-Netherlands Corps HQ is something of a hybrid between zero 
distance and functional distance from the frontline. While there is zero temporal 
distance from the frontline, given that the capability is exercised at a functional 
distance, the political risks in its deployment are considerably less. On the other 
hand, given that there is zero temporal distance from the frontline, there still remains 
a very high degree of mutuality in the arrangement, and thus a degree of entrapment 
and abandonment risk. As with previous examples, some interviewees raised the 
issue of close cultural proximity and strong historical foundations for cooperation. 
Yet, one again, this explanation has its limits, in part because functional 
mutualisation is, in itself, indicative of the constraints that states operate within. If 
cultural similarities were sufficient to conquer fears of entrapment and abandonment, 
then mutualisation would surely go to far greater depths than it does. 
 
Capability mutualisation at a functional distance from the frontline is thus based on 
the inherent flexibility within the alliance. In contrast to some of the views of 
practioners and analysts set out in the introduction, the explanation above argues 
that rather than the requirement for flexibility being an inherent block on 
specialisation or sharing, as argued, for example, by Henius, it may in fact be an 
enabling factor in certain circumstances. Because subordinate states have 
considerable politico-military flexibility within an asymmetric alliance they can support 
each other without making commitments to join each other on the frontline. Thus, 
these examples provide concrete evidence of the possibility of functional cooperation 
raised by Giegerich and Diesen above, and the theory provides a plausible 
explanation as to why such cooperation is possible and the limits to which it will be 
subject.  
 
ii. Research questions revisited 
 
It is now appropriate to return to the research questions set out at the beginning of 
this thesis and assess the extent to which plausible answers have been provided.  
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Why have European states forgone their autonomy and willingly put themselves into 
a condition of mutual dependence for the generation and deployment of some of 
their most vital military capabilities? 
 
Why is it that European states have sought out such arrangements at all, i.e., what is 
it that precipitates the search for mutually dependent capabilities?  
 
What is it that gives the partners confidence in their mutual support for each other? 
 
It was argued at the outset of the thesis that the key issue at the heart of the puzzle 
is that of the reliability of expectations between states for mutual support. To explain 
how such expectations can be believed to be strong enough for capability 
mutualisation to be undertaken, and why those expectations may vary under 
different circumstances, thus leading to different forms of military capability 
mutualisation, a novel theoretical approach has been developed. This has been 
achieved by drawing on established neorealist concepts and Snyder’s conception of 
process variables to develop structural-relational configurations of system-level 
variables that enable and constrain state opportunities for mutualisation.  
 
The thesis has shown that comparison of quite different states under the same 
systemic conditions supports the claim that these configurations exert independent 
effects that lead to variable outcomes at the system level. While these effects do not 
determine cases of mutualisation, they do provide significant systemic incentives and 
disincentives to states who wish to gain greater efficiency from their military 
capabilities through cooperation with others. The thesis is based on a theoretical 
perspective of international politics as a bounded domain of action and outcomes at 
a systemic level, thus it does not provide a comprehensive answer to the question of 
what causes any specific historical case. In theoretical terms this would be an 
infinitely complex undertaking because it would need to consider myriad variables. 
Yet in mapping the systemic constraints and opportunities for capability 
mutualisation, the theory can offer considerable insight and utility; the theoretical and 




The theoretical approach developed in this thesis thus provides a significant 
contribution to literature on contemporary European defence cooperation, and more 
particularly to the development of neorealist explanations for phenomena in this field 
of study. First, it tackles the absence of a formal definition of the phenomenon of 
capability mutualisation, which is an essential step if the full potential of an avowedly 
theoretical investigation is to be realised. Secondly, the thesis has found a plausible 
way to overcome the challenge of understanding why subordinate states in an 
asymmetric alliance will have sufficiently strong confidence in each other to 
mutualise capabilities in different ways and in different circumstances. It was seen at 
the outset of this thesis that scholars and analysts have tended to focus on ‘strategic 
culture’ or ‘threat perceptions’ as the key variables in European defence cooperation, 
particularly regarding the deployment of capabilities, though less so the generation of 
capabilities. This thesis has shown that explanations relating to convergence or 
divergence in cultures may have important explanatory contributions to make in any 
specific historical outcome of capability mutualisation. But it has been argued that 
structural-relational variables of relative military power, levels of interdependence, 
forms of capability and an instrumental view of concrete interests provide greater 
granularity, reliability and a more plausible explanation as to why and how states will 
embark on military capability mutualisation.  
 
As argued at the outset of this thesis, an alignment of culture may well be present in 
some of the cases, but it is difficult to see how it would wholly mitigate doubts over 
expectations of future support, even in a case built on longstanding historical 
cooperation such as that of Belgium and the Netherlands. And it has been seen that 
while it may be that France has moved closer to British policy vis-à-vis the US, the 
degree to which this will enable deeper defence cooperation on the frontline can 
perhaps be exaggerated by analysts and scholars (De Durand, 2010; Jones, 2011; 
Pannier, 2016). This is because, as has been seen, action in support of the US tends 
to be highly unpredictable and thus a hindrance rather than a help to mutualisation, 
at least as far as frontline capabilities and combined forces are concerned. 
 
The theoretical approach developed above has also found a way to move beyond 
the limitations of explanations that focus on divergence and convergence of ‘threat 
perception’ to understand the likelihood of deep defence cooperation over military 
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capabilities. As argued above, while there are also meta-theoretical issues around 
the use of threat perception as a variable in conjunction with neorealism, the main 
issue is that subordinate states in an asymmetric alliance may support the dominant 
state for reasons other than threat perceptions. Indeed, if the primary aim is 
mitigation of entrapment by the dominant state through influence, then much of the 
generation and deployment of military capabilities will be shaped by this need, not 
necessarily by the recognition of specific threats. Thus, this thesis has instead 
developed an approach that views ‘concrete interests’ as instrumental to strategic 
ends, themselves shaped by the nature of the alliance security dilemma in an 
asymmetric alliance. In this way, whether a subordinate state supports the dominant 
state or indeed another ally, is a result of an assessment of its concrete interests in 
the framework of its strategic ends, not via threat perception. And importantly, this 
approach demonstrates how concrete interests are derived, at least in part, from the 
position of a state within an alliance. This is a systemic view of interest formation, 
rather than simply a dyadic or ‘bilateral’ approach to convergence of interests 
between states. 
 
Finally, the theoretical approach undertaken in this thesis demonstrates that it is 
possible for neorealism, broadly conceived, to explain military capability 
mutualisation. A crucial theoretical conclusion is that the controversy over state 
sovereignty and the mutualisation of capabilities can be resolved, and its relevance 
to the issue put into perspective. As noted in chapter one, some scholars argue that 
the problem of ‘national sovereignty’ explains the limits on mutual dependence 
through specialisation and sharing (Terlikowski, 2010: 3; Howorth, 2011: 5; Dyson, 
2012: 21); and some have argued that states naturally seek to ‘maximise’ autonomy 
(Baumann, 2001). The theoretical approach undertaken in this thesis assumes, in 
line with Waltzian neorealism, that the core concept of sovereignty, or what might be 
termed sovereignty-autonomy, is defined as the ultimate political authority of the 
state, and this remains absolute and indivisible. This conception of state sovereignty 
does not imply that states must therefore seek fully autonomous military capabilities 
in all circumstances.  
 
On the contrary, it has been shown that the extent of autonomy that a state may 
require for the generation and deployment of its military capabilities is conditional 
 279
upon its systemic environment, as set out in the form of configurations of structural-
relational variables. Seen from this perspective, the constraints on the mutualisation 
of military capabilities are not chiefly those of ‘national sovereignty’ sui generis, but 
rather the extent of self-help pressures, the degree of interdependence with allies 
and the extent to which concrete interests may be aligned. Simply put, the propensity 
towards, or aversion from, mutual dependence for military capabilities is not best 
explained in terms of sovereignty, but by a state’s structural-relational context. Such 
a conclusion suggests that it would be better for scholars, at least those concerned 
with defence cooperation, to dispense with notions of the ‘maximisation’ of 
sovereignty or its apparent erosion and dilution. Neorealist analysis need not mean a 
proscription on the possibility of mutual dependence for military capabilities. On the 
contrary, it may offer the best explanation for such an outcome. 
 
Important events beyond the temporal purview of the thesis 
 
Some recent events may be construed to pose a challenge to some of the key 
assumptions and conclusions of this thesis. There is not sufficient space to go into 
detail on events that are beyond the temporal purview of this thesis, but they may be 
considered in brief. First, in 2014 Russia invaded and occupied Crimea and parts of 
eastern Ukraine. Did European states respond to an apparently greater Russian 
threat in a way consistent or inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions outlined 
above? Certainly, there was a reaction from NATO states in the form of a new 
strategy for the defence of the alliance’s eastern flank, which now includes ‘forward 
presence’ and ‘pre-positioning’ of forces; there have also been renewed 
commitments to greater spending (NATO, 2014). It is hard to argue against the view 
that such responses are due to shifts in threat perceptions. But this does not 
undermine the explanatory power of the theory above.  
 
Indeed, the theory assumes that increments of European NATO spending are of little 
systemic consequence. Thus, it can be argued that the increases in spending have 
not been significant in relation to the gravity of Russia’s invasion and its apparent 
contempt for the post-Cold War consensus on European security. In fact, the 
behaviour is in line with that of subordinate states in an asymmetric alliance. Fresh 
commitments to defence are as much about retention of credibility in the eyes of the 
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US as they are about a response to the Russian threat. And the US did not abandon 
Europe to the increased threat but responded by returning an armoured brigade 
following years of decline in the US military presence (Barnes and Lubold, 2015). It 
remains the case that for European NATO states the primary strategic end is to 
mitigate entrapment through influence and reputation.  
 
A second major event that has developed beyond the temporal purview of this thesis 
is the election of Donald Trump as President of the US, which has, in part triggered 
the third event, which is an apparent rejuvenation of the EU’s CSDP. These events 
may for some cast doubt on the core assumptions of NATO as a durable asymmetric 
alliance with the primary goal of subordinate states to pursue a ‘struggle for 
influence’ over the dominant state. Trump appeared to cast doubt on the US 
commitment to NATO, although more recently he and senior American military 
figures reaffirmed that commitment (Shotter, 2017). Meanwhile European states, 
most notably Germany, have directly questioned the reliability of the US itself 
(Henley, 2017). There has thus been renewed interest in the CSDP as a means to 
bolster European military capabilities and scope for autonomous action. It is too soon 
to tell if these events mark a decisive break with what has been claimed in this thesis 
to be a pervasive logic of behaviour since the formation of NATO. The author notes, 
however, that for European states to do anything more than hedge against US 
abandonment, i.e., to assume full responsibility for their own security collectively, 
then radical changes in defence spending and politico-military organisation that 
would go far beyond any current EU defence initiatives would surely be expected. No 
such changes have yet occurred. Thus, while changed threat perceptions and 
renewed fears of abandonment are no doubt present in contemporary Europe, the 
theoretical approach laid out in this thesis remains a robust means for analysis. 
 
Limitations of data gathering and analysis 
 
As illustrated above, this thesis has drawn on a wide range of empirical materials, 
including thirty elite-level interviews, and it has developed a novel theoretical 
approach to the study of capability mutualisation. The data gathered for the thesis 
does, however, suffer from some limitations that need now to be recognised. The 
first limitation on the data used in this thesis is the low number of mutualisation 
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cases. The foregoing discussion has sought to test the structural-relational theory on 
the basis that similar conditions lead to similar behaviour, and has attempted to 
separate systemic from ad hoc variables. In terms of the ‘logic of behaviour’ and the 
‘logic of crisis’ there is plentiful evidence available to justify this approach in the form 
of historical examples and data points on defence spending. By contrast, there are 
only a few cases of capability mutualisation of each form, i.e., temporal, functional 
and zero distance from the frontline. In aggregate, however, and considered as 
examples of mutualisation as a discrete phenomenon, the principal cases presented 
in the case studies above do provide a reasonable comparative cross-section.  
 
Furthermore, while the number of case studies in each category of mutualisation 
remain scarce, the application of the theory does not necessarily require 
comparative corroboration to be plausible as an explanation. As Waltz argued, it is 
also legitimate to test a system theory ‘by seeing whether things work in the way the 
theory suggests’ (1997: 916). Thus, while it would be preferable to have greater 
numbers of cases to hand to make a comparison-based claim for the independent 
effects of structural-relational configurations on each form of mutualisation, the 
theory can at least provide for a plausible explanation. Indeed, regarding the forms of 
cooperation set out above, no comparably convincing arguments present themselves 
from the empirical evidence considered. Furthermore, there are more cases to 
investigate, and policy developments suggest they are likely to proliferate. This will 
provide a greater number of cases to investigate in future. 
 
Another drawback with the data selected is the limited geographical sample of 
European states. As argued in the chapter on methodology, this limitation is in large 
part due to the lack of sufficiently well-developed cases elsewhere in Europe. But it 
does mean that the claim that the logic of structural-relational configurations outlined 
here must be caveated on the basis that as cases arise elsewhere in Europe they 
would need to be examined against the theory set out in this thesis. A further point of 
geographical and political limitation is that of limiting the scope of the thesis to 
European NATO states. A further test of the thesis would be to apply it to non-
European but similar structural-relational configurations. More research would be 
required to assess whether such case studies exist, but this may be fruitful and this 
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possibility, together with other further avenues of exploration to address the 
shortcomings of the approach taken in this thesis is examined in more detail below.  
 
Finally, the theoretical approach itself limits the scope of the available data. While it 
has been attempted to bring in unit level factors on an ad hoc basis as they have 
arisen in the evidence, this has meant that these factors have not been treated in as 
systematic fashion as other theoretical perspectives might have approached them. A 
further narrowing of the focus of the thesis is caused by the theoretical approach to 
interests. Interests are defined as instrumental and based on the narrow rationality of 
neorealism, i.e., derived from the ultimate objective of ‘survival’. It is the case, 
however, that states act on other motives besides instrumental interests relating to 
their security. The simplification of state motives is a theoretical device to allow for 
greater parsimony of analysis; it is only claimed that such a logic of behaviour is 
sufficiently strong to create patterns or regularity in behaviour and outcomes over 
time, not that it is the only basis of state action in international politics. Nevertheless, 
this is a downside to the parsimony of the approach. Some of the implications of 
these more theoretical issues will now be considered below.  
 
iii. Implications of the theory and areas for further research 
 
Theoretical and practical implications  
 
The preceding development and application of a theory of military capability 
mutualisation allows for the modification of neorealist thought to include the 
possibility that self-help does not always rule out the more efficient provision of 
security through specialisation and sharing of capabilities at the international level. It 
is possible to view the greater significance of the foregoing theoretical development 
and analysis as a confirmation that the general neorealist proscription against 
capability mutualisation appears to remain, at least for the most part, quite robust. 
And, given that the number of cases of mutualisation remain limited relative to the 
breadth and scale of most European armed forces’ capabilities, and particularly 
regarding the deployment of frontline military forces, there may be some truth in such 
an observation. Yet a theoretical explanation for capability mutualisation is more 
important than this, for it shines a light on the possibilities and limitations for further 
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initiatives of this kind, and thus for the scope for further European defence 
cooperation based on mutualisation. Indeed, it is theoretically plausible, though it 
remains very challenging in practice, to envisage European armed forces becoming 
considerably more efficient whilst retaining the flexibility that is inherent in their 
configurational circumstances. The prospects for the three forms of mutualisation 
can, therefore, be usefully considered with the aid of the theoretical perspective. 
 
First, the theory suggests that the barriers to capability mutualisation at temporal 
remove from the frontline relate primarily to the local alignment of capability 
requirements; after this, unit level factors become critical, particularly negotiating 
around differences in domestic industrial policies, and pushing cooperation through 
potentially resistant domestic interest groups. For the mutualisation of frontline 
capabilities, the theory suggests that there may be more scope for initiatives that 
respond to situations where the interests of the partner states are temporally and 
functionally aligned, and thus where the role of the capability is more tightly fixed, as 
seen, for example, in BENELUX air defence cooperation. Such an observation 
suggests that there may be further opportunities for the mutualisation of basic 
territorial defence responsibilities among European states.  
 
Regarding the mutualisation of frontline capabilities into binational or multinational 
forces, the theory suggests that any such initiatives that are designed to mitigate 
entrapment through support to the dominant state, in this case the US, are unlikely to 
provide a fruitful context for capability mutualisation. As has been explored, the 
theory suggests that the EU’s CSDP, conceived of by several scholars and policy 
makers as a means of mitigating entrapment and abandonment by the US, is highly 
likely to be bedevilled by such problems. Similar limitations also apply to the Franco-
British combined joint force. This does not, however, mean that such forces do not 
provide useful options for participating states, including that of aggregating their 
forces more effectively for use in US-led operations. In theoretical terms, however, 
the high flexibility of policy that is open to subordinate states in the face of military 
action led by the dominant state seriously undermines the reliability of such an 
approach, and makes it an unlikely forum for frontline capability mutualisation. 
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It has been argued, however, that this aspect of mutualisation supports the 
possibility of more efficient organisation of allied territorial defence. It has been seen 
that where concrete interests are expected to be aligned to a high temporal and 
functional degree then they can be mutualised up to the frontline. Perhaps, then, it 
would be feasible to create highly integrated NATO forces with earmarked 
capabilities that are specifically charged with Article 5 responsibilities, for example 
with heavy armour that is likely to be of limited use for ‘out of area’ expeditionary 
operations. To some degree this is already implied by the model of Germany-
Netherlands army cooperation at the division level, but it could perhaps go further. 
While such arrangements would considerably reduce the flexibility of a participant’s 
capabilities, decision-makers may consider a trade-off in flexibility for efficiency to be 
worthwhile. And, according to the theoretical approach outlined above, it would not 
open up significant new entrapment and abandonment dilemmas. 
 
Regarding mutualisation at functional distance from the frontline, while the 
constraints are considerable, there may also be significant scope for such this form 
of cooperation. To mutualise support services to military capabilities such as the 
maintenance of ships and aircraft, participating states are likely to need to have 
identical equipment and to use it in a similar way, i.e., with similar doctrine and 
concepts of operations. This raises a high material and conceptual bar. On the other 
hand, as BENESAM naval cooperation demonstrates, such cooperation can 
maintain highly reliable capabilities with far greater efficiency. These observations 
only serve to underline another advantage of greater defence industrial cooperation, 
which is that greater mutualisation at temporal distance from the frontline may 
eventually enable greater functional mutualisation.  
 
A final point relates to the complexity of uncovering those circumstances in which 
mutualisation is possible and where autonomy can be traded for efficiency without 
creating new entrapment and abandonment concerns. This complexity perhaps best 
explains why the most advanced forms of military capability mutualisation tend to 
come ‘bottom-up’ as proposals from the military and specialist officials. Politicians 
may understand the logic of mutualisation for efficiency and the general nature of the 
risks involved, but few have the time or the technical understanding to determine 
how to trade-off mutualisation and risk. The theoretical approach here thus suggests 
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that the most successful division of labour in driving forward mutualisation will come 
from politicians pushing the strategic case for such cooperation and military decision-
makers suggesting the practical ways that this can be done within limits prescribed 
by politicians. Here, however, there may not always be an alignment of interests, as 
mutualisation for efficiency may not be in the narrow interests of all elements of the 
military and civil service. 
 
Scope for further research 
 
This thesis represents a ‘first cut’ attempt at defining and theorising capability 
mutualisation. As such, it raises the possibility of further research on similar empirical 
cases, other ways of testing the theory and other avenues of investigation 
concerning mutual dependence and military capability more broadly. These will be 
considered below: 
 
i. Other cases of capability mutualisation 
 
As the theoretical tools of analysis have now been established, it would be relatively 
straightforward to consider other cases of capability mutualisation, which would 
provide a further assessment of the plausibility and utility of the theory. As discussed 
in the introduction and methodology chapters, there are other contemporaneous 
European defence cooperation initiatives with elements of capability mutualisation, 
for example, the NORDEFCO cooperation between Scandinavian states, and the 
Visegrad group of Central and Eastern European states, and cooperation between a 
group of European states that operate the F16 fighter jet (NATO, 2012). And, as 
discussed, there are multinational groupings such as the extant initiatives under 
NATO auspices, including multinational fleets of multinational AWACS aircraft and 
C17 transport aircraft.  
 
ii. Comparison with different systemic circumstances 
 
It might also be fruitful to consider ways in which, and the extent to which, military 
capability mutualisation might occur in similar or quite different structural-relational 
configurations from that considered in this thesis. The methodological approach 
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undertaken in this thesis is a systemic one, i.e., that similar structural-relational 
configurations will result in similar behaviour and outcomes across a set of states 
with different internal attributes. There may, however, be other empirical 
opportunities to test the claims offered by this thesis, particularly that the durability of 
an alliance helps to explain the occurrence of mutualisation at temporal distance 
from the frontline. There are, for example, non-European but US-aligned states such 
as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan; there may be some cooperative 
initiatives between those states that could be considered against the theoretical 
approach developed here. There is also increasingly developed defence cooperation 
between Russia and China, which could provide for analysis of behaviour in a non-
US aligned relationship (Schwartz, 2018; Meick, 2017). Such research could also 
consider the extent to which frontline and functional mutualisation might be possible 
for these states, or whether other structural-relational configurations work against 
such cooperation. 
 
iii. Other forms of mutual dependence 
 
Mutualisation of military capability as defined by this thesis is only one aspect of 
mutual dependence. Though this thesis has not considered the viability of whole 
capability specialisation underpinned by formal arrangements the theory does not 
rule this out. There is also the area of mutualisation of entire fields of defence 
industry, which missile cooperation hints at, and which already exists to a high 
degree in parts of the European defence aerospace sector. As Pannier has noted in 
her study of Franco-British defence cooperation, there is a strong degree of what she 
calls ‘symmetrism’ evident in all the cooperative arrangements considered above 
(Pannier, 2016: 85-96). While it has been assumed in this thesis that such symmetry 
is largely axiomatic to the cooperation of self-interested units in the form of ‘win-win’ 
arrangements, the means by which the symmetricity of the relationship can be 
traded-off in both functional and temporal aspects of capability mutualisation is 
particularly interesting. For example, this thesis has considered mutualisation in the 
form of specialisation within capabilities. But in one case, mutual dependence has 
been pushed beyond the boundaries of a discrete capability. In the specialisation of 
support to different ship types in BENESAM naval cooperation mutualisation is 
balanced across two capabilities, MCM vessels and frigates. While both ships are 
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within the maritime domain, they provide separate capabilities. Thus, though these 
capabilities are mutualised in that they are not fully autonomous, there is an 
asymmetric dependence within each arrangement, i.e., Belgium depends on the 
Netherlands for support to its frigates, the Netherlands supports its own frigates. But 
the symmetry in terms of mutual dependence is restored by it being mirrored by 
Dutch dependence on Belgium for MCM support.  
 
This raises the following question: Are there any limits on how far mutual 
dependence might be linked across rather than within capabilities? An initial answer 
is perhaps provided by the logic of behaviour in the asymmetric alliance 
configuration. As argued in the preceding case studies, the primary strategic end of 
subordinate states is the mitigation of entrapment by the dominant state. As a result, 
subordinate states tend to prefer forces with a breadth of military capabilities in order 
to maximise potential for contribution and influence. Thus, total specialisation of 
capabilities, which would result in completely foregoing a particular capability is 
unattractive, not only for reasons of entrapment and abandonment risks, but also for 
reasons of policy flexibility. The Dutch-Belgian arrangement helps preserve national 
capability while ensuring that mutual dependence holds more broadly than within a 
single capability. It is theoretically plausible, however, that if two or more states were 
faced with the impossibility of maintaining a capability in this way, they might opt for 
mutual dependence across two separate capabilities. Such an arrangement would 
still be subject to all the structural-relational constraints and possibilities described in 
the foregoing thesis, but it might be plausible, particularly at temporal remove from 
the frontline. So, for example, it might be theoretically plausible that State A could 
forego its surface-fleet ship building industry and specialise in submarine 
construction, and State B do the opposite.  
 
iv. As a theoretical framework for historical analysis 
 
Finally, the theoretical approach developed in this thesis also provides a framework 
for the in-depth consideration of capability mutualisation initiatives as historical case 
studies in themselves. As set out in the methodology chapter above, theory as 
envisaged by this thesis can provide either a general framework for explaining 
phenomena, or it can be used as a framework to provide the systemic causal 
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aspects of an historical narrative against which unit level factors such as domestic 
industrial policies, elements of culture, bureaucratic, party political and personality 










Example Questions for Semi-Structured Interview 
 
Context for cooperation 
 
Broadly speaking, what are the primary drivers of Netherlands - German/Belgian 
cooperation? 
 
To what extent are the cooperative initiatives between the Netherlands and 
Germany/Belgium driven by economic/budgetary constraints? 
 
To what extent do contemporary cooperative initiatives draw on past cooperation?  
 
How have the particular cooperation initiatives been chosen by the Netherlands and 
Belgium/Germany is this an ad hoc/bottom-up approach or is it more strategic? 
 
Where do Dutch-Belgian and Dutch-German interests converge and diverge and 
how does this affect the depth of cooperation? 
 
Does the Netherlands have a different conception of the use of force than its 





How do you decide where to draw ‘red lines’ for the autonomy of military capability, 
i.e., what is an acceptable diminution of autonomy and what not?  
 
How does the risk of abandonment or entrapment by a partner influence decisions 




Do certain forms of capability lend themselves to deeper cooperation, e.g. there is a 
strong degree of interdependence in the maritime domain BENESAM, could this be 
(or is it already) also the case for frontline Army units? 
 
How does symmetry/asymmetry of partnership affect cooperation, i.e. Germany is a 
much larger state than Belgium? 
 
How important is it for the success of cooperation initiatives that partners have a 
similar strategic culture? What elements are most important (e.g. willingness to use 
force/similar interests or Europeanist/Atlanticist outlook)? 
 
How important is having similar equipment to contemporary defence cooperation 











i. Primary sources 
Interviews 
Number Date Location Function 
Direct 
Involvement 
1 September 2015 London Former UK official Yes 
2 January 20 15 London UK official Yes 
3 April 2015 London Former UK officer Yes 
4 January 2015 London UK PM Political Adviser Yes 
5 March 2015 London UK official Yes 
6 April 2015 London Industry Yes 
7 April 2015 London  Industry Yes 
8 June 2016 Brussels NATO official No 
9 June 2016 Brussels French official Yes 
10 September 2015 London French official No 
11 June 2015 London French official No 
12 September 2015 London Former UK Political Adviser No 
13 June 2014 London Former UK official No 
14 June 2016 Brussels Belgian official No 
15 June 2014 Brussels Belgian officer Yes 
16 June 2014 Brussels Belgian officer Yes 
17 June 2016 Brussels Belgian officer Yes  
18 June 2014 Brussels Belgian officer Yes 
19 June 2014 The Hague Dutch officer Yes 
20 June 2014 The Hague Dutch official Yes 
21 June 2014 The Hague Dutch official No 
22 September 2016 Telephone Former Dutch officer No 
23 June 2016 The Hague Dutch official Yes 
24 June 2016 The Hague Dutch official Yes 
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25 June 2014 Zeebrugge Belgian officer Yes  
26 October 2013 Berlin German officer Yes 
27 October 2013 Berlin German analyst No 
28 May 2015 London German analyst No 
29 June 2015 Berlin German officer Yes 
30 June 2014 Brussels EU official No 
 
Official documents and news reports 
 
i. France-UK  
House of Commons Hansard Debates (1967) ‘Aircraft Industry and Royal Air Force 
(Government Policies)’ July 13, 1967. 
 
UK Government (2000) ‘MOU on Co-operative Defence Research and Technology’  
United Kingdom Government (2003), Delivering Security in a Changed World, The 
Stationary Office, London. 
 
UK Government (2005), Defence Industrial Strategy, The Stationary Office, London. 
Government of France (2008), Défense et Sécurité nationale – Le Livre Blanc 
UK Government (2008), Franco-British Summit Communique, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_03_08communique.pdf  
Townsend, M., (2008) ‘Outcry over ‘delay’ of helicopters for Afghanistan’ Observer, 
16th November, 2008. 
 
Marcus, J. (2008), ‘Trimmed French military is no retreat’, BBC News, June 17, 
2008. 
 
US Government Note (2008), Meeting between Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Eric Edelman met with Francois Richier, Elysee Counselor for Strategic 
 293
Affairs, and Michel Miraillet, Director of Strategic Affairs at the Ministry of Defense, 
April 28, 2008, released on Wikileaks. 
 
Conference Transcript, Session 5: Options for Security and Defence Policy, The UK 
and the World: Rethinking the UK’s International Ambitions and Choices (2010), 
Chatham House.  
UK Government (2010a), ‘UK-France Defence Co-operation Treaty announced’, 
November 2, 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-france-defence-co-
operation-treaty-announced--2  
UK Government (2010b), The strategic defence and security review: securing Britain 
in an age of uncertainty, 19 October, 2010, The Stationary Office, London. 
UK Government (2010c), David Cameron speech on announcement of Franco-
British Lancaster House treaties, http://www.number10.gov.uk/ news/speeches-and-
transcripts/2010/11/uk-france-summit-press-conference-56551 
 
‘Franco-British Defence Cooperation Roundtable Report’, (March, 2010), Franco-
British Council, London. 
 
Borger, J., Norton-Taylor, R,. (2010) ‘France offers to join forces with UK’s nuclear 
submarine fleet’, Guardian, 19 March, 2010. 
 
Norton-Taylor, R. ‘Armed forces are 'overstretched' says Commons defence 
committee’, Guardian, February 9, 2010. 
 
Robinson, N. (2010) ‘The entente frugale’ BBC News 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/nickrobinson/2010/11/the_entente_fru.html  
 
Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation 2 November, 2010 (2011a) 
Treaty Series No. 36. Cm. 8174, The Stationary Office, London. 
 
 294
Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities France No. 
02 (2011b), Cm. 7975, The Stationary Office, London. 
 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Development Policy (Sub-Committee C), (2011) Inquiry on British-French 
Defence Relations, (February 3, 2011). 
House of Commons Defence Committee, (2011), The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review and the National Security Strategy. 
 
‘France ends Afghan combat mission early’, BBC News, November 20, 2012. 
 
House of Commons Defence Committee, (2012), Written Evidence for Committee 
Inquiry into Defence Acquisition, Finmeccanica, 2 April, 2012. 
 
UK MOD (2012) National Security Through Technology: Technology, Equipment and 
Support for UK Defence and Security, UK Government. 
 
Government of France (2013), French White Paper on Defence and National 
Security. 
 
UK MOD (2014), How Defence Works, Ministry of Defence, London, 
 
UK MOD (2014) Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2045, Ministry of Defence, London. 
 
Farmer, B. (2015), ‘Britain calls in French to hunt Russian sub lurking off Scotland’, 
Telegraph, 22 November, 2015. 
 
Hollinger, P., ‘Europe plays catch-up in drone technology’, Financial Times, August 
12, 2015  
 
UK MOD (2015), National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015  
 
 295
ii. Netherlands-Belgium  
 
London Treaty (1839), 
http://www.worldlibrary.org/articles/eng/treaty_of_london_(1839)  
 
Government of the Netherlands (2000), Defence White Paper 2000 
 
Belgian Government, (2000), Le plan stratégique 2000-2015 à mi-parcours 
 
Gray-Block, A. (2011), ‘NATO chief calls for more planes to bomb Libyan targets’. 
Reuters, July 14, 2011. 
 
Rachman, G. (2011) ‘The Libyan war and the gallant Belgians’, Financal Times, 
October 28, 2011. 
 
Netherlands MOD (2011), ‘Defensie na de kredietcrisis: een kleinere krijgsmacht in 
een onrustige wereld’, April 8, 2011. 
 
Defense: Status quaestionis and Quo vadis? (2012), Belgian Army, 
http://www.nieuwsblad.be/extra/defensienota.pdf  
 
Belgian Government (2012) Benelux declaration on cooperation in the field of 
defence. 
 
‘Chapter Four: Europe’, The Military Balance (2012), Vol. 112, No. 1., pp 71-182, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
 
Netherlands AIV (2012) ‘Open Letter to a New Dutch Government – The Armed 
Forces At Risk’, Advisory Letter No. 22, Advisory Council on International Affairs, 
The Hague. 
 
Dutch MOD (2014), ‘Internationale militaire samenwerking’, February 13, 2014. 
 
Andries, G. (2014), The Value of the Belgian Defence, Belgian MOD 
 296
 
Belgian Foreign Office (2016) ‘NATO operations in which Belgium is involved’. 
 
‘Trade as percentage of GDP’ (2016), World Bank Data Catalogue, World Bank 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS  
 
‘Netherlands to Replace Naval Vessels Together with Belgium’ 






Final Act of the London Conference (1954) 
http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/1b.htm  
 
Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on Bilateral Defence Cooperation 
(2006). 
 
German Government, (2006) White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future 
of the Bundeswehr, Federal Ministry of Defence. 
 
German Government, (2011) Defence Policy Guidelines, Federal Ministry of 
Defence. 
 
Dutch-German 2012 Letter of Intent on Intensified Army Cooperation (July 2012). 
 
German-Netherlands Declaration of Intent on the Further Enhancement of Bilateral 
Relations in the Field of Defence (Netherlands Government, 2013). 
 
Military Balance, (2012), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
 
International Artillery Symposium (2014), Bundeswehr, Germany. 
 297
 
Faiola, A. (2014) ‘German military faces a major challenge from disrepair’ 
Guardian, October 7, 2014. 
 
Chuter, A., ‘German Navy Extends Life of P-3C With New Wing’ (July 29, 2015), 
Defence News.  
 
Germany Netherlands I Corps (2017) http://1gnc.org  
 





Gates, R. (2010), ‘Speech at National Defense University’, US, February 23, 2010, 
http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1423  
 
SIPRI military expenditure database https://sipri.org/databases/milex  
 
‘Interview with General David Petreaus’, Spiegel Online, September, 19, 2010. 
EDA’s Pooling and Sharing (November, 2011), European Defence Agency, Brussels. 
NORDEFCO Annual Report (2011), NORDEFCO, www.nordefco.org  
Defence Strategic Guidance (2012), US Department of Defense. 
 
Regional Fighter Partnerships – Options for Cooperation and Cost Sharing (NATO, 
2012), Joint Air Power Competence Centre, NATO, Kalkar, Germany. 
NATO (2014a), ‘Multinational Projects’ Media Backgrounder, NATO, Brussels, 
Belgium. 
NATO (2014b), ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, September 5, 2014, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm  
 298
‘Long-Term Vision of the Visegrad Countries on Deepening their Defence 
Cooperation’ (2014) Visegrad Group. 
Barnes, J. and Lubold, G., (2015) “U.S. Military Officials Aim to Bolster Troop 
Presence in Europe”, Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2015. 
 
Elgot, J. (2017), ‘Theresa May pledges above inflation rise in defence spend until 
2022’, Guardian, May 10, 2017. 
 
Henley, J. (2017), ‘Angela Merkel: EU cannot completely rely on US and Britain any 
more’, Guardian, May 28, 2017. 
 
Shotter, J., (2017), ‘Trump affirms commitment to NATO mutual defence’, Financial 
Times, July 6, 2017. 
 
European Air Transport Command Factsheet (2017) 
http://eatcmil.com/user_uploads/page_contents/downloads/pdf/EATC%20factsheet%
20June17%20-%20updated%20version.pdf  
NATO AWACS (2017a) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48904.htm# 




Alexander, M., Garden, T. (2001), ‘The arithmetic of defence policy’, International 
Affairs Vol. 77 No. 3, pp. 509-529. 
 
Alford, J. (1989), ‘The prospects for military cooperation outside Europe: a British 
view’ pp. Boyer, Y., Lellouche, P., Roper, J., Franco-British Defence Cooperation – a 
New Entente Cordiale? Routledge, London, pp 84-94. 
 
Anrig, C. F. (2015), ‘The Belgian, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian Experiences’, 
Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, Mueller, K. P., (ed), RAND, 
Santa Monica, pp. 267-307. 
 299
 
Art, R. J. (2004), ‘Europe hedges its security bets’, Balance of power: Theory and 
practice in the twenty-first century, (ed.) Paul, T. V., Wirtz, J. J., and Fortmann, M., 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Art, R. J. (1996), ‘Why Western Europe needs the United States and NATO’, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1 
 
Ashley, R. K. (1986), ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, Keohane, R. O., (ed.), Neorealism 
and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York pp. 255-300. 
 
Augustine, N. (1979), ‘Augustine’s Laws and Major System Development Programs’, 
Defense Systems Management Review, Vol. 2 No. 2. 
 
Augustine, N. (2015), ‘Augustine’s Laws and Major System Development Programs’ 
[a new preface], Defense Acquisition Review Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 2-63. 
 
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, Cambridge MA. 
 
Baumann, R., Hellmann, G. (2001), Germany and the use of military force: ‘total 
war’, the ‘culture of restraint’ and the quest for normality’, German Politics, Vol 10 No 
1, pp. 61-82. 
 
Baumann, R., Rittberger, V., Wagner, W. (2001), ‘Neorealist foreign policy’,German 
foreign policy since unification, Rittberger, V. (ed.), Manchester University Press, 
Manchester. 
 
Bickerton, C. J., Irondelle, B., Menon, A. (2011), ‘Security Co-operation beyond the 
Nation-State: The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol 49 No. 1. 
 
Bird, T. (2013), ‘Perennial Dilemmas’: NATO’s Post-9/11 Afghanistan ‘Crisis’’ 
Hallams, E. (ed.), NATO Beyond 911, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 
 300
Biscop, S. (2012), ‘Mediterranean mayhem: Lessons for European crisis 
management’, in Biscop et al (eds.) An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy, 
CEPS, Egmont Institute, EPC, Brussels. 
 
Biscop, S., Colemont J., Drent, M., Zandee, D. (2013), ‘The Future of the Benelux 
Defence Cooperation’, Egmont Institute and Clingendael Institute. 
 
Blang, E. M. (2004), ‘A Reappraisal of Germany's Vietnam Policy, 1963-1966: 
Ludwig Erhard's Response to America's War in Vietnam’, German Studies Review, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 341-360. 
 
Blunden, M. (2000), ‘France’, Manners, I., Whitman, R. G., (eds.), The Foreign 
Policies of European Member States, Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
 
Bohnen, J. (1997), ‘Germany’, Howorth, J., Menon, A., The European Union and 
National Defence Policy, Routledge, London. pp. 49-65. 
 
Bouvier, A. (2014), ‘MBDA, a test case for Anglo-French cooperation in defence’, 
INFO, French Chamber of Commerce in Great Britain, London, p. 48. 
 
Bozo, F. (2001), Two Strategies for Europe - De Gaulle, the United States and the 
Atlantic Alliance, Emanuel, S. (trans.), Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford. 
 
Bozo, F. (2014), ‘Explaining France’s NATO “normalisation” under Nicolas Sarkozy 
(2007–2012)’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies Vol. 12 No. 4, pp. 379–91. 
 
Breuilly, J. (1996), The Formation of the First German Nation State 1800-1871, 
Macmillan, London. 
 
Brooks, S. G., Wohlforth, W. C. (2005), ‘Hard times for soft balancing’, International 
Security Vol. 30 No. 1: 72-108. 
 
 301
Brune, S. C., Cameron, A., Maulny, J., Terlikowski, M. (2010), Restructuring 
Europe’s Armed Forces in Times of Austerity: The United Kingdom, France, 
Germany and Poland, SWP, Berlin.  
 
Bruns, S. (2016), ‘The Baltic Sea and Current German Naval Strategy’, Centre for 
International Maritime Security. 
 
Bull, H. (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 
Macmillan, London. 
 
Buras, P., Longhurst, K. (2004), ‘The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force’, 
European Security, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 215-245  
 
Butterfield, H. (1951) ‘The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict’, History 
and Human Relations, Collins, London, pp. 9-36. 
 
Buzan, B., Jones, C., Little, R. (1993), The Logic of Anarchy, Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
 
Chalmers, M. (2009), ‘Defence Inflation: Reality or Myth?’ RUSI Defence Systems, 
12–15. RUSI, London. 
 
Cladi, L. and Locatelli, A. (2012), ‘Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe 
Confounds Realism’, Contemporary Security Policy, 33:2, 264-288 
 
Clarke, M. (2008), ‘The Overdue Defence Review: Old Questions, New Answers’, 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 153 No. 6 pp. 4–10  
 
Codner, M. (2009), ‘A Force for Honour? Military Strategic Options for the United 
Kingdom’, Future Defence Review Working Paper 2, RUSI, London. 
 
Collard-Wexler, S. (2006), ‘Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European 
Union’ European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 397–432  
 
 302
Coolsaet, R. (2009), Atlantic Loyalty, European Autonomy: Belgium and the Atlantic 
Alliance 1949-2009, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels. 
 
Croft, S. (1996), ‘European Integration, Nuclear Deterrence and Franco-British 
Nuclear Cooperation’, International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 771-7.  
 
Davidson, J. (2011) America’s Allies and War, Palgrave, London. 
De Vore, M., Weiss, M. (2013) ‘Who's in the cockpit? The political economy of 
collaborative aircraft decisions’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 21, 
No. 2. 
De Durand, E. (2010), ‘Entente or oblivion – prospects and pitfalls of Franco-British 
cooperation on defence’ Future Defence Review Working Paper 8, RUSI, London. 
 
De France, O., Mampaey, L., Zandee, D. (2016), ‘Defence Industrial Policy in 
Belgium and the Netherlands’, Policy Paper, 7, Armament Industry European 
research Group. 
Diesen, S. (2013), ‘Towards and Affordable European Defence and Security Policy? 
The case for Extensive European Force Integration’, Matlary, J. H., and Petersson, 
M. eds., NATO’s European Allies, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 
Donnelley, J. (2009), ‘Realism’, Theories of International Relations, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 4th edn. 
Duffield, J. (1999), ‘Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds 
Neorealism’, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 765-803. 
Dunne, T. (2004), ‘When the shooting starts – Atlanticism in British security strategy’, 
International Affairs, London, Vol. 80, No. 5. pp 893-909.  
 
Dyson, T. (2010), Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War 
Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 
Dyson, T. and Konstadinides, T. (2012) ‘The Drivers and Destination of European 
 303
Defence Cooperation: Reconciling EU Law and IR Theory’ Paper presented at panel 
‘EU Security and Defence’ UACES Annual Conference, Passau, 3-5th September 
2012. 
Dyson, T. (2013a), ‘Balancing Threat, not Capabilities: European Defence 
Cooperation as Reformed Bandwagoning’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34, 
No. 2., 387-289. 
Dyson, T. (2013b) ‘The Material Roots of European Strategy: Beyond Culture and 
Values’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 34 No. 3, 419-445 
Dyson, T. (2013c) ‘Developing New Capabilities: The European Imperative’, Hitting 
The Target? How New Capabilities are Shaping International Intervention, Royal 
United Services Institute, London, pp. 105-112. 
Ekstrom, M. (1992), ‘Causal Explanation of Social Action - The Contribution of Max 
Weber and of Critical Realism to a Generative View of Causal Explanation in Social 
Science’, Acta Sociologica 35, pp. 107-122. 
 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, M. (2014) ‘Europe’s Defence Dilemma’, The International 
Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 49:2, 83-116. 
Everts, P. (2012), ‘The Netherlands’, Sobel, R., Furia, P., Barratt, B., (eds.) Public 
Opinion and International Intervention: Lessons from the Iraq War, Potomac Books, 
Washington D. C. 
Faleg, G., Giovannini, A., (2012) ‘The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart 
Defence Making a virtue of necessity?’ CEPS Special Report, No. 61,  
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
 
Fluerant, A., Quaeu, Y.(2014), ‘L’Industrie de Defense Francaise: une autonomie 
stratégique sous contrainte’, Note D’Analyse, Groupe de Recherche et D’Information 
sur la Paix et la Securite, Brussels. 
 304
Fontaine, A. (2004), ‘Four’s a crowd’, Mayne, R., Johnson, D., Tombs, R., Cross 
Channel Currents – 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, Routledge, London pp. 192-
201. 
 
Foucault, M. (2012), ‘The Defense Budget in France: between Denial and Decline’, 
Focus stratégique n° 36 bis, Institut français des relations internationals, Paris. 
 
Friedburg, A. L., ‘Why Didn't the United States become a Garrison State?’, 
International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4., pp. 109-142  
 
Fursdon, E. (1980), The European Defence Community: A History, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 
Futter, A., Collins, J. (eds.), (2015), Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: 
Transformation, Evolution and Lessons Learnt, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Gallagher, M. (2013), ‘Capturing meaning and confronting measurement’, Mosley, L. 
(ed.), Interview Research in Political Science Cornell University Press, London, 
pp. 181-195. 
 
Gilpin, R. G. (1986), ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, Keohane, R. 
O., (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York pp. 301-
321. 
Goddard, S. E., Nexon, D. H., ‘Paradigm Lost? Reassessing Theory of International 
Politics’ (2005), European Journal of International Relations, Vol 11, No. 1.  
Gray, C. (2008), ‘Britain’s National Security: Compulsion and Discretion’, RUSI 
Journal, Vol. 153 No. 6. 
Grunbacher, A. (2010), The Making of German Democracy: West Germany During 
the Adenauer Era, Manchester University Press. 
Haine, J. (2015), ‘A new Gaullist moment?’ International Affairs Vol 91. No. 5. 
Harries, M. (2012), ‘Britain and France as nuclear partners’, Survival, Vol. 54, No., 1. 
 305
Hague, R. (1990), ‘The Anglo-American special relationship in retrospect’,European 
defence cooperation – America, Britain and NATO, Hague, R., Clarke, M., (eds) 
Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp 3-27. 
 
Hartley, K. (2004), ‘Offsets and the Joint Strike Fighter in the UK and the 
Netherlands’, Brauer, J., Paul Dunne, J., (eds.), Arms Trade and Economic 
Development: Theory, policy, and cases in arms trade offsets, Routledge, Abingdon. 
Hartley, K. (2011) ‘Evaluating collaborative projects’, The Economics of Defence 
Policy - A New Perspective, Routledge, London, pp. 168-182. 
Hartley, K. (2015), ‘UK defence inflation and cost escalation’, Defence and Peace 
Economics. 
Heath, E. (1998), The Course of my Life: The Autobiography of Edward Heath, 
Hodder and Stoughton, London. 
Heise, V., (2005), ‘Pooling of Sovereignty: A New Approach?’, Biscop, S., (ed), E 
Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union (Egmont Paper 7), Royal 
Institute for International Relations, Brussels. 
Hernandez, M. (2013), ‘Dutch Hard Power: Choosing Decline’, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D. C.  
Herz, J. H. (1950), ‘Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma’, World 
Politics, Vol. 2. 
Hobbes, T. (1996) Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Hoffmann, S. (1966) ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the 
Case of Western Europe’, Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 862-915. 
Homan, K. (2012), ‘BeNeSam: ‘Kroonjuweel’ van internationale 
defensiesamenwerking!’, Marineblad, June 2012, pp. 15-18. 
Howorth, J. (2005) ‘The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain and the 
ESDP’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1., pp. 39-54. 
 306
Howorth, J., Menon, A. (2009), ‘Still Not Pushing Back: why the European Union is 
Not Balancing the United States’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 53, No., 5, pp. 727-744 
 
Howorth, J. (2007) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union Palgave 
Macmilan, Basingstoke. 
 
Howorth, J (2010), ‘Prodigal Son or Trojan Horse: what's in it for France?’, European 
Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, 11-28. 
 
Howorth, J. (2011), Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards 
Supranational Intergovernmentalism? Kolleg-Forschergruppe Working Group Series, 
Freie Universität Berlin, No. 25, 5. 
 
Humphreys, A. R. C. (2012), ‘Another Waltz? Methodological Rhetoric and Practice 
in Theory of International Politics’, International Relations, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp 389-408. 
 
Humphreys, A. R. C. (2013) ‘Applying Jackson’s Methodological Ideal-Types: 
Problems of Differentiation and Classification’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol 41, No. 2, pp. 290–308  
 
Hussain, F. (1989), ‘Cooperation in arms procurement: a British view’, Franco-British 
defence cooperation: A new entente cordiale? Boyer, Y., Lellouche, P., Roper, J., 
Routledge, London, pp. 128-139. 
 
Hyde-Price, A. (2006) ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 217-234 
 
Hyde-Price, A. (2013) ‘Neither Realism nor Liberalism: New Directions in Theorizing 
EU Security Policy’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 34 No. 2, pp. 397-408  
 




Jervis, R, (1997). System Effects, Princeton University Press. 
 
Jervis, R. (2011), “Unipolarity: a structural perspective”, G. John Ikenberry et al 
(eds.), International Relations and the Consequences of Unipolarity, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
 
Joffe, J., (1984) ‘Europe's American Pacifier’, Foreign Policy, No. 54, pp. 64-82 
 
Jones, B. (2010) Franco-British cooperation: a new engine for European defence?, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris. 
 
Joseph, J. (2010), ‘Is Waltz a realist?’, International Relations, Vol 4 No. 24  
 
Kasdorf, B. (2014), ‘Military cooperation between the German Army and the Royal 
Netherlands Army from a German perspective’, Militaire Spectator, Vol. 183, No. 4. 
 
Katznelson, I. (1997), ‘Structure and Configuration in Comparative Politics’, 
Lichbach, M. I., Zuckerman, A. S. (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture 
and Structure, Cambridge University Press 
 
Keller, P. (2012) Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally, Survival, 54:3, 95-110  
Keller, P. (2015), ‘German Hard Power: Is There a There There?’, Schmitt, G. J., 
(ed.), A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US 
Allies and Security Partners, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College 
Press, Carlisle, PA. 
Keohane, R. O. (1984), After Hegemony – cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, Princeton University Press. 
Kershaw, I. (2015), ‘Out of the ashes: Europe’s rebirth after the Second World War, 
1945–1949’, Journal of the British Academy, Vol. 3, pp. 167–183.  
Kirkpatrick, D., (2004), ‘Trends in the costs of weapon systems and the 
consequences’, Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 259-273.  
 308
 
Kirkpatrick, D., (2008), ‘Is defence inflation really as high as claimed?’ RUSI Defence 
Systems, October, 2008, London, RUSI. 
 
Kirkpatrick, D., (2010), Making ends meet: challenges for the 2010 Strategic Defence 
and Security Review for the United Kingdom, Centre Forum, London. 
 
Kissinger, H. (1965), The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the 
Atlantic Alliance, McGraw Hill, New York. 
 
Kossmann, E. H. (1978), The Low Countries: 1780-1940, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Korteweg, R. (2011), The Superpower, the Bridge and the Hesitant Ally, PhD Thesis, 
Leiden University Press. 
 
Krasner, S. D. (1999), Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, Princeton, USA. 
 
Krotz, U., (2011) Flying Tiger - International Relations Theory and the Politics of 
Advanced Weapons, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Krotz, U., and Maher, R. (2011), ‘International Relations Theory and Relations and 
the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy’, World Politics Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 
548–79. 
 
Kuipers, S. (2006), The Crisis Imperative – Crisis Rhetoric and Welfare State Reform 
in Belgium and the Netherlands in the Early 1990s, Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam. 
 
Kundnani, H. (2011), ‘Germany as a Geo-economic Power’,The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol 34, No. 3, pp. 31-45. 
 
Kurki, M. (2008), Causation in International Relations – Reclaiming Causal Analysis, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 309
 
Lake, D. A. (2009), Hierarchy in International Relations, Cornell University Press, 
USA. 
 
Layne, C. (2000), ‘US hegemony and the perpetuation of NATO’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 23:3, 59-91. 
 
Legro, J. W., Moravcsik, A. (1999), ‘Is anybody still a realist?’, International Security, 
Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 5–55. 
 
Liska, G. (1962), Nations In Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, The John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore. 
 
Locatelli, A., Testoni, M. (2009), ‘Intra-allied competition and alliance durability: the 
case for promoting a division of labour among NATO allies’, European Security, Vol. 
18 No. 3, pp. 345-362. 
 
Longhurst, K. (2004), Germany and the Use of Force, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester. 
 
Lowes-Dickinson, G. (1916), The European Anarchy, Macmillan, New York. 
 
Lynch, J. F., (2013), ‘Aligning sampling strategies with analytic goals’, Mosley, L. 
(ed.), Interview Research in Political Science, Cornell University Press, London. 
pp. 31-44 
 
Macmillan, H. (1969), Tides of Fortune 1945-55, Macmillan, London. 
 
Mallinson, W. (2010), From Neutrality to Commitment: Dutch Foreign Policy, NATO 
and European Integration, I.B.Tauris, London. 
 
Matellar, A. (2014), ‘Strategic Insurance: The Future of the Belgian Armed Forces’, 
Policy Brief, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels. 
 
 310
Matlary, J. H., and Petersson, M. (2013), ‘Introduction’, NATO’s European Allies, 
Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 
Maull, H., (2000), ‘Germany and the use of force: still a 'civilian power'?’, Survival,  
Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 56-80. 
 
Maulny, J., and Liberti, F. (2008), Pooling of EU Member States Assets in the 
Implementation of ESDP, European Parliament, Brussels. 
 
Maulny, J. (2010) The European Union and the Challenge Posed by Defence Budget 
Cuts, IRIS, Paris. 
 
Mayne, R., Johnson, D., Tombs, R. (2004), Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of 
the Entente Cordiale, Routledge, London. 
 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990), ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56. 
 
Meick, E., (2017) ‘China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a 
Higher Level of Cooperation’ Staff Research Report, US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, Washington. 
 
Menanteau, P. (1989), ‘Co-operation in arms procurement: a French view’, Franco-
British defence cooperation: A new entente cordiale? Boyer, Y., Lellouche, P., 
Roper, J., Routledge, London, pp 140-146. 
 
Menon, A. (1994), ‘Continuing politics by other means: defence policy under the 
French fifth republic’, West European Politics Vol. 17 No. 4. 
 
Menon, A., Freedman, L., (1997) ‘Conclusion’, Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon 
(Eds) The European Union and National Defence Policy, Routledge, London, p. 155 
 
Mill, J. S. (2009), System of Logic, Project Gutenberg EBook.  
 
 311
Milward, A. S. (1979), War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, University of California 
Press, Berkeley. 
 
Mölling, C., Brune,  S. (2011), The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European 
Defence, Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union, European 
Parliament, Brussels. 
 
Mölling, C. (2012), ‘Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO’, SWP Comments, 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany. 
 
Mölling, C., Major, C. (2014), ‘The Framework Nations Concept Germany’s 
Contribution to European Defence’, European Security and Defence, (3), pp 12-14. 
 
Monger, G. W. (1963), The End of Isolation, Thomas Nelson and Sons, London. 
 
Morrow, J. D. (1991), ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability 
Aggregation Model of Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 
4, pp. 904-933  
 
Noetzel, T. (2011), ‘The German politics of war: Kunduz and the war in Afghanistan’, 
International Affairs Vol. 87 No. 2, pp. 397–417 
 
Olson, M., Zeckhauser, R. (1966), ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 266-279  
 
Onuf, N. (2009), ‘Structure, what structure?’, International Relations, Vol. 23 No. 2., 
pp. 183-199. 
 
Pannier, A. (2016), ‘From one exceptionalism to another: France’s strategic relations 
with the United States and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 3, pp. 1-30. 
 
 312
Pape, R. A. (2005), ‘Soft balancing against the United States’, International Security, 
Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45. 
 
Parrein, P. (2011a), ‘Some Ideas for European Defence Cooperation from the Case 
Study of the Belgian-Dutch Navy Cooperation’, Focus Paper 25, Royal High Institute 
for Defence Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Brussels. 
 
Parrein, P. (2011b), ‘De evolutie en toekomst van de Belgisch-Nederlandse 
marinesamenwerking: spill-over en politieke samenwerking’,Veiligheid and Strategie, 
No. 111, Koninklijk Hoger Instituut voor Defensie Studiecentrum voor Veiligheid en 
Strategie, Brussels.  
 
Parrein, P. (2012), ‘Subregional European Military Cooperation Initiatives: In Support 
of a European Defence?’. 
 
Parsons, T. (1968), The Structure of Social Action, Free Press. 
 
Porter, P. (2010), ‘Last charge of the knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the special 
relationship’ International Affairs, Vol. 86 Issue 2 pp 355-375 
 
Posen, Barry R. (2004), ‘ESDP and the structure of world power’, The International 
Spectator Vol. 39 No.1, 5-17. 
 
Posen, Barry R. (2006), ‘European Union security and defense policy: Response to 
unipolarity?’, Security Studies Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 149-86. 
 
Powell, R. (1991) ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory’  
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 pp. 1303-1320. 
 
Press-Barnathan, G. (2006), ‘Managing the Hegemon: Nato under Unipolarity’, 
Security Studies, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 271-309. 
 
 313
Quinlan, M. (2001), European defence cooperation: asset or threat to NATO?, 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D. C. 
 
Rathbun, B. (2008) ‘A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the 
Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism’, Security Studies, Vol. 17 
pp. 294-321. 
 
Richter, A., Webb, N. J., (2014), ‘Can Smart Defense work? A suggested approach 
to increasing risk- and burden-sharing within NATO’  Defense & Security Analysis, 
Vol. 30, No. 4, pp 346–359  
 
Rieker, P. (2013), ‘The French return to NATO: Reintegration in practice, not in 
principle’ European Security Vol. 22 Issue 3. 
 
Rothstein, R. L., (1968) Alliances and Small Powers, Columbia University Press, 
London. 
 
Rousseau, J. J. (1997), ‘Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality 
Among Men’, Gourevitch, V., (ed.), The Discourses and other early political writings, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Rubin, H. J., Rubin, I. S., (1995), Qualitative Interviewing – The Art of Hearing Data, 
Sage, London. 
 
Ruggie, J. G. (1986), ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a 
Neorealist Synthesis’, Keohane, R. O., (ed.), Columbia University Press, New York, 
pp. 131-157. 
 
Ruggie, J. G. (1992), ‘Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution’, International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 561-598. 
 
Russet, B. M. (1970) The Price of Vigilance, Yale University Press, London.  
 
 314
Schoeman, J. (2017), ‘25 jaar Luchtmobiele Brigade: Een jonge, maar rijke 
geschiedenis in valkenvlucht’, Militaire Spectator, Vol. 186, No. 2,  
 
Sauer, T. (2015), ‘Deep cooperation by Belgian defence: absorbing the impact of 
declining defence budgets on national capabilities’, Defence Studies, 15:1, 46-62. 
 
Schwartz, P. (2018) ‘Evolution of Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation since the Cold 
War (Part 1+ Part 2)’; Rozman G., Radchenko S. eds, International Relations and 
Asia’s Northern Tier, Palgrave, Singapore. 
 
Shapiro, J., Witney, N. (2009) Towards a post-American Europe: A Power Audit of 
EU-US Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations, London. 
 
Shricke, H. (2014), ‘The Lancaster House treaties; highlights on equipment and 
industry’, INFO, French Chamber of Commerce in Great Britain, London, p. 41. 
 
Stein, G. J. (1990), Benelux Security Cooperation: A New European Defence 
Community, Westview Press. 
 
Steinglass, M. (2011), ‘Dutch tank crews take aim at cuts’, Financial Times, April 29, 
2011. 
 
Snyder, G. H. (1984), ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics, Vol. 
36, No. 4, pp. 461-495. 
 
Snyder, G. H. (1996), ‘Process variables in neorealist theory’, Security Studies, Vol 5 
No. 3, pp. 167-192 
 
Snyder, G. H. (1997), Alliance Politics, Cornell University Press. 
 
Taliaferro, J. W., Lobel, S. E., Ripsman, N. M., eds. (2009) ‘Introduction’, 
Neoclassical Realism, The State, And Foreign Policy, Cambridge, pp. 1-41. 
 
 315
Taylor, C. (2010), Franco-British Defence Cooperation, Standard Note, House of 
Commons Library, London. 
 
Taylor, T. (1984) European Defence Cooperation, Chatham House, London. 
 
Taylor, A. J. P. (1954), The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1914, Oxford. 
University Press. 
 
Tertrais, B. (2012), Entente Nucleaire: Options for UK-French Nuclear Cooperation, 
BASIC, London. 
 
Turner, S. P., Factor, R.A. (1981), ‘Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in 
Weber’s Methodological Writings’, Sociological Review, Vol 29. No. 1. 
 
Turner, S. P., Mazur, G. (2009) ‘Morgenthau as a Weberian Methodologist’, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 15, No., 3. 
 
van Staden, A. (1995), ‘Small State Strategies in Alliances - The Case of the 
Netherlands’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 30, No. 1. 
 
van Staden, A. (1997), ‘The Netherlands’, Howorth, J., Menon, A., The European 
Union and National Defence Policy, Routledge, London. pp. 49-65. 
 
Válašek , T., (2011) Surviving Austerity: The Case for a New Approach to EU Military 
Collaboration, Centre for European Reform, London. 
 
Von Hlatky, S. (2013) The Great Asymmetry: America’s Allies in Times of War, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Wallace, W. (1989) ‘Bilateral steps to multilateral; co-operation’, Boyer, Y., 
Lellouche, P., Roper, J., (eds.) Franco-British defence cooperation: A new entente 
cordiale? Routledge, London, pp. 171-180.  
 
 316
Wallace, W. and Phillips, C. (2009), ‘Reassessing the special relationship’ 
International Affairs, London, Vol. 85, Issue 2. pp. 263-284. 
 
Waever, O. ‘Waltz’s theory of theory’ (2009), International Relations, Vol. 23 No. 2 
 
Waites, N. H. (ed.) (1971) Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British Relations in the 
Twentieth Century, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 
 
Walt, S. M. (1985), ‘Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power’, 
International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 3-43. 
 
Walt, S., (2011), ‘Alliances in a unipolar world’, Ikenberry, G. J., Mastanduno, M., 
Wohlforth, W. C. (eds.) International Relations Theory and the Consequences of 
Unipolarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Waltz, K. (1959), Man the State and War, Columbia University Press, New York. 
 
Waltz, K. N. (1979), Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, USA. 
 
Waltz, K. N. (1986), ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to 
My Critics,’ Keohane, R. O., (ed), Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University 
Press, New York. 
 
Waltz, K. N. (1991), ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Rothstein, R. L. (Ed.), 
The Evolution of Theory in International Relations  
 
Waltz, K. N. (1996), ‘International politics is not foreign policy’ Security Studies, Vol. 
6, No. 1, pp 54-57. 
 
Waltz, K. N. (1997), ‘Evaluating theories’, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 91, No. 4, 913-917. 
 
Waltz, K. N. (2000), ‘Structural realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 5–41 
 317
 
Weber, M. ‘Objectivity in Social Science’; ‘The Logic of the Cultural Sciences’ in The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences (1949), Translated and Edited by Shils, E. A., 
Finch, H. A. 
 
Weil, C. L. (1970), The Benelux Nations – The Politics of Small-Country 
Democracies, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York. 
 
Wels, C. B. (1982), Aloofness and Neutrality, HES, Utrecht. 
 
Wight, C. (2006), Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
 
Wohlforth, W. C., (1999), ‘The Stability of a Unipolar world’. International Security 
24:1 
 
Wohlforth, W. C. (2011), ‘Introduction’ in ed., G. John Ikenberry et al International 
Relations and the Consequences of Unipolarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Zandee, D., Drent, M, Hendricks, R. (2016), Defence Cooperation Models – Lessons 
Learned and Usability, The Clingendael Institute, The Hague, Netherlands. 
 
Zimmermann, H. (2003), ‘The Quiet German: The Vietnam War and the Federal 
Republic of Germany’ (eds.) Goscha, C., Vaїsse, M., La Guerre du Vietnam et 




Nemeth, B. (2017), Outside NATO and the EU: Sub-Regional Defence Cooperation 
in Europe, PhD thesis, King’s College, London. 
 
 318
Pannier, A. (2016), Franco-British defence cooperation under the Lancaster House 
Treaties (2010): Institutionalisation meets the challenges of bilateral cooperation, 
PhD thesis, King’s College, London and Sciences Po, Paris. 
 
